Paper/Speech Details of Conference Program for the 14th NISPAcee Annual Conference Program Overview I. Working Group on Politico-Administrative Relations Author(s) Vladimir Gutorov St. Petersburg State University Saint-Petersburg Russian Federation Title How does the Russian President’s Administration really work. File Paper files are available only for conference participants, please login first. Presenter Abstract In December 1993 when the Constitution of the Russian Federation had been adopted by minority of population through referendum, the new parliamentary-presidential (semi-presidential) political system was established. During the last 12 years the Russian political elite try in vain to solve the basic conflict of this system defined by the tendency to strong authoritarian rule on the one hand, and the full inefficiency of system of government, on the other hand. As in Latin America where semi-presidential systems demonstrated quite clearly an inclination to deadlock situations concerning relation between executive and legislative powers, in Russia the semi-presidential regime has transformed itself into ‘the system of superpresidential power’ (S. von Steinsdorf). The Russian federalism is undergone constantly to the influence of political and economic conjuncture and the interaction of central and regional powers acquires a cyclic form – ‘decentralization – centralization’. From 2000 after a long period of chaotic decentralization (the Eltsin’s presidency) Russia entered the phase when the federal center tries to ‘make an order’ in the country mainly by rigid administrative measures. It is important the President’s administration played a decisive role in all phases of the Russian political cycle. The cause is quite evident. From the very beginning the institute of Russian presidency created especially for destruction of monopolistic communist party rule constantly reproduces the main features of the Soviet power. The Russian system of ‘two-heads’ executive power built on political defectiveness of government duplication of plenary powers, the cadres’ leap-frog and informal ways of division of power competence makes impossible both the realization of any successive course of democratic reforms and creation of effective system of public administration at all levels. Despite of its semi-presidential form the Russian governmental institutes was the full imitation of the USA’s model. The liquidation of the post of vice-president after the coup d’etat in October 1993 (General A. Rutskoi was the first and the last vice-president) did not change this imitative tendency. The President’s administration was the main instrument of its realization. As regards to administration of Eltsin and Putin, one can not use the famous phrase of F.D. Roosevelt expressed in 1933 when creating the Executive Office of the President - “In no event shall the Administrative Assistants to the President be interposed between the President and the head of any department or agency”. In Russia the President’s administration executes the functions of ‘shadow government’. The assistants and aids of the President have much more power comparing with ministers of the Russian government. The main cause of this tendency is the oligarchic and ‘clan-oriented’ (Th. Graham) character of the new Russian political order. That is why the Administration of the President had been privatized by the Eltsin’s family clan and to a definite degree it continues to play this subordinate role up to the years of the President Putin’s rule
