Politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe: an irresolvable stalemate?
Tony Verheijen and Aleksandra Rabrenovic
Paper Prepared for the NISPAcee Annual Conference, Sofia 25-27 March 1999

The research work for this paper was financed in part by the Netherlands Institute of Government 

Introduction

Politico-administrative relations remain one of the most difficult issues to address in public administration development in Central and Eastern Europe. Ten years after the start of the transition administrative stability has still not been achieved in a majority of central and east European states. Furthermore the role of civil servants in the policy process has still not been clearly defined. 

More is at stake than simply stabilising public administrations. The civil service, as a provider of impartial and professional expertise to elected politicians, should serve as a ‘bridge’ between politics and society. This is a condition sine-qua-non for the development of democratic systems of governance. This is mostly valid for central government administration, but also increasingly for municipal administrations, in particular in big cities.

The problems described above were the main focus of the discussion on politico-administrative relations at the NISPAcee annual conference in 1998. A permanent working group on politico-administrative relations was created under NISPAcee to carry out in depth research on these issues. The working group has a triple objective:

•	to make an inventory and comparative analysis of systems of politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe
•	to reflect on possible ways to resolve the stalemate in politico-administrative relations
•	to provide input to the debate on how a new role for the civil service can be defined in policy formulation

The development of an inventory of politic-administrative relations in a selected group of states was the subject of the research work carried out in 1998-1999. This inventory has shown that there are different patterns in the development of politico-administrative relations. On the basis of additional information available to the authors of this paper, a relatively complete comparative picture can be drawn on the ways in which the politico-administrative interface is functioning across Central and Eastern Europe. 

In this paper we will attempt to draw conclusions on the different types of relations which have developed in the region and how the development of these relations can be explained. For this, we will consider the relative influence of four main factors:

•	The historical development of relations between politicians and civil servants, including the influence of the transition period
•	The legal framework governing relations between politics and administration; the degree to which this has been formalised and the type of ‘model’ which has been chosen
•	Political culture and tradition
•	The evolution of the policy process and the role of civil servants in policy development

In the next section we will analyse the systems in place according to two comparative frameworks, the Heady classification (using the only the typology in relation to politico-administrative relations) (Heady, 1996: pp. 207-225) and the ‘village model’ of politico-administrative relations, as presented by B. Guy Peters (Peters, 1988: pp. 144-161).

Finally, in the conclusions we will set out some tentative options for the development of further research on ways to organise politic-administrative relations in a way as to guarantee stability in the administration while developing the role of the civil service in the policy process. It is important to note that this paper intends above all to set the agenda for further research in the area and therefore does not aim to provide the ‘magical formula’ for the resolution of the stalemate situation which continues to characterise politico-administrative relations in many Central and East European states.

The nature of the stalemate: the political merry-go-round and instability in the civil service

The stalemate between politics and administration has two crucial features, the entanglement of political and administrative instability and the lack of civil service involvement in policy development. 

As regards the first feature, Central and East European administrative systems have, with few exceptions, been caught in the vicious circle of the electoral merry-go-round. In most states citizens have, without exceptions, thrown out the government in office at each and every election. A less universal pattern is the tendency of governments not to serve their full term in office. In addition, where coalition governments have been in place, frequent government re-shuffles, including the re-allocation of strategic ministerial posts, have been the rule rather than the exception. This creates a general lack of political continuity, whereby the political leadership of ministries tends to change much more frequently than once every four years. In such conditions the presence of a stable and professional administration is a key requirement to keep state affairs moving, the French experience under the IVth Republic is often quoted as a textbook example of a state where political instability did not lead to a collapse of the state system, due to the presence of a stable and professional civil service. The increasing number of cases of ‘state failure’ setting of economic crises across Central and Eastern Europe (Russian Federation, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, to name three well-known cases) suggests that the situation in Central and Eastern Europe is different. The prevailing pattern in Central and Eastern Europe is still one of the top echelons of the civil service changing with each election, or, in worse cases, government re-shuffle. Interestingly, civil service laws, even though these have been adopted in a number of states, have in many cases failed to break this pattern. The cases of Poland and Hungary, which both had civil service laws in place but where after the last elections large groups of civil servants were replaced, mainly for political reasons, are probably the best known recent cases. This is not a universal pattern, in Poland and Hungary previous changes of government did not lead to a large scale change in the civil service, even though there was a radical change in the coalition controlling the government and in other states, such as for instance Latvia, recent elections did not bring about significant changes in the administration either. However, these examples remain the exception.

A second feature of the crisis in politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe is the virtual exclusion of civil servants from the policy development process. The role of civil servants as professional advisers on the substance of policy has hardly been developed. Politicians generally rely heavily on political advisers, from outside the administration, when it comes to the development of policy and strategy. The case public administration policy in Bulgaria is illustrative. In Bulgaria both the administrative development strategy ‘The Strategy for the Establishment of a Modern Administrative System in the Republic of Bulgaria’ and large parts of the Law on Public Administration and the Civil Service Law were developed by a consultancy firm, STRATEGMA, hired by the responsible minister to carry out this specific task. Even though this might be one of the more extreme examples, it is certainly not an exceptional case. There are no obvious reasons to criticise the involvement of external advisers in policy developments in principle. However, there is a danger in limiting too greatly the role of the civil service in these processes, in particular in the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, which is still characterised by a high degree of turnover among political forces in government. It is important to identify possible ways in which the involvement of civil servants in providing professional advice on the substance of policy can be increased and to create civil servants better prepared to play such as role.  For the time being civil service systems appear to have become extreme versions of the classical Wilsonian paradigm: politicians make policy and civil servants implement policy. In view of the complexity of the problems in contemporary society, however, this is hardly a feasible or desirable model for modern systems of governance.

Four key questions can be posed regarding the nature of the stalemate. First, why relations between politicians and civil servants continue to be characterised by a lack of confidence. Putting this in terms of paranoid politicians or politically ambitious civil servants, as is often done, would be a gross over-simplification, as is trying to explain this problem solely in terms of a lack of respect for laws and legal frameworks.

Second, whether this merry-go-round situation is really problematic. From the point of view of public administration theory, the development of a stable interface between politics and administration is one of the key success-or-failure factors in any administrative development process. However, many analysts point to the relative continuity in policies in Central and East European states, regardless of political changes. The question of whether this issue is a real issue might not have had a straightforward answer a few years ago. However, the malperformance of administrations in Central and Eastern Europe is generally considered to be one of the causes of economic downturns in the region. The lack of development of policy capacities combined with frequent changes in the top management of the administrations are main factors in explaining malperformance. Improving politico-administrative relations and developing policy capacities in the administration is therefore an important issue.

The third and fourth questions to be raised are how the continuing failure of Central and East European states to develop a stable interface between politics and administration can be explained, and how this problem might be addressed. The discussion in the remainder of this paper will focus mainly on addressing these two questions.                

History and transition 

The following classification of the historical development of civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe is based on a comparative study of civil service systems carried out under the Civil Service Research Consortium (see Verheijen: 1999), and additional material provided in the papers submitted to the NISPAcee Working Group on Politico-Administration relations. 

The pattern of development of civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe showed a high level of diversity before the second World War, followed by a relative similarity of development in the period between roughly 1946 and 1989. There are two exceptions to this pattern. The first exception are the successor states of the former Soviet Union, of which the Russian Federation and the Ukraine provide the most interesting cases of development of politico-administration relations. In the Soviet-Union developed the ‘Communist model’ of civil service systems, created in the years following the October Revolution. The second exception was Yugoslavia, which remained closer to the continental European civil service tradition than other Central and East European states. The Yugoslav system also showed certain features of the models existing in the other small central and east European states, especially from the late 1960s onwards.

Pre-World War I

Most Central and East European states did not develop an indigenous civil service system until the second half of the 19th century, some even later. The main developments of interest are therefore generally those of the early 20th century.

Civil service systems developed mainly under the influence of the central European, German and Austro-Hungarian tradition. Bulgaria, Romania and (parts of) Yugoslavia were under Ottoman rule for some five centuries, but their civil service systems developed under either German or Austrian influence after independence, even though in the early years of Bulgarian independence there was a strong influence also from Russia.

Poland and the three Baltic States have all been subject to a mixture of influences, Russian and German influence for all three Baltic States and German, Russian and Austrian influence in the case of Poland. Hungary and Slovakia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, under which Hungary developed its own civil service tradition. 

Russia developed its own very specific civil service system before the October Revolution. All emerging states in central and eastern Europe, with the exception of Russia, were therefore part of the developing mainstream continental European civil service tradition around the time of the start of the First Word War.

The codification and professionalisation of the administrative systems of central and east European states was continued after the First World War, with the exception of Russia. However, under the authoritarian regimes, which emerged in the early 1930s, widespread politicisation and corruption became a permanent feature of most of the civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1930s, with the exception of Czechoslovakia. The presence of civil service laws, which were supposed to protect the civil service from political interference, did little to prevent the gradual politicisation of civil service systems.

Totalitarian and authoritarian rule

After the Second World War civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe were re-modelled on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles: full political subordination of the civil service to the political structures of the Communist Party and the establishment of a parallel bureaucracy of Party and state administration. The state administration became a mere implementation apparatus, with no role in policy development. Civil servants were brought under the Labour Code as ‘clerical workers’ and employment conditions were harmonised. Even though the civil service systems in place in Central and Eastern European shared a number of common characteristics in this period, there were a number of differences which deserve mentioning.

The three Baltic States were part of the specific system of the Soviet Union, which had a clearer separation of Party and state administration, creating a more strict system of political subordination of the state administration than in the other central and east European states. Yugoslavia maintained for a long time a politicised version of the traditional civil service system and continued to be connected with mainstream continental European developments until the late 1960s.       

Even though the early 1980s witnessed a return to professionalisation of the civil service, which mainly consisted of the improvement of management capacities, this did little to change the full politicisation of the civil service systems at all government levels.

The transition period

The development of new civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the authoritarian regimes at the end of the 1980s is still in its early stages. It is  impossible to classify developments in central and eastern Europe in a coherent manner, but some patters in development can be identified.

The level of priority given to civil service development in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been consistently higher than in most of the other states, with the possible exception of Hungary. Civil service development has been a high priority issue in the political debate in all three states, and attention for the professionalisation of the civil service appears to be higher in these states than in other Central and East European states. This includes an emphasis on stability in the civil service system, which has been visible in particular in Latvia, where a relatively high level of continuity can be observed in the top levels of the civil service, and to a lesser extent also in Estonia. In Lithuania large numbers of civil servants were replaced following the 1996 elections, but this could well have been a one-time exception. The effect of state building could be an explanatory factor for this, but the situation in Slovakia, also a new state, is in stark contrast with that in the three Baltic States.

The general ‘conservatism’ in civil service development is a second pattern. Classical continental career systems appear to be a main source of inspiration for central and east European states. The German model has generally emerged as a dominant influence in most states. Some other models are of significance as well. For instance the Swedish model has been a source of influence in the Baltic states and the idea of political cabinets, ‘French style’ has also had its impact. Even though the introduction of managerialist principles is often discussed, there generally appears to be a clear tendency to return to the ‘continental roots’ of pre-1945.

The development of civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe is far from linear, and therefore difficult to fit in models with a ‘linear logic’ such as the Raadschelders model. The current problems in defining politico-administrative relations, however, do have historical roots, both in the pre-war period and in the period of totalitarian and authoritarian rule.

History and transition as factors

Politicisation was a feature of the pre-World War II civil service systems in most Central and Eastern European states, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia. This politicisation occurred regardless of the existence of civil service legislation. Civil servants were expected to be loyal to authoritarian rulers rather than to the democratically elected government of the day. However, the history of the transitions to democracy in Spain and Portugal have shown that this does not mean automatically that such civil service systems cannot subsequently serve democratic regimes (Verheijen, 1995: pp. 28-29) and one should be careful in drawing far reaching conclusions on the legacy of the pre-war regimes in terms of determining current developments. Where politicians refer to this experience, they usually do this in terms of the legal frameworks in place at that time, and the extent to which these can be used for re-constructing administrative systems today.  

The legacy of the Communist regimes has been far more damaging. The role of the state administration was extended to an instrument of suppression in the hands of a totalitarian state (Verheijen, 1995, p. 29). At the same time the policy development and implementation functions were clearly separated, leaving only a technical implementation role for the civil service.

The concept of a politically impartial administration is, contrary to what is often believed, not alien to Central and East European political tradition. It is true that the period of development of such systems was generally limited to 15-20 years after the First World War, and that current CIS states were excluded from this development.  Also, there is no evidence to suggest that the level of politicisation in pre-Word War II systems (with the exception of current CIS states) was higher than that in, for instance, Spain and Portugal before democratisation. In both these cases the civil service which had functioned under authoritarian rule formed the basis for the civil service under the new regime. What is most important is that many Central and Eastern European states have some form of tradition of a civil service system based on continental European principles, which could have been used in re-building administrative systems. 

What is important to note is that the policy role of civil servants has never been well developed in most Central and Eastern European states. This is not surprising, since this role of the civil service was developed mainly after the Second World War, with the rapid expansion of the role of the state. Central and East European states ‘missed out’ on that development. One could therefore have expected that the definition of the role of the civil service in policy development would have been a problematic issue. At the same time virtually not attention was devoted to this question (Verheijen and Coombes, 1998: pp. 211-212).    

Political polarisation, characteristic for transition periods, has certainly made the establishment of professional and impartial civil service systems more difficult. Transition-related polarisation has been a more stubborn feature of Central and Eastern European politics than political analysts had expected. However, one should remember that for instance in Spain elements of transition related polarisation have influenced political life until very recently. We would argue that the problem in Central and Eastern Europe is not so much the duration of transition-related polarisation, but the way in which civil service development has become a victim of this process. This is valid in particular for states with a drawn out transition, like Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, but also Albania, or states in which the transition to democratic rule has not been (fully) completed, such as Yugoslavia, Croatia and some CIS states. Disentangling civil service development from the web of transitional politics will remain a formidable task for some time to come, in particular in the latter groups of states.  

Laws: how much can they help?

In the initial phase of civil service development in Central and Eastern Europe, Civil Service legislation was considered a main instrument in breaking the stalemate in politico-administrative relations. The adoption and implementation of laws to protect civil servants from political interference and to set the framework for the development of a high quality administration was expected to address both the problem of instability and administrative quality. Experience in a number of states has cast serious doubts upon the extent to which laws alone can address these problems.    

Civil service laws have been adopted in many Central and East European states, including the Russian federation. In states where no civil service law is in place yet, they are generally in the process of being adopted (Bulgaria (under second reading in parliament), Romania and the Republic of Macedonia). Interestingly, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are among the states which lag furthest behind in the process of adopting civil service laws. In the Czech Republic the process of drafting a civil service law was re-launched recently and in Slovakia the drafting work will probably be re-started by the recently appointed new government.  However, in many states laws adopted have been at most partially implemented, and, most importantly in this context, the existence of Civil Service Laws has not prevented a continuation of the cycle of political dismissals.
  
A few examples to illustrate this point: Hungary was one of the first states in Central and Eastern Europe to adopt a civil service law, in 1992. Even though the law initially did have a stabilising effect on the administration, the process of creating a permanent Civil Service has been slowed down by the attitude of the incoming government in Spring 1998, which has shown a reluctance to work with the civil servants in office. Furthermore politicians have made extensive use of loopholes in the law, such as the fact that the civil service law does not make it mandatory to publicly advertise vacancies. One should take into account that Hungary actually constitutes one of the most positive examples of administrative stabilisation. Staff turnover has been reduced significantly since the adoption of the civil service law. The impact of the civil service law, however, has not gone any further than to generate limited stabilisation, and has not had the expected spin-of in terms of developing the role of civil servants in policy formulation.

In Poland the implementation of the 1996 civil service law was halted by the incoming government in autumn 1997. After a period of reflection, the new government decided to start working on the adoption of a new law, rather than work with the law adopted by the previous government. The reluctance of the incoming government to work with civil servants in office to have been the main reason behind the decision to stop the implementation of the law. It is interesting to note that Poland was the only state in Central and Eastern Europe to have a civil service law, adopted in 1982, under the previous regime. A new civil service law will probably replace the law adopted in 1996.

Civil service laws were adopted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania within a relatively short time span in 1994-1995. Even though in all three cases the laws were based on continental European tradition (German tradition in the case of Lithuania, Nordic tradition in the case of Latvia and Estonia), the impact of civil service legislation has been very different from case to case. In Latvia and Lithuania the adopted civil service laws were never fully implemented and have been subject to an ongoing revision process. It should be noted that the changes introduced in Latvia and Lithuania are primarily based on financial/economic considerations rather than on the wish to exert political control over the administration. The fact that both states want to create a stable core civil service consisting mostly of top officials, protected from political dismissal, would support this observation. In Estonia the civil service law, adopted in 1995, entered into force in January 1996. Unlike in the other two Baltic States the Estonian civil service law has been implemented. However, since the implementation of the civil service law was not enshrined in a clear public administration reform concept, the overall impact of the law remained limited. 

In other EU candidate states civil service laws have not been adopted yet (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Slovakia), even though in the first three states the adoption of a civil service law can be expected in the near future.

In several other central and east European states civil service laws were adopted (Russian Federation, Yugoslavia, Albania). However, due to internal political problems their implementation was either abandoned (Albania) or their effect has been limited. In  Yugoslavia the administration has become increasingly politicised over the last decade, but especially following the 1997 elections (see Sevic and Rabrenovic, 1998). Politicisation can be expected to increase as a consequence of the direction of developments in Serbia. However, it will be interesting to follow to what extent the fragile democratisation process in Montenegro will be translated into the creation of a more independent and professional civil service in this republic. In the Russian Federation the civil service law has had little impact, the Russian administration remains highly politicised and fragmented (see Kotchegura, 1998).  In the Republic of Macedonia a draft civil service law was completed in summer 1998. However, following the election victory by the opposition parties in the October/November elections, it has become increasingly unlikely that this draft will ever become a law.

It appears that civil service laws seldom have had the impact they were expected to have (to be a catalyst for the stabilisation, de-politicisation and professionalisation of the central administration). They have in many cases been re-considered even before the implementation process was completed or have not been fully implemented at all. 

A second type of legislative instrument that could have helped structuring the relations between politics and administration are laws/regulations on administrative structures, defining for instance the role and position of political cabinets and advisers as well as accountability relations. Laws regulating the structure and mode of operation of the administration have been adopted in some states, for instance in Bulgaria, but it is early yet to determine to what extent the adoption of this law can help stabilising politico-administrative relations. Similar laws are under development in Latvia, Lithuania and also in the Republic of Macedonia.   

Laws have proven to be of use in re-defining politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe. However, they have been far from the panacea they were expected to become in the initial stage of the transition.   Finally it is also important to give a word of warning. Civil service laws, if they provide too much protection, can also become a cause of administrative stagnation and the development of an overly legalistic administration. The example of Italy, where civil servants for a long time tended to ‘hide behind the law’, creating an inflexible administration ill suited for the task of modern governance, should be borne in mind as much as the possible positive effects of civil service legislation.    

Political Culture: the standard excuse ?

Presumed differences in political culture are often used as a standard explanation of why attempts to create impartial and professional civil service systems have so far yielded a limited effect in Central and Eastern Europe.  This is valid in particular for analyses of developments in South Eastern Europe, which are often explained in terms of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and religious differences (see for instance Huntington, 1996). The lack of a tradition in democratic governance is also frequently used to explain the lack of development of sustainable political and administrative institutions in CIS states.

Questions can be posed regarding the validity of such statements. Bulgaria, for instance, has a strong tradition of respect for the constitution and (constitutional) law. Once a constitution is adopted, however controversial it may be, it is generally respected (see Verheijen, 1995). The clearest example of respect for the constitution was the way the political crisis of winter 1996-1997 was resolved. Regardless of the high degree of political and social tensions and the impending economic collapse of the state, all political forces abided by the settlement which was finally reached through constitutionally prescribed procedures. We would argue that the problems of politicisation in Bulgaria are much more an effect of a draw out transition marked by a high degree of political polarisation than of a lack of constitutional and legal traditions.

Yugoslavia has for a long time held on to a tradition of an impartial administration, even under Communist rule. Only the extremity of political developments during the last decade has managed to undermine this tradition. To explain the problems in civil service development as an effect of a presumed lack of constitutional or legal culture in South Eastern Europe therefore at first glance seems an over-simplification.

Political culture and traditions are of limited relevance for explaining the lack of development of impartial and professional civil service systems in South Eastern Europe. This is even more obvious when comparisons are drawn with Central European states, where political and legal traditions are presumably more developed. Politicisation and instability in the administration remain serious problems in Slovakia and to a lesser degree also in, for instance, Poland. The development of the policy role of civil servants has not really been addressed in any of the Central European states. 

For either of these two groups of state it is difficult to point out the exact influence of cultural beliefs on the development of politico-administrative relations. The stereotypes generally applied to South Eastern and Central European states might appear to have little validity under more careful scrutiny.  

The ‘Baltic exception’ would warrant further study in relation to the role of political culture and traditions. All three Baltic States prioritised the development and adoption of civil service legislation after independence. Even though the Civil Service Laws in Latvia and Lithuania have not been fully implemented the relative level of stability of civil service systems in all three states is remarkable. Except for the politically motivated dismissals in the civil service of Lithuania after the 1996 elections (carried out within the framework of the civil service law...), changes of government have generally not lead to large-scale changes in the administrations of these states. To some degree the lack of alternative candidates for civil service posts might be a factor in this respect (Sootla and Kasemets, 1999). However, it would be interesting to see whether the relative lack of politicisation in the administrations of the Baltic States can be explained by culturally motivated differences in approach.  

Political culture and traditions might also be a significant explanatory variable for the  problems which have hampered the development of a democratic institutional system in several CIS states. This might be of particular importance when discussion the Central Asian republics, but also for other CIS states. The nature of politics in Russia is possibly one of the main reasons why an independent civil service has not developed.

Political culture and tradition is a factor often used as an ‘easy way out’ in explaining problems in politico-administrative relations. The Ottoman legacy and ‘dividing line’ theorems have often been misused in trying to explain difficulties in South Eastern Europe, which in reality might be mainly due to the character of the transition and the ensuing level of polarisation. Political culture and tradition might have played an important role in creating the ‘Baltic exception’ and the lack of progress in the de-politicisation and professionalisation of civil service systems in CIS states. However, more in-depth research would be required to establish the degree to which political culture and tradition have influenced the development of politico-administrative relations.

Policy processes: how to organise the ‘policy interface’

The nature of policy processes is an important potential factor in explaining the stalemate in politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the way the delivery of policy advice is organised. As stated in the introduction, policy development is still predominantly carried out outside the administration in many Central and Eastern European states. The organisation of the politico-administrative interface is a crucial question to be answered in relation to the integration of policy development in the administration. Professional policy advice is delivered by special structures, part of the public administration but placed outside the ministerial hierarchy, like in France and Italy, or predominantly by civil servants in the top of the ministerial hierarchy, like in Northern European states, the UK and Ireland. Many different varieties exist within these two predominant models.

The French and Italian systems provide an excellent example of this. The French and Italian systems both use political cabinets placed outside the ministerial hierarchy for the delivery of policy advice. However, the way these two systems operate in practise is fundamentally different. In France cabinets are mainly made up of career civil service, seconded to cabinets, while in Italy cabinet staff is general recruited from outside the core administration. Whereas in France policy advice is delivered generally by civil servants, even if they are in special position in cabinets, in Italy the core civil service is generally (voluntarily) excluded from this process (Meny, 1993: pp. 318-322). Due to the specific nature of politico-administrative relations, the Italian administration developed as almost a classical Weberian administration, only concerned with policy implementation, according to the law, while the French civil service has gained a virtual monopoly on policy development. This regardless of the fact that both systems have very similar structural features.   

The form of organisation of this aspect of the politico-administrative interface has significant repercussions on the development of policy capacities in the civil service as well as on the scope for stabilisation of politico-administrative relations. The delivery of professional policy advice through the ministerial hierarchy required a higher degree of trust between politicians and civil servants and thus carries a higher risk of instability than the ‘isolation’ of policy advice delivery in ministerial cabinets. Mechanisms have been created in some states where policy advice is provided by ‘ordinary’ civil servants to prevent potential tensions, for instance the creation of ‘Politische Beamten’ in Germany and creation of a political layer in the Spanish administration (level 30 civil servants). Such mechanisms institutionalise the ‘right of interference’ by politicians in the very top layers of the administration, mainly to ensure that politicians get policy advice delivered by civil servants they consider reliable. Informal practise guides similar processes in, for instance, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Central and East European states that have civil service laws have generally opted for the Germanic or Northern European approach, i.e. no special structures for the provision of policy advice have been put in place. Lithuania, for instance created a system modeled on the German system, as well as, to a certain degree, Hungary, while the Latvian and Estonian system are variants on the Nordic model. The Latvian system in particular has opted for the creation of small core ministries, which should mainly deal with policy development. Bulgaria will create a system which includes small ministerial cabinets, but the system generally resembles more the German/Northern European tradition than the French tradition.

The formal character of the system created, however, might not be the most important. As stated earlier on, most policy advice is provided by ‘outsiders’ in Bulgaria. This is a pattern also found, for instance, in Romania, as well as in Montenegro. In the first two cases this could be a consequence of the lack of trust in civil servants by politicians from the former opposition, who carried a deep suspicion against the state apparatus. In the latter case this might be more a matter of a lack of available expertise. This does not necessarily need to be problematic, as long as it remains a temporary phenomenon. Central and East European states should where possible avoid the ‘Italian scenario’; the permanent exclusion of the civil service from policy development. The demise of the Italian system, which underwent fundamental reforms in the mid 1990s, has proven above all that the strict separation of policy development and implementation is no longer a viable option in the complex contemporary reality.

Two issues therefore remain open for further research. The first issue is in what way and under what conditions the civil service can obtain a greater role in policy development processes. The current tendency in a number of states to have policy development carried out by consultants operating outside systems of accountability and control is neither beneficial to the development of democracy nor, in the long term, for the quality of policies developed. Solutions for this problem can be mostly found in increasing the independence of civil servants and administrative stability, combined with confidence building measures to improve levels of trust between politicians and civil servants.

The second issue is how capacities in the civil service to provide high quality professional policy advice can be increased. Policy capacities remain a highly underdeveloped quality in Central and East European administrations and it would be important to prioritise their development. The discussion on strategic policy capacities at the annual meeting of Heads of Centres of Government in 1998 highlighted the awareness among senior civil servants of the need to develop policy capacities, but also the general lack of ideas on how to achieve this.  A new World Bank study on administrative reform in Central and Eastern Europe (Nunberg, 1999) also highlights the development of policy capacities as one of the key issues to be addressed in administrative development.

Configurations

The comparative analysis of the politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern European states shows that the theoretical models developed by Heady and Peters are not fully applicable to the transitional countries of East Central Europe. The reason for this is the relatively unstable politico-administrative situation in almost all Central and Eastern European states. As changes of Governments are pretty frequent and often take place before the end of their mandate, there is an evident lack of the stability, which is a prerequisite for the application of different public administration configurations. This is why configurations can not be shaped as static categories, but need to be observed in their dynamic perspective.

In this project the classification of politico-administrative relations in CEECs was analysed through the application of two Ferrel Heady`s configurations: relation to the political regime and sense of mission (Heady, 1996). However, as we will see it is fairly difficult to apply a ‘clear’ model developed in a Western democracy to the countries in transition, which is often characterised with quickly changing social conditions, undefined legal structure, high levels of politicisation of both public offices and professional civil service posts, etc. But, with the somewhat broader interpretation of the basic model, sustainable results may be expected. Although, it is necessary to depart from the basic model in order to apply it to the transitional countries, the model’s very own characteristics will be fully preserved, and its structure and internal logic will not be affected by the necessary adjustments.

Until the late 1980s in all CEECs the relationship between politicians and the administration in relation to the political regime could have been described as single party responsive. Government employees were fully responsive and loyal to the communist party and faithfully executed its political decisions, without any interference in decision-making process. Today, in most of the CEECs the relationship to the political regime can be described as a majority party responsive. The civil service is responsive to the majority party or coalition parties in the Government. While the classical parliamentary type of a majority party responsive model dominates in CEECs, the parliamentary system with strong position of the president can be found in Russia and Yugoslavia. In both countries the presidents are usually very strong personalities whose powers extend even further than the Constitution stipulates. In contrast, Bulgaria has de jure a semi-presidential system of government, but presidents have so far had little real influence on political decisions.

Having in mind that it is not easy to apply Heady’s classification of sense of mission to the entire public administration, but only to some of its parts, it can be said that most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be generally classified to a co-operation model, evolving towards policy receptive (‘policy responsive’ in original Heady’s words) model. However, it is important to note that for a number of Central and East European countries the model of compliance is still present, mostly as a consequence of the lack of preserved legal status of civil servants. Because there is a significant difference between senior civil servants and mid- and lower rank civil servants, it is highly unlikely that they will share the sense of mission. Senior Civil Service in politically dependent civil service system will stress the compliance in their day-to-day actions, as they can be replaced by the minister at any time. However, practice has shown that it is also fairly rare that compliance behaviour will be clearly and exclusively practised. Often it is accompanied by some other attribute, such as policy responsiveness or constitutional responsiveness. 

Constitutional responsiveness of civil servants is stipulated by most Constitutions and legal acts of the CEECs. However, constitutional responsiveness is not likely to be found in practice since civil servants in CEECs still do not have enough stability that would enable them to respond to a constitutional or legal system, not taking into account policy set by political officials. As stated by Heady, this priority of responsiveness is more likely to be accepted by individuals or small segments of the civil service than to be generally prevailing sense of mission. As we have seen, all Civil Services in CEECs are de jure constitutionally responsive, but the question is what is the usual order of preference amongst the different aspects and forms of sense of mission. At this point we encounter the usual problem facing former socialist societies, a huge difference between legal system and legal order. Legal acts stipulate one thing, while in practice other things are applied. Accompanying problem is very inefficient law enforcement, and very strange situation that the law is promulgated, but with intention not to be applied in practice. This discrepancy between formal legal rules and behaviour of different social actors is one of main reasons as to why it is very difficult to apply Western developed models to CEE transitional countries.

In critical and politically turbulent times for a while even very politically dependent Civil Service can demonstrate guidance as its value. In transitional Civil Services guidance can appear only when the Civil Service is left on its own, due to difficult political times, and when the politicians are more interested in political battles and power struggle than in the Civil Service. Despite these temporary distortions, the main model of sense of mission in CEECs can be characterised as Co-operation model, evolving towards policy responsive behaviour of the Civil Service. 

Co-operation can properly identify the mission of the civil service when social transition is undertaken, and the co-operative attitude of the Civil Service can contribute to the smooth transitional pattern to be applied in a country. In transitional times the demonstration of the willingness of the civil service to co-operate with the politicians (the Government of the day), may contribute to the faster de-politicisation of the Civil Service as the politicians will not exercise their powers (of the day) and affect the ranks within the civil service.  A temporarily applied pure co-operation model can be seen as an act of political opportunism that can support the final ends. If we compare all CEECs described in this project, all of them passed sooner or later through a phase of co-operation model, as an attribute of the sense of mission.

Finally, when it comes to summarise Heady’s model, it seems that the Civil Service system in CEE transitional countries are dominantly party controlled (see Heady’ scheme in Heady, 1996, p. 222). The Civil Service is majority party responsive, with classical corporatist socio-economic concept. The Civil Service career is highly correlated with the intensity of ties with the political party. A number of Civil Servants are in some way connected with political parties, which practice party loyalty or even party patronage in non-advanced transitional democracies. CEE transitional Civil Services promote co-operation attributes of the sense of mission, although there may be some element of compliance, especially in the early stages of transition. 

The expected development in this domain (sense of mission) would be for the civil service systems to move towards policy receptive civil service system, as the most appropriate in a political, social and economic environment which is pluralist and competitive. Heady himself assumed that the largest population amongst the various configurations will be found in this particular group, enhancing the importance of sub-classifications and comparisons amongst examples of possible subgroups (Heady, 1996). The Civil Service which has this particular sense of mission is committed to conformity with legal obligations as formulated in the political sphere. But, the civil service itself is not politicised and is highly professional. In a sense, the civil service serves politicians (the government of the day), but resume its professional independence and dignity. However, even if this would be the expected final ‘destination’ of most Central and Eastern European civil service systems, it might take a long time for many of these systems to reach this destination if fundamental changes are not achieved.

In this project we tried to apply Heady’s theoretical model to the countries of CEE. As we have seen it was a fairly difficult task. Empirical tests run by the contributors shown that there are many specifics regarding the classification of the Civil Service systems in transitional countries. These countries departed from a specific centralised concept of unitary government (unity of state power), but have not yet arrived to efficient democratic society with a clearly defined civil service system. Therefore, the best methodology in analysing civil service systems in CEECs is case-by-case research and necessary adjustments of the existing Western theoretical models. At the end, Heady himself argued that the only way to prove that his model work is to run a number of empirical country studies, and test the real situation against a theoretical model.

Peters’ models depict the dynamics within the Civil Service regarding the level of politicisation, classifying civil service systems in four groups, while the fifth group (the full separation between policy-makers and bureaucrats), was proposed by Wilson (1975). But, politicisation problems have fairly different meanings in different parts of the world. Sometimes high politicisation can be explained as part of the creation of the state or public sector capacity building. There are countries where civil servants are fairly close to politicians, but despite that the civil service retained high levels of professional responsibility and social transparency. Therefore, it is very difficult to make general rules or models applicable world-wide that can depict all wealth of possible differences that exist in various political system. Peters’ models to a great extent succeeded in depicting the main characteristics of the existing political processes with reference to civil service politicisation, and the relationship between the career Civil Service and politicians (the government of the day). 

According to the Peters’ classification, most common models in Central and East European countries are ‘functional village life’ and ‘village life’. The ‘Village life’ model assumes that civil servants and politicians are both the part of a unified state elite and they should not be in conflict over power within the government structure. The ‘Functional village life’ model assumes that civil servant from on Government department have more in common than a minister with his political cabinet colleagues heading other sectors of Government. 

However, it seems that Peters’ classification models also cannot be fully implemented in the CEECs environment. There are a few reasons for that. First, in many CEECs there is still no clear separation between politics and administrations (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, etc.). Second, in states where civil service laws have been enacted (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Estonia, etc.), quite a different legal status has been established for the senior civil servants on one hand and middle and lower ranks on the other hand. Senior civil servants (assistant minister, secretary general to the ministry, head of department) are usually nominated by the Government (Estonia, Yugoslavia) or minister (Hungary), which means that they often take their post on political basis. Most of the senior civil servants go with the change of the Government. If we consider senior civil servants as political persons, which they at least de facto are in practice, it is hard to speak of Peters model of village life, which presumes clear separation between the two. However, it seems that over time, most of the CEECs will be able to fit the ‘village life’ or, more likely, the ‘functional village life’ model.

Some authors participated in the project expressed their doubts, explicitly or implicitly, that about the applicability of Peters’ models to their own country (Bulgaria, Estonia, Ukraine). To a large extent it is true, but as we have just said, the modifications of the model must be necessary and useful as well. Despite the limitations of the model, it can not only explain the current relationship within the public policy sphere, but also to depict the main trends of future developments. Peters’ model depicts intra-Civil Service dynamics, and has to be supplemented by some other models. However, it gives the picture of the nature of relationship between the career civil servants and politicians, which is very clear, and difficult to be created with the use of other existing models. Briefly said, a civil service system that will be promoted in CEECs will be either “functional village life” or “village life”. We envisage that the former will be more applicable in the case of CEE transitional democracies, since it requires high level of unity within the ministry, which can be easily achieved in a policy responsive and co-operative civil service system.

Conclusions

The development of a stable interface between politics and administration in Central and Eastern Europe remains one of the main problematic issues in public administration development in the region. The lack of a stable interface has prevented a stabilisation of the emerging administrative systems and stifled the development of a policy role for the administration. There are obviously some positive exceptions to this pattern, but these are still few and far between. The crisis in administrative development, in which the lack of a working politico-administrative interface is one of the main causes, is considered one of the core reasons for the downturn in economic development that has occurred in a number of Central and Eastern European states during the last two years. 

In this paper we have examined some of the main potential factors which can help explain the problems in development of politico-administrative relations, based on country studies carried out by members of the NISPAcee working group on politico-administrative relations and other country studies available to us. The comparative analysis leads to the following tentative conclusions:

The influence of history is significant, in particular in terms of the inheritance of the totalitarian/authoritarian regimes. Whereas the pre-war traditions of Central and Eastern European states might be rather close to the continental European tradition (except for the current CIS states), the legacy of the previous regime, a culture of full politicisation and the exclusion of the administration from policy development, has created a very difficult starting position for administrative development at the start of the transition process. The transition-related polarisation of politics and the lack of (working) legal frameworks for the operation of the administration have further aggravated the situation.

The development and in particular the implementation of new legal frameworks for the operation of the civil service has been highly problematic. Where civil service laws have been adopted they have proven to be far from stable, to allow to much scope for the continuation of politicisation and create too little opportunity for the development of a high quality administration. This is not to say that civil service laws have not been good for anything, where they have been adopted there is generally a higher level of stability in the administration, with Hungary as the main example. However, The presence of civil service laws has generally not stopped politicians from carrying out ‘cleaning operations’ (Lithuania 1996 and Poland in 1997 are some of the main examples), either by changing the interpretation of the law or by stopping its implementation. The lack of a broad political consensus underpinning civil service laws and problems of legal quality are the main causes for the disappointing effect of laws in terms of stabilising politico-administrative relations.

Political culture is often used as a ‘standard explanation’ for the lack of progress in administrative development in certain parts of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular South-Eastern Europe and the CIS.  However, even a superficial analysis of patterns of development in the region indicates that explaining politicisation as an element of divergence in political culture is an over-simplification. At the same time it would be interesting to establish to what extent political culture can help explaining the ‘Baltic exception’ and the almost universal lack of progress in CIS states. However, it is dangerous to draw general conclusions on the role of political culture in stimulating or preventing the development of impartial and professional civil service systems merely on the basis of the geographic location of a state.

The development of a policy role for the civil service has become intertwined with the discussion on decreasing politicisation. A policy role for the civil service cannot be successfully developed without a stabilisation of the politico-administrative interface while. At the same time, politicians are reluctant to stabilise the administration because they feel that policy development should be carried out by political trustees. The ‘policy question’ seems one of the most serious impediments to the development of a stable system of politico-administrative relations. The ‘policy void’ which has been created has so far been filled mainly through the use of political advisers and outside consultancy firms to support policy development. Even though the use of political advisers and think tanks is common practice in most modern states, the development of policy exclusively or even predominantly by such entities cannot provide in the long term for high quality policies with sufficient support in society. The development of a flexible, but clearly defined ‘political zone’ between politics and administration, which might in time be professionalised might provide the only solution at this point in time. The modalities of such an interface should be well designed, ensuring that there are effective communication flows between the political and administrative sphere and that incentives are created for politicians to retain civil servants in these functions, rather than to automatically remove them with each change of minister. Furthermore a cross party agreement on setting immovable limits for such a zone would be a condition sine-qua-non.                 

It is still difficult to fit Central and Eastern European civil service systems into configuration models designed to allow for comparative analysis. The transition-specific nature of civil service systems, which is expressed in particular in the form of complex politico-administrative relations, as well as the lack of a policy role for civil servants, make classification difficult. Still a dynamic in development of civil service systems, and politico-administrative relations in particular, can be found, generally a movement towards policy receptive civil service systems (Heady) and functional village life models in Peters’ system. However, as the other parts of this paper show, a number of crucial conditions still need to be met before the move of these systems towards the ‘ideal models’ concerned can be completed.  The development of academic research on these issues could facilitate these conditions being met.  

Towards a tentative research agenda

A number of issues for further research arise from the comparative conclusions on the causes for the continuing crisis in politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe. These range from more in-depth analysis on the level of significance of some of the factors, to a discussion on possible solutions. The following questions could form the basis for a research agenda for the next year:

1.	To what degree can electoral dissatisfaction serve as a catalyst for change? The link between dysfunctional politico-administrative relations, a malfunctioning administration and stagnation in economic development has become increasingly acknowledged. Still, citizens have remained disinterested in public administration. This is much unlike the situation in other parts of Europe where dissatisfaction of citizens with the administration, including deficiencies in politico-administrative relations, are a matter for public debate, thus forcing politicians and civil servants to ‘clean up their act’. The feasibility of putting pressure on politicians and officials by raising citizens’ interest in this issue should be one issue for further study.
2.	A next question is whether traditional ways of formalising politico-administrative relations (through law) could be supplemented by more innovative methods. In this respect the attempt by ‘t Hart and Rosenthal (NRC, November 1998) to draw up ‘rules of the game’ for politicians and civil servants could provide an interesting starting point for analysis. ‘t Hart and Rosenthal developed their approach as a response to the increasing problems in politico-administrative relations to the Netherlands. Obviously such an approach might seem unfeasible in the context of many Central and East European states, but on the other hand seems an option worth considering. This would mainly provide a way in which to address loopholes which laws are bound to leave.
3.	How can the policy role of civil servants be developed. This question has two aspects. First, the re-organisation of the policy-interface, possibly through the creation of some kind of buffer zone, which should be clearly defined and respond to certain criteria. Second, raising policy-making capacities among top civil servants and how ‘lopsided’ administrations, leaning heavily towards technical implementation work, could be transformed into ‘intelligent administrations’, acting as bridges between government and society.    

If some tentative answers to the above questions can be formulated, this might provide the debate on politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe, now often dominated by clichés, with a new impetus. 

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