Abstract
|
Presidential Offices (executive offices of the presidents) belong to the institutions which insure the activities of the presidents. This politico-administrative institution fulfils different functions and has different configurations due to separation of powers between president, government and parliament. Legal status of this body is determined as rule by the presidential decrees, though some different regulative documents could be. Nevertheless in political sense the presidential executive offices can have more influential functions and roles than legal ones. That why there are some gaps between prescriptive theories of presidential power and of institutional insuring his capacities to fulfill presidential management and analytical theories of real presidential practices of power.
It is known the Executive Office of the President in the USA is the result of growth of political influence of the executive branch. The executive was equipped with a powerful EOP in 1939 that can offset parochial pressures and try to arrive at a concept of the broader national interest. In the Central and East European countries and the CIS powerful presidential institutions (more in the CIS than in the CEE, except Romania and Yugoslavia ) as a rule were formed during transformational processes. Presidential power played different role: (1) in the CEE it was more influenced by prodemocratic forces; (2) in the CIS the situation was more complicated – from prodemocratic presidentialism to authoritarian and personalistic presidential regimes. Presidential institutions played sometimes political role (policy and political governance and management). Mostly political role of the president was determined by his position in the executive or relatively to the executive. In this case the executive and administrative process has emerged as perhaps the most important arena for state inter-branch competition. Presidential dominance within the administrative process is often considered as instrument of state development. Different stages of transitional processes are often resulted in different attitudes (from different parties and political forces) to the power of the president. It will be interesting to study transformation of the presidential offices during period of transition paying attention not only to legal configuration (for example the transition from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism, like in Ukraine), but to change of political role of the president in consolidation of democracy. To this, formation of different political institutions during transitional period was influenced by historical legacy in different aspects. Partly we can see influence of historical legacy on formation of the political parties systems. But in some countries the institutions of executive power and presidential bodies show the high degree of ‘path dependence’ and the characteristics of the proceeding system. Especially this is true for the centralize tendencies in some countries. The Presidential Administration in Russia, as some scholars stressed, retains many of the institutional structures and functions of the old Communist party, but has lost three of the four main pillars which supported communist hegemony; the power to purge, to control ideology, and to indoctrinate. But sometimes political role of the Presidential administration here is obvious (construction of political and ideological processes).
Next point is determination of the construction and functional complex of PO by corresponding system of state configuration (presidential, semipresidential – with modified unified executive or with dual executive, or parliamentarian republics). In CIS and CEE countries we can mostly speak about semipresidential systems in which, on the one hand, the parliament and party competition (coalition politics) cannot balance the executive power (except perhaps Ukraine and Moldova ) of the president. On the other hand, the presidential executive bodies are supplemented by the government and PM. In that case the government and its support structures may have different extent of discretion in shaping policy. But there are some premier-presidential system (Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine), where politico-administrative system has some restriction of presidential power; sometimes there is the imbalance and conflict.
There would be several main scenarios in the separation of politico-administrative roles. On the one hand, countries might revive the peculiar dual executive, when the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority (president-parliamentarism). Often this system inclined to the executive leadership of the president under formal legal dual system. This politically motivated presidential management is aimed on the coordination of organizational interrelationships between state bodies (and specially the executive) and on policy integration. Last point means that the administrative process is becoming a key locus for policy development. In this version main interplay of politics and administration in the policymaking process – making policy and coordination of its implementation – is concentrated in presidential office. Yet important issue in this system is the position of the president. What does it mean constitutional position of the president as the head of the state? Does he belong to the executive or he stands under all bodies of the state power?
Another situation we have if the president nominate the prime-minister and member of government, he influence on national policy and activity of government, but the government is subject to parliamentary confidence, and its survival depends on the parliament while the president does not possess formal powers to dismiss either individual ministers or the government (Poland, Lithuania). This modified unitary executive under semi-presidentialism (or premier-presidentialism) put influences on an activity of presidential office. In this case partly division of politico-administrative roles is very unpredictable and is depended from real political control over cabinet and its authorities.
There are also differentiations between responsibilities of president and of government (cabinet) for certain policy areas and sometimes for some fields of executive. Has the president some ministries in his direct authority or not? What is the construction of a presidential office in that case of differentiation? Is there parallel politico-administrative mechanism? What is the structure of balances and conflicts?
Presidential office can fulfill different complex of the functions. It would be interesting to see how many functions and what kind of functions are in responsibilities of the offices. It is obviously the function of the PO serve for provision of the president’s authority: policy-making, participation in legislative activity, control function, coordination, communication and information, and so on. But sometimes presidential office come out the provisional functions. Has this state body self-functions, and what is the mechanism of responsibility of this organ? Is this institution only and strictly executive office of the president?
Presidential office is complex state institution. Its structure includes different departments, positions and roles. What are core departments and positions? What is the base for institutional capacity of this state body? Capacity of the state institutions as the ability to perform functions, solve problem and set and achieve objectives belongs to the core point of effectiveness of policy and administration. Being one of the important section of the policy-making network, implementation of decision, coordination and control, presidential office (attention to its function) must have such institutional capacity that favours to good politico-administartive governance. Institutional capacity often implies some broader focus of empowerment, social capital, culture, values, power relations, rules that influence human activity. What does it mean institutional capacity for the element of politico-administrative relations and governance? Is institutional capacity of the presidential offices enough for different politico-administrative contexts?
Some additional points for considerations:
1. Uncooperative/cooperative president and confrontational/partnership patterns of political behavior are expressed in specific forms of activities of his executive office (decree, veto, dissolution, uncoordinative work with faction, and so on). What is mode of coordinative strategies which are using the presidential offices into politico-administrative relations?
2. It is need to see the role of the presidential offices in providing of public service policy? Who and how regulate public servants’ education and training, nominations some positions into the state organs? What is a role of presidential office in public administration reform?
3. Some countries (Russia, Georgia, Yugoslavia) have a complex territorial organization. What is the role of presidential administration (structure, functions) in politico-administrative relations of the central power and territorial powers?
4. What are the positions into presidential offices that give the officers direct access to the president? What are the relations between core officers in the PO and core officers and politicians out presidential close circle? Are the core officers from PO into presidential close circle?
5. What is influence of the political parties on the construction (institutions, personalities, and so on) and activities of presidential administration?
6. What is the extent of transparency and openness of the presidential office? How is widen a group of public experts who assist PO?
|
