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RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC TRUST TO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS AS BASIC PREREQUISITES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.

Abstract. The problem of public trust decline to national governments became one of key problems both for practice and for academic discussions in the last decades. It covers both institutional and psychological sides of problematic. The general trend of state prestige’s decline, civic «desacralization» of state, even in countries with long-term statist and paternalistic tradition, became empirical fact. In psychological sense we see the serious crisis of public trust towards state authorities. It is connected, in particular, with contemporary large group identity crisis. All it seems a part of more general issue - a certain crisis of the bureaucratic state as a whole, at least in its traditional forms, especially, of executive branch of power. The substantial reforms of public governance system can be the only adequate reply to this challenge. I observe in the text how different countries react to this problem. In more details it considers concerning Russian, mostly failed efforts of PS reform. Also some possible explanations of failure are offered in the conclusion.

I. The problem of trust decline to governments became in the contemporary world almost general knowledge and also one of crucial key points both for practice and academic discussions, both for social theorists and practical persons. The essential part of it – lack of confidence to capacities of national governments respond adequately diverse modern challenges in principle. The public administration is one of main "battlefields" around this dilemma; searches of new paradigm of executive branch of authorities is an essential part of this process. The academic and practical reactions to this challenge vary at scale from ignoring it by means of “ostrich syndrome” of politicians and affiliated with them administrative scholars, or scared repressive reactions and actions, or attempts to push most of “unpleasant” problems to “Pandora’s box” and supposedly lock them there (like in Russia, for example), to more or less serious intellectual and practical efforts create a new paradigm of governance (like NPM and GG concepts and other versions of them). Surely, the latest choices are more promising and deserve much more respect than former ones. But, like any limited measures, they hardly could bring some sustainable long-term solution, by my opinion. The issue seems broader and dramatic.

We face the serious conceptual changes in public views concerning a very character of mutual relations between citizens and governments in different countries during the last several decades. It covers both institutional and psychological aspects. One of crucial global factors of the current time is the general trend of state prestige’s decline. People in different countries believe less and less that existing state institutions are capable to solve main problems satisfactory. Moreover, in many countries one can observe a decline of trust concerning not only for quality but, moreover, even for simple honesty and good will of public servants as such. Ordinary people suspect that persons in power have other priorities than public service in pure meaning of word. This process has ebbs and flows but general tendency is negative, unfortunately. I even
think that we deal with a certain, potentially rather serious, alienation people from state. There are many empirical data based on sociological researches in several countries what confirm this decline.

Let me present some data about decline of people trust to most of different institutions of governance in Russia according polls of Levada Center, main independent Russian sociological institution, just for three years, since 2015 to 2018.

So, the dynamic of trust looks this way: to government – from 45 to 26 %, to police – 31-24, to court – 28-22, to procuracy 24-24, to FSB – 46-50, to regional authorities – 38-23, to local authorities -27-27, to church – 43-48, to army – 60-66, to Sovet Federatsii – 24-24, to Duma – 24-22, to political parties 16-12, to mass media 31-31. One can see the negative dynamic for most of institutions, some stability on lower level for several others, and rise for such specific, “extreme” structures, as army and FSB; the Orthodox church paradoxically also proved to appear in this row, what deserves special consideration beyond the topic of this paper. I guess, that tendency to appeal to this kind of organizations reflects a public mood of desperate “last hope” search and deserves a special analysis. Concerning a level of trust to president Putin, it was stably high – 58-58, but currently, i.e. in the first half of 2019, it also fall seriously to 32%.

It is not only Russian problem, but general tendency. In France, for example, general respect to the institutions of state, declined since 90s’ from 28 to 21 percent. Eurobarometer shows that more that ¾ of Europeans don’t believe to current political parties, because people in post-modern societies treat their governments more demanding and critically, and respect to power diminishes.1

The waves of different kinds of “occupy” protesting movement in many countries in latest years, including current “yellow jackets” movement in France, became one more clear indicator of it. There are a lot of discussions on the reasons for that, as you know. I just mention a couple of points, more relevant to our theme:

People in mass became more educated and, therefore, incline to treat authorities more critically. Public expectations and demands, addressing to governments, grew and dissatisfaction and anger when this new level of demands does not meets adequately, also grows; moreover, the growing incapacity of governments to cope effectively with problems and challengers of new age becoming more and more obvious and enforces the mood of people distrust. One could see it everywhere

On the other hand, ambitions of bureaucratic circles, both at national and European levels, to stay the main problem-solver for the most issues, at least do not decreases. So, in psychological sense we see the serious crisis of public trust towards authorities. The level of trust in state institutions and current condition of them, especially, of executive branch of power, at least, in its current forms, diminishes substantially. The visible appearances of this crisis we observed during the latest years at the streets of many cities around the world: from US and Arabic countries to Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, France. What seems important is that a certain, probably even leading human force of street protests’ are not marginals but good educated and personally successful young people. I suggest that it is the sign of broader phenomenon - a certain crisis of the bureaucratic state as a whole, at least in its traditional forms. Certainly, the marginal groups and other irresponsible, even criminal elements also take their own profit from street actions, fish in trouble waters, so to speak. But they are not crucial part of these processes.

I think we may hope that is only the part of story, i.e. the necessary negative, even destructive partially in a sense, stage of mainly positive process of search and construction a new paradigm of relations between state institutions and civil society.

1 Skidmore P., Bound K. Governance as jazz: meeting the adaptive challenge. The paper produced to British Council/Demos Forum.
Also distrust to "bad" politicians and crooked bureaucrats, to predatory governments, like “Maidan revolution of dignity” in 2014, might be considered as a positive phenomenon, as a trigger for progressive development.

This process began almost 40 years ago and had its ups and downs, ebbs and flows. After its rather calm phase and even some retreat in 2000s it activated almost volcanically during the last several years and even months. From a philosophical perspective it looks like a refusal from so-called Hegelian statist paradigm which being recognized as inadequate for new conditions of modern and especially post-modern society. I think that is, at least partially, the delayed effect of horrible power abuses in totalitarian and authoritarian states in the 20-th century. I mean, firstly but not exclusively, the Nazi Germany and the USSR, where unbelievable number of human life had been brought to altar of state needs. It taught people in many countries important lesson – «you have to be suspicious or, at least, cautious, towards any governments’ ambitions and expansion». As a result, the civic «desacralization» of state, even in countries with long-term statist and paternalistic tradition, became empirical fact. It can be considered as one of major intellectual achievements of the second half of the 20th century. And also could be interpreted as a reincarnation of the new-liberal concept of the role and the place of the state in public life. This shift seems critically important and capable to create serious challenges in number of respects. In particular, many states stepped back from direct public services' provision in favor of accent to coordinating and monitoring functions. At the same time private and voluntary sectors have become more and more involved in providing of public goods.

From the side of governments there is different kind of reactions varies at the scale from rhetoric exclamations a kind of “how difficult to govern in anti-government era” - to efforts of reforming a whole civil service system and other connected public institutions. Some states, most responsive to public needs and aspirations, responded to this challenge by introducing serious reforms in the field of public service. This movement developed initially in the framework of the so-called New Public Management reforms and even acquired the name of “managerial revolution” what sounds as a big exaggeration but reflects, however, serious general trend. The USA and England became the pioneers and leaders of this process. One example was the program “Reinventing Government” have been launched in 90s in US under leadership of Vice-President Al Gore. However, it was only partially realized because of political circumstances and now we face the partial disappointment in results of it. The other example would be the New Public Management and/or Good Governance patterns.

Now let us turn briefly to the question: whether NPM and/or Good Governance models suit for post-Communist East European countries, or not. There are different views. Some answers are negative. They presume that so-called burden of mentality, “curse of tradition”, “cultural code” or “matrix” are unchangeable factors and societies doomed to carry on this burden forever. This position grounded, consciously or unconsciously, on the constructions of those who considers autocracy as insuperable trait attributive to some societies who supposedly just not adjusted for democracy “genetically”.

I disagree with such fatalistic view. Yes, tradition is very important but not a fatal factor. Struggle against bad traditions in own society, striving for overcoming them is an essential source for positive development. Even the history of the 20-th century gives many remarkable examples of it. As human beings, we are not completely enslaved by our past. Otherwise we doomed to repeat same mistakes time and again.

Certainly, it is not an easy job for societies like Russia, for example. It is starting from lower point comparing with some other, more successful societies. So, it would be more difficult for it to achieve “new horizon”. However, to presume existence of any “civilization prohibition” for positive changes, especially under conditions of the 21-st
century, sounds like absurd. It looks as a captivation by some version of Racism or complex of national inferiority. Moreover, it seems that to transform the obviously wrong, traditional model of officialdom towards more modern patterns is the only reliable way for all post-Soviet type countries to avoid a final transformed into full-fledge bureaucratic state, “bureaucratic reign” with all inevitable consequences: uncontrollable growth of size and influence of irresponsible bureaucracy, its low effectiveness, flourishing of corruption, revival of nomenclature system in some modernized form, etc.

II. After this general, “philosophical” part of the paper, let's turn to more specific questions and consider the experience of several countries in comparative aspect in terms of public services' responses at the public needs, expectations and demands. The limit of the paper does not affords to be comprehensive in that. Also I intentionally shift a focus of analysis towards the aspects what are especially deficient in my own country - Russia - and also critically important not only for it but also for most of Eastern European countries. So, I'll present briefly at the following pages a view from post-Communist “shore” of Europe and make brief review of points described in details for the Russian audience in the monograph “The Crisis of Bureaucratic State. Civil Service Reforms: International Experience and Russian Realities” with addition of some newest materials. 

I'll start with the Anglo-Saxon countries because the changes in them seem to be mostly substantial and promising.

a) United Kingdom. The British Civil Service was in the first line of countries who reacted quickly at the growing public demands and social critic concerning the quality of state in general and public administration, in particular. This process is in progress now. It is not avoid some difficulties and certain measures became an object of critic both from inside and outside of government. However, Britain, I believe, is among of few leaders who make radical efforts in order to bring civil service in accordance with needs of the new age.

The first thing deserves to be mentioned is the unique model of civic participation in the processes of public officials' hiring. The modern Civil Service Commission consists of fourteen respected, experienced and qualified representatives of civil society, most of them are not the civil servants themselves but makes serious influence at the whole process and procedures of recruitment. They are appointed by the Privy Council under the Royal Prerogative – for the five years term, at the part-time condition and don't leave their permanent duties outside of government. So, they are not civil servants in the usual meaning of word. They operate alongside departments and ministries but are independent on them. Thanks that, they are capable to fulfill a role of standards' watchdogs effectively. For example, in 2006-2011 years the first Commissioner was Janet Paraskeva who being engaged in the same time in a lot of


other things: she has been the Law Society Chief Executive, board member of the Serious Organized Crime Agency, Chair of the Olympic Lottery Distributor, etc. The others were: director of big commercial company, director of McDonald’s chain in UK, retired career Scottish civil servant, journalist, chairman of the Financial Times Group, high sheriff for county, vice-chancellor of metropolitan university, social worker, art director of museum, several persons of the national health system, etc. The major functions of the Commission are: 1) direct participation in the processes of civil servants’ hiring for 600 major administrative executive posts of UK (one of commissioners always chairs at the commission meeting that select and appoint persons for this positions); 2) issuing of the Recruitment Code for all other positions; 3) monitoring and control of the recruitment processes’ in departments and ministries of the government at the merit and open competition basis; 4) arbitration of complains concerning violations of recruitment procedures.4

The Civil Service Commission (CSC), which for a century and a half had been an ordinary personnel department, was radically transformed. Its core now consists of 14 or 15 so-called commissioners, who are appointed for a five-year term on a part-time basis mainly not from among civil servants but from among authoritative outsiders with experience of work in prominent positions in the public and private sectors. And even while working for the CSC they do not become civil servants. The idea underlying this approach is to place the function of forming the bureaucratic corps in the hands not of professional apparatchiks but of those who deal with them as consumers of the services they provide. The CSC is an independent body whose powers include final examination and confirmation on merit of candidates for about 600 posts, issuance of a code [Recruitment Principles—Trans.] that regulates corresponding procedures at all levels of the civil service, monitoring and oversight of compliance with the code, and examination of complaints concerning violation of the code. The significance of this experience lies mainly in the real and, in certain respects, decisive participation of representatives of civil society in the recruitment of officials for state service. In our view, this is an almost unprecedented breakthrough toward a model of the “post-bureaucratic” state and society of the future.

So, the main idea of this system is: society takes direct part in personnel administration’s policy, in recruitment of executive officials who should serve it. One can draw some partial analogy with election of top politicians - political representative of public interests - in democratic countries. Now this practice extends gradually also to the executive staff. I believe this is a very promising step towards future post-bureaucratic society, as some authors wrote.

The other thing is maximizing of public services’ transparency. Also in terms of public control, seems important, the work of the UK Committee on Standards in Public Life. This independent body has been established in 1995 and publishes twice a year very serious reports on different acute issues of politics and government. 5 The first step of the Committee was adoption and publication of so-called seven principles in public field, standards of behavior for all public officials. Actually these principles based on core civil service values: integrity, honesty, objectivity, impartiality and following merit system principles and standards.


5 The Reports of Commitee on Standards in Public Life.
The story with jurisdictions’ restriction for so-called “special advisers” of the premier and other British ministers seems very topical for many countries (look to current Russia, particularly). The problem evolved when Mr. Blare increased the number of his advisers – from 8 to 25 – and other ministers followed this practice. As a result, the total number of this category increased from 1997 to 1999 from 25 to 74. It met immediately serious public and professional concern. The arguments were: “Who are there guys? They did not pass through merit system’s selection; they aren’t neutral politically and definitely not impartial; they appointed beyond due procedures, necessary for other officials, etc. What is the nature of their proxies at all? Their role must be limited exclusively by contacts with their political bosses, by advices and offering them some political analysis. But on practice they have significant influence on permanent public officials because they able to speak supposedly on behalf of top politicians.” This anxiety engendered the special inquire and discussion in the Committee on Standards. As a result, the number of political advisers was diminished seriously and proxies of them were considerably restricted. They were prohibited to give any orders or instructions to permanent public officials and especially to take part in discussions on financial issues, on budget money assignments. Let us compare it with common practice of the Russian President’s administration where even middle rank employee regularly give instructions not only to people in government but also to legislatures and even to formally independent bodies like mass media, trade unions, etc.

Last but not least points deserve to be mentioned are the Code of Ministers what publishes for general public and signs by each minister during coming into office, policy of interchange by personnel between state and private sectors and NGO, control and restrictions by former public servants’ transfers after they leave their positions in government. In sum, I believe, that the British civil service came closer than others to pattern of the 21st bureaucracy.

b) USA is also in the same foremost «rescue command» searching new model of public service, with all inevitable achievements and shortcomings at this way. It started in 80s’ and progressed thanks to efforts of AL Gore Commission based on the ideas of Osborne and Gaebler and their followers. I think, no need to describe all its steps and suggestions for professional audience. Since then many things - good and not so good - had happened in this field. Despite on high expectations and optimism of 90s’, the condition of American public service in the 21-st century is still far from ideal. So-called “post-bureaucratic revolution” failed. Hopes connected with NPM and, later, with Good Governance concepts, came true only partially.

According American analysts, marketization of public services by means of broad outsourcing, did not much improve a quality of them. Moreover, they engendered some counter-productive effects. Contracting out state, in spite of initial expectations of enthusiasts, turned to new form of corporativism, created a group of privileged

6 Ninth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, April 2003: Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the permanent Civil Service.
permanent received of most profitable contracts and the system of so-called "iron triangle" in the field of state procurement. The most qualified and innovatively minded part of governments employees moved to "quango" organizations because they offered much higher wages. As a result, according the Brooking Institute survey, 80% of Americans believe that the government currently is "broken, fragmentized and over-bureaucratized". Domination of technology over objectives and values of civil service caused a certain decline of civic spirit and morality among the personnel of governmental organizations. President Obama attempted to oppose this technocratic approach. The very first executive order of him was devoted to the problems of government ethics and personnel policy. Also the Public Integrity Division has been established in the Department of Justice. Unfortunately, these promising initial steps have not been developed and did not bring any essential improvements.9

Fortunately, these critical judgments inevitably accenting negative aspects, contain some ground for optimism. It is connected, in particular, with empirically confirmed tendency of attitudes' change among new generation of potential public employees, among colleges' graduates. Differently from their predecessors, they give priority not to material rewards but to content of work and other non-material factors.10 Briefly, instead of traditional classical question "show me the money", they ask first "show me the job". Some analysts consider it as a source for optimistic vision of prospects, envisioning to 2020 ascension of new era of Public service, its revival and revaluation by the hands of "millennium generation".11 So, the pendulum swings back from full, non-critical approval of NPM as a supposedly universal panacea, but not to classical Weberism, rather to more synthetic approach. A design of this new concept is still forming. I believe, this is a road to new philosophy of public service and its reciprocal actions with citizens.


I published recently the article at this subject, with observation of the situation, for the Russian readers.\textsuperscript{12}

Now let's turn to the continental tradition characterizing the most of European countries. c) **Germany.** The German experience and example seems remarkable in different respects. Traditionally, the German public service enjoys the reputation of one of the best in the world in terms of its effectiveness, honesty and detailed regulation of all aspects and procedures. The high level of legal and administrative culture is the reason for high public prestige of it. Just a couple of characterizing points – the institutes of public officials' fidelity to Constitution and of the honorary public official. The principle of fidelity had been distorted in Nazi time in favour of personal faithfulness to the Furer and officially proclaimed duty to «serve selflessly to the ideals of national-socialism». It have been restored in Western part of country after 1945. The latest assumes periodical voluntary payless work of individual for public needs. Such practice exists in many countries, but only in Germany it legitimized by special name. That means, I believe, that person engaged it, acquires a higher respect among co-citizens. I hardly could imagine that such name, being declared publicly, might increase sympathies to him among local people, especially in countries of Eastern Europe. In Russia, for example, even decent, honest officials, prefer to conceal the fact of they job in government bodies, especially at the lower levels of service.

The German practice and history of independent system of administrative courts – the administrative justice - also deserves special attention. It had been adopted as long as in 1899 and was abolished only twice: the first time by the Nazis and the second one – in DDR. The Nazi case is especially «interesting» in terms of the argumentation: these courts were recognized by Nazi lawyers «harmful because they work not for the state but for individuals"; so far, their functions had been transfered to Gestapo! After 1945 the administrative courts, surely, have been restored.

However, in spite of all advantages, even this, almost "ideal" public service does not meets the contemporary public needs effectively enough. It is too big and resource demanding. For example, according the data of the international auding firm «Grant Thornton», more than 50% of respondents included Germany, together with Poland, Greece and Holland, in the list of countries where the bureaucratic rules prevent the business development\textsuperscript{13}. As the Chancellor A.Merkel remarked, the German companies must present the information to statistic offices by 69 points, by social insurances – by 78 points, to custom and tax services – by 60 points and, according the labor law – 111 documents\textsuperscript{14}!! A a result, the investments prefer other directions and countries. An ambitious program named "Modern State – Modern Administration» have been adopted\textsuperscript{15}. It looks as remarkable confirmation of the thesis that even very good civil service is not good forever and that now we face a need for more than serious reconsideration of very basic principles of it.

\textsuperscript{12} Krisis administrativno-burokraticheskogo gosudarstva i poiski vyhoda: opyt USA (evolyutsia teorii i praktiki upravlenkiya v poslednie desytiletiya) - The effectiveness crisis of bureaucratic state and search for way out: the USA's experience. (The evolution of theory and practice of PA during the last decades), in: Problemy gosudarstvensogo i munitsipal'nogo upravleniya, 2014, No. 2.

\textsuperscript{13} URL: http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/digest/446492acd9d9/.

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example Federal Ministry of the Interior, Dr.Wolfgang Schauble at the dbb congress. URL: http://www.bmi.bund.de/cin_012/nn_174390/Internet/Content/Nachrichten/Reden/2007/05/BM_dbb_Tagung_en.htm.
d) **France** is one more example of historically successful civil service in frames of the continental tradition. It had and still keeps a plenty of dignities. I believe, that there is no need to remind its qualities for the professional scholars and seems more useful to emphasize the more ambivalent points. Even this, close to «ideal», model of high centralized administration faced a serious crisis of public trust since 80's. In 90's, moreover, it became a field for scandals and even anecdotes. The talks on the corruption in the French government, in the executive branch especially, became a common place. Both public and professional opinion turned to conclusion that the French civil service does not corresponds to new economical and technological realities and, last but not least, to growing public expectations. The issue of loyalty took on a new character with accent not to the loyalty or fidelity to the administrative boss, even not to the office, but, first of all - to citizens as final consumers of public services and to their constitutional rights fidelity. The exorbitant degree of hierarchy to the official system also became the subject of critic. The uncertain and controversial today situation concerning successful initially «Macron phenomenon» and actions of «yellow jackets» are beyond this topic.

It would be untrue to say that the French administrative system ignored these problems completely. Some measures had been introduced during the last 10-15 years. Even new administrative bodies – The General Department on State Modernization (Direction generale de la modernization de l'Etat), the Central Service for Corruption Prevention (Service central da Prevention de la Corruption), three separate commissions on the administrative ethics (Commissions de Deontologie), etc., have been established. In 2005 so-called the Marianne charter (La Charte Marianne) where the standards of public officials' behavior for their contacts with citizens were confirmed, have been adopted. Also the special commission designed to provide the right on free access to administrative documents have been organized.\(^{16}\) However, all these steps were just half-measures and are not able to achieve decisive improvements what the system needs and citizen expect. The reason, by my opinion, is that the reformers rely again at obsolete centralistic vision, on conviction that the successful way to correct wrongdoing of administrative system might be born by the system itself, come for inside of it, so to speak. That seems a misketable idea. The old French proverb proclaimed: «don't commit frogs to drain a swamp where they live». It means, in the context of the our topic, that to struggle with bureaucracy's wrongdoings by creation of new administrative bodies is a logically wrong idea, if not to say more. As the prominent scholar of the Toulouse university remarked, «while the other European countries conduct rather radical public service reforms, France don't hurry to join to them, restricting itself by the half-measures and still continue to be one of the last strongholds of the centralization and bureaucratism, because the state sector consists of dinosaurs who don't wish to shake the former way of matters.»\(^{17}\)

III. **Russia.** Now I am turning to the Russian attempts of its national bureaucracy reforming. This experience, in general, looks unsuccessful but remarkable and deserves to be learned carefully because it reflects general post-Communist specifics and, even broader, is a part of more universal question: **Why is it so Difficult to Reform Bureaucratic State in Transit Countries?** With all differences, there is some common in these processes. So far, the Russian example seems quite interesting in comparative perspective.

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With all diversity of East European countries, similar heritage of a single-party governance and totalitarian rule created similar problems. In this paper I am just remind some of these inherited obstacles for the civil service reforming.

- In all Socialist countries officialdom was just "cogs", “driving belts” of ruling party.
- The merit system practically had not existed, deteriorated version of patronage in form of party-nomenclature system prevailed instead.
- The public service, in genuine meaning of word haven't existed either, because it is incompatible with autocratic way of rule.
- After the fall of Communism all post-Socialist countries met serious difficulties in creation of new, true Public service. Some cases are better, some other are worse. But it would be hard to name any completely positive example of successful PS reform in this part of the world. Moreover, some variations of bureaucratic state tend to revive.

Since 1991 one could see in Russia minimum five "rounds" of reforms' attempts, but with minimal true achievements. As far as I had the opportunity to publish my view on five rounds of failed attempts to reform Russian public service both in one of NISPA collective books and, recently, in the Croatian international journal, I am omitting this description and passing directly to general judgments.

The fundamental basis of all these rounds is the intransigent struggle of two incompatible models of service. The heart of conflict is a hidden struggle between two opposing approaches. The first approach champions a kind of pseudo-reform with minimum of practical steps towards pure Public Service's creation, but, in contrary, is a step back, to institutionalizing and protecting the privileged status of bureaucratic corporation. The second approach seeks to carry out a genuine modernization of state administration, transforming it to a new type of service, really corresponding to demands of the epoch and challenges of the democratic development.

The Specific Reasons for the Reformist Policy Failure

Reasons for the PS reform's failure are different at the each stage of transition. From 1991 to 1996 political situation in Russia was highly unstable. The danger for restoration of communist regime, with probably even with semi-fascist traits, looked as not incredible. Later, since 1996, President Yeltsin was not able to conduct any decisive steps against state bureaucracy by physical and political reasons: his health, energy and intellectual capacities deteriorated. It was a time of fierce political conflicts between bearers of radically different views about direction of further way for the country.

If we consider the early 90s as an incomplete peaceful revolution, risk to unleash one more reform under condition of fragile political environment and state weakness\textsuperscript{19}, such concern contains some rational reasons. But, on the other hand, it was precisely unique chance and minute for that: anti-nomenclature and anti-communist popular feelings were high at the moment and the political leadership supposedly possessed then broad “popular mandate” for anti-bureaucratic reform. Anyway, it should be easier to mobilize popular support for this reform than for any other one.

The imaginary political risk was not the single anti-reformist factor. The another was a dominant ideological influence of the economic determinism concept. The most of intellectual leaders of the early reforms were economists or, at least, economically thinking people. Ironically, Russia, being bankrupted in late Soviet time under influence of primitive version of Marxist super-economism, used the same glasses to consider new, post-communist situation. Surely, this generation of liberal Russian economists were mostly honest and high qualified people. Thank to their efforts, the country had been actually saved from economic catastrophe in the early 1990s. But their vision of social life was narrowed by one-dimension materialistic approach.

Yes, they talked for a while on issues like freedom of speech, human dignity and rights, that man “do not live by bread alone”, etc. But they did not believe themselves in crucial importance of these kind of factors. The freedom of human spirit, differently from economic freedom, was not their pair of shoes. They believed almost religiously in omnipotence of "invisible hand" of market, which supposedly might resolve all other issues itself, almost automatically. In a word, they had no humanitarian view on the world. As a result, they yielded stage for national debate on non-material, cultural and other social and spiritual values to other, mostly irresponsible and demagogical forces – to hard liners Communists and nationalists.

So, the underestimation of the officialdom’s reform importance was a part of this fallible blind-spot economic “one-dimensionalism”, i.e. the underestimation of role of government as agent of change and neglect of the bureaucracy’s usual preferences of minimal changes, self-protection and growth. The next reason was an absence of clear refusal from the Soviet political heritage. Although Boris Yeltsin and his team at the beginning made some efforts in this direction, it never reached administrative levels. The most prominent step was the proscription of the Communist Party after the putsch of August 1991 by the President degree. However, persons who retained their positions in the nomenclature, used all the means to resist genuine “de-communization”. The decision of the Constitutional Court, practically annulling Yeltsin’s decree, facilitated this resistance. Yeltsin himself was not insistent in this respect. None of former communist state personnel, even KGB officers, had been lustrated either then nor later. So, it is not surprising that, after recovering from the initial fear, the old nomenclature, at first cautiously, and then more aggressively, began to carry out a “quiet revenge.” Differently from other post-socialist countries, Russia did not conduct any serious campaign of “de-communization.” The full tragic results of it could be seen in 2000s’ and now to the utmost. "The people of past" regained their status of country bosses. Moreover, they “managed to transform

\textsuperscript{19} I cannot fully accept, for example, the view on the 1990s advanced by authors like Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinksi, who considered the decade’s events as an anti-democratic coup designed to empower and enrich a small segment of Russian society. Reddaway and Glinksi, \textit{The Tragedy of Russia’s Reform. Market Bolshevism against Democracy} (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001).
power into property”\textsuperscript{20} and also to pass their privileged status and wealth to their following generations. However, the final decade of the 20th century brought many positive changes in the life of people in Russia. Rhetoric judgment on this decade in completely negative tones, what now is in fashion in circles of Russian political establishment and around, is no more then conformist demonstration of loyalty, cynical wish to be in official pro-Putin trend. The massive political street protests in 2011-2014 and later demonstrated clearly the vital public need to revive at least part of the 90s’ democratic heritage, its achievements and institutions. Unfortunately, the Kremlin politicians, instead of positive reaction at this challenge, chose another way – different repressions against the opposition, even in moderate forms of it; they actually declared a kind of war to civil society.

One of serious impediments for reform was that is carried out behind the scene rather than in public. The absence of openness, of glasnost’, during the presidency of Putin, became one more barriers for reform. One of the most serious obstacles for transformation of a “ruler's service” into civil service was a semi-secret manner of reform proposals' elaboration. As far as this reform assumes a fundamental change in relations between state and society, its success requires support and approval of the citizenry what is not possible without their knowledge and understanding of the proposed changes. The aims and plans of the reformers should be published and explained to public, which could then to make feedbacks and monitor the process. If society feels itself a partner of reform, it able to provide both fresh ideas and a political counterweight to the anti-reformist forces. Moreover, if public opinion is joined around the idea of reform and makes some pressure to bureaucratic circles, it prompts them to be more responsible and transparent in their actions. There are many groups in society who have incentives to support reform. Among them, for example, are small and mid-sized businessmen, whose firms have suffered at the hands of corrupted avaricious officials. Neglect of Russia’s political leaders their duty to inform society permanently, honestly and in necessary details about true condition of national economics, on reforming projects and plans, not only undermined chances for success but also triggered growing alienation people from their politics.

In spite all fears of political leaders captured by the secret services' mentality and paternalistic political vision, public discussion around reform projects may made citizens political allies of them. In any event, it seems better to confront the inevitable, and possibly harsh, public criticism before adoption of laws, when there is still a chance to revise something, to find appropriate compromise. Whether in Russia or elsewhere, the experience of both successful and unsuccessful attempts to reform officialdom illustrates that it is vital to attract allies both within the bureaucracy as well as beyond it, inside society. Officialdom is, after all, heterogeneous, it concludes not only opponents, but also advocates of progressive changes. Certainly, it would be naïve to expect that even the most forward-looking officials could elaborate comprehensive programs themselves. However, a considerable part of them understands the necessity of reform and agree with the general direction of changes. The basis for thus conclusion are the author's multiple contacts with the Russian officials at different levels: there is significant number of reforming minded persons inside of administrative circles who could become allies of reform. To achieve a breakthrough, the political leadership must have an open dialogue both with administrators and society. Only clear political will, insistence and administrative honesty can provide the success of the reformist movement.

\textsuperscript{20} The phrase of Egor Gaidar.
The initial impulse for reform might come both from “above” and from “below”. But the agents of changes will have little chance for success unless they manage to attract popular sentiments in support of their initiatives. Without pressure of society, apparatus of state would incline to prevent its modernization, preferring to keep status quo.

Now some remarks on applicability of the “western” patterns of governance for post-Communist countries. There are different views on that. Some answers are negative, assuming that burden of mentality, “curse of tradition”, cultural and administrative “code” or “matrix”, etc., are the constant, unchangeable factors and “unlucky” societies doomed to carry this burden forever. These pre-mordialistic concepts are rather popular among some social antropologists, who consider autocracy as insuperable trait inherent to some societies supposedly “not adjusted for democracy”, at least, in foreseeable future. I disagree with this fatalistic view. Yes, tradition is very important but not a fatal factor. Moreover, efforts to overcome bad national traditions is an essential source for positive development. Even the history of the 20-th century gives us many remarkable examples of it. We are not enslaves by our past. Otherwise we would be doomed to repeat same mistakes time and again.

So, efforts to transform inherited autocratic pattern of bureaucratic officialdom towards true Public service seems the only reliable way for all post-Soviet style countries in order to avoid risk to be transformed into full-fledge “bureaucratic reign” with all inevitable consequences and abuses: uncontrollable growth of number and influence of Kafkian style bureaucracy with low effectiveness, flourishing corruption and revival of nomenclature system in technologically renovated forms.

Generally speaking, in spite of some limited, mostly technological successes in different areas of governance. Beyond that, it would be difficult to find any positive changes in the style and nature of it. More obvious is the state bureaucracy’s growth in number and self-satisfaction. Essential part of them acquitted the hyperbolic feeling of self-importance as a “new ruling class”, following concept of Milovan Dgilas, but in positive meaning of word. Even some changes to the good side, noted above, reduced mostly to excessive formalities than to real modernization of PS. Looks obvious that the Russian politico-bureaucratic top chose other priorities than true reform of it. Moreover, it considers reform as a jeopardy for its power, including unlimited usage of so-called “administrative resource”.

The recent geopolitical events and economic crisis made the prospects of reform even more uncertain, if not hopeless under current political regime.

A few concluding remarks from the Russian experience.

- The huge growth of amount and influence of patrimonial, corrupted, complacent and irresponsible bureaucracy in contemporary Russia is a consequence, in particular, of non conducting lustration (vetting) among former high rank Soviet "apparatchics" and KGB officers during perestroika and later.
- The most malignant foes of further reforms are not the people who failed during the first stage of them but so-called “early-winners”, i.e. those who won then and intend to save achieved privileged positions and wealth.
- So-called “administrative resource” is the worst and most dangerous bureaucratic mechanism for power abuses; effective struggle against it can be successful only under conditions of strict public control and independency of the judicial system.
- It is the state itself that is the major law violator in the modern Russia.
- Therefore, a good deal of public mistrust to authorities, contrary to usual views, contains a substantial progressive potential for positive political and administrative reforms.