Abstract
|
Previous research by the authors on the Western assistance to CEE countries during the transition process revealed that it was often ineffective and that priorities in and the nature of aid changed irrespective of negative side-effect on ongoing processes. Recipients blamed foreign advisors for giving inadequate advice; the Swedish foreign advisors pointed to the aid organizations, which did not provide adequate boundary conditions; and the latter told us that it was all politics, decided by consecutive ministers in the Swedish government (Sobis & De Vries, 2004, 2005, 2006, De Vries & Sobis, 2006).
This paper is a follow-up on this previous research. In this paper we investigate the motives and reasons behind the assistance programs from the perspective of the Swedish government, which was responsible for this kind of aid. How did Swedish government arrive at decisions regarding the technical assistance to CEE countries and changes therein? The aim of this research is to gain further insight in the explaining factors of the (in)effectiveness of foreign assistance programs. The research question underlying this investigation reads: What were the characteristics of the position of Swedish government with regard to foreign assistance to CEE countries? How did these change during the last 15 years and what were the determining factors explaining these developments?
In neo institutional theory two explaining factors are mentioned: the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness. (March & Olsen, 1989). The research presented in this paper will be framed within this theory. The description of this theory constitutes the first part of the paper. This theoretical part is followed by the presentation of our empirical research.
This empirical research is based, firstly, on interviews with the Swedish officials: the Prime Ministers, the representative of Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the representative of Finance Ministry, who were politically active during the years of 1988-1997. Secondly it is based on an analysis of the diaries written by the Swedish officials who were political active during the years 1988-1997, and by some politicians who are still politically active today. Thirdly, it based on an analysis of the Swedish statute-books, government bills, resolutions and reports.
The paper concludes on the question which logic (of consequentiality or of appropriateness) was dominant in explaining the decisions made by the Swedish government regarding assistance to CEE countries during the transition process.
References
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen 1989. Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.
Sobis, I.& M.S. de Vries. 2004. Outside experts in local government in transition countries. Nispacee conference: Vilnius Lithuania. Published in: Alexei Barbashev Jenei György & Frits van der Berg (Eds.), Institutional Requirements and Problem Solving in the Public Administrations of the Enlarged European Union and Its Neighbours. Bratislava: Nispacee. 2005: 119-141.
Sobis, I.& M.S. de Vries. 2005. Western advice in CEE countries: The Swedish experts' view. Nispacee conference: Moscow . Published in Bill Dunn, Katarina Staronova, Sergei Pushkarev, Implementation: The Missing Link in Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava, Nispacee. 2006: 65-90.
Sobis, I & M.S. de Vries. 2006. Pawns on a Chessboard. The role of donor organisations during the transition process. Nispacee Conference: Ljubljana Slovenia.
Vries, M.S. de & I. Sobis. 2006. Beyond Blame, Debunking the myths underlying the foreign aid debate, Paper for the second international conference on "Public Management in 21st century: Opportunities and Challenges" Macau, China, 2006.
|
