The PAST, PRESENT and the FUTURE of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION in CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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The Past, Present and the Future of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe
THE PAST, PRESENT AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

This book has been developed on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of NISPAcee. It attempts to provide an overview of both NISPAcee and the state of public administration in the region over the last twenty years.

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NISPAcee is an international Association focused on public administration. Its mission is to promote and strengthen the effective and democratic governance and modernisation of public administration and policy throughout the NISPAcee region.
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The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the beginning of a period of very substantial and, in some instances, highly volatile political, economic and social change in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This, and other subsequent events, triggered a series of waves of transition that led to the emergence of market economies and democratic institution building in many of the countries of the region. From the very beginning, these processes were accompanied by a steady in-flow into the region of advisers, consultants, bankers, economists and academics from the West. This, in turn, led to many new forms of cooperation between East and West in the fields of public administration and public policy. However, two decades of experience since those historic days have shown that while in many instances this often highly welcomed cooperation produced the anticipated positive results, in other instances the outcome of this cooperation did not go as planned and did not meet the hoped-for expectations.

It was 20 years ago that the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration of Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) was established for the purpose of providing an institutional framework and a professional association which would serve to encourage the processes of modernization and transformation of the administrative systems of the region, as well as to encourage the spread of democratic principles and standards therein. One of the several goals of NISPAcee was to ensure the free flow of knowledge, ideas, best practices and successful experience, both among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and between East and West more generally. In addition, another central goal of NISPAcee was to link the practitioner community in the region with the academic and research community and, in so doing, to connect theory and practice.

In the 20 years since NISPAcee was founded, the transition processes in terms of the development of political, economic and administrative structures in most Central and Eastern European countries has proved to be both highly complex and somewhat unpredictable. Nevertheless, it has been a process that, in many respects, has been extraordinarily successful and a process to which NISPAcee’s
member institutions, and the Association as a whole, has in many ways contributed. While this period of transition has for many Central and Eastern European countries been almost completed, or at least is in its final stages, many of the theoretical and practical aspects of these processes and their impact (both positive and negative) on the social, political, economic and administrative systems of the individual countries still require in-depth scientific analysis.

The conferences, workshops, publications and training that NISPAcee has provided to institutions and individuals within the region have served to encourage greater cooperation both within and among countries, as well as the transfer of knowledge, ideas and experience between the East and the West. Equally as important, NISPAcee has played a major role both in helping to provide individuals with the skills required to engage effectively in local and national policy-making processes and has through many of its projects served to connect the academic and the policy-making communities. In so doing, the organization has helped to build the foundation upon which the modernization and development of administrative systems throughout the region has been built.

In fact, the impact of NISPAcee has been felt both at the regional and the national levels. Indeed, one might argue that its impact at the national level has been, in some cases, even more profound than its impact regionally. For example, in Poland, numerous people who have played significant roles in NISPAcee, have risen to very important positions in the Polish government, often based on their experience as leaders in programs that were both heavily influenced by and very active in NISPAcee. Individuals who have in the past (and currently) served as cabinet ministers, led the country’s civil-service system, guided its decentralization program and served on its constitutional court all have had important connections to NISPAcee.

Equally important in terms of the Polish experience, has been the impact of NISPAcee on the higher-education and training institutions which prepare the future leaders of its government and provide skill enhancement for many of its public administrators. Particularly notable in this regard has been the country’s national school of public administration, which has had very close ties to NISPAcee for most of the past two decades. NISPAcee has also played a very important role in helping to establish, and served as the model for, the development of Poland’s National Public Administration Education Association, which has become a major force in building the field of public administration in that country.

Romania is yet another country where the NISPAcee impact has been very profound on both its public-administration education and training sector and its gov-
ernment. Several individuals who have been active in NISPAcee have held positions at the highest levels of the Romanian government. They also have played a significant role in developing the Romanian public-administration association which has both shaped public-administration education and training in that country and has helped to strengthen those institutions which have produced individuals who have assumed important roles in the government of that country.

Nevertheless, while the impact of NISPAcee in terms of institution-building both across the region and within individual countries has been profound, the organization has performed many other important functions over its two-decade history. One of the most important of these is knowledge transfer into the region. However, twenty years of experience have shown that the transfer of knowledge is not, and should not be, simply a “one way street” or a “copy and paste” approach to governmental reform. It has demonstrated that models and solutions which have proven to be effective in one country or another cannot simply be transferred across borders and copied onto other environments. Indeed, 20 years of highly productive institutional development have demonstrated that while there are certainly many basic principles that are applicable in almost all situations, the specific and individual contexts must always be taken into account.

The 20th anniversary of NISPAcee is not only an important milestone for the organization, but it also provides an excellent opportunity to examine in a more detailed manner the considerable institutional development that has taken place within the region, as well as the role that East-West relations have played in these processes. As the principal organization promoting comprehensive scientific and professional analysis of these developments in the CEE region, NISPAcee is well positioned to lead the efforts to provide a clearer and more comprehensive picture of the processes of transformation that have occurred.

The aim of this book, *The Past, Present and the Future of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe*, is therefore twofold: 1.) we have tried to collect and to present to a broader academic and professional audience some of the most important aspects of the political, administrative, institutional and social transformation of the CEE countries in the last twenty years, as well as the role of NISPAcee in these processes, and: 2.) the book is also trying to collect data and reflections on NISPAcee work, activities and impacts as seen through the eyes of some of the most important individuals who have been closely involved in one way or another in these activities, and who personally have contributed to the NISPAcee success. Some of these people were from the region and were involved in managing, developing or chairing different working bodies and groups of NISPAcee over the past two decades. Others are people from around
the world – representatives of different international organizations, institutions and/or universities who decisively contributed to the development and international recognition of NISPAcee.

The book is divided into three parts. In Part I, we try to analyze and summarize some of the most significant trends and examples of political, societal and administrative transformation and reform in the region and how NISPAcee has been addressing and influencing these processes in order to make them more successful and predictable on the one hand and less painful for the affected societies on the other. Section I.A is a collection of chapters which from different perspectives analyze and depict the transformation of political and administrative space in the region. In some cases they also focus upon NISPAcee activities which helped to make these processes more effective by focusing on democratization and the development of the key political and administrative institutions according to accepted democratic standards.

Section I.B is composed of a collection of national reports and case studies from selected countries or groups of countries in the region. Each chapter seeks to analyze, summarize and outline the main trajectories and characteristics of the political and administrative reforms of the last twenty years. Obviously, these essays, while analytical and politically neutral, do reflect the authors’ own views and may be influenced by their roles in these processes. Section I.C is a collection of a few short essays on the current economic and fiscal crisis around the world and its impact in the CEE countries in particular, as well as its possible implications for the development of public-sector reforms in the future.

Part II of the book is a collection of shorter personal reflections on NISPAcee’s role and impact on the development of the region in a political and administrative context during the last twenty years and represents a small tribute to the 20th anniversary of the organization. NISPAcee’s remarkable international profile and image has been influenced and shaped by a great number of enthusiastic individuals who devoted a great amount of their precious time to the progress and recognition of NISPAcee.

Section II.A includes three remarkable speeches presented at the opening plenary of the 20th NISPAcee Annual Conference, 23–25 May 2012, Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia. The first, presented by Malkhas Mikeladze, commemorates the life of his sister, Mzia Mikeladze, the NISPAcee President who passed away in January 2012, prior to the conference. The second speech was the keynote address on the main conference theme: Public Administration East and West: Twenty Years of Development, presented by Barbara Kudrycka, the Minister of Science and Higher Education of Poland, who was a former President of NISPAcee and is one
of the outstanding personalities of the Network. The third speech was presented by Haiyan Qian, the Director of the Division of Public Administration and Development Management of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, long-time friend of NISPAcee, who, like Mzia Mikeladze, was taken away from us at far too young an age.

NISPAcee, as we know it today, would not exist without many enthusiastic and devoted individuals from various parts of the world, especially Western Europe and the United States. Although officially representing different international organizations, institutions and universities, in most instances their support and valuable advice very much exceeded the level of engagement and involvement expected of their formal positions. Through their personal involvement and support and in many different ways they contributed to the building of the organization and its international recognition. Some selected reflections on NISPAcee from these partners, indeed friends, of the organization are collected in Section II.B.

Similarly, Section II.C represents a collection of personal memoirs and experiences as related by individuals from NISPAcee member institutions in the region. These are individuals who were for many years actively involved as members of the most important governing and working bodies of the organization. They include individuals who have served as presidents, steering-committee members and working-group chairs. At the conclusion of Part II, Section II.D, we have collected some brief presentations of the work and results of NISPAcee’s permanent working groups.

Part III is a collection of some basic data and facts about NISPAcee, which reflects the organization’s extensive reach and its versatile portfolio of activities, conferences, workshops, projects and publications over the last twenty years. These materials taken together with the commentaries found in Part II, provide the reader with a very good sense of the breadth, depth and powerful impact of the organization’s activities upon public administration in Central and Eastern Europe.
There are always, in the case of preparing a book such as this, many people who
deserve acknowledgment for the final product whose names do not appear on
the front page. In the case of this book, this is especially so given that it serves not
only to present an overview of the development and the current state of public
administration in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but it also provides a his-
tory of an organization as well. Like all organizations, NISPAcee would not have
developed into the extraordinary entity that it is without the very considerable
devotion and extraordinarily valuable contributions of time, knowledge and ex-
pertise of many individuals who have voluntarily worked and cooperated with
NISPAcee for many years. We do not dare try to name all of them because the
list, no matter how long, would always be incomplete. However, there are certain
individuals and organizations for whom we must express our deep respect and
gratitude. The first two individuals both served as NISPAcee Presidents, the late
Alena Brunovská and the late Mzia Mikeladze, who both much tragically passed
away too early. Alena Brunovská served as the first NISPAcee President between
1994 and 1997 and played a very important role in the official launching and
founding of NISPAcee and in bringing the organization into full operation. Mzia
Mikeladze served as President between 2006 and 2008 and again between 2010
and 2012. She played a very important role in strengthening the organization
during times when the financial crisis had begun to threaten NISPAcee activities.

The reputation, role and success of an international organization depend on more
than the governing bodies and the people at the top of them. In many instances,
to an equal extent, they also depend on the skilled and devoted work of the or-
ganization’s professional staff. Hence, an important share of the contribution to
the overall success and outstanding development of the organization also goes
to its secretariat headed, since 1995, by Executive Director Ľudmila Gajdošová.

NISPAcee must also acknowledge the very important support of external do-
nor organizations and partners who, from the very beginning, provided not only
substantial financial support, but critical expertise and advice. Several of these
individuals and organizations are noted and/or included in Part II of the book.
The most important of these organizations which provided critical assistance
during the organization’s early years include the Austrian Federal Academy and its Director Theo Oehlinger, and the SIGMA/OECD program headed by Bob Bonwitt. NISPAcee is grateful both for their initial support and the assistance that continued for many more years. Also, of great assistance has been the Local Governance Initiative of the Open Society Institute of Hungary for both its financial support and the great personal support from Violeta Zentai. NISPAcee is also very grateful to the US National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, which, initially under Executive Director Al Zuck and then Executive Director Michael Brinntall, secured the support of US private foundations immediately after the establishment of NISPAcee and then later was able to obtain important USAID grants for projects jointly implemented for the benefit of NISPAcee and its members.

As mentioned above, the list of all those who require our acknowledgement could never be complete as there would be hundreds of names. We apologize to all those who are not named here. Nevertheless, we are extremely grateful to all of those thousands of individuals who have actively participated in NISPAcee conferences, trainings and other events, research programs and projects and contributed to NISPAcee publications. We are especially thankful to those who have written articles for this anniversary book and enabled the celebration of NISPAcee achievements in the region. These are the people who have created the substance of the network, all the members, officers, partners, contributors, donors, as well as beneficiaries. Finally, we are especially appreciative of various individuals who have helped in the preparation of this book manuscript. These include Ľudmila Gajdošová, Juraj Sklenár and Carlota Valdes.
PART I

Political and Administrative Transformation: Critical Analysis and Synthesis of the Last 20 Years and the Role of NISPAcee
The emergence of a professional community, as well as the governmental and institutional development of the region of which it is a part, is the topic of Part I of this book. In Europe and in the United States, a broad range of international networks concerned with public administration and governance reform – both global and regional – have recently been developing and NISPAcee has become a prominent core organization for those specifically concerned with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Thus, as the CEE region has been transforming itself both governmentally and economically over the past two decades, so too has public administration education and research in the CEE countries become an integral part of Euro-Atlantic developments in this regard.

The papers in Part I also serve to demonstrate that NISPAcee has become a major participant in and supporter of the reform process in the region. NISPAcee activities and projects have been planned and implemented in a dramatically changing environment of massive governmental, economic and administrative reforms and scholars associated with the organization have also, as the papers in Part I further indicate, documented and assessed these reform efforts. In so doing, they have addressed many of the key politico/administrative issues in the region. This has had a significant impact on the various CEE countries as regards the building of awareness of the necessity of reforms and in the development of comparative analysis of common principles, good practices and benchmarking for the region. NISPAcee has also helped to build bridges and networks among academicians and practitioners in the CEE region and the West. The work of those associated with NISPAcee has also:

- contributed to the smooth accession of several CEE countries to the European Union
- provided description and analysis of the fundamental, long-term changes in the economic and socio-political environment of the CEE governments
- supported the development of a dynamic stability for public agencies in a rapidly, sometimes unpredictably, changing environment
• strengthened the institutional capacities of public agencies throughout the region
• contributed to the encouragement of a shift from a governmental focus upon task execution to one of solving complicated problems
• helped to create much closer ties between the public sector, the private enterprises and the civil society organisations.

As a consequence of its activities, NISPAcee helped to create common agendas and vocabularies through its series of annual conferences, sub-regional meetings, and workshops. It has also helped develop joint research agendas and contributed to the creation of region wide-shared theories, concepts, and methods which were applied in both the conduct of and the analysis of public policy making in the various CEE countries.

Today, NISPAcee is an important forum for the exchange of experiences, knowledge and new ideas in the public administration domain in the region. It has helped support the development of a “convergence” of Central and Eastern European thinking about the need for government and economic reform, while also maintaining and strengthening national distinctivenesses at the same time.

The country reports from Central and Eastern Europe that follow clearly demonstrate that the political-administrative context of each CEE country has affected the form and content of public administration education there. They further indicate that the general trends in public administration modernisation and education reforms have resulted in models with national differences. In general, they are different from models from other parts of the world and other parts of Europe. The common feature of them has been to move away from the pre-Weberian state-party systems in the direction of legal states, the implementation of market incentives, and the implementation of administrative principles, such as openness, transparency, reliability, predictability, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.

More recently, scholars associated with NISPAcee have worked to find the proper answers to the challenges caused by the global economic, financial, social and political crisis. The papers of Part I also suggest that NISPAcee has and must continue to develop – directly and indirectly – the ability to contribute to the relevant analysis of the current crisis symptoms and to find new ways of problem solving not only in the region, but also worldwide.

NISPAcee scholars have learned from the experiences of the modern democracies as they have avoided the threat of “intellectual colonization” at the same time. NISPAcee has had a decisive role in public administration education – including
public law, public economics, public policy and public management – in the region as it has developed strategic and action oriented partnerships with academics and practitioners of modern democracies.

The publication of this volume serves to suggest that the first period of this cooperation is over. The organization and those associated with it, have had many achievements and learned many lessons as well. New challenges are arising and new answers are needed. The papers included in this section provide many suggestions regarding new questions which need to be addressed. Among them are:

- the need to institutionalize successful teaching programmes and develop them as double degree or joint degree programmes, or even into various multilateral initiatives
- the need to move to a model in which there is a greater balance among Eastern and Western partners. In that regard, it is in the mutual interest of EGPA and NISPAcee to promote more effective and equal partnerships
- the need to develop more cooperative programmes in education and research which must be tailored to particular regional and national needs. In that regard, cultural differences especially must be recognised.
- the need to place greater emphasis upon emerging problem areas and crucial and controversial policy issues.

Thus, it is clear that the time has come to begin a second period in terms of NISPAcee’s relationship with its various partners both within Europe and outside of it. The papers in this section serve to document the very real achievements made during the first two decades in the history of NISPAcee. However, there are many economic, social, political and administrative issues that continue to exist within the various countries of the CEE region and it is these problems which NISPAcee, and the scholars who make up the network, will address in this next era.
Section I.A

Historical Overview: 20 Years of Transition

MIRKO VINTAR

1. Introduction

The twentieth anniversary represents an important milestone in the life of a man, let alone an organisation, and at this festive occasion I shall try to give an account of this exciting path of NISPAcee in which I had the honour to take part. My version of the (hi)story will most likely lean towards the genre of personal memoirs rather than a scientific analysis of NISPAcee development, nevertheless an attempt will be made to include elements of both. Through these 20 years NISPAcee has evolved into one of the leading and most influential international associations of institutions and individuals in the field of public administration, not only within Europe but in a much broader context, and thus has gone far beyond the goals initially defined in its title (Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe). Through its broad range of activities NISPAcee has influenced the development of public administrations in Central and Eastern Europe in many ways and has contributed to a better transfer of knowledge and experience from Western Europe and the USA, where the theory and practice of administration science have a much longer tradition and where the field of public administration was not subjected to half a century of complete suppression by politics. All these contributions have had an invaluable impact on the development of administration in and beyond this region, both in the sense of a state-administration system and administration as a scientific and specialised discipline.

1.1 The birth of NISPAcee and its first steps

The first and foremost credit goes to Dr. Theo Oehlinger, former Director of the Austrian Administration Academy, who proposed, during one of the coffee breaks at the IASIA conference in Vienna in July 1992, to organise a similar event for the CEE region and thus support the process of administrative reform in those countries. I welcomed the idea and promised to help organise the initial meeting, which he then really hosted in Vienna in January 1993 and later another meeting in October of the same year, both at the premises of the Austrian Federal Administrative Academy. At this second meeting with about 15 participants the preparations started for a broader gathering in Bratislava with around 30 participants from both Eastern and Western Europe (Austria, Germany, Denmark etc.), where a formal resolution was made to found the NISPAcee international
organisation in that same year. The foundation took place with three founding members (Academia Istropolitana, Bratislava, Slovakia, Austrian Federal Administrative Academy, Vienna and University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), and a joint decision was made that the headquarters of the new organisation was to be in Bratislava, where a secretary’s office was set up. The first official managing board was formed simultaneously, presided over by Alena Brunovská, now deceased, who is to be credited for the fast execution of administrative procedures and a fast registration of NISPAcee under Slovak law.

From then on NISPAcee grew quickly and within a few years established itself as a respectable international player in the field of administration, outgrowing similar organisations not only by size but primarily by the multitude of its activities, including annual conferences, numerous projects and publishing books and journals. This fast expansion and successful development can be attributed to several key factors, which should be given acknowledgment at this important anniversary. The first element of success was the setting up of a strong and professional secretariat, primarily due to the first president, Alena Brunovská. Another important factor was the fact that strong support in terms of knowledge and experience was offered from the very beginnings from our Western colleagues. During this initial period the support of the Austrian Administrative Academy, as well as our sibling organisation EGPA, was absolutely crucial. Last but not least, some of our key sponsors deserve to be mentioned here, in particular the Open Society Fund and LGI.

1.2 The goals of this paper

In the remainder of this paper we attempt to reach beyond the level of “family” chronicle at the occasion of a birthday celebration and focus on an analysis of NISPAcee actions through the past 20 years, more specifically by analysing its main activities (conferences, WGs and projects). Our aim is to shed light on the questions below:

1. Which were the main challenges in the administrations of CEE countries in the beginning of the 90s, and which of these challenges benefited most from expert knowledge and transfer of experience from Western Europe?

2. How did NISPAcee respond to these challenges, which issues were addressed within the scope of its functions, and were these responses adequate and prompt?

3. Can the contemporary state of affairs in the administrations of CEE countries serve as a basis for assessing our efforts and what conclusions can be drawn for the future?
2. The politico-administrative context into which NISPAcee was born and the main courses of action

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and at the beginning of the “transition”, a process which brought to many citizens of the region more negative than positive consequences, the administrations of both new and newly reformed countries were faced with entirely novel, and yet very different circumstances. Some new countries emerging from the former Soviet Union had to start developing their administrative systems from scratch, because the Soviet Union was a very centralised country with a centrally-planned economy where all major decisions were made in Moscow. The so-called Communist Bloc countries had to establish fully functional administrative systems, but they were to a large extent incapable of managing the transition from a totalitarian system – where a single party was making all the decisions and had full control over the entire public sector – to a Western-type democracy, and even less of dealing with the complex process of transforming the centrally-planned national economy into a market economy with primarily private ownership. In this respect the transition was least painful, at least at its beginning, in the countries of former Yugoslavia, which had been a federation granting a relatively high level of autonomy to its member republics, so that they already had their own administrative systems which had established to some extent a semi-market economy with a substantial share of private ownership, especially in agriculture.

The key changes in all of these administrative systems involved two main processes:

1. The process of transition into a democratic society where executive power is in the hands of democratically elected representatives and is exerted by some democratic standards;

2. The process of implementing a market economy and fast privatisation of companies formerly owned by the state.

In most countries of the region both of these processes were the source of numerous difficulties with lasting consequences, but the greatest damage was most likely caused by critical errors committed in the second area: economic damage, uncontrolled appropriation and redistribution of national wealth. NISPAcee was founded at a time when in most countries these transitional processes only just started, but it was already becoming clear that the state administrations were unable to cope with the enormous tasks they were facing without a fundamental administrative reform, yet for such a reform there was little know-how and even less experience. As is stated in the OECD report (OECD 2005):
For CEE countries, the starting positions, the challenges, the capacity to change, and the initial objectives were quite different from most of the Western European countries, except, for example, Portugal, or Spain.

It was therefore crucial to establish the channels and instruments necessary to transfer this knowledge from the West to the East, whereby a mechanical copying of Western solutions, often vigorously defended by visiting advisors, could bring more harm than relief, especially if applied uniformly to the extremely diverse countries in this region. There were almost no local experts with suitable administrative education who could adapt the know-how from abroad and apply it to their own administrative environment and culture. Public administration as an academic or scientific discipline was underdeveloped or non-existent in most countries; similarly there were little or no contacts or channels of co-operation between the countries within the region. Jak Jabes (Jabes 2008) points out in his introduction of NISPAcee:

Against a zeitgeist that wanted to cooperate only with the western European countries, NISPAcee was founded to reinforce the view that transition countries had much more to share among each other, and borrow from each other than from the West to advance educational initiatives in the public administration field.

In 1991, there were but a handful of educational institutes between Trieste and Vladivostok dedicated to the education and training of public servants.

2.1 Main areas and forms of action

At the time of the creation of NISPAcee there were already several other similar international organisations which could serve as a model, in particular EGPA (European Group of Public Administration) in Europe and NASPAA (National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration) in the USA. However, given this specific situation it was only natural that NISPAcee adopted a wide range of aims from the very beginning:

- Establishing networks and channels for a transfer of know-how and experience between W-E and E-E;
- Developing the administrative discipline and science with a focus on public-sector reforms;
- Developing the institutions and systems of administration and those pertaining to a state of law;
• Raising the awareness of academics and practitioners about the key concepts and models of public governance (public policy);
• Developing conceptual approaches and standards of efficiency and quality in the public sector;
• Developing basic administrative principles, values and code of ethics;
• Developing systems of education and training for public servants.

When NISPAcee was launched in 1994 its capacity to address enormous problems with which national administrations in the CEE countries were struggling was, for understandable reasons, very weak. Despite a number of very enthusiastic professionals and academics from the region and several very supporting Western organisations (Austrian Federal Academy, OECD-SIGMA etc.) who devoted a considerable amount of their strength and knowledge to the development of the new-born network, it was very difficult to start as support was desperately needed on so many fronts. But most of these initial problems were overcome very quickly and successfully which was demonstrated through the fast-growing number of activities and their complexity.

Hence the vitality and impact of NISPAcee can be measured by the multitude of its activities aimed at enhancing the development of the public sector in the CEE region and beyond. How successful NISPAcee was over the last twenty years in these terms can be concluded from the numbers presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Overview of NISPAcee activities/events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity/Event</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Conferences</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Summer Schools/Workshops</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Courses</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Groups (within annual conferences)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications (conference/summer school proceedings, selected papers)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching and Training Materials</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISPAcee Scientific Journal</td>
<td>V Volumes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Projects</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of NISPAcee’s main activities is organising an annual conference. This tradition started with the Bled Conference in 1995, which coincided with the begin-
ning of fulfilling one of its main goals – developing administrative theory and practice in PA as well as PA as an academic discipline, all of which had been almost completely neglected in most countries of the region during the communist era. In the mid-nineties PA started to emerge at universities and institutes as an independent field of research and study, in part definitely also due to NISPAcee efforts. These annual conferences soon became an important forum for experts and researchers of the region and gradually attracted academic colleagues from Western Europe and the USA as well. This facilitated and accelerated the transfer of knowledge and experience between East and West, which was particularly crucial in the first few transitional years. Administrative models and approaches, however, cannot be blindly transposed from one environment to the next, and this awareness contributed to an intensification of contacts between transitional states and their respective administrative experts themselves.

Very soon NISPAcee also initiated the organisation of international summer schools, which were intended primarily for the education and training of junior teachers and researchers in the key areas of the public sector. Table 1 shows that these summer events were organised approximately every two years.

### 2.2 Some indicative milestones

For the first few years, NISPAcee conferences were organised into sections without standing working committees, because the sections were called each year on a specific topic. However, as early as 1999 the concept of “permanent working groups” was introduced, pursuing the idea that a certain topic is to be researched and developed over several years, which would give room for more in-depth analyses on the one hand and highly specialised and interconnected teams on the other. The concept of permanent working groups is familiar to many other international scientific and expert associations and certainly brings higher standards in the quality of analysis, research methodology and – most importantly – results. By introducing permanent WGs NISPAcee certainly committed itself to a higher level of quality. We can argue that the introduction of permanent working groups and the very fast growth of them in terms of their number as well as quality of research represented one of the first important milestones in the development of the organisation.

This mode of operation soon prevailed and became the preferred method of organising work within annual conferences. The WGs are normally appointed for 3 years, sometimes for a longer period. To this day there have been 26 working groups, investigating nearly every important topic concerning public-sector development within the region and beyond. The number of WGs operating at the
same time started at 2–3 and gradually progressed to 8–10; this limit is partly related to the capacities of conference venues.

The next symbolic milestone in the progress of NISPAcee annual conferences was reached in 2004, when instead of the traditional conference proceedings, a volume of selected papers was issued as a book. This was a proof of NISPAcee’s impact with growing numbers of submissions each year, but even more significantly it raised the bar of quality for the papers selected for publication.

From its very beginnings, the belief was strong within NISPAcee that high-quality publications addressing authentic problems of the countries and administration in the region were crucial for scientific and academic development. The fulfilment of this goal, however, was not entirely smooth. The first obstacle turned out to be the language; despite the fact that for most countries in the region there was no better lingua franca than English, this choice presented a considerable communication problem at first. The second issue concerned the quality and range of available scientific and specialised literature. In retrospect the past 20 years of publications in this field give testimony of an impressive development not only in terms of the range and diversity of research, but primarily in terms of scientific quality and methodological soundness of research approaches. By 2008 these activities have reached a level of maturity which resulted in the launch of the NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy; this important step marks the third milestone in the life of NISPAcee.

In summary, in the twenty years since its foundation NISPAcee has been continuously growing with respect to its membership, conference participants, publication and other activities and, most importantly, quality. It soon reached the influence of other – much older – similar organisations in Europe, in particular EGPA (European Group of Public Administration), which initially served as a role model, but particularly in terms of quality of academic debate within its working groups, EGPA was later outperformed by NISPAcee in many respects, particularly in the diversity of its activities and projects.

3. An analysis of the main NISPAcee activities

In the remainder of this paper we try to analyse the main activities of NISPAcee with the aim of evaluating its responses to the pressing problems the transitional countries were facing while seeking solutions for managing the reforms of the public sector. These challenges were all the more demanding due to the fact that there was no solid base of past experience they could rely on, nor could they completely trust the recipes offered by Western experts.
3.1 NISPAcee through the lens of annual conferences and main conference themes

The chief products of NISPAcee’s yearly activities were annual conferences. They provided a forum to present research results, exchange experiences and good practices as well as meet like-minded experts and academics working on similar issues. From the start, the basic principle was to organise each conference in close co-operation with a local host, who would be involved in programme issues and would choose a particular local topic or theme which would be of interest to other participants and help broaden their horizons. The choice of venue is therefore important for several reasons: On the one hand the organisation is expanding its area of influence into the country hosting the conference, and on the other hand it gets a detailed and genuine insight into the processes and problems of public administration in the host country.

An assessment of the success of NISPAcee in fulfilling its mission through the annual conferences shall be made on the basis of two parameters:

- The geographical coverage of the region through the selection of conference venues;
- A substantive analysis of the research topics and problems chosen as “main conference themes” or as focal topics among the “permanent working groups”.

As the name NISPAcee itself suggests, the organisation was founded with the purpose of contributing to a faster and better development as well as to a smoother tackling of transitional problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Figure 1 clearly shows that the venues of NISPAcee’s annual conferences covered the region of Central Europe very well from the very beginning, while the countries of the former Soviet Union – with the exception of the Baltic States – and the region of the Western Balkans were underrepresented. Fortunately this injustice is now being repaired, as NISPAcee has had a series of conferences in the Balkan region in the last couple of years (Montenegro: 2009, Bulgaria: 2011, Macedonia: 2012, Serbia: 2013). One of the strategic tasks in the near future is to intensify the activities towards the East, in particular to Middle Asia and the Caucasus region.
In terms of the number of participants it seems that over the last few years NISPAcee reached numbers between 250 and 300 participants, which seems to be its natural scope and the goal for the future conferences (Figure 2).

The substantive analysis of NISPAcee conferences will be focused on the topics addressed through the selection of NISPAcee conference “main themes” and through the established working groups since 1999 when the first two WGs were established. We have been trying to select the main concepts which appear to be in the focus of NISPAcee’s research and study activities in the past twenty years, and design them into a kind of semantic grids.
3.2 NISPAcee through the lens of selected “conference main themes”

The selected topic for the “Conference main theme” every year is trying to shed light on an important topic, issue, challenge or problem around which organisers are trying to draw debate and attention of the academic and professional community before, during and after the conference. The nodes in the semantic grid presented in Figure 3 are pointing at the topics which were addressed and highlighted over the past one and a half decades. Although on a very abstract level, our observation can lead to the conclusion that NISPAcee, through the selection of conference main themes, very well followed the historical trajectory of political and administrative development in the region and stimulated debate around the topics which were very important for professionalisation of PA as a profession and as an important sub-system of the society.
3.3 NISPAcee through the lens of established and operating WGs

When we are looking back and trying to evaluate NISPAcee’s activities, the most important question would probably be: did NISPAcee do the right things and at the right time? Namely we know that over the last twenty years the challenges which governments in the region were confronting were changing all the time. During the early stages of transition in most countries very basic problems of making systems work within completely new political and economic frameworks were at the forefront, thus reforms of existing administrative structures and principles were of the utmost priority. Later on more refined topics and specific areas were put on the governmental agendas. In that respect we decided to analyse NISPAcee conferences via their main activities, i.e. established and operating working groups and their research areas and topics. To date NISPAcee established 26 different permanent WGs, a number which does not give us enough room to do an in-depth analysis of their scope, research and results, although it would be good to do it some time in the future. Again we took a much easier route and looked specifically at their core focus.
We selected the main concepts surfacing through the names of WGs and ordered them into a semantic grid. After semantic and substantive analysis we concluded that most of the concepts analysed and researched can be grouped into two clusters. In the first cluster, which is presented in Figure 4, we included WGs which were in the majority and which, through their scope and work, were addressing PA reforms issues in one way or another. The rest of the WGs and their research focus can be grouped into the cluster of topics addressing policies, efficiency and quality of services in PA (Figure 5).

3.3.1 NISPAcee focus on PA reforms

As Tony Verheijen described it in one of the very early comparative analysis of East/West experiences (Verheijen 1997): “… the reshaping of the public administration/public management and the redefinition of its role in the state as well as society proved to be a very complex and demanding task for most of the states and their governments.” In many CEE countries politicians were very eager to look for models and solutions implemented in the “Western countries”. Nevertheless in the same period many “Western” governments (and some others like New Zealand and Australia) were also implementing more or less radical reforms influenced mainly by the New Public Management (NPM) doctrine. Hence NPM principles appeared to be a very promising leading line along which public-administration reforms should have been developed in CEE countries, in particular since at that time there were very few empirical studies available concerning the “good” and also the “bad” impacts of NPM. Particularly, rapid “privatisation” of largely state-owned companies and services in the former communist countries looked very appealing for the new governments. In this “reforming atmosphere”, which was in the air in the nineties, it was only logical that NISPAcee began very early to establish WGs focusing on comparative studies of these reforming agendas in the region. A brief overview over the WGs’ topics in this cluster and their logical structure reveals that content-wise and time-wise NISPAcee very well directed its work on the most relevant PA reform issues since 1999, when the first WG has been launched.
Figure 4
NISPAcee WGs’ topics addressing Administrative Reform issues
3.3.2 NISPAcee WGs addressing policies, efficiency and quality issues

As David Coombes says “… the main concern of ‘public management’ in West European states seems to be efficiency, even in an especially narrow sense, economic efficiency” (Coombes 1997). Hence it seems logical that other aspects which have been pointedly addressed through main NISPAcee activities were related to public policies, efficiency, effectiveness and quality of public services. Since the beginning a number of WGs were established and run focusing on those issues (Figure 5). Later on this focus was even broadened, and WGs dealing with topics like e-government and administrative burden were introduced.

**Figure 5**

NISPAcee WGs’ topics addressing policies, efficiency and quality issues
4. Conclusions

The huge amount of activities and projects through which NISPAcee has been involved in the development of PA in the region over the last twenty years would require much more comprehensive analysis in order to give us a solid ground for evaluation of its impact. Our improvised substantive analysis of these activities and selected topics leads us to the conclusion that NISPAcee (sometimes probably more intuitively than systematically) steered research and debate on all key open politico/administrative issues of the recent past without big detours from the main stream of events and development. We can say that NISPAcee has been addressing more or less the right topics at the right time and through all these activities NISPAcee established itself as an important forum for exchange of experiences, knowledge and new ideas in the PA/PM domain in the region. Even if we had a kind of “time machine” and if we were able to return back into the past for twenty years and start the whole process again, I do not think that there are many things which would require a much different approach or different timing.

Of course, NISPAcee did not try to deliver recipes since there has been an understanding from the very beginning that the principle “one size fits all” would cause more harm than benefits. NISPAcee’s primary foci were on building awareness on the necessity of reforms, comparative analysis of common principles, good practices, benchmarking and on building bridges and networks between the institutions and experts in the region and West-East. All these contributed to a better transfer of knowledge and expertise among the main stakeholders in the countries and between them. In the second half of the nineties practically all Central European countries became candidate countries for accession to the EU, which sped up the reform processes and contributed to setting up special reform agendas in those countries. We can argue that NISPAcee considerably contributed through its activities to a smooth accession of eight countries from CE to the EU.

NISPAcee directly and indirectly contributed a great deal in building institutions needed for faster development of PA as a professional and as an academic discipline. If we had only a handful of schools, institutes and programmes in PA in the whole region at the beginning of the nineties, today we have dozens of them, many already accredited and working according to the highest European standards.

However, in light of the deep financial and economic crisis, roaring public debts and budget deficits which serve to many governments in the region as an excuse for austerity measures against the public sector and the social welfare state in general, it seems that some basic PA principles and rules of conduct are again
at stake. In this new situation the mission of NISPAcee may become even more important in the future than it was in the past twenty years.

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Transition and Transformation: The Last 20 Years and the Role of NISPAcee

GYÖRGY JENEI

Introduction (Transition and Transformation)

The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) was established in 1994 in response to the needs coming to light with the immense political, economic and social transformation in the Central and Eastern European region.

In 1990 Lord Dahrendorf raised the following questions on the transition: “What does it all mean, and where is it going to lead? Are we not witnessing a process of dissolution without anything taking the place of the old and admittedly dismal structures?”

These questions were raised in his work entitled “Reflections on the Revolution in Europe”, written in the form of a letter, dated April 1990, “intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Warsaw.” A model for his writing was Edmund Burke, who, in a similar letter in 1790, “intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Paris,” articulated his opinions concerning the French Revolution.

The envisaged ideal schedule of transition to democracy develops according to Dahrendorf as follows: first comes the problem of constitution, a new political order has to be found, without arbitrariness and on the basis of “Rule of Law”. It can be established in 6 months. Then “normal” politics bursts in, and economic reform must be executable within this environment. It can take 6 years. The key, however, the lengthiest process, according to Dahrendorf is the third problem: the emergence of civil society:

“The third condition of the road to freedom is to provide the social foundations which transform the constitution and the economy from fair-weather into all-weather institutions capable of withstanding the storms generated within and without, and sixty years are barely enough to lay these foundations.” (Dahrendorf 1990, 100)

And this process needs 60 years. Dahrendorf’s formula has basically proved to be relevant in the past two decades, and we are now in the middle of a special transition.
In this process all the essential components have been transformed, the economic and political system, the system of public education, health care and social policy etc.

In other words the mainstream process in the region consists of a series of transformations, and the final result is the transition. NISPAcee has been connected to one of the transformations: the politico-administrative transformation.

But you can identify exceptional countries in the region where the transition was not combined with transformation.

In these cases transition has a simplified meaning and transformations are superficial. Sometimes it means that money goes from the pockets of the old elite to the pockets of the new elite.

On the other hand in the mainstream countries of our region substantial politico-administrative transformation was accomplished and has not been finished yet. NISPAcee has contributed to a unique transformation without any historical precedents. It means that NISPAcee has had to cope with unique challenges of the changing politico-administrative requirements.

1. Unique politico-administrative challenges in the NISPAcee region and the first bridging function of NISPAcee

1.1 The starting point

In the Western world the “Rechtsstaat”, and the traditional Weberian public-administration system were the starting points in the 1990s.

At the same time in Central and Eastern Europe – on the other hand – the starting point was a state-party or party-state system in totalitarian or in authoritarian versions.

The history of Central and Eastern Europe swarms with turning points. Following World War II – it is an interesting historical coincidence – Europe was severed along the Elba-Saale and the Leitha Rivers, following the borders of the Carolingian Empire, which existed more than a thousand years ago.

In the 1980s the communist world was haunted by a ghost, it was the ghost of democracy; in Central and Eastern Europe socialism reached the final point of its historical existence; central planning and totalitarian state control came to be defeated.

What was this so-called “existing socialism”?
According to Raymond Aron it was a loop instead of a progress. But it is perhaps best expressed by the Hungarian joke which looks upon existing socialism as the longest and most painful transition from capitalism to capitalism. Anyway, it did not have much to do with social ideals, instead it was bureaucratic tyranny with a new elite and privileged class, under the veil of a new religion, the religion of “historical progress”.

In 1990 the “historical progress” of Central and Eastern Europe ended up in a dead-end street. For the model had been built on the short-term utilisation of the energies of production, and thus it could not be maintained in the long run since it disrupted the social relationships and devoured the social energies.

The efforts to maintain the model met with social resistance, which could only be restricted with the help of political-ideological and power constraints.

The year 1990 terminated the dictatorships referred to as socialism.

All those events opened up new opportunities for the countries of the Central and Eastern European region: to catch up with Europe, to find the way to Europe, and the list of luring metaphors could be continued.

1.2 The transitional framework

(Organic transition in the mainstream and functional transition in CEE region)

Historically, there are two types of systematic transitions to a market economy. The first is a long process of an essentially market-led, evolutionary type of transition – we can call it the “organic” type. This was the road followed by Great Britain, the first industrial nation, and later followed by the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. In this type of transition, the state did not play a dominant role; rather it merely facilitated growth and supported the economy.

However the above-mentioned countries represented an attracting model for the NISPAcee region, but the output and productivity standards of the organic model were tested over more than a century of economic progress. NISPAcee countries could not get closer to these standards and therefore they were forced to go another way, because the civil societies and the market forces were weak in these countries. This type was a functional, state-led transition, in which the role of the state is decisive, especially in the beginning. It creates the overall legal and economic framework for the transition and also serves as a major economic agent. However, even though the role of the state in functional transitions is critical, the state does not usurp the place of the private economy and the civil society (Feinstein et al. 1990)
In this functional transition NISPAcee countries started from a highly unfavourable position compared to the organic type. They had to begin the transition with the state in the dominant position, to answer to an external constraint. They had no other choice. Countries in the NISPAcee region could not follow the organic type with the following systemic changes in the direction of market capitalism:

- transition from a feudal economy and society initiated in the second half of the 19th century by Tsar Alexander II and his ministers in Russia and by the leaders of Meiji Restoration in Japan;
- the return from fascism and state control to their previous market-led system by West Germany, Italy and Japan after defeat in World War II;
- transition from autarchy and state control in Spain after 1959.

But the transition could not be completed with the central position of the state. The role of the private enterprises and the civil society should increase, and the precondition of the completed transition is when the civil society is in the dominant position.

It means: nowadays the crucial precondition of the transition is that the role of civil society should increase further until it will replace the state in the long run.

To summarise: the basic characteristics of the transitional process in the CEE countries were substantially different from Western Europe.

1.3 Political framework
(Mainstream pattern and CEE pattern)

In the mainstream developments of the democratic political system there were three main stages:

- direct democracy;
- representative democracy;
- post-parliamentary, so-called participative democracy.

At the very beginning the need for direct and active involvement of citizens was stressed. The widespread political participation of the citizens was the most important criterion of the democratic political system.

In the second stage the role of regular competitive elections was emphasised, as Schumpeter defined democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1947, 269). It is the description of the model of indirect democracy.
Recently the mainstream pattern of democracy has reached the third, so-called “post-parliamentary”, or participative stage. It means that the role of pressure groups has been increased. The organised groups of the civil society – as consumers, tenants, parents or patients – required from the parties and governments to take into consideration their advice. The very essence of the third stage is that public policies are developed and implemented in negotiation between government agencies and pressure groups organised into policy communities.

In this model of democracy the role of social groups is much greater than in a representative democracy. In these participative democracies pressure groups have grown up alongside the formal institutions of government and political system. They have developed a bargaining power, and governments and parties have had to seek the consent of and cooperation with these pressure groups.

But the democratic political system in the CEE region has been frozen in the stage of a representative democracy now. I would add that a special version of representative democracy has been implemented. In this version the party leaders are supposed to be charismatic and democracy reduced for the citizens regular participation in the voting process. And nothing else!

There are two problems with this version. Firstly strong social groups do not accept it. The public opinion polls show a frightening decline in the personal prestige of the politicians. Very limited confidence exists in the political institutions and in the public agencies anymore. (Exceptions are a few local politicians, among them even city mayors, as well.) This level of mistrust endangers the stability of the democratic system.

In a comparative perspective we can raise the question: What model of democracy has emerged in the NISPAcee region?

Definitely it could not be described with the terms of participative democracy. The very essence of this model of democracy is the widespread political participation, the direct and active involvement of citizens as decision makers in public-policy-making. CEE models do not meet these criteria, because the institutional mechanisms of participative involvement either have not been set up (mechanisms of civil dialogue) or they are established, but they do not function in the day-to-day practice of policy making (mechanisms of social dialogue).

CEE models were somewhat similar to the representative democracy when regular competitive elections are the core of the political system. But with a deviation. The parties are not only competitors, but they created a polarisation in the competition, which resulted in a fragmentation in the party system and a lack of trust toward the state and a mutual one inside the society.
It is deadlock situation. The integrative political organisations, the pressure groups and the civil-society organisations are not able to force the parties moving out from this deadlock of fragmentation. The democracy here has an unbalanced institutional background. The centrifugal forces (parties) have essentially more strength then the centripetal, integrative forces (trade-unions, pressure groups, civil-society organisations). Even sometimes these centripetal, integrative forces only imitate their socio-political functions, because some of them were created by parties and therefore they are extended arms of various parties. (It is the Trockyst version of the involvement of civil society organisations)

1.4 Public administration framework
(Mainstream pattern and CEE pattern)

The mainstream public-administration reforms has had three stages: (It is outlined in the book of Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004)

The three stages are as follows:

- the first stage was the traditional Weberian model with the dominance of hierarchical mechanisms;
- then the different functions of policy-making were uncoupled, involvement of various actors in public-service provision (private enterprises and civil-society organisations) and an increasing role of market mechanisms have become widespread;
- in the third stage horizontal integration was added to the hierarchical and market integration, struggling with the danger of fragmentation.

Most of the EU countries are in the third stage now, but the coordinative mechanisms are not always able to counterbalance the impact of market-type mechanisms and hierarchical vertical integration.

What about the NISPAcee region?

Firstly the starting point was different. It was not the traditional Weberian model, but a pre-Weberian model, a state-party and party-state system.

In the first place there were essential changes in the functions of the state. The functions of a typical socialist state were abandoned, and new functions had evolved. These fundamental changes regarding the functions can be characterised as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions of the State</th>
<th>Before the transition</th>
<th>After the transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organising the economy</td>
<td>Providing the legal framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-educative</td>
<td>Less emphasis on ideology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of the society</td>
<td>Restoration of the civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were essential changes in the day-to-day work of the state. Its tools for functioning have changed. The process can be illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before transition</th>
<th>After transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruments of “etatism”</td>
<td>Social-market mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal with political-ideological loyalty</td>
<td>Civil service requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic centralism</td>
<td>Power distribution horizontally and vertically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party solution</td>
<td>Legal and economic regulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(König 1992)

Secondly in the mainstream countries market integration was built upon the hierarchical integration of the “Rechtsstaat”. They moved away from the dominance of hierarchical integration. It was a sequential process.

On the other hand in the NISPAcee region the process was not sequential, but parallel. The introduction of market mechanisms began when the legal-institutional framework of the “Rechtsstaat” had not been completely established yet.

It resulted in a “vicious cycle”. The legal institutional framework could not provide institutional stability for the application of market mechanisms. On the other hand the impact of market mechanisms strengthened the instability of the legal-institutional framework.

1.5 Public management framework

(Mainstream pattern and CEE pattern)

The mainstream public management reforms are the combinations of three contracts.

They were as follows:

- Creating contractual-based relationships between the regulative and service-provider functions of the governments providing the ability for public agencies to compete. The governments had to separate service-delivery and compliance functions from the policy-focused departments that housed them – separate steering from rowing. Second, they had to give service-delivery and
compliance agencies much more flexibility and autonomy. And third they had to hold those agencies accountable for results, through performance contracts.

- Contracting out for creating competition and for the improvement of quality of public services. It required departments to bring in private-sector help in analysing the most promising areas for privatisation and contracting, and it gave them an incentive to privatise by allowing them to keep any savings achieved.

- Legitimising public services by Citizens’ Charter; either they are market-type oriented as in Great Britain or “Rechtsstaat” (Rule of Law) oriented as in France. The social groups cared about far more than efficiency. Citizens wanted public services to be effective: they wanted the subways and commuter trains to run on time, the mail to arrive in one day and their children to receive a quality education.

To force agencies to look beyond efficiency – to produce quality services for their customers – the government needed a new strategy. It needed to make agencies directly accountable to their customers. The answer was the Citizen’s Charter.

What about the NISPAcee region?

Our region has had an incomplete trajectory in an international perspective. From the three different contracts (contractual based relationship between the regulative and service-delivery functions; contracting-out for quality improvement; Citizen’s Charter) only contracting-out was applied in practice.

The steering and rowing functions were not uncoupled. The day-to-day actions of the public agencies were not based on contracts between regulation and service provision. Only a performance appraisal system has been prepared without creating the opportunity for correct performance measurement.

The consequence was that public agencies could not compete in the badly regulated market of service delivery with private enterprises. Contracting-out, public procurement, Public-Private Partnerships are applied in the tool-kit of the government, but they did not generate competition because of the political patronage. Sometimes the state monopoly was being replaced with a private monopoly.

No transparent mechanisms of accountability were built up for civil monitoring. Citizens were not empowered. No Citizen’s Charter could be seen on the horizon.
1.6 Politicians and civil servants
(Mainstream pattern and CEE pattern)

In the last century the mainstream pattern – according to Max Weber – was dominated by two twin trends: in the first place by the emergence of modern bureaucracy – a growing state apparatus, led by technically trained, professional career administrators –, on the other hand by the rise of a new class of professional politicians, whose influence was based on political parties and the suffrage of millions of ordinary citizens (Aberbach et al. 1981).

In this trend the first stage was characterised by a clear separation of the tasks: Politicians make decisions, bureaucrats implement them. In the second stage bureaucrats began to influence the content and the timing of the decisions based on factual, “administrative rationality”, which was different from evaluative, “political rationality”.

In the third stage the impact of bureaucrats had been further increased. The difference is that “whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganised individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organised clienteles. In this interpretation of the division of labour, politicians are passionate, partisan, idealistic, even ideological; bureaucrats are, by contrast, prudent, centrist, practical, pragmatic” (Aberbach et al. 1981, 9).

The fourth stage has just recently integrated politics with administration. The result is a “pure hybrid”, in which a high rate of personal circulation between the political and administrative ladders is experienced.

The mainstream trend is quite clear. The roles of politicians and bureaucrats have been converging; it suggests an increasing overlap between the roles of bureaucrats and politicians.

The sequence of these four stages does not exist in CEE. These stages could not be separated in the NISPAcee region. Instead special combinations of the four stages could be observed in the various countries of the region.

A serious problem is that in the current situation in the NISPAcee region the relation between politics and administration is instable and over-politicised. It is also relevant what Verheijen and Rabrenovic pointed out on the CEE level, which is quoted by Meyer-Sahling (2008, 2): “The prevailing pattern in (post-communist) states is still one of the top echelons of the civil service changing with each election or, in worse cases with each government reshuffles” (Verheijen and Rabrenovic 2001, 410–426).
Politicisation of public administration is also characteristic for Western democracies (Goetz 2001), but in a comparative perspective our regional practice is different from the prevailing modes of politicisation in Western democracies (Meyer-Sahling 2008). The author argues that the main differences are as follows:

- personnel turnover is essentially higher than the international standards after every election;
- new appointees have been recruited from outside, mainly based on their political affiliation rather than from the public agencies;
- governments appoint officials who are “returnees”, as Meyer-Sahling argues, “in the sense that they work in senior administrative ranks under governments of the same political couleur, leave when a government is formed by parties of the opposite political spectrum, but return to senior ranks with ‘their bloc of parties’ after having bridged the out-of-office period in the private sector, academia or at a political party” (Meyer-Sahling 2008, 10).

In our region a partisan politicisation has emerged, which is different from the other modes of politicisation, namely the non-politicisation, and the bounded politicisation. This mode is the heritage of the authoritarian system, where the politicisation of public administration was strong and dominant. It had been a one-party system, in which the career paths were merged among the leading positions of the party, of the public administration and of the economic enterprises.

This party dominance survived the authoritarian system, but in a modified form. In the new multi-party systems the “ancient mode” of politicisation has been preserved, and it was taken over by the newly established parties as well.

1.7 The Euro-atlantic world and the CEE region
(The development of cooperation)

Before 1990 public administration was dominated by formal, legalistic approaches in the CEE region – in the framework of party states in various countries, and in many countries there was not even an expression for “public policy”.

After 1990 public-administration education and research had to meet the needs of a society based on market economy, liberal multi-party democracy and the rule of law.

NISPAcee promoted the development of new, multidisciplinary public-policy and management teaching programmes and of new research projects. There was a basic need to have access to Western social science and practical experiences and NISPAcee established East-West personal contacts, organised meetings, workshops and conferences.
In the 1990s NISPAcee became a well-known, appreciated actor in East-West cooperation in the CEE region. NISPAcee had a supportive role in

- Developing new public-administration, public-policy or public-management programmes at universities based on various models at Western institutions;
- Making available and accessible to Eastern partners the Western public-administration literature, including research methods ranging from highly theoretical to highly applied;
- Creating curricula and teaching materials to provide the content of the programmes based on European and American models;
- Fostering cooperative research programmes, including joint conference papers, articles, edited volumes and research grants;
- Organising and sponsoring domestic and overseas internship programmes;
- Developing educational resources and technologies, particularly in libraries and computers;
- Faculty development activities including language skills, research methods, course development and research activities;
- Faculty and student exchanges between Eastern and Western partners.

(Berg et al. 2002)

NISPAcee contributed to the development of the hierarchy of cooperative relationships between East and West. It consisted of the following stages:

The very beginning was Exchange of Contacts and Information: meetings, contacts and the mutual exchange of information. They were useful since partners may not be well informed about the needs and interests of one another.

The second stage was Systematic Exchange of Knowledge and Experience: As partners got to know each other better, the relationship could expand to meaningful dialogues, visits, initial exchanges, and the exploration of scholarly cooperation.

The third stage was Joint Action: The third level of cooperative relationship was marked by the beginning of identifiable projects and activities. The product could be a library, a teaching programme, internships, formalising exchange relationships and developing research activities.

The fourth stage was Mutual Co-operation: As the collaboration became more extensive and regular, a truly mutually co-operative relationship could exist. It is characterised by coordinated activities and programmes based on strategies that were agreed upon and met the needs and interests of both partners.
The final stage was Institutionalised Partnership: Finally, the highest level of cooperation is institutionalised partnership where the relationships were on-going and continuing, not dependent on particular individuals at either end. Perhaps the most important characteristic of these relationships was that they are self-sustaining in terms of funding and organisation on both ends (Berg et al. 2002).

Nowadays NISPAcee is an important and prestigious actor in all five stages of cooperation. NISPAcee is always ready to help in the initial phase of exchange of contacts and information. But NISPAcee is active on the highest stage creating bilateral and multilateral institutionalised partnerships as well.

In the so-called “knowledge transfer” process NISPAcee has climbed up the ladder of cooperative relationships.

Moving away from exchange of experiences toward institutional partnerships was a selection process at the same time.

The participants of this annual conference are the results of the selection. Persons misusing or misunderstanding the objectives of the cooperation are not here anymore. Who remembers the “heroic time” when money seekers or experts with the “Stone of Wisdom”, with “Panacea Magna” tried to influence the events. And when Eastern partners wanted to get and steal the money. To illustrate this I recall the cases collected by Frits Van Den Berg. My favourite case is when the fax machine turned to be a chicken. It was eaten by the recipients and – no wonder – it was looked for by the donors in vain. (van den Berg et al. 2002)

By now we have learned that a mechanic transfer of knowledge from West to East is impossible. In the CEE region we should learn from the Western experiences, but we could only learn from them when we have sovereign knowledge of our own economic, political, cultural and administrative circumstances. It is the precondition of integrating and applying the Western results and experiences in order to use them in our special type of transitions and not to repeat the mistakes committed by the West in the past.

From the very beginning we recognised in the NISPAcee region the competition among the various models coming from the West. We got recommendations and advice for the creation of a classical Weberian model, but the impact of New Public Management or a Neo-Weberian orientation, an later on of a New Governance approach, were significant as well.

This diversity of impacts created fruitful and substantial discussions in NISPAcee, and we had ongoing debates on the applicability of various models or the combination of different models even now.
At its conferences NISPAcee promoted, by use of different projects, the substantial understanding of the various models and supported the academicians and scholars in the CEE region in the initiation of recommendations for their own countries on

- which sequence of models is relevant;
- which combination of models could be applicable.

But perhaps the greatest problem of the transferability of knowledge and experience from West to East and in East-East relations is the broader question of cultural relativism. The application of existing knowledge to Eastern nations must take into account their particular economic, political, social, and cultural factors, but that has not always been the case. Perhaps the least effective orientation was what might be called the "paratrooper" approach: well-meaning Western experts landing with all the problems diagnosed and solutions at hand. Examples of cooperation in which Western partners tried to act directly rather than through their Eastern partners failed to produce positive long-term results, and often alienated both sides.

On the other hand, some Eastern partners held the naive view that it would simply be possible to copy the West. In some CEE countries, for instance, political parties spoke about following the German "Soziale Marktwirtschaft", unaware of the extent to which it was rooted in very special economic and political circumstances. Participants on both sides must have an understanding of the uniqueness of their own situation and strive to distinguish between areas of knowledge and experiences that are more applicable or less applicable to Central and Eastern Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union. Successful cooperation at all levels must be built on a recognition of some limits of transferability and the importance of adapting theory and practice to new situations. Policy analysis needs to think in history without being bound to the past. Co-operation should recognise cultural and historical differences, but not to the extent that it stifles innovation or ignores instances where Western experiences and knowledge can be adapted.

And by now it turned out that East-West cooperation is a reciprocal relationship. CEE scholars have to learn from the Western experiences, but this cooperation offers benefits to the Western partners, as well

- It can broaden narrow perspectives that can be found in Europe and the United States.
- It can allow Western scholars to test the scope of generalisation concerning concepts and theories developed in the US or Europe.
• It can expand the sensitivity of Western partners to cultural values and historical factors in policy-making and bureaucratic reform. (Berg et al. 2002)

2. Growing differences among countries in the CEE region and the second bridging function of NISPAcee

In the very beginning the region was labelled with the term “Soviet Bloc”. It is true that the attempts at homogenising the Soviet-Russian Empire were inseparable from “existing socialism”. To what extent this was artificial, to what extent the organic roots were missing, to what extent this was an external envelopment or a pressing clasp on the body of the individual national societies is best shown by the rapidity with which the countries of the region wishing to become independent put an end to this political system: they did so in a matter of seconds like a snake when it “sheds its skin”.

There was life beneath the concrete shelter, the veins of community life had remained fit for life and able to survive, i.e. the historical experiment of creating “homo sovieticus” instead of “homo sapiens” proved to be impossible, and it failed.

But there were essential differences in starting conditions, political, economic levels of development among various countries and their readiness to overcome transition problems.

It meant that exchange of experiences was required in the development of new public administration, public policy and public management programmes at universities, and at national and/or regional academies.

East-East cooperation was needed, and NISPAcee provided a multinational, institutional and professional framework for these activities from the very beginning.

Since then an increasing diversity has emerged in the NISPAcee region in the progress of transition.

Such diversity refers to the level and pace of transition, and it is related to the following factors:

• differences in the political systems, which vary from functioning democracies through instable democracies to enlightened absolutism;

• differences in the economic systems, which vary from the highly liberal regulated market economies to centralised economies with a high degree of government involvement and control;

• differences in the development of civil society;
• differences in the aspirations and understanding of the national elites in the country regarding the type of political, economic system and civil society they wish to have;
• differences in the relationship to the European Union; one group of countries has become member states of the European Union; the second group of countries has the chance to obtain membership in the foreseeable future; a third group has the chance of associate membership and the perspective of the fourth group is a relationship based on an agreement;
• differences in the relationship to the United States of America; one group of countries is allied to the US in the economic, political and military spheres; a second group has the ambition to develop an alliance with the US; a third group has the ambition to keep its distance from the US.


European Union membership has had special importance for the new member states in the CEE region. It meant that these countries have become parts of the European Administrative Space. However, our national administrative systems differ from each other, but we have agreed upon a common definition of administrative law as being the set of rules and principles applying to the organisation and management of public administration and to the relations between administration and citizens (Ziller 1999). The main administrative principles are as follows:
• reliability and predictability (legal certainty);
• openness and transparency;
• accountability;
• efficiency and effectiveness.

These are the reasons why NISPAcee has had to evolve a second, extremely important, multilateral bridging role in
• bringing together Eastern European scholars from various countries for conducting comparative analyses on regional issues and problems;
• establishing contacts among Eastern European scholars and scholars among Central Europe, Caucasus and the Western Balkans
• facilitating the transfer of knowledge toward Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia and Central Asia. (NISPAcee Strategy for 2012–2015, 2012)

By now NISPAcee has developed the two bridging functions and has achieved a tremendous contribution to the transition in the Central and Eastern European region, has become a recognised regional organisation and is considered a major
actor and partner in the region in the field of public-administration research and education for all the relevant European as well as worldwide organisations.

NISPAcee could make convincing progress in the implementation of its major functions in networking, in facilitating training and education, in fostering research, in developing consultancy and in supporting advocacy.

Two decades ago, we hoped that within two decades, we could put the national and local communities at the centre, replacing the position of the state, and with this shift, we would complete the transition. We did not have in mind any kind of neutralisation or sterilisation of national interests, values or worldviews, nor were we thinking of societies of robots with a highly developed technology, nor did we visualise a certain type of new internationalism, under which the nations could be tightly squeezed. Contrary to that, our conviction was that in this changing world, each nation has to find its new identity and new ways of cooperation.

This task has not been completed yet. We have been facing an increasing level of international terrorism, with dangers of various waves of a worldwide financial and economic crisis and unexpectedly great social burdens on communities and individuals. These problems cannot be solved with short-term measures in the framework of a four-year “business cycle”. We need a strategic solution. The requirements of this strategy are clear: To create viable communities – among the nations – in which the people are free to dispose of their own lives in politics, in their workplaces, at home. Only tolerant and pluralistic societies may provide the key to overcoming a state dividing the regions, drowning all progressive initiatives in abject hatred and unfruitful arrogance.

Academia and practitioners in Central and Eastern Europe are rowing in the same boat. The weather is stormy. Politicians, even nations could be sacrificed. Growing tensions, clashes, even wars could be forecast. We must not loose our faces. Our common past obliges us, members of NISPAcee, to strengthen our empathy toward each other, to strengthen our solidarity, our professional integrity, and our commitment to look for new ways and opportunities in the application and improvement of knowledge transfer and exchange of experiences.

References


Islamic Public Administration –
The Missing Dimension in NISPAcee Research?

WOLFGANG DRECHSLER

1. The NISPAcee Region and Islam

If one looks at a map of the NISPAcee region – essentially the former “Second World” – one notices that a large part of it consists of countries we may call “Islamic” in the sense that they have a Muslim majority and thus a Muslim heritage and context as well, never mind how secular or not they currently are:

![Map of the NISPAcee region](image)

This part includes, as of now, ten countries, covering an enormous land mass, for the most part in the south of the region:

1. Albania
2. Azerbaijan
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina (or at least the Federation)
4. Kazakhstan
5. Kosovo
6. Kyrgyzstan
7. Tajikistan
8. Turkmenistan
9. Turkey
10. Uzbekistan

Excepting Turkey, which is a special and new case for NISPAcee,¹ these are the countries of Central Asia (see Hiro 2009; Golden 2011) and the Muslim ones of the (Western) Balkans. Many other NISPAcee countries were influenced or indeed administered by Islamic empires for centuries, even half millennia, as well.

¹ Turkey, the only non-second-world country among the NISPAcee countries, is a very new addition – in fact, it was only admitted in Ohrid itself at the NISPAcee business meeting on 23 May 2012, 24 hours before this paper was delivered, due to the importance of that country for the region.
One could think, therefore, that studying the legacy, context and practice of Islamic Public Administration (PA) in the region would be a major topic of NISPAcee research. But in fact, so far, this is not the case – rather, with very few exceptions (e.g. Urinboyev 2011), there is almost no research on Islamic PA at all, as looking at the proceedings, the publications and the journal will attest. If it happens, then usually the Islamic times and institutions, indeed the entire context, are seen as obstacles to modern PA and to Europeanization, as stumbling blocks on the way to good PA; usually, they are cavalierly dismissed in a footnote. In the current essay, I will argue that this may not be the best way of looking at the issue and that this attitude may cause both scholarly and policy problems for the countries in question. Rather, I will claim that Islamic PA may be neither a negative presence in the region, nor necessarily a negative legacy at all.

This claim, at this point in time and in the present context, has to be and will be made in a truly essayistic manner, not in a fully scholarly one, and annotations will be rather sparse, usually more intended to point to further reading rather than to mirror the scholarly discourse on the statements in question or to back up specific claims (excepting quotes of course). Further, my intention is to outline the desirability of a research program, not the program itself, let alone its possible results. And many of the propositions on the way may easily be dismissed if one disagrees with them. My point is merely that if one does agree, the consequences are rather obvious as well.

2. Islamic PA?

But first of all, is there such a thing as Islamic PA at all? There is, after all, no PA system comparable to what the sharia is for law. (Cf. Kadri 2011) Is Islam important enough an element, a variable of the countries in question, that it significantly determines their context, including PA? (On Islam in general, see Armstrong 2000 as the classic introduction) Aren’t there too many varieties of Islam, so that one could not really speak of one Islam, but of many? This debate went on, and still does so, in all areas of inquiry regarding Islam, and it was – like many theoretical debates, such as the one around Postmodernism – probably first raised among art historians. And there, one largely came to the conclusion, in the words of Anna Ballian, that
It can be reasonably argued that the arts of the Muslim peoples contain many common features which justify the continuing use of the label by the academic world, without in any way minimising the importance of local variations and national traditions. (Ballian 2006, 34)

Inversely, the argument can nicely be taken from a December 1934 Berlin lecture, in which one of the greatest experts on Islamic art of his time, Ernst Kühnel, pointed this feature out, from a Nazi background, as a deficit of Islam:

Without a doubt, a world view [like Islam], which dominated so strongly, was little suited to let racial and völkische peculiarities have an impact, and that was perhaps its greatest weakness. Islam forced the life of the mind, the morals and customs of the different people into an amazingly uniform shape and blurred as much as possible national delineations amongst its confessors. (Kühnel 1935, 62)

One can generally tell whether a Mosque is a Mosque – never mind how local styles have influenced the basic form, and never mind that the general mental image educated people have is that of the Mimar Sinan-type mosque. (See Necipoğlu 2010)

Taken beyond art, one could generalize that Islam is, in all its profound variety, stable at the core and that for centuries, one textual basis – the Quran – has served as a strongly unifying principle. To this, for governance and PA as well as for many other spheres of life, must be added the Hadith (the canonized sayings and reports about the opinions of the Prophet) and, for our context at least, maybe also the teachings of Ali (Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib), the fourth Caliph and last of the Rashi-dun (rightly-guided Caliphs), on whose basis Behrooz Kalantari has constructed an ideal Islamic PA paradigm. (1998)

On the governance level, the one salient feature of Islam is the incredibly quick expansion of Islamic rule (and religious conversion and political conquest were closely connected for the first centuries and beyond), faster than any other large religion ever before, and this led to the issue of how to manage such a large area. The answer (in contrast to the Chinese one) was via decentralization, via the creation of client governments and, arguably and crucially, often via not asking for the maximum of obedience, revenues, loyalty and so on, but for the functional, just good-enough minimum. (Cf. Barkey 2008, Hanioğlu 2008)

In general, an important claim would be that the people in the Islamic countries themselves would very likely overwhelmingly say that Islam – Islam as such,
whatever their own tradition – matters, and it matters very much – often to the chagrin of Western observers who want to bring Western-style democracy to Islamic countries and then note that election victories go to Islamic parties, not to people who think as they themselves do. (Cf. Lerch 2012)

A hypothesis would thus be that Islam – being such a strong determinant of context, of the world in which people live and the systems that they build there and that emerge³ – has had, and still has, a non- incidental, indeed important and actually crucial impact on how the public sphere is organized and even managed, and thus that one of the most important variables for PA – not only governance – in Islamic countries is Islam, not just the national tradition, even if (albeit less so) the society in question is quite secular. National traditions, national history may be important, but the most recent research in PA has precisely suggested that we are not sure at all how legacies actually manifest themselves in PA, and that it is more a matter of how history is taken up and, yes, constructed and utilized. (See Painter and Peters 2011; cf. with care Sindbaeck and Hartmuth 2011)

3. Is Global PA Western PA writ large?

But is (good) PA not totally globalized by now? Can there be such a thing as good Islamic PA today – even if PA can be Islamic – that is different from global PA, and is global PA not Western PA? That has surely been the general – if often tacit – universal assumption, and it still is: Global is Western⁴, and global is good, and the improvement of PA means to modernize it, which means to Westernize it. In Europe, the trajectory of European Union (EU) membership and EU requirements, alleged and otherwise (the “European Administrative Space”), have pretty much obliterated any debate about whether there are alternative forms of PA – and this shows, for instance, in NISPAcee publications on the Western Balkans. (See even Nikolov 2013 in this volume)

And why would this be a problem? It is not a problem if the mainstream is supposed to be right by definition, but that actually is not a mainstream view. It

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³ I understand context here as Lebenswelt, life world in the sense of the existence of the human person in a phenomenological, Continental-idealistic or semiotical sense, as “the sum of non-inheritable information” (Lotman 1971, 167) in which the individual persons, and then by extension the groups of persons, live by their own, however evolving and latent, self-definition, and through which they operate – what defines people is what they let define them. To speak with Nicolai Hartmann (who talks about Geist, which arguably is the manifestation of context), “Nobody invents his own language, creates his own science; the individual, rather, grows into what is existing, he takes it over from the common sphere, which offers it to him.” (1949, 460; for a general philosophical discussion of this question, see Drechsler 1997, 67–69.)

⁴ With “West” and “Western”, I mean in this PA-centered context Europe as embodied in the core EU, North America, and Australia and New Zealand, with their combination of the Greco-Christian legacy, a science-based rationalistic Enlightenment framework and, of course, Capitalism.
would be a problem, for instance, if the suggestion that modernization means Westernization actually delegitimizes the former in those societies and contexts in which Westernization is at least an ambiguous concept for many. In that case, and that is my suggestion, to show that improvement of PA does not mean Westernization, in other words, *that modernization is not necessarily Westernization*, would be a major accomplishment. But this goes well beyond the ideological level⁵, on to the empirical-epistemological one: It may be that countries which do not follow the Western model are not laggards but rather pursue their own path. A nice parallel would be the European countries which, according to Pollitt and Bouckaert, did not follow the New Public Management (NPM), because they followed their own, perhaps even (in my opinion certainly) better model, that of the Neo-Weberian State (NWS). (See Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 99–100) And then, policy recommendations (preferably linked with financial incentives) to move towards Western PA benchmarks might be not only misguided, but they may turn out to be counterproductive.⁶

This may have seemed more bizarre to argue ten, even five years ago than it does now. Since then, however, two phenomena have weakened the assuredness in and of the West, even Europe, that their solution is the global one, wherever one goes, and in PA as well. One of them is the global financial crisis, which has called the Western system into question both as regards setup and performance, including PA (see Drechsler 2011), and the other is the rise of China, with a potentially different and successful mode of governance and, as I would argue, also of PA. (See Drechsler 2014; Fukuyama 2011, esp. 17–18; Bell 2010; Jacques 2011) At the very least, we could speak, as has recently been very elegantly suggested for East Asia, of global or Western trends and paradigms that might be interpreted in a strongly regional way. (See Cheung 2012)

So this would suggest, and I would, too, that *there is such a thing as Non-Western PA* (NWPA), and that this can be good PA, not an aberration or an atavism. Whether one agrees with that or not depends, among other things, on what model of global PA one has, how one judges the situation, and what one means by NWPA.

In order to clarify the situation a bit, I would (preliminarily, of course) propose three possible models of trajectories to Good PA: Western, Multicultural and Contextual.

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⁵ It is not the point of this essay to argue about the potential of such an argument for the integration of Muslim minorities in Western countries with regard to the citizen-state relation, but it has often been pointed out to me that such a potential might exist, and if it does, given the urgency and prominence of the issue, that would also be an interesting opportunity to at least discuss.

⁶ This, interestingly enough, is the implication, but not the point, of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) as well.
The first one would mean that there is one good way of PA, that good and global PA are the same and, by tacit extension, that either is also identical with Western PA. All other traditions, including the Chinese and Islamic ones, would have to eventually converge into the development trajectory of Global PA or else be not just different but worse.

One may or may not, in this context, allow minor contextual variations, but in principle, the idea is that we know what good PA is, that good PA is universal, that by and large this is Western PA, and that this will remain so for the times to come. (Public Administration Review 2010, in spite of much sophistication, basically makes this point.) This, as I would argue, is the mainstream view, purported, at least tacitly, not only by the usual suspects of globalizing Westernization such as the World Bank (see Peet 2003; Hopper 2007), but also by more sensitive and development-minded institutions, also in the NISPAcee context.

If one does not buy into this narrative, or at least would like to question it, then the second model would seem the obvious counter-alternative. This, which we may call Multicultural PA, would imply that there is no such thing as ideal PA and that ideal PA depends entirely on culture and context, never mind on which level, and that the ways there are entirely context-dependent, as well, and generally not linked to any other.

Multicultural PA has the advantage of being politically correct in many contexts; it is prima facie a good alternative to the erroneous simplicities of Global PA. However, the problems with this approach are manifold as well, notably that, as any NWPA research will quickly show, there are both problems and solutions that are germane to PA, no matter where one looks, and that solutions may be sometimes different across time and space but sometimes very similar indeed. Kalantari has stressed this aspect of ideal Islamic PA. (1998)

As an alternative, the third model, the contextual one, would say that there is something like Good PA, although it is an amorphous form and a moving target. Some solutions in Good PA are similar at all or most times (e.g. managerial ones), some are different (e.g. state-citizen relations); what is good PA in one context does not have to be in another; it depends on the circumstances. The key to reaching Good PA is to realize where one is coming from at the moment and to be in synch with that, and that means, to realize the context. Of course, one can look at other systems and adapt from there, but that would be policy learning, not policy transfer. (See Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg 2013)
The key variable for context, PA and otherwise, in Islamic countries – or a key variable, to meet even the fiercest skeptics half way – surely is Islam.\(^7\)

### 4. Ottoman PA

But if this is the case, what is the substance of Islamic PA? On the governance level, we may point, for starters, to two classic thinkers and texts from Central Asia, Alfarabi (الفارابی محمد بن سعد أبو، 872–950), “The Second Teacher” (the first being Aristotle) and his *Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila* (*The Perfect State/The Good City*) (2001), and the Nizam al-Mulk (طوسي نظام الملك خواجه، 1018–1092) and his *Siyāsatnāma* (*The Book of State Art/of Governance*) (1960). While Alfarabi is a perfect symbol of the compatibility of quintessentially Western, here Greek, philosophy and its independent conjuncture with Islam, the Nizam al-Mulk presents us with a specific, workable and very different concept of governance that may be as different from the usual Western recommendations for improving the governance of the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries as it may be superior in realism and applicability. One example is the strong emphasis on the absolute non-delegatability of the responsibility for those over whom one rules. (1960, II, IV, VI) This was often seen as a key feature of Islamic PA, even classically in the West, for many centuries, although today it is generally forgotten. (Cf. Hebel in Stolleis 2003, 81–85) Alfarabi, on the other hand, shows more how one can reach common goals while not necessarily presenting certain goals as Western, but rather, Islamic. (2001)\(^8\)

For the purpose of this essay, however, I will now focus on the Ottoman Empire. For many reasons: Because of its centrality for much of the NISPAcee region, especially in its Western Muslim part; its sophistication in PA and public policy, especially on the practical level; because its successor, modern Turkey, is becoming, or actually has become, the powerhouse in the former Imperial region again (see just Aras 2012; Walker 2011); and also because today’s radical Islamicism is to a large extent based on a fundamentalist movement against the mainstream Ottomans. (See Kadri 2011, 123–125; Finkel 2007, 411–412) Not least importantly: to reevaluate Ottoman legacies and Ottoman PA in this region is probably the

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\(^{7}\) Another argument for one global PA often is that there cannot be any national or regional specificities in the day and age of Facebook, Twitter and Skype – of a world that has become the McLuhanian Global Village. What speaks against this is, however, the observation that the Web 2.0 has not only not harmed Islam and Islamic governance, even Islamicist movements, but is actually used by them to a very successful degree. If anything, it has led to more pan-Islamism. The “Arab Spring” and its current development is probably the clearest instance of this effect. Cf. e.g. http://arabworldincontext.weebly.com/projects.html, but see also http://www.economist.com/node/21560541, http://www.welt.de/debatte/article109575524/Besiegen-Internet-und-Smartphone-die-Islamisten.html.

\(^{8}\) Along exactly these lines, the first *Arab Human Development Report* (UNDP 2002) uses, for instance, Islamic thought throughout to justify development based on UN assumptions.
most contested approach one could take, much more controversial – for various reasons, including the EU trajectory and all it brings with itself – than considering the importance of Islam in Central Asia could ever be. (Cf. Sindbaeck and Hartmuth 2011) The question of whether there is Islamic PA and especially whether it is a good or bad legacy largely evolves, in the current context, around it. In other words, Ottoman PA as Islamic PA is, in both the Islamic and non-Muslim countries of the South-Western part of the NISPAcee region, a central PA narrative that is about history, but not historical at all.

Especially in the last decade or two, the Ottoman Empire has been reassessed as “not so bad” in many ways, quite to the contrary of the clichés that various legacies – self-interested, more often than not – have so far promulgated. (An excellent, non-post-colonial introduction to Ottoman history is Finkel 2007) And these reassessments, not often but certainly occasionally, have included governance. In addition, shifts in how we see governance and PA generally – the latter a swiftly moving target, as the rise and demise of NPM has just demonstrated so impressively (see Drechsler and Kattel 2009) – have also contributed to new possibilities of how to see Osmanian rule and administration. Merilee Grindle’s concept of Good-enough Governance (Grindle 2004; 2007) is one of the most important ones in this context, underlining that very often, governance is about achieving minimal workability of a system against the odds of heavy policy constraints, rather than achieving “Western standards” (“getting to Denmark”; see Fukuyama 2011, 14), assuming that those are actually desirable.

Amongst the best recent works specifically about Ottoman governance are M. Sükrü Hanioğlu’s work on the late Ottoman empire (see only 2008), which traces very well the overall success of 19th-century Ottoman governance and also deals with PA, or Karen Barkey’s excellent studies, such as those of the inclusion of brigands into the state, unthinkable in Europe at that time (1997)⁹, and of the complex governance of and living-together in the Empire generally. (2008) Brown (1996) discussed the specific legacy, i.a., in the Balkans, attempting some neutral and thus more positive reassessment.

As regards Ottoman PA on the public-management level, this has, as regards the center, by now often been described not as a haphazard, corrupt institutionalized failure, but as a “super-Weberian” structure. Suffice it here to cite Metin Heper’s standard essay on the subject, stating that

⁹ “[T]he Ottoman state centralized mostly through negotiation and incorporation of bandit armies that were largely the product of state consolidation in the first place. The French state engendered a strong center-periphery dislocation, followed by the rebellions of peasants and landlords, with both disaffected groups losing income or autonomy. The Ottoman state, on the other hand, was able to manipulate most classes in society and divert them from rebellion.” (Barkey 1997, 230)
Not unlike the political experience of continental Western European polities, the Ottomans, too, had a distinctive center, or state, with its own normative system. In the Ottoman case, however, the center was far more autonomous … While in continental Europe the normative system of the center including that of the bureaucracy was to some extent interpenetrated by aristocratic and middle-class values, in the Ottoman Empire the bureaucratic elite were “devoted exclusively to the secular interests of the state” (Inalcik …); it has been claimed that “they represented no group or class interest, not even their own” (Berkes …). It also follows that the Ottoman polity was a bureaucratic polity and not a patrimonial regime … In Turkey democratization of the polity was not an upshot of increased pressures from the weighty social groups; democratization was rather engineered by the state elite themselves. (Heper 2001, 1020)

And this was in several respects highly successful – Şevket Pamuk, in his important study of The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913, underlines in conclusion as its one specific feature “the relative strength of the central bureaucracy vis-à-vis both the European powers and the internal classes such as merchants and landlords.” (2010 [1987], 147)

Ottoman PA was constantly under reform, too – constantly modernizing since the late 18th century (see Findley 1980; Heper 2001, see esp. 1021–1022) – and perhaps the case study for such an effort under such circumstances. Even Timur Kuran, one of the most prominent recent critics of Islam as an obstacle to Middle East modernization (meaning Westernization; see 2011, 4–5, 12–13, 279–281; 301–302), admits:

Middle Eastern administrative history offers abundant examples of adaptation to new circumstances. … To be sure, enough flexibility existed to keep dynasties in power for centuries. When the Ottoman state succumbed to European imperialism at the end of World War I, it was in its 622nd year. Such longevity could not have been achieved through policies chained to the past. (2011, 18)

The Westernizing variant of this modernization effort, in its core time of the mid-19th century known as the Tanzimat reforms and even the Tanzimat era (1839–1876), was, however, also a reaction to Western direct and indirect pressure, which partially contributed to its illegitimacy (Ansary 2009, 285–288) – but in this aspect, as well, this is a history that seems to deserve our full attention. (Cf. Reinkowski 2005, 286–288) To see Hamidism (1876–1908), the governance reforms and reactions to outside and inside pressure by the last powerful Sultan,
Abdülhamid II., as a less Western but more contextual form of modernization (see Hanioğlu 2008, 123–129; Finkel 2007, 488–501) is one of the more recent trends in Ottoman governance reevaluation and, I think, very likely correct. (Examples include the refocus on the Sultan’s role as Caliph, the dexterous use of media and communication technology, the emphasis on personal loyalty and the purposeful creation of the ideology of Ottomanism; see already, e.g., Haslip 1973 [1958], passim; generally, cf. Reinkowski 2005, 14–29)

These new aspects of the Ottoman Empire, however, have not made it yet to PA history, let alone PA studies generally, in the NISPAcee region. (Scholarly work dealing with PA history is extremely rare in the NISPAcee context to begin with.) To the contrary: Basically, as mentioned already, in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Islamic, and that means here Ottoman, PA is always seen as a necessarily bad legacy, because the fight against the Ottomans is an – often the central – identity-creating myth of many CEE countries. This is, of course, much less so for the countries with a Muslim majority (which is one of the reasons why I focus on those in the current essay), who, however, are usually made to feel bad about it, but surely the entire self-told story of much of the Balkans, and even beyond, is the successful struggle against the Ottomans for freedom. Differences in administrative and life quality are still excused today by saying that one part was Western and the other one Turkish. (Cf. Sindbaeck and Hartmuth 2011, 1) Anecdotally, and certainly flippantly and insensitively, one could say that every other Balkan town square shows generic mustachioed, fur-capped heroes on horseback, cast in bronze, who fought against the Turkish oppression – never mind that one may often describe their fight for independence as the attempts of the local elites who ruled for the Ottomans already to get even more power and dominance over their subjects for themselves than they had before (they built the monuments, too). It was these local elites and especially the Orthodox Church who fought hardest the attempts of the Tanzimat reformers to do away with group differentiation and establish a direct link for every citizen to the central authority in Istanbul. (Hanioğlu 2008, esp. 75–76)

There is, thus, still today what is generally called a leyenda negra concerning the Ottoman Empire, generalized from the black legend against Spain and its conquests in Latin America (Juderías 2003 [1919]) – not without reason, but certainly politically motivated. One does not need to whitewash the historical record of the Spanish Empire and to deny that much of the black legend is quite on target (as Adam Gopnik has recently underlined regarding the Inquisition; see Gopnik 2012b), in order to appreciate, especially from the governance and PA perspective, a more nuanced picture. This may be drawn from research such as the recent debunking exercise by Dobado-Gonzáles and García-Montero (2012), pointing
out, by empirically looking at the size and well-being of Latin Americans over the centuries, that problems did not start with Bourbon Spanish colonial times but rather with national independence, or Pietschmann’s older study (1972) documenting the Spanish drive to improve PA in the colonies and to treat equally the inhabitants of colonies and motherland in 18th-century Spain (302–308; see also the relevant chapters in Paquette 2009) – just as the Tanzimat leaders tried.

And in fact, the Ottoman conquests on and of the Balkans, even by the participants themselves – we have the magnificent memoirs by Evliya Çelebi (2011) or those by Hasan Ağa (1976) – do not present a pretty picture as far as dealing with the local population is concerned, certainly not by 21st-century Western standards. And if we look at the great Greek-Albanian ruler Ali Pasha of Ioannina, horrible despot that he was (the old sensationalist and biased account by Ibrahim-Manzour-Efendi 1914 is excellent as an example), and never mind his immense economic success in the region that may make much of his area look better, comparatively speaking, than almost ever since (Ruci 2002, e.g., is typically only available in Albanian), we may indeed relegate Ottoman history to the trash bin of terror regimes of the past.

But can we in the West, with all its great Enlightenment legacies, really be so triumphalist? It was Foucault who, in the first part of his famous study of the prison system, reminded or even told his audience that public punishment in Europe up to the 18th century was hardly less cruel than Ottoman practices. (1975, cf. 9–12) And even regarding the core of the West today, the USA, Adam Gopnik has recently stated that regular features of the prison system “will surely strike our descendants as chillingly sadistic, incomprehensible on the part of people who thought themselves civilized.” (2012a) In the NISPAcee region, right in our times, the high point of torture and mass murder to an unfathomable degree, evoked by the place name of Srebrenica, was not committed by the Muslim side. Atrocity accounting and you-tooism lead nowhere, of course, and I am not saying that the Ottoman Empire was “nice”; but seeing the leyenda negra around its Balkan rule, to say that it was less evil than is generally narrated is actually important.

5. What does it all mean?

And why would this be important? From the reassessment of the Ottoman Empire, we may get closer to appreciating that it had and has a legacy in governance and PA that may be different from, but not necessarily worse than, others in the region, and this eventually may give us, and especially the Muslim-majority Bal-
kan countries, a freer hand to deal with the possibilities of PA development, with its potential success, in the region today.\(^{10}\)

Again, the question of our current context is, *do we arrive more easily at Good PA if we realize that there are different contexts and thus different ways thither?* If we fail certain places, as is so often the case, for not living up to the standards of modern, globalized European PA, is this necessarily the problem of the countries, or may it also be the problem of asking the wrong questions and thus setting the wrong targets? It may be that it is better to improve governance, and PA, on the level and by the standards and according to the context that exist, rather than presenting unattainable goals (some of which, at least in PA, are highly volatile – privatization, say – and some others quite questionable as well – transparency as an absolute goal may come to mind; see now Han 2012). But even if we go for the ("good") Western Global values – do we in certain contexts reach them more easily if we take the path that fits the context, and that means also the narrative that does? Should we not at least look whether the same values are perhaps global but not exclusively Western, and whether they could just not be promulgated in a way that is more easily swallowable? (Cf. Steiner et al. 2007, 517–540; Maier 1997, 48–50)

Of course, such a way of thinking comes with high costs attached. It does go against the principles of the European Administrative Space (about which see Hofmann 2008); it does go against the mindset that still, even and especially from a liberal rather than a right-wing perspective, defines Europe almost as “non-Turkey.” (See only Böckenförde 2011) And that is the tradition, of course: Europe is, more often than not, historically defined by the struggle against the Turks, and against Islam generally, and the “othering” goes on with a vengeance: A recent study by quite serious scholars bears the amazing – and not at all ironic – title, *Ottomans into Europeans: State and Institution-Building in South-East Europe.* (van Meurs and Mungiu-Pippidi 2010)\(^{11}\) The Ottomans are still the “quintessentially other”, and Muslims, it often seems, as well.

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\(^{10}\) This perspective is somewhat missing from neo-revisionist works such as Sindbaek and Hartmuth (2011), which apparently set out to confirm, in spite of some considerable sophistication, the “guilt” of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans (6), or from Reinkowski (2005), who concludes his source-rich book on Ottoman reforms by wanting to forbid, via fiat it seems (not to say *par ordre du muftî*), the view of Ottoman adaptation and amalgamation as something positive. (292) But see the excellent case study of Albania by Endresen (2011) in the same book, which shows how the Ottoman discourse can and does legitimate even “Western progress” or modernization. (2011, 48–50)

\(^{11}\) It is interesting as well that the term “Southern Europe” for the same time still exclusively refers to the area that goes as far East as Italy; see for instance Paquette 2009.
In addition, Istanbul may be the largest, most dynamic and most innovative city in Europe again, and actually one of the three largest municipalities in the world\(^\text{12}\) (a fact rarely realized in the West), but Turkish PA today is not Ottoman at all – it is currently dominated, by and large, by old-fashioned NPM (Filkins 2012, esp. 43; Tuğal 2009, 55–56; Sezen 2011, esp. 339), and among Westernizing intellectuals, Kemalite modernizers, and even AKP activists, to praise the government aspects of the Ottoman Empire, let alone Hamidism, including PA, usually meets with incredulity at best.\(^\text{13}\)

There is one ironic yet profound effect, however, of the approach to define Europe, and by extension the West, by excluding it from and contrasting it to Turkey, the Ottoman Empire and Islam: If this is so, then surely it is much more likely that there is indeed something like Non-Western and especially Islamic PA, because there must then be something specifically Western, rather than global, in our current system.\(^\text{14}\)

What does remain very weak in the current essay – if on purpose – is the exact description of what really makes PA Islamic on the practical public-management level, rather than on the governance one, which is quite clear.\(^\text{15}\) The main critique would still be that there is no such thing. But my purpose with this essay is not to present a clear catalogue, maybe even a table, of Western, Islamic and perhaps also Chinese PA, but to suggest this as a research program, especially for the NISPAcee context. But I would argue, admittedly with a certain dose of pessimism towards Western solutions, that the more or less forced Westernization of Islamic countries, and people, in PA and otherwise, has not exactly met with much success. Very significantly, current Turkey has become an exception only after matching Islam with Westernism. (See Lerch 2012)

De-Ottomanization has not led to so much advance of “the Good Life in the Good State”, neither presently nor even historically – World War I was not exactly

\(^{12}\) Because most statistics on population are neither complete nor consistent regarding the underlying definition of municipality, it is in this case perhaps most promising to rely, for once, on the crowdsourced ranking given by Wikipedia, where Istanbul is currently listed as the second largest city proper in the world; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cities_proper_by_population.

\(^{13}\) On the reassessment of the Ottoman history in Turkey today, cf. Bilefsky 2012.

\(^{14}\) The reply to those who want to keep Turkey out of the EU is, of course, primarily: Do we have a choice? In other words, the preservation of the European Social Model, which is financed by more money than the European Union should have if one looks at global distribution, can only be achieved if enough is produced to make the extra profit needed for that, and Europe is doing less and less well in this regard, while Turkey is doing better and better – even disregarding the demographics for a moment. Cf. Bilefsky 2011.

\(^{15}\) One could, perhaps, mention at the moment the idea that government is never “A Machine That Would Go of Itself” (Kammen 1993); the focus on minimal rather than maximal solutions; the emphasis on the family, not the individual, as the key basic unit; the impossibility of the delegation of responsibility; and so on. Cf. generally again Kalantari 1998.
avoided by Bosnia and later Herzegovina being taken away from the Osmanian Empire and being annexed by the Austro-Hungarian one. (And see Okey 2008)

As Karen Barkey concluded her book on the empire,

\begin{quote}
in using local notables as the basis of indirect rule, the center also recognized and reinforced their distinctiveness, bolstering later claims for more independence. The seeds of empire were also the seeds of its transformation.
\end{quote}

Is the conundrum of large-scale rule, or at least controlled co-existence, unsolvable? For the Ottomans, finally, it was, but only after centuries … So, the questions remain for us now, calling out from the minarets of an empire that once coordinated and enriched a wide array of difference that we have yet to see again. (Barkey 2008, 296)

The Ottoman Empire may be a historical specificity and much of its governance and PA not Islamic but specifically Ottoman, but in CEE, Islamic and Ottoman very often mean the same thing. In addition to detailing the specifics of Islamic PA, a careful analysis of the relation of “Islamic” and “Ottoman” will be of great significance.

To sum up and repeat, the question for policy-relevant PA history may be that of constructing a potentially convincing narrative and not of “what really happened”, especially if the currently paradigmatic narrative creates many problems indeed. Along Grindle’s lines, it may be more pragmatic and realistic at least, maybe also more ethical and promising in the long run, to pick people and countries up where they are, and not where one would want them to be. To look into Ottoman PA specifically and Islamic PA generally and to see whether this is a context upon and through which governance and PA can be improved, and that is modernized; whether this is a story that can legitimately be told, and not less legitimately than the tales of the “Journey to the West”, seems to be an agenda that is promising, potentially beneficial and thus necessary to be discussed. And that, crucially, is the case also empirically-epistemologically, because I cannot understand an NWS country if I judge it by NPM standards, nor – or so the argument would go – an Islamic one if I judge it by Western ones.

If NISPAcee is (re-)emphasizing the Balkans, Turkey, and Central Asia, then it would probably be a very good idea, both institutionally and for PA scholars from and interested in the region, to both consider the reassessment (or reconsider the assessment) of Ottoman PA and to add the meta-variable of Islamic PA to the equations of PA research wherever this is applicable.
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All hyperlinks were valid as of 24 July 2012. Pure web-based information mentioned in the text is not repeated here.
The past three decades have witnessed quite extraordinary changes in both national government and economic systems in many countries throughout the world. In some places, change has been highly dramatic; as in some parts of Latin America, almost all of Central and Eastern Europe, a few parts of Africa and more recently, the Middle East. In other instances – the United States, some Western European countries and other parts of Africa – change has been less dramatic, but nevertheless significant. In this chapter, we shall briefly examine the changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the course of the past three decades as a means to gain a better understanding of the processes of reform which have facilitated the changes that have, in more than a few instances, profoundly affected the lives of tens of millions of people.

In order to better understand the consequences of change, and the processes by which it has been achieved, it is useful to begin by specifying what have been the major areas of reform in the CEE region. Generally speaking, most efforts at reform occurring over the past three decades fall into one of three categories: political-institutional reform, economic reform and/or administrative reform. The first two types of reform, political-institutional and economic, obviously involve the more dramatic, and thus the more easily visible, changes in a society. However, administrative reform, while less dramatic, is nevertheless frequently central to consolidating the more visible, broader political-institutional and economic reforms.

1. Central and Eastern Europe: What has been achieved?

Certainly no region of the world has seen more dramatic changes over the past quarter-century than Central and Eastern Europe. The region has witnessed massive governmental and economic reform, as well as considerable administrative reform. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, almost every country in the region initiated significant and wide-ranging reforms over the course of the past two decades. Most notable of the many developments in this regard has been the movement from single-party-dominated socialist planned economies to laissez-faire capitalist economic systems with competitive, multiparty elections. The political-institutional and economic reforms that have characterized almost the
entirety of this region have in many instances been accompanied by significant administrative reforms which in varying degrees are both the product of and have facilitated the economic and political changes that have occurred.

Without question, the most dramatic and significant set of reforms to take place in the region has focused on national economic systems. In all but a few instances, dramatic, major economic reform was undertaken. In some cases, the reforms were rapid and involved literally the overnight transformation of the entire economy and, to some extent, whole social systems as well. While the more rapid and dramatic economic change, “shock therapy”, as it came to be known, was most intensely utilized in Russia, elements of it were common throughout much of the CEE region. However, in many instances in the region, the reforms, while very significant, were carried out more gradually. The result has been, in many cases, very positive. Massive economic development has occurred throughout the region, and the standard of living for many of the citizens of the CEE countries has risen dramatically. However, without question, many have been left behind, as income inequality has grown significantly.

As the ruling governments of the CEE region either collapsed or were pushed out of power, many political-institutional reforms, often designed to disperse power and authority within what had been traditionally very highly centralized governments managed by a tightly controlled party apparatus, were initiated. In some cases, these developments were home-grown and based upon the reassertion of traditions and practices which had previously existed. In other instances, these developments were encouraged and supported by the international community through multilateral organizations and agencies or the activities of individual national-government aid agencies (Rosenbaum and Svensson 2002). But in almost all instances, the relevant reforms were designed to disperse political, economic and administrative power in countries where, as Klaus Goetz has noted, “The organization of state power under communism … was based on the explicit rejection of the idea of a separation of powers” (Goetz 2001).

The combination of a tradition in many countries of a high degree of centralization, and regimes that had become increasingly authoritarian, had produced political-institutional (and economic) stagnation and a quite extraordinary degree of centralization. The resulting situation, as Goetz has further noted, was one in which:

> a unified state administration comprising all tiers of the state apparatus, with strong hierarchical controls and subordination; the intertwining of party democracy and state administration, with the former having directive authority over the latter; a general disregard
for the rule of law, so that party decisions took precedence over legal norms; a personnel system that relied on politicized cadres and a party-controlled nomenclatura; the reluctance to acknowledge a separate public service identity; and an emphasis on economic planning and social control as central administrative functions (Goetz 2001).

Political-institutional reforms have taken many different forms in the various countries of the region. However, there have been three areas in which the greatest degree of activity has taken place. While differing in nature, in each case, the reform initiative has been driven by the underlying goal of facilitating the dispersal of power and authority within countries where governance had been historically highly centralized through the dominance of the communist party. The three principal areas of political-institution reform include the strengthening of legislative bodies; the encouraging of decentralization through the developing of local government and the enhancement of civil society (Rosenbaum 2009).

Almost every country in the region has undertaken significant efforts at administrative reform of various kinds. This has ranged from restructuring government departments and agencies to the introduction of new civil-service systems and, with that, significant efforts to retrain government administrators. At the same time, efforts to develop a new generation of professional public administrators has, in turn, led to the establishment of new training institutions in almost all of the countries of the region and the introduction of public-administration education into university curricula (Newland 1996).

Nevertheless, while almost the entirety of Central and Eastern Europe has seen significant reform efforts, there has certainly been a good deal of variation among the countries of the region in terms of the adoption of reforms. At one end of the continuum is a country like Poland which dramatically reformed its economy and its political institutions. It not only opened up its economy, but it restructured many of its political institutions with a particular emphasis upon decentralization. This, in turn, was followed by significant efforts at civil-service reform and the introduction of a variety of other administrative reform efforts. The country also witnessed the establishment of many public-administration education and training programs in both its private and public higher-education institutions. It has also witnessed the establishment of tens of thousands of non-governmental organizations.

While the reform efforts in Poland are more typical for the region, nevertheless, at the other end of the continuum is a country like Belarus, which has undertaken only the most limited reforms of its political institutions and its economic system.
Typical of the more slowly reforming states of the region is Ukraine where the process of democratization and the introduction of capitalist economic institutions have moved forward, but rather haltingly. For example, while the Ukrainian Parliament is certainly a stronger institution today than it was two decades ago, the executive branch still dominates the government and is the principal shaper of public policy. Similarly, regional and local governments have begun to emerge but they do continue to be dominated by the national government in Ukraine (Kolisnichenko and Rosenbaum). Likewise, while there has been some emergence of civil society, it has been quite limited by comparison to many of the countries in the region.

2. What have we learned (or relearned)?

The reform initiatives that have taken place during the course of the past 30 years, have been, as the discussion above suggests, very extraordinary ones. They have been the subject of many different types of analyses by scholars from many disciplines. Some have looked at specific institutions or processes, others at specific countries, but few have taken a comprehensive overview and thus, while much has been written about the transitions and reforms that have occurred, there are still many unanswered questions regarding what we have learned or, in some cases, relearned. Consequently, for the remainder of this chapter, we shall seek to lay out at a dozen different insights that can be observed, or lessons that can be learned, as one assesses the transition processes that have characterized the past three decades in Central and Eastern Europe and, in many cases, are still underway.

1. There is no definitive model, or single best strategy, for bringing about the change of an authoritarian or dictatorial regime to a more pluralist or democratic one. While scholars have recognized that we did not know a lot about how certain reform processes worked in many parts of the world, we did believe that we understood both what might precipitate, and what was necessary to facilitate, major regime reform or transformation. Three decades ago, it was assumed that major political-institutional and economic transitions would have to be driven by negotiated pacts between reformers and the old-guard regimes (Bunce 2003). For this reason, in many instances, those who might wish to promote regime reform argued that it was important not to encourage large-scale public political mobilization on behalf of political or economic change.

Indeed, the established wisdom was that the key to bringing about successful transitions from authoritarian regimes to more pluralistic ones was through
elite political bargaining which would produce agreements or “pacts” that would lead to the establishment of more democratic regimes (Gunther et al. 1995; Encarnación 2011; O’Donnell 1973). Experience in some cases in Latin America (Chile) and several of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the Baltic States) has suggested that other approaches to achieving political-institutional reform are equally valid and, in some situations, more appropriate and effective (Bunce 2003). In several instances in the CEE experience, the bringing-about of political and economic reform was very much driven by mass popular mobilization which led to very strong opposition to the existing regime, which, in turn, put pressure on it to negotiate with its opposition. In some cases, the mobilization of opposition to the existing regime clearly led to an enhanced willingness of its leadership to negotiate a pacteed transition. In other instances, mass popular mobilization led to the collapse of the existing regime.

2. Political and economic systems often change must faster than the individual institutions and administrative structures of which they are composed. Virtually all of the Central and Eastern European countries changed their political institutions and their economic systems very dramatically and, in some instances, quite rapidly. However, in many cases their efforts to change the specific individual institutions which together were part of their broader political-institutional and economic systems resulted in much frustration and, in some cases, total failure. Countries like the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, for example, were able to create viable, and in some cases very vibrant, democracies with remarkable rapidity. On the other hand, each of them has had great difficulty trying to bring about any number of specific administrative reforms. Particularly notable in this respect was the lack of success in most countries in bringing about civil-service reform. (O’Dwyer 2002). In other cases, legislative branches had difficulty gaining real autonomy or the capacity to actually exercise much policy-shaping influence and/or civil society was very slow to develop.

3. In many cases, reform initiatives of all types (political-institutional, economic and administrative) are driven by ideology and political preference and not so much by evidence and knowledge. This can be seen both in terms of the experience of countries that have engaged in major political-institutional reform and in those countries where reform has been much less grand in scope and intent. For example, as Călin Hințea and Marius Constantin Profirou have pointed out in a review of the reform process in Romania, those political-institutional and administrative changes which were the product of analysis and the measured judgment of experts were the first to be abandoned by a
new government (Hințea and Profiroiu 2012). In contrast, those reform initiatives that were based upon the political ideology and/or needs of individual actors were the ones that were sustained and effectively implemented.

Similarly, as Gene Brewer and Ed Kellough have suggested in their wide-ranging study of the administrative-reform movement in the United States, there was little or no empirical evidence suggesting that the strategies that were implemented through such major initiatives, at the national level, as the Clinton-era National Performance Review and, at the sub-national or local level, the many reform initiatives of state and municipal governments, would be effective (Brewer and Kellough 2011). Rather, these reforms, which included in some cases significant changes in long-standing civil-service systems, major privatization and deregulation initiatives and the like, were driven almost entirely by the ideological preferences and beliefs of those leading the reforms efforts.

4. Despite seeming similarity in political and economic systems, there was much more diversity among the countries within the CEE region than was perceived to be the case. There was a tendency, especially on the part of observers in the West during the cold-war era, to view Central and Eastern Europe as a kind of monolithic entity dominated by the Soviet Union. The reality was very different. In fact, there were very significant differences among many of the countries of the region. In part, this was due to the pre-communist history of many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, in part, it was due to the very real variations that existed in terms of the nature of the various communist regimes. The reality was that there was far more variation among the Central and Eastern European countries that were a part of the Soviet orbit than is recognized even today.

Nevertheless, today, it is evident that countries like Romania and Yugoslavia were very different both politically and in their economic organization. Even, for example, in the preparation of party/government officials, the nomenclatura, there was, as Chester Newland noted, considerable diversity among the former Soviet-bloc countries (Newland 1996). Recognition of this reality, in turn, is a significant factor in better understanding what has happened since the transition has taken place in that region. The results of the political and economic reforms have been different in the various countries of the region, in part because the local culture and history was very different, and that culture and history has a strong impact on the present.

5. In the case of economic reform (perhaps unlike the cases of political-institutional and administrative reform), the notion of “shock therapy,” which drove many of those involved in the reform efforts of two decades ago, did not work
very well. Russia is the most obvious example. There, American economists, among others, strongly advocated and were able to convince local authorities to engage in the “shock therapy” of dramatic and abrupt reform of economic institutions. The results, as are now known, were to send the Russian economy crashing and lead to the rise of oligarchic capitalists who used their ties to the old regime to dramatically enhance their personal wealth at the cost of the broader society. The more recent experience of Argentina in 2001 further confirms the fact that such approaches are still being tried with equally devastating results.

Much different were the experiences of countries like Poland and East Germany, where institutional change, particularly in the economic sphere, was brought about somewhat more slowly and gradually. In many instances, for a number of years, especially in Poland, state-owned enterprises continued to exist side by side with the newly established private sector. Obviously, in the case of East Germany, the institutional change was very much assisted by the continuing economic and fiscal support provided by West Germany.

6. The change of individual institutions within a system often takes much time and frequently comes about in quite different ways, depending upon the local history and culture. As noted above, many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have sought to reform various administrative processes, most notably their civil-service systems and have not succeeded very effectively. The US example in terms of seeking to achieve a viable civil-service system is highly illustrative as regards the time required to consolidate institutional change. That nation’s first civil-service law was passed in the 1880s. However, it was not until the 1930s, fifty years later, that half of the national government’s employees were covered by civil-service protection, and it was not until the 1960s that almost all were. Many state and local-government employees were not brought into civil-service systems until the 1980s.

7. Institutional change can be facilitated by opportunities to learn about new policy alternatives, and consequently, exposure to other experiences is beneficial for those seeking to guide reform efforts. Particularly informative in this regard has been the notable political success of former communist parties in many of the Central and Eastern European countries as they proceeded to transform themselves into social democratic parties. In many cases, this transformation has been facilitated by the reaching-out of their leadership to Western European social democratic parties and seeking their support, technical assistance and encouragement in the development of the successor parties to the once dominant communist parties (Paterson and Sloam 2005).
The effort to draw upon Western experience was by no means limited simply to political-party reform. Indeed, it was equally relevant in terms of trying to bring about administrative reform of post-communist regime institutions and policies. As Meyer-Sahling has commented, “It was common for administrative reformers to go policy shopping in Western Europe. In most countries (CEE), policy inspiration from abroad was actively sought during the transition period and influenced constitutional designs and administrative reforms” (Meyer-Sahling 2009).

8. The internal character and nature of the political party which comes to power after a transition has taken place does make a difference in terms of the type of public-administration practice that is put in place. While past administrative experience and traditions certainly do influence the direction of administrative reforms in new democracies, nevertheless, the inclinations of the political party in power in the aftermath of the democratic transition can play a very important role.

A classic case of this is seen in Poland’s efforts at developing a civil-service system. Whenever the country’s communist successor party has been in power, the emphasis in terms of qualifying to enter Poland’s civil-service system has been dramatically different from when the anticommunist opposition party has been in power. When the communist successor party is in power, the main requirement to enter the civil-service system has been seven years of governmental experience (a qualification which many of the individuals involved in the anticommunist opposition movement obviously did not have). In contrast, when the principal anticommunist party was in control of the government, the experience requirement to enter the civil service was replaced with the requirement of knowledge of a second language, preferably Western (a criterion that many of its adherents could easily meet and which at least some involved in the communist regime could not).

9. The quality of legislation passed both before and after the transition can have a significant impact. For example, in many of the countries making the transition to democratic governance, the legislation establishing the civil-service systems was loosely and/or poorly drafted either by intent or chance, and this significantly inhibited the development of those systems. Not surprisingly, local elites have in many instances taken advantage of such situations to facilitate their traditional institutional interests in political patronage and the amassing of resources needed to strengthen party and personal political organizations.

In most instances, the weakness of the legislation involved is not simply a function of limited competence or lack of precision and specificity. As Theo-
dore J. Lowi noted in a highly regarded study of American politics, in most instances where legislation was ambiguously or imprecisely written, it was not from oversight or incompetence, but rather the need to maintain ambiguity either in order to achieve consensus among parties that disagreed on specifics or in order to facilitate the intended manipulation of the statute in question as it was being implemented (Lowi 1969). Most assuredly, the same has been true in Europe as Arolda Elbasani has noted:

*The governing actors, reluctant to renounce the power of controlling the state have preferred partial compliance – which consists of paying allegiance to the broad principles of a modern administration, but permits de facto control over the state either through incomplete laws or manipulation of laws during the process of implementation (Elbasani 2009).*

10. Significant political-institutional and administrative change is almost always a product of both internal and external factors. On the one hand existing practices, as well as long-standing traditions, have had considerable impact in virtually every country making major economic and political transitions. On the other hand, in many instances, external factors such as pressure from international multilateral financial organizations have had their impact on policy development. This was particularly the case in the major democratic transitions which took place in Latin America during the eighties and early nineties. It was also, perhaps to a lesser extent, true of the transitions which took place in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, there was also the very considerable influence of the European Union which, both through its very substantial aid program and the lure of Union accession, played an extraordinarily important and influential role in promoting political-institutional and economic reform.

The impact of multiple factors in shaping or reshaping important institutions in Central and Eastern Europe was particularly evident in terms of the considerable efforts in many countries to achieve civil-service reform and the restructuring of public-personnel systems more generally. As Meyer-Sahling has noted: “The legacy of the past, the mode of transition and the constellation of actors after the first free elections, shaped the personnel policy and civil service reform dynamics in the immediate period after the change of regime” (Meyer-Sahling 2004).

11. Incentives can be a powerful positive force – but only up to a point. The most obvious illustration of this involved the desire of many of the transitioning countries of Central and Eastern Europe to enter the European Union (EU). Many very major reforms in all sectors of society – political, economic, admin-
istrative – were driven by that desire. Indeed, those CEE countries entering the EU had, as part of the process of qualifying to enter, to adopt a wide array of reforms which came to almost 80,000 pages in total as presented in the “acquis communautaire.” These reforms ranged from rewriting local agriculture policy to developing new requirements for national banking systems. However, as the example of at least a couple of the countries that did enter the EU illustrates, once in the Union there was an inclination to back away from some of the reforms. Certainly this has been the case as regards civil-service reform in places like Slovakia and Poland.

Nevertheless, as was noted at the outset, the transitions that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe have been quite extraordinary. They have certainly changed the nature of the region’s political and economic systems. In some cases, it is even arguable that they have begun to modestly change the culture of the countries involved. Clearly, the desire to enter the European Union on the part of both the countries that have done so and those that wish to do so, has been an extraordinarily powerful force for the bringing-about and, in many cases, the consolidation of change.

12. All transitions have their costs and, in most cases, some negative consequences as well. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, one witnesses a significant growth in inequality and the emergence of growing underclasses. This has been especially the case in rural areas, where the impact of the new economies has been not nearly as great as has been the case in the larger cities of the Central and Eastern European countries. But it has also been true in urban areas which have seen the emergence of the same type of underclass that has long characterized Western European and US cities. Similarly, as has been the case in many parts of the world, and especially in places like the United States and Great Britain, the past two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the degree of inequality to be found in Central and Eastern Europe. In part this is the product of global economic trends, but in part it is also the consequence of the collapse of many of the social safety-net systems which existed in Central and Eastern Europe.

3. Conclusion

The principal concern of this chapter is reflected in the second half of its title. “What Have We Learned?” The short answer to that question is much, but there is still much yet to learn. In terms of changes in political institutions, economic systems and administrative relationships, quite a bit has been achieved in the CEE region. Indeed, few regions of the world have witnessed such extraordinary
changes in political, economic or administrative systems in such a short time, nor carried it off so well, as have the CEE countries. Nevertheless, in terms of what we have learned about the processes by which these achievements have been made, things seem rather less clear. However, certainly we do know more about, and understand better, the complexity of the processes of reform than we did two or three decades ago.

Interestingly, in terms of these reform initiatives, there appears to be some relationship between the degree of consequence and significance of the change and the ease with which it has occurred. That is to say that in terms of the three areas of reform upon which we have focused here, clearly the greatest degree of change/reform has taken place as regards political and economic institutions. This is obviously the area of activity which has attracted the most engagement and the greatest attention of the population in the CEE region. Significantly less change and/or reform has occurred in the area of administrative relationships.

Much of the political-institutional change/reform which has occurred has focused on the decentralization and dispersal of governmental and economic power and authority. Towards this end, numerous political institutions in many countries have gone through a period of growth, development and strengthening. In general, this has appeared to have, at least thus far, very positive consequences for the countries and societies involved. The region’s economic reform activities often also focused on a decentralization of power and authority, have been equally as dramatic and wide-ranging and, many observers would conclude, have been the most successful of all reform efforts.

In terms of what we have learned about the processes of governmental and institutional reform and how we can facilitate such activity or at least enable the process of change to be carried out most effectively, the picture, while becoming more focused, is still not totally clear. We have certainly learned that these processes are complicated and while, in many instances, it may appear that change/reform has been dramatic, old traditions and patterns of behavior certainly do not immediately disappear. In part, this is because, while systems may change in dramatic and highly visible ways, many of the individual institutions which are a part of them resist change even in times of turbulence and, when they do change, often do so in the most deliberate manner. In many respects, in any review of the past few decades of government reform in the CEE countries, it is hard not to come away without a greater appreciation of the truism that the more things change the more they remain the same.
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Explaining the Incidence of Administrative Reform in Eastern Europe

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“In the third wave of democratization, the old assumptions that institutional change must be completed in the initial stage have been falsified.” (von Beyme 2001, 24)

Introduction

After the fall of the Communist regimes, institutional reform was placed high on the agenda of democratic transformation in all Central and Eastern European countries. Yet while constitutional changes and the institutionalization of property rights came relatively early in the transition everywhere, reforming the public-administration sector was postponed in many places for about a decade. This “neglect” of institution building, especially with regard to crafting rules that would transform the old state machine into a modern and effective bureaucratic apparatus, is a concern shared by an increasing number of scholars and practitioners (Eatwell et al. 1997). Opponents of the “shock therapy” approach to marketization, for instance, assign the guilt for the tremendous social costs of rapid restructuring to the lack of supporting institutions, such as labor and consumer laws, and of strategies enhancing administrative capacity (Haynes and Husan 2002). So far, the interest of transitologists has been attracted more by the negative effects of delayed administrative reform than by the puzzling question of why some countries chose to modernize their bureaucracy earlier than others. Some research identifies past legacies as shaping different trajectories of reform, but inconsistencies in the predicted outcomes show there is need for a more thorough investigation. Are the historical constraints of the Eastern European transition the main reason for differences in the timing of reform, or do post-1989 political choices and social tensions also offer relevant explanations? Revealing the sources of protracted institutional reform would contribute significantly to the current understanding of democratic transition after Communism.

This paper analyzes the factors that determined the adoption of new civil-service legislation in thirteen post-Communist countries in the period between 1989 and 2002. We start by defining the nature of public-administration reform in a post-Communist setting, the kind of changes it involves, and how it has been studied. In the next section we draw upon existent studies on institutions and institutional change, and develop a theoretical framework of reform from a rational-
choice perspective. Our approach is based on an understanding that institutions guide the behavior of participants in the political life of a country by offering opportunities and imposing constraints. We believe that changing the status quo is costly but might also be beneficial under certain circumstances, and that the latter drives elites in deciding upon altering the existent rules. In our model the final decision for reform is motivated by such rational calculations, formed under both domestic and external pressures. In the last two sections of the paper, we test the propositions derived from theory with empirical data through an event-history analysis. Specifically, we use a Cox proportional hazard model, which determines the probability for a country to adopt a reform given its initial characteristics and its evolution over time.

What reform and what do we know about it?

Institutional reform in post-Communist states is a broad and complex concept. Therefore, from the start we need to define what kind of transformation the study will be analyzing. This will ensure more accurate observation of the timing of reform occurrence and will help establish the challenges faced by institutional engineers. Thus, for the purposes of this study we define reform as the adoption of a new civil service act which introduces the principles of depoliticization and professionalization as fundamental rules of appointment, promotion and award. That this would be a major break with the Communist past is a fact recognized by most of the literature on bureaucratic reform in Eastern Europe (e.g. Bossaert and Demmke 2003, Meyer-Sahling 2004, Neshkova and Kostadinova 2012). Defined this way, reform means a shift from the non-transparent, ideological, one-party-dominated bureaucratic apparatus toward modern, merit-based administrations, which are professional and independent from political pressure.

Although all post-Communist countries have undergone fresh civil service reforms, as Table 1 shows, there is considerable variation in the timing of reform introduction. For example, Hungary, which is widely considered a front-runner in terms of institutional reconstruction, passed its civil-service law as early as 1992 (Gajduschek 2007, Goetz 2001, Meyer-Sahling 2004, 2009). Estonia and Lithuania adopted new civil-service legislation by the mid 1990s; other countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, passed their civil-service acts in 1999 (Grzymala-Busse 2007). Surprisingly, one of the most successfully democratizing countries in the region, the Czech Republic, was very slow in passing civil-service legislation. Although several successive drafts of the bill had been circulating in the Czech parliament since 1993 (Goetz 2001), civil-service legislation was not adopted until
2002 (Grzymala-Busse 2007). What might have caused this variation in the timing of the decision to reform?

Table 1
Timing of Reform Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Adoption</th>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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Extant research on post-1989 Eastern Europe links institutional reform, as part of the broader transitional process, to the context of regime change (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996, Meyer-Sahling 2004, Vachudova 2005, Hale 2007). At the core of this approach is the notion of past legacies, i.e. structures and relationships inherited from Communism, which place countries on different paths of development and pre-determine the success of democratization. In a comprehensive study of democratic consolidation in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, Linz and Stepan (1996, 63) associate the success of reform to the presence of a “bureaucracy acceptable and serviceable to democratic government” and the extent of political penetration of the previous administration. Emphasizing the role of elites, Meyer-Sahling (2004) and Munck and Leff (1997) connect politicians’ strategies at the start of transition to the institutional rules adopted later. Meyer-Sahling, who specifically studies civil-service reform, explains the dynamics of institutional innovation through political trust and the attitudes of senior bureaucrats under different scenarios of elite continuity. Vachudova (2005) has a slightly different take; she focuses on the anti-Communist opposition (created before 1989) and
identifies its strength as the factor which sets a liberal pattern of successful political and economic transformation.

The “past legacies” theoretical approach offers helpful insights, but also raises questions. First, the typologies developed in most of these studies do not agree on the classification of some of the cases, and consequently on the predictions that can be derived about institutional change. For example, Bulgaria and Romania either fall in one group of “revolution from above” (Munck and Leff 1997, Meyer-Sahling 2004), where there are no incentives for real reform, or in separate categories of previous non-democratic systems (Linz and Stepan 1996), assigning different prospects for bureaucracy modernization to the two nations. Similar inconsistencies can be found with regard to Poland and Hungary. Second, some theoretical constructs focus exclusively on a particular part of the elite, including incumbents’ preferences and choices by Meyer-Sahling (2004) and the strength of the anti-Communist opposition by Vachudova (2005), and discount the influence of other political actors. This leads to the classification of Czechoslovakia in the group of the early reformers (Vachudova 2005), which might be true in many other areas but not with regard to civil service reform. Being one of the last countries in the region to regulate its administration, the Czech case is clearly one of a laggard. In this sense, Grzymala-Busse’s (2007) approach that pays equal attention to both governing and opposition elites is much more promising for understanding the peculiarities of occurrence of administrative reform.

Moreover, extant research shows that applying the same frameworks to explain the adoption of various institutional changes may not prove effective (Munck and Leff 1997, Beyme 2001). Superimposing different layers of institutional reform in Eastern Europe, one cannot but notice an interesting pattern of distinct priorities in countries where transition started abruptly and in countries with a more gradual, negotiated transition. In what Beyme (2001, 7) describes as a “paradox,” broader democratic support for change in some places resulted in less radical constitutional reform, while countries with weaker civil societies produced entirely new basic laws. Interestingly, the Polish and Hungarian elites were not in a hurry to adopt distinctly new constitutional drafts but passed legislation for transformation of the civil service shortly after the transition started. In both countries, some constitutional changes had already been passed in the years preceding 1989. In contrast, in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, political elites who prevailed in the first phase of the transition were quick in designing new constitutions but reluctant to adopt administrative reform that would reduce their own control over the allocation of state resources.
Drawing upon these considerations, we start to develop a theoretical model that incorporates internal and external factors that affect elites’ incentives to undertake administrative reform. Under what conditions will politicians decide to alter the status quo? We believe that both the characteristics of the elites in power and in opposition are important, as are the domestic context and the international environment. The constellation of all this leads to particular elite decisions about whether or not to change the way bureaucracy functions.

The costs and benefits of institutional reform

Political institutions are social constructs which produce distributional benefits, i.e., they make some players in the political game better-off (Magalhaes 1999). Politicians are well aware of this, as shown by numerous studies examining the battles in which elites engage every time new legislation is being crafted (Benoit and Schiemann 2001). As Douglass North (1990) succinctly put it, institutions determine opportunities for exchange by reducing the transaction costs for participants. Rational actors may take advantage of these chances and impose legal constraints on free-riding behavior to reduce uncertainty among contracting parties. In this sense, institutions create a stable environment for exchange, or provision of public goods in the case of bureaucracies, by contributing to the efficiency of the product and its distribution.

Because institutions establish a certain structure of exchange that has distributional effects, the idea of changing them is loaded with concerns about possible own losses and rivals’ gains. Along these lines, scholars propose that the reform of existing rules becomes possible only when those who have the power to introduce it perceive change as more advantageous than preserving the status quo (North 1990, 8). During democratic transition, circumstances change the relative prices of management and enforcement under current institutional arrangements. The need to initiate reform will most likely result in alteration when elites realize that the costs of keeping the old framework are too high and not worth the uncertain and/or progressively diminishing gains. When such a perception occurs, institutional change is brought to the agenda for negotiation of its terms by dominant political actors. The urgency of replacing existing rules with a new set of rules is what makes a transitional institutional choice different from reform in consolidated democracies (Benoit and Schiemann 2001). Nested within the broader game of fundamental institutional transformation, the changing of particular institutions becomes inevitable and just a matter of time.

The intensity of the struggle over institutionalization of new structures depends on the distance between the positions and the relative power of the politically
relevant actors (North 1990, 101). These characteristics vary across countries and over time; therefore, the outcomes will be different despite the urgency for institutional innovation under transition. Because change is costly, elites will agree to initiate reform only after they recognize that a critical number of their constituents stand for change (North 1990, 138). The opposite also holds: because institutions shape opportunities for gains, politicians will oppose deviations from the status quo if followers who are important to them are unwilling to accept changes involving more rigid and binding commitments.

The games of institutional change during transition take a route of “protracted” alteration, where the opposition constantly struggles to “peel off layers of authoritarian control step by step” (Schedler 2002). The asymmetry of control over resources between ex-Communists and their democratic rivals translates into different choices, as shown in studies on constitutional and electoral reform (Zielonka 2001, Birch et al. 2003). At the onset of transition the incumbents have a procedural advantage in determining the terms of competition, while their opponents’ strength is in being perceived as an antipode of the past and the carrier of innovation. Less costly, and hence more likely, are changes in basic laws (constitutions and electoral systems) that have a direct impact on political transformation. State structures and their operations, in contrast, remain a potential resource for governing elites to extract rents and satisfy their support base (Ganev 2007, Grzymala-Busse 2007). Reforming the public sector may be perceived as beneficial by politicians when their electoral fortunes are uncertain and the costs of leaving an unreformed bureaucracy in the hands of political opponents rise. Only after the costs of keeping administrative rules unchanged become overwhelmingly high, so that a large mass of constituents suffer losses, would politicians agree to launch reforms. This outcome is more likely for later stages of the transition, when the structure of democratic competition consolidates and the need to complete institutional reform intensifies.

**A Model of Public Administration Reform**

Under what particular circumstances would post-Communist elites reach a decision to reform their state administrations? The discussion above points to the importance of perceived opportunities and costs of reform in the decision calculus of elites. In this regard, the pay-off structure for separate actors involved in institutional engineering is different, and their preferences are conditioned by the political context.

In our theoretical model, decisions for change and over the new rules are taken by elites who face a strategic situation loaded with demands for more transpar-
ent and responsive policies. The intensity of these requests and the urgency with which they need to be addressed vary by context. In general, reform may become an issue when the existing institutions are seen by ruling coalitions as increasingly inefficient in performing their main function, i.e. providing the public good. In such instances, incumbents would initiate reform to improve bureaucratic performance and to carry out successfully their policy programs. However, the ruling party may find it more beneficial to retain the old rules if the latter allow great opportunities for expropriation of state resources. This is exactly the case in the post-Communist transitions, which in the early 1990s started a process of economic restructuring that opened opportunities for hidden privatization, illegal election campaign funding and partisan allocation of public contracts. An unreformed bureaucracy, staffed with politically loyal administrators, is a great resource that politicians in power prefer to keep as long as possible. The cost of losing it by replacing political appointment with a merit-based mechanism, free of conflict of interest, seems well too high. Therefore, when governing coalitions concentrate a lot of power in their hands, they will be in a position to prevent reform.

But incumbents make these economic decisions under conditions where they are challenged by other political and social actors. Pressures for reform from the domestic and the international environment may re-shape incumbents’ preferences, despite the expected immediate gains from access to state resources through a politicized administrative machine. The strongest impact comes from the opposition, which, if competitive and likely to win the next election, would benefit from a politically loyal bureaucracy the same way as those currently in government. As previously argued, state re-building after Communism is more likely under conditions of “robust competition”, where there is a political force that exists as a viable “governing alternative” (Grzymala-Busse 2007, 11).

Another source of pressure for reform is civil society. Strong public support for democratization and modernization of the institutions of power may potentially enhance the elites’ decision to initiate reform. While civil society in Eastern Europe is widely known as underdeveloped and weak, especially at the start of transition, the public has demonstrated interest in politics and readiness to vote incumbents out of power. Mobilized popular interest in depoliticization of the inherited bureaucratic apparatus (also accused of corrupt behavior) is too costly for politicians to ignore.

Finally, pressure for administrative reform may also come from abroad. A large body of literature relates institutional reforms in post-Communist countries to the external pressure from international institutions and mainly from the Eu-
Rational-choice theory offers a compelling explanation of the behavior of post-Communist states. Within this perspective, countries comply because they seek to maximize their benefits. In other words, countries accept to reform because the costs of not doing so would jeopardize expected returns from membership. As Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003, 43) describe, “East European states take part in the laborious accession process because EU membership brings tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits – particularly as compared to uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as others move forward.” In the absence of external pressure, however, these countries would either delay, or weaken, or not change at all, their administrations (Grzymala-Busse 2007). Indeed, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Slovakia had not implemented any civil-service reforms until the late 1990s, when such institutional change became an explicit requirement for acquiring membership.¹

In sum, because accession is strongly desired by the post-Communist countries, the EU has a chance to influence reform through the accession-conditionality mechanism (Vachudova 2005). National governments that have not modernized their bureaucracies earlier cannot afford to ignore Brussels’ conditions. In the calculation of reform initiation, the costs of losing EU membership and access to the European structural funds may overwhelm the domestic gains associated with keeping the status quo.

Four central hypotheses can be derived from the above arguments:

H_1: Higher concentration of power in the hands of transitional incumbents makes the initiation of administrative reform less likely.

H_2: The existence of a viable political opposition that has the potential to win the next election makes administrative reform more likely.

H_3: Strong pressure from society for democratization makes administrative reform more likely.

H_4: External pressure from the EU for transformation as a condition for future accession makes administrative reform more likely.

¹ Vachudova (2005) uses the terms “passive” and “active” leverage to describe the evolution in the EU’s influence over politics in the candidate states for membership. In the first phase of “passive” leverage, the early and mid-1990s, the Western governments “did not care about improving the public administration … in East European states” (110). After enlargement to the East became part of Brussels’ agenda and progress towards reform was a required condition, the EU could exercise “active” leverage.
Research Design

To test empirically the above hypotheses about the incidence of administration reform, we employ data from thirteen post-Communist countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. We track each country from the first year it was “at risk” of adopting a reform to the time of the actual event. This type of longitudinal analysis allows us to confirm the factors that impact the decision to pursue administrative reform, given a country’s initial characteristics and its evolution over time. The data set for our analysis is a pooled cross-sectional time series, where the observations are country-years. More specifically, the data consist of one observation for each year the country is at risk of adopting a reform and one observation for the year the country adopts a reform. The dependent variable, \textit{REFORM}, is coded as a dummy indicating whether the country adopts the new policy in that year. It assumes a value of one for the year of adoption and zero otherwise. A country enters the data set in the first year when enacting reform is considered feasible. Since the Communist regimes in CEE started collapsing in 1989, observations on most countries in our sample start with 1990. The time series of countries that were once part of federations, such as Croatia, Macedonia and the three Baltic republics, begin with the first year they gained independence. Observations for each cross-section end when that state passes a law to reform the administrative system inherited from the Communist era.

We start the analysis by developing a model testing our four hypotheses. Variable names and descriptions, as well as data sources are provided in the Appendix. We model the expectation put forward in H\textsubscript{1} through a variable measuring the concentration of power in the hands of the winning party. \textit{ABSMAJOR} takes the value of one when the ruling party has more than 50 percent of parliamentary seats, and zero otherwise. We expect a negative association between this factor and reform, in the sense that an incumbent party with much power has the capacity to keep the status quo, thus the probability of adopting a civil-service law is lower. The expectation about the effect of political competition (H\textsubscript{2}) is operationalized by using the margin of victory from the last parliamentary elections. \textit{MARGIN} is measured as the difference between the percentages of votes received by the first and the second parties. We expect to observe a positive correlation between competition and the adoption of reform. In other words, as the margin between the first and second party increases, the probability that the ruling elite will pursue administrative reform should decrease.

Strong civil society, as posited in H\textsubscript{3}, is expected to affect positively reform probability. We operationalize the strength of civil society by the number of non-gov-
ernmental organizations in a country. Data for NGO come from the Yearbook of International Organizations, which publishes the counts each year in its Guide to Global Civil Society Networks. EU accession status is also expected to impact positively the decision to adopt a reform. Moreover, after 1997 the administrative requirement became an independent source of conditionality for membership. The expected influence of the EU is operationalized as country-accession status. The variable ACCESSTATUS has four categories: zero is assigned to the stage at which no formal association exists between a country and the Union; a value of one reflects the existence of an association agreement; a value of two is assigned to years with applicant status, and a value of three means that the country is in negotiations and has candidate status. For the years covered by the data set, only the Czech Republic and Slovakia reached candidate status and received the highest possible value of this variable.

We also test the explanatory power of the past-legacies theories. We consider three main explanations discussed in the literature that relate the probability of adopting a new civil-service law to the characteristics that the state inherited from its past (see Meyer-Sahling 2009 for a detailed review). In the first explanation the mode of transition, more specifically the outcome of the first democratic election, predetermines a state’s trajectory to reform. Ganev (2007) argues that the results of the first democratic vote have had long-term implications for the speed and forms of state reconstruction. According to him, the separation between the party and state was delayed in countries where the ex-Communist party won the first democratic election, and institutional reconstruction was essentially slowed down. In contrast, countries where the opposition won the founding election were quicker in breaking up with the past and rebuilding the state institutions. If this argument is correct, we should find higher probability of administrative reform adoption in countries where the first elections were won by the opposition. To test this expectation, we include in the data set an indicator variable, WINNER, which scores one if the opposition prevailed in the first elections, and zero otherwise.

Another legacy theory relates the rate of reform to the levels of detotalitarianization of bureaucracy before 1989 (Linz and Stepan 1996). According to this perspective, countries with more detotalitarianization will have higher probability of reforming their administrations sooner. Within this classification, countries like Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and the three Baltic Republics score high while countries like Albania and Romania are at the bottom. DETOTAL accounts for this variation in our model. Finally, some authors explain the trajectory of administrative development in CEE countries by focusing on legacies from the periods preceding the Communist regime. Verheijen (1999) considers the administrative
systems of the Russian and the Ottoman empires to be worse at fostering professionalism compared to those coming from the Habsburg tradition. To test the effect of imperial legacies, we employ a variable \textit{IMPERLEGACY}. It is coded one for countries whose administrations share features of a common Habsburg past, and zero for countries whose administrations were shaped by the Russian and Ottoman traditions.

To take into account the extent of democratization and national wealth of the countries in the sample, we introduce two controls. \textit{DEMOCRACY} accounts for the possible impact of democratization, in particular respect for citizen freedoms and civil liberties and equality before the law. Such democratic environments are considered more favorable to institutional innovation, and thus they are expected to increase the probability of reform adoption. Since we measure the level of democracy through the Freedom House rankings, higher values indicate less freedom. Our democracy variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the reform variable. \textit{GDP/POP} is the control for national economic development. We do not have a prior expectation about the direction of this variable. It is measured as country GDP per capita in constant US dollars of 2005.

\textbf{Theory meets data}

The four central hypotheses are tested using a Cox proportional hazard model. This semi-parametric estimation technique is essentially designed to address issues such as censoring and non-normality, which usually plague time-to-event analysis like ours. Moreover, it is relaxed from various strict distributional assumptions on the way the reforms occur over time, usually imposed by other parametric techniques. A positive coefficient on a variable in the hazard model implies that higher values are associated with a higher hazard rate and thus a lower expected time to event. The hazard ratio, in turn, reveals how much the hazard (relative risk) of reform adoption increases for a unit change in the independent variable. To ease the interpretation of our results, we focus on the hazard ratios derived from our models rather than the estimated coefficients. The critical value for hazard ratios is 1: a hazard ratio greater than 1 means increase in the rate of reform, while a hazard ratio less than 1 suggests a decrease in the rate of reform in the countries in our sample.
We present the results of the hazard-model estimation in Table 2. Our data provide support for $H_1$ conditioning the probability of reform occurrence on the concentration of power in the hands of winners. If the winning party attains a majority victory in the parliamentarian election, the rate of reform slows down by 94%. Both the hazard rate and the estimated coefficient are significant at the five-percent level. An opposite effect is observed, however, in regards to political competition. The margin of the victory is associated with a hazard rate of 1.09, which indicates an increase in the rate of reform by 9%. The last effect, however, is only significant at the 0.1 level. Our third hypothesis relates the incidence of...
reform to the strength of civil society, but the test fails to detect any statistical link between the number of NGOs and the occurrence of reform: the hazard rate for this variable is indistinguishable from one.\(^2\)

With regard to the fourth hypothesis, the data show strong statistical association between a country’s accession status and the incidence rate of administrative reform. However, the effect runs contrary to what theory predicts. The hazard rate and the estimated coefficient are significant at the .01 level. The hazard ratio of almost 0.24 suggests that the rate of reform decreases by 76% (100% – 24%) when the access status of a candidate country changes by one unit, that is, when a country becomes an applicant after being just a participant in an association agreement. Finally, both of our controls are significantly associated with the reform. As expected, higher levels of democracy create favorable conditions for reform adoption. Since we operationalized the level of democracy through the Freedom House ranking, where higher values indicate less freedom, the negative sign of the parameter of this variable is in the expected direction. The GDP variable also shows negative correlation with reform.

Our second model tests the explanatory power of the past-legacies theories. In particular, we relate the rate of reform across our countries to the winner of the first democratic elections, the extent of detotalitarianization of pre-1989 bureaucracy, and imperial traditions inherited from the pre-Communist era. The data fail to support the explanation conditioning the rate of reform occurrence on the outcome of the first elections after the collapse of Communism. They do, however, provide some support for the detotalitarianization thesis. The rate of reform increases almost five times for each unit change in this variable. Thus, countries like Poland or Hungary have a significantly higher hazard of undertaking their civil-service reforms than countries like Albania and Romania. The test of the imperial legacy explanation offers some useful insights about the post-Communist administrative development. The data show that countries that inherited common features from the Habsburg type of administration have a greater hazard of undertaking reforms compared to countries whose administrations were shaped along the Russian or the Ottoman imperial traditions. As in our previous model, both our controls are associated with lower rates of reform. However, their coefficients and hazard rates do not attain statistical significance at conventional levels.

\(^2\) We also employ an alternative measure to assess the effect of civil-society strength on a country’s hazard (probability) of adopting a new civil-service law. The variable measures NGO membership density for each nation as the number of memberships in NGOs per 1 million population. The alternative specification yields similar results.
Discussion and conclusions

Our results suggest that although past legacies still have some impact on the administrative development in post-Communist countries, they are not the only reason why some countries undertake their administrative reform earlier in the transition process than others. The analysis shows that political factors, such as the presence of a big electoral winner, strongly affect the probability that countries will reform their administrative systems. A high concentration of power significantly slows down the rate of reforms. This finding confirms that if a winning party (no matter its ideology) enjoys parliamentary majority, it has little incentives to reform the bureaucracy. Just the opposite, it has greater incentives to keep the bureaucracy politically dependent, controllable, and less transparent.

Contrary to the theoretical expectations, our data reveal that progress in EU accession may weaken incentives for civil-service reform in candidate countries. We suspect that this result is driven by cases such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia; both countries moved rather fast through the accession procedure, but were notoriously slow to reform their administrations. In a sense, this provides support for the “credible threat” thesis extended by Dimitrova (2005). According to her argument, conditionality works best when the threat of exclusion is credible. But the threat of exclusion for no compliance with administrative conditionality has been much lower for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, compared to Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, it is possible that our result was affected by the way EU leverage was exercised. Nevertheless, we believe that the issue of late civil-service reform in some of the successful transitions deserves more attention and should be explored further.

This paper has begun to uncover the factors that explain the decision of a post-Communist country to undertake administrative reform and the timing of this decision within the transition process. Although a more precise and detailed modeling is needed to understand better the drivers of institutional modernization, this analysis allows to conclude that the decision to undertake civil-service reform involves a rather complex weighting of the costs and benefits associated with it. So far the legacies of the past provide an incomplete picture of what the real process might look like.
## Variables Description and Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSMAJOR</td>
<td>Coded as 1 when the winning party has more than 50% of parliamentary seats.</td>
<td>Sources: Birch, Sarah. 2003. Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave; Parties and Elections in Europe (Albania ’96, Croatia ’90, Macedonia ’90); Wikipedia (Latvia ’90, Lithuania ’90-1partyseat%, and Ukraine ’90-1partyseat %).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARGIN</td>
<td>Margin = (%vote for 1st party) – (% vote for 2nd party).</td>
<td>Sources: same as for ABSMAJOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>The number of NGOs of conventional type (types A-F in the yearbook’s categories) for a given country.</td>
<td>Source: Yearbook of International Organizations; Guide to Global Civil Society Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINNER</td>
<td>Coded as 1 if opposition won the first elections, and zero otherwise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERLEGACY</td>
<td>Coded as 1 for countries with administrations along the Habsburg’s traditions, and zero for countries with administrations shaped by the Russian and the Ottoman traditions.</td>
<td>Source: Verheijen 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>Freedom House political rights and civil-liberties indexes.</td>
<td>Source: <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings">www.freedomhouse.org/ratings</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Out of the Box:
CEE and CA Transitions and PA Paradigms

MICHEIL S. DE VRIES

1. Introduction

Research into developments going on in the CEE and CIS region poses an interesting challenge. Not only because it keeps our knowledge updated of what is going on in this part of the world, but especially because it has severe consequences for our theoretical understanding of change processes. Existing theories are mainly developed by Western scholars (cf. Kotter 1996, Sabatier 2008; Burke 2010). Public Administration as a scholarly discipline has been, and is still, dominated by Anglo-Saxon and American theorizing with evidence based on and often even restricted to countries in which data are easily available, e.g. especially the US and UK, and the scholars are native-English speakers.

The developments that took place and are still going on in CEE and CIS countries could challenge such theories and provide contrary findings. When conducting research in this geographic area one could arrive at conclusions that contradict the hypotheses compared to those deduced from theories dominant in mainstream Public Administration. This paper elaborates on this issue by presenting data on long-term trends visible in these countries, and relating them to one another and to the theoretical expectations.

This paper concentrates on the effects of governance, which is a crucial theme in Public Administration.

Many theories hypothesize that good governance is not just to be seen as a value in itself and argue that it also is a necessary condition for socio-economic development. Good governance is not a goal, but a means which would ensure the creation of institutions that act as safeguards for returns on investment, diminish social unrest and diminish public expenditures, especially military expenditures, and through those generative mechanisms increase economic growth. Furthermore, the motivation to work and invest would profit from a climate in which individual liberties, information exchange and property rights are maximized. Although this notion has been disputed, because dictators and authoritarian regimes could be more capable in suppressing social unrest, diminishing public expenditures, especially in social areas, and can enforce the savings needed for investments, the dominant idea nowadays is that a free economic market sys-
tem, together with democratic government, is a necessary condition for socio-economic development (cf. Kurzman et al. 2002).

As this paper will argue, analyzing the developments in CEE and CIS countries for the last two decades makes one wonder if this paradigm is corroborated by the empirical facts. The underlying research question is what it is that good governance can accomplish, whether such effects are related to contextual features and what it is in the context that interferes with government’s accomplishments.

Originally this paper had an ambitious aim, namely to analyze the developments that took place in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and to judge the implications thereof for paradigms that dominate in Public Administration. Within the framework of a paper and given the preliminary outcomes, the analysis has to be limited. It is acknowledged in advance that much more research than presented below is needed. The goal of the paper thus changed into arguing that such further analyses can contribute to our understanding of processes of change and to make a plea to devote more time and energy to such research.

Its main research question is the following: on a macro level, what has been accomplished in CEE and CIS countries during the last two decades, to what extent is this the effect of good governance, and what are the main peculiarities that could challenge dominant paradigms?

In order to answer that question this paper will give an overview of the developments that took place in general statistical terms with regard to good governance, economic growth, human development, inequality and stability and point to the peculiarities.

The description of the developments is based on international comparative data gathered by international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank and NGOs such as Freedom House. Combining these data provides some insights in the validity of the paradigms dominant in the explanation of transition processes. The previous sentence deliberately mentioned the word “some” because the validity and reliability of the data coming from these international organizations may well be disputed (cf. de Vries 2010).

Furthermore, given the problems with the data and the limited number of independent cases (nation states) the paper will not present advanced methodology such as time-series analysis and pooled-regression analysis. The number of countries is just too small and the timeframe too short to conduct such analyses. However, the limited number of data does enable the search for peculiarities and extreme cases, which seem to contradict the expectations derived from popular theories.
This will result in a discussion about the findings at the end of this paper. Before we come to that, first a brief discussion is needed about the appropriate aggregation level on which the analyses should take place. Can we see the NISPAcee region as one coherent whole, or do we need to distinguish between regions, or should we look at an even lower level of aggregation that is the developments of nation states as such?

2. Aggregated and disaggregated developments

The developments that took place in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia during the last two decades could be seen as one big experiment. For instance the World Bank and UNDP allow users of their database to extract aggregate data for this region as a whole, i.e. “Europe and Central Asia, developing only”. At first sight there are good reasons to do so. All these countries moved from centrally steered economies to free market economies, and all these countries departed from communist systems dominated by the Soviet Union and moved toward more or less independent democratic countries. From this perspective one can witness a transition with huge political, economic and social consequences for the region as a whole. A tremendous economic growth is seen, as GDP per capita increased on average from $18,233 in 1992 to $27,856 in 2010, an increase of almost 53%. On average the Human Development Index, a UNDP composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living – also steadily increased in CEE and CIS countries from 0.64 in 1980 to 0.68 in 1990 to 0.70 in 2000 and 0.75 in 2010. (http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/). From an aggregate point of view the developments went smoothly and a prosperous transition is seen.

One should again note the small modifying word, that is, “on average”. From a disaggregated perspective, variations are seen, pointing to a possible interpretation of the developments in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia as multiple experiments, in which different regions need to be distinguished, such as the Baltic States, Central Europe, the Balkans and the CIS countries. There are again good reasons to do so, because these regions are different in cultural background, geographic location, their political (in)stability and, as will be argued, trends in good governance.

Seen from such a regional perspective, no one-size-fits-all development is visible. In some countries there is still a Soviet-style government with a kind of superpresidentialism, where reforms mainly pose a paper reality (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan), while in other countries serious reforms have taken place (Baltic
States, Central Europe) and in still other regions the transition was delayed because of internal conflicts (Balkans). As Freedom House puts it on its website: “Countries in this region (Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MdV) range from among the best to among the worst in the world with regard to respect for human rights. Most states in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union rank at or near the bottom of Freedom House’s ratings for political rights and civil liberties, while the democracies of Central Europe have established institutions that generally protect most fundamental rights, despite some recent backsliding. Georgia, Ukraine, and most countries in the Balkans fall somewhere in between, and need ongoing monitoring to ensure continued democratic progress.” (http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/central-and-eastern-europeeurasia)

A third way to analyze the two-decade developments is to see them as 29 distinct national experiments, in which there are huge differences even within regions with regard to socio-economic and political developments. Trends in, for instance, Estonia differ from trends in Lithuania; trends in the Czech Republic vary from those in Hungary, trends in Slovenia clearly differ from those in other Balkan states, and even in the Central Asian republics huge differences exist, for instance with regard to political stability.

From the outside developments within the area and at least within the regions are seemingly congruent, just as the Japanese have difficulty to distinguish a Swede from an Italian and Europeans have difficulty in distinguishing Korean people from the Chinese and Japanese. From an outsider point of view, the communality in developments in CEE and CIS countries is that a lot has changed in this region and still is changing. If you as a reader think you are knowledgeable about the public sector in some of these countries, because you visited it twenty or ten years ago, or even two years ago, you are seriously mistaken, because at present things might and do look quite differently.

Viewed from such a point of view, the CEE countries have for the last 20 years been a laboratory, an experimental playground out of which a variety of differently arranged public-sector models evolved. Such differences are partly explained by the difference between the 10 central European countries which became a member of the EU in 2004 and the countries that did not acquire that status. However, also within what are now EU countries, huge differences are seen. Some countries are quite stable, while others are struggling and still others are returning to old habits, as seen in the political rights provided and curtailed, but also the social and economic rights. Within the non-EU countries there are huge differences also: between the Balkan countries and the CIS countries in Central Asia, but again also within the Balkans and between countries belonging to the
CIS region. It is not possible to equate Georgia and Ukraine with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, let alone with Kyrgyzstan. One only needs to compare them on the political rights they grant to their inhabitants.

Probably there is no coherent NISPAcee region but in name, and variation is certainly to be expected. For the scholar such variation is the point of departure for conducting research in order to explain this variance, research aimed at confronting theories with realities. The next section will address this by investigating the relation between political and civil rights and economic growth.

3. Political rights and economic growth

Figure 1 shows the situation regarding good governance in the CIS countries in 2010 according to the World Bank on the dimension of voice and accountability. This dimension includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, political and human rights, measuring the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments.

The figure shows that democracy is not yet developed to its fullest in the countries belonging to this region, to put it mildly. The figure also shows that huge differences exist, with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia doing somewhat better, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan doing somewhat worse, and countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Azerbaijan positioned in between. The first conclusion to be drawn from such data is that a lot still needs to change in these countries, before they can be seen as real democratic countries. In-depth studies on separate countries point to the brutal ways opposition and independent media are handled and the wide-spread corruption going on. The figure is not intended to suggest that being at the top of this ranking implies that there is something called democracy. There may be free elections in these countries, but the way the opposition is treated still needs to be condemned (cf. Ukraine, where it seems to be the custom to put the members of previous governments behind bars). In the middle of the ranking, such as in states as Kazakhstan the situation is even worse (cf. de Vries and Sobis 2012), and this is certainly the case in the countries at the bottom of the ranking, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (cf. Urinboyev 2011).

Up to this normative point, there will not be much discussion. Such discussion does arise when investigating the hypothesis that good governance results in higher economic growth, because in this something peculiar is seen. The countries with the worst scores on voice and accountability seem to have had the high-
Table 1
Economic growth (GDP) in selected CIS Countries (source: World Bank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The highest economic growth rates are found in those CIS countries that have the lowest scores on political and civil rights (i.e. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and the economies of these countries also seem the most robust, because the growth of the Gross Domestic Product hardly suffers from the economic and financial crises of 2008.

Although the scores with regard to the indicator on good governance in Central European countries belonging to the EU are on average much higher, it does not make much sense to equalize the developments taking place in Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia with the developments taking place nowadays in Hungary, or to equate the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia with the situation in Bulgaria and Romania.

Looking at the economic growth in the last decade, however, the economic growth in Kosovo is exceptional, with Bulgaria doing very well and Estonia doing well in times of prosperity, but having an economy that is hardly robust against economic crises (see Table 2).

Table 2
Economic growth in selected Central European countries (source: World Bank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>–1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–5</td>
<td>–14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the assumed positive relationship between democratic governance and economic growth seems more plausible in these countries, this is mainly due to...
the rapid economic growth seen only in Estonia. In Poland, having an almost equal score on democracy, the economic growth is not exceeding the growth in countries scoring far worse on governance. Even Bulgaria and Kosovo experience at least as good economic growth in the latter part of the first decade in the new millennium. Furthermore, the country seen as most democratic (Estonia) also seems to be the most vulnerable for economic crises (see the huge negative growth in 2009).

In general a small but still positive correlation exists for all CEE and CA countries between economic growth and good governance in times of worldwide economic prosperity, but this relation reverses in a negative relation in times of economic crisis (after 2008). In the latter case good governance seems to be bad for economic growth.

The suggestion is not, in a Hobbesian tradition that one needs to make a plea for a Leviathan, or to say that a tradeoff exists between good governance and economic growth (cf. Rao 1984; Haggard 1990; Hewlett 1980) or that in order to develop economically autocratic government is to be preferred. This is only the implication of these outcomes if one sees good governance just as a means and not as a goal in itself.

The developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS countries point to the fact that the relationship is more complicated than the simple “good governance results in economic growth” paradigm suggests, making in-depth research into the developments taking place in these countries all the more necessary. Such research could result in the conclusion that the figures of the international organizations are not as valid as presumed (cf. de Vries 2010). It could also result in the conclusion that there are generative mechanisms which impact on the bivariate relationship between good governance and economic growth that are yet unknown. Such research could even point to the existence of an inverted-U relationship, in which authoritarian as well as real-democratic regimes do promote economic growth, and that especially the states in the middle are confronted with severe difficulties in accomplishing economic growth (cf. Muller 1985, Kurzman et al. 2002), or that good governance works well in times of prosperity, but has opposite effects in times of economic crises.

4. Path dependencies, the transition to the free market economy and prosperity

Another popular theory lies in neo-institutional reasoning and especially the path-dependency theory within this field (Krasner 1988). The general idea is that
a specific combination of actors and contexts – in which the context is defined in terms of institutions – results in specific outcomes. Within such reasoning path-dependency theory has a central place, arguing that institutional settings as built in the past have a persistent impact on the institutions as they will be built and hence determine the outcomes for a long time: “choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is being initiated, will have a continuing and largely determining influence ... far into the future” (Peters 1999, 63). Adrian Kay argued: “it [path-dependency theory, MdV] does not provide a general list of variables that can be used to organize ‘diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry’; nor does it provide hypotheses about specific links between variables or particular parameters of those links. Instead, path dependency is an empirical category, an organizing concept which can be used to label a certain type of temporal process. The application of this label to a phenomenon is a form of explanation; it competes with alternatives – such as the particular political circumstances pertaining at different times – to provide the best explanation of that phenomenon.” (Kay 2005, 554). Path-dependency theories are about the inevitability of constrained, limited change, because of the existing institutions, which are themselves path-dependent. This refers to macro-level institutions, such as the type of regime and the constitution, the meso level with its rules concerning collective-choice decision-making and micro-level institutions, regulating individual and operational decisions. The lasting influence of institutions can be understood by pointing to the commitments induced by institution-building, and the resulting predictability of choices; the short-term time horizons of politicians unable to tackle the existing institutions; the increasing return on investments, and lock-in effects of change-resistant institutions once established (Pierson 2000). Therefore, this theory predicts that most changes are not radical changes and stay within the boundaries set by the institutions and that only severe external shocks can change the paths.

The basic question is whether path dependency can explain the developments that occurred in CEE countries and Central Asia during their transformation. In order to examine this question, this paper proceeds as follows. It concentrates on outcomes, in this case human development and income inequality. It does so, because the region was rather homogeneous in these respects at the start of its transformation. The starting point was rather similar for most countries. Taking path-dependency theory seriously one would expect that the developments within the region would be similar, too. Below an empirical analysis is presented which argues rather differently. In some aspects an increasing divergence between the countries involved is seen.
For instance, as argued in the previous section, growth in GDP per capita in the region was visible, at least until 2008. However, not everyone made profit from this increase to the same degree. When looking at the income share in GDP of the lowest 10% of the population, they got an average 4.57% of the national income at the beginning of the 1990s. In this case there were hardly significant differences between the countries. Whether looking at Lithuania or Kazakhstan, the income share of the 10% of the people with the lowest incomes was almost the same everywhere. In 2008 their share had on average gone down to 3.33% of the national income, however with large differences between countries. In Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Lithuania the share in income of the lowest 10% of the population dropped to 2.53–2.63%, while the share remained above 4% in countries like Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Slovak Republic.

As for the richest 10% an opposite trend was visible. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall they got on average around 20% of the national income, again with hardly any variance between countries. Around 2008, just before the crisis, their share had increased to over one-third of the national income in some of the countries and on average their share of the national income went up by 7 points, however again with huge variation between countries. The standard deviation was 0.95 in the early 1990s while it equals 3.1 around 2010. The increase in their share was especially visible during the first 10 years of the transition (1990s) and was especially large in countries like Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Slovenia, and Tajikistan, while the inequality increase was much less in countries like, Latvia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Turkmenistan.

Something similar goes, inter alia, for the human development in the countries involved. This index is a composite of life expectancy, education and standards of living. Also in this regard we see a starting point in which the situation is rather similar for the Central and Eastern European countries and on a somewhat lower level for the Central Asian countries, but we also see huge differences in progress toward the situation in 2010.
### Table 3
Income share of richest 10% of population

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<tr>
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<td>19.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>33.4</td>
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<td>28.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>27.5</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>25.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia, FYR</td>
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<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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Slovenia made the fastest jump, while the situation in Central Asian countries hardly improved in this respect. Almost all of the latter countries still have an HDI lower than 0.75, while 9 out of the 10 new EU members now have an HDI higher than 0.80 (The exception being Bulgaria). Here we do see the usual regional divisions with the Baltic and Central European countries on top, most of the Balkan countries in the middle and most of the Central Asian countries at the bottom of the ranking. This is peculiar. Why would the distinguished regions be internally coherent according to their human development and even with regard to the positive development therein, while being internally so diverse in terms of economic growth and income inequality and the developments therein?

It can be doubted whether path-dependency theories could predict the increased diversity regarding income inequality. Perhaps it could explain the trends in
human development, that is, the substantive output of government in terms of health, education and standards of living. The correlation between good governance, in terms of voice and accountability, and the Human Development Index is indeed very high (Spearman’s Rho = 0.88, p<.000). Hence, good governance can be seen as being responsible for good living.

However, not so for income inequality, which pushes the question what it could be in the institutions that has resulted in such diversity among nations in this part of the world. What made income inequality in the Slovak Republic stable, while it increased so much in the Czech Republic, and why has the GINI-index in Albania exploded, while remaining relatively stable in neighboring Montenegro, and how to explain the different paths seen in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in this respect?

It takes in-depth research to find out what exactly has happened in those countries. In this paper it is only possible to find a general explanation. This explanation could be found in the political stability of the countries involved. A simple correlation points to the fact that political stability is the only WGI indicator, being significantly associated with income inequality (Spearman’s Rho = –0.33). Political institutions vary in the way they take care of health, education and standards of living, but income inequality (the share of the poorest 10 %) goes hand in hand with political instability, although it is uncertain what determines what. Political stability might well be seen as the consequence of limited income inequality.

This outcome is rather different and results in a more informative hypothesis than the one derived from the theory of path dependency. Income inequality as an outcome of transition processes is most strongly related to the stability of the political system and the absence of political violence and terrorism. That outcome is not exactly what the path-dependency theory would suggest. Path dependency claims to be an alternative for such contingency factors and emphasizes government effectiveness and rule of law as the most encompassing institutions. However, according to this investigation these factors have much less explanatory power.

5. Discussion

This paper discussed developments within CEE countries and Central Asian countries as they evolved during the last two decades. These countries came out of the box in the early 1990s and since then have done rather well. Incomes increased, vast economic growth was visible, and the prosperity of the populations
went up as indicated by the development of the human development in these countries (health, education and standard of living).

However, differences in development are also seen between regions and especially between countries. In fact the comparative data from the World Bank, the UN and NGOs show huge variation in development. One can doubt whether there still is a single region now covered for 20 years by NISPAcee. The first section of this paper mentioned that the aim of this paper was to analyze the developments that took place and judge the implications thereof for paradigms being dominant nowadays in Public Administration. We especially investigated the extent to which path-dependency theory could be corroborated and whether the developments in this “region” reflect the widely supported claim that good governance results in economic growth.

The paper did not present advanced statistical methods using pooled-regression analysis or time-series analysis. With only 29 countries in the region this would not result in reliable outcomes. Instead we looked at the raw figures, with sometimes a correlation coefficient, and argued that during the last two decades the countries grew apart, even within regions which are at first sight coherent and at the start of the transition indeed were similar. This increasing variation was seen in the development of what is called “good governance”, economic growth, income inequality and human development. It is not easy to explain these increasing differences between countries, which started off from a relatively similar position. The variance in economic growth can hardly be explained by a corresponding variance in the level of good governance in these countries. Bad governance seems to do as good as, and in times of economic crisis even better than, good governance. The increasing variance in outcomes is also not well covered by the popular theory on path dependency in which the lasting effect of institution building is seen as the determining factor. Especially income inequality seems to be much stronger related to something more basic, that is political stability and the absence of violence and terrorism. Neo-institutionalists could of course explain the occurrence of such violence by the absence of proper institutions, but the fact is that the context, outside factors, not under the control of the state, seems to have more explanatory power than the actions taken by the governments themselves and the institution-building. Institution-building does have an effect on government outlays, such as health, education and standards of living, summarized in the Human Development Index.

Hence, the outcomes, based on this investigation into developments taking place in this part of the world, do not refute the theories, nor did it aim to do so, but
specify them. It argues that context does matter and that the countries in the CEE and CA area have a very specific context.

Such outcomes beg for further research. Perhaps that is the main message of this paper. Conducting comparative research into the developments taking place in this region – these regions – is not only fun to do, but more importantly, necessary in order to test, fine-tune and develop theories about social change, public-sector change and transitions in general.

The contents of this paper argue that the existing frames are just not good enough and do not yet grasp the crucial factors in transition processes. Too often the theories are based on analyses in Anglo-Saxon countries, which may have resulted in biases, neglect and shortcomings. The conclusions of such research could also tell us that outside organizations, that is the World Bank, the EU and the IMF, can make all the comparisons they want and provide all kinds of figures and stats, but might still miss the point of what is crucial in the different regions in CEE and Central Asia and in the countries within each of these regions.

6. References


Section I.B

Towards Some Theoretical and Practical Assumptions: Comparative Analysis of Institutions, Models and Practices
Twenty Years of Development: Poland at a Glance

PATRYCJA J. SUWAJ

This paper reviews and assesses the initiatives undertaken in Poland over the course of the past quarter-century. Geographically, Poland is at the centre of Europe and increasingly is at the centre of the continent’s political and economic life. In achieving this status, the country’s government has undergone much political, institutional, economic and administrative reform.

The historical legacy

During Poland’s communist era, the country had a highly centralised party system which controlled the organisation of state-administrative structures (in Poland the term public administration did not exist) and administrative bodies (Kudrycka et al. 2009). The Communist regime which ruled Poland from the 1940s to the 1990s can be characterised by the following four types of subordination:

• Organisational subordination – The crucial attributes of the centralised system included close hierarchic subordination of lower-level bodies to higher-level ones. Therefore, the practical existence of real and independent territorial governments was non-existent. This subordination (dependence) was also present in other spheres.

• Personal subordination – Elections to authoritative bodies either did not exist or were fictitious, as there were no competing candidates. In practice, people were assigned to government offices by way of party nominations. The holding of formal elections, in reality, was for political show, and the results were falsified. Personal assignments at the territorial levels depended only on the governing party. All members of councils, as well as other key persons performing public functions, were determined in this way. Uneducated, but obedient and easy to manipulate, individuals were appointed to high positions.

• Competence subordination – Even if formally some decision-making competences were located at the decentralised territorial levels, all important decisions were made at the central level and were dependent on the nomenclature. Deciding about the state’s actions and the matters it would address was in the hands of the party even though from a formal point of view it should have been beyond the control of the party. Within the government structure, the central communist party and its bureaucracy made decisions.
• Financial subordination – Local and regional levels were financially dependent on the decisions of the communist party. Local budgets were part of the central budget, where the division of financial resources took place in the supreme bodies. Central grants composed the largest share of local income since the possibility of deciding about financial resources at the local level was very limited. Local-government property (community property) did not exist. Land and buildings were part of the state’s property and were handled only by the territorial administration.

The communist system in Poland survived until the end of the 1980s by retaining the majority of the fundamental features of totalitarianism. A model of central guidance affected not only the contemporary shape of administration, but also its competence, as well as the way it was carried out. It also distorted the attitudes of the people, for whom circumventing the law became the norm. Virtually every situation which fell under the rule of the bureaucracy (regardless of whether it was planning permission, admitting a child to a pre-school, medical and nursing services in a hospital or a trip abroad), required not only the ability to negotiate and to persuade, but also having contacts in the governing party. Jan Boć (Blaś et al. 2003, 291) referred to this phenomenon as “letaprivation” (from French “l’Etat privée”). Nepotism, unequal treatment, an excessive use of power and wide-spread corruption were the elements of normal life of that time. Even today, some of those features are still problematic, such as routine losses by state enterprises and deeply rooted corruption.

The fall of 1989, called the Autumn of Nations, resulted in the breakdown of the Soviet empire and strongly affected the contemporary history of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE). Poland is an example of a country where the government takeover and the building of a new democratic country was conducted in a peaceful way. The two individuals who are considered to be most responsible for this successful peaceful transition are the founder and leader of the independent, self-governing trade union “solidarity” – Lech Walesa – and the highest-ranking member of the Roman Catholic Church at the time, Pope John Paul II.

Reform efforts in 1990 and after

It has often been suggested by various institutions, and some international experts, that public administration, following the fall of communism, required a very rapid rearrangement because it was the best time at which political transformations aiming to strengthen democracy and the market economy could be made. These rapid changes mainly focused upon:
• abandoning central planning, as well as the command system of economic management;
• beginning the process of privatisation and re-privatisation;
• restricting the functions and influences of government administration;
• more frequently using different forms of civil law, not only by administration but also within administration;
• abandoning the provision of some public services by the state and implementing equivalent benefits through the private sector.
• acquiring a fresh attitude towards the management of public matters;
• appointing (or re-appointing) a self-governing administration.

The first major reform of the political system was the reactivation of autonomy at the municipal level. The restoring of municipalities in 1990 broke the monopolies of the socialist state. First, it eliminated the political monopoly of the Communist Party. Elections to municipalities in 1990 were fully democratic. Second, it revoked the monopoly of the single state power. Local authorities obtained the constitutional right to carry out many public functions on their own behalf. Third, the monopoly of state ownership was broken. Municipalities obtained legal personalities, and a great part of state property was turned over to local and/or private authority by law. Fourth, the monopoly of highly centralised public finances was abolished. Fifth, the government monopoly was eliminated. In 1990, about 100,000 workers were shifted from the centralised national government to the local governments (Regulski 2000).

Since 1989, Poland, as well as other CEE countries, has been involved in a fundamental transition consisting of three distinct paths which are connected and interrelated to each other: introducing democracy and democratic state institutions; shifting to a market system; and moving towards integration into the European Union (e.g. Fournier 1998a). Initially, democratisation meant establishing new constitutional provisions for transferring power to elected representatives, establishing laws protecting freedom of opinion and expression, the establishment of a multi-party system and ensuring the possibility for the electorate to replace those in power. Additional steps toward democracy also required the creation of a legally constituted state acting under the rule of law. These steps involved the elimination of the arbitrary use of public power, the fostering of openness and transparency, and initiating the systemic fight against corruption. This all presupposed a thorough transformation of the system of governance; the government was no longer at the service of a particular party or class of individuals (Fournier 1998a).
The present structure, relationships and the division of powers and duties of government and public administration have been shaped by reforms carried out primarily in the 1990s. The most important of these were the municipal reform of 1990, the economic centre-of-government reform of 1996 and the administrative reform of 1999. A crucial and stabilising turning point was the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in 1997 (Czapuowicz and Sakowicz 2011). The government and public-administration model of Poland is now based on the constitutional premise that the public sector is composed of both national-government administration and local-self-government administration.

Of strategic importance for the reform of public finances were Leszek Balcerowicz’s reforms carried out from 1990 to 1993. A radical project called the “Balcerowicz plan” was geared to deal with the hyperinflation of 1989. The programme led to market balance and, thus, eliminated the shortage economy.

The process of economic transformation was based on the required actions for building a market economy. Reforms in the direction of a free-market economy meant leaving the central planning and command-and-quota system of economic management behind in favour of reliance upon individual initiative. These developments had to be institutionalised through the reform of the legal and administrative framework. Privatisation of state-owned enterprises, trade and price liberalisation and the establishment of mechanisms supporting markets through taxation and bank restructuring were at the core of the economic reforms and the changed role of government. The movement away from the direct production of goods and services required a complete transformation of public law, duties, structures and personnel of the national public administration and its regional agencies (Fournier 1998a). By the end of 1999, the ownership of 6,438 state enterprises had been transformed – three quarters of the 8,441 state enterprises existing in the economy at the start of this process in 1990. In subsequent years, the rate of transformation has decreased. In sum, the balance sheet of privatisation by the end of 2009 reflects a process that has involved 7,516 state enterprises, of which 1,738 were commercialised; 2,191 were directly privatised; 1,933 were liquidated for economic reasons; and 1,654 were liquidated state farms (Czaputowicz and Sakowicz 2011, 21; CSO 2010).

The domestic political context and, especially, the stability and persistence of the ruling political regime were the major elements that could significantly facilitate or hinder the administrative reform processes. In Poland, the party system had been changing for a long time. Elected central governments, during the first decade of the reshaping of the state (the 1990s), were formed by coalition arrangements facilitated by multiparty cooperation and, thus, were often very weak.
Major legislative and institutional reform measures were subject to political deliberations and bargaining processes in which professional clarity and coherence of proposals was often absent (Péteri and Zentai 2002). Alterations of, and sometimes the acceleration of, reform processes was also influenced by shifts in political power, especially if they were connected to basic electoral and political party changes. One example of this was that the model of new territorial administration, prepared in 1992 by the important Polish reformers Michal Kulesza, Jerzy Stepień and Jerzy Regulski, was not implemented until 1998, when their political allies gained power.

The Great Transformation, as the first generation of reforms is known, has brought about a stable system of democratic institutions. This profound transformation of institutions, designed by the early democratic constitutions, was finished by the mid-nineties, and a new wave of reforms (at the end of the twentieth century) involved the transfer of responsibilities to local governments, the moving towards revised social-assistance systems where local and national governments had a new role, and the development of transparent regulatory mechanisms (Péteri and Zentai 2002). Reforms of this scope were the second wave of institutional reforms, which had the task of finishing the reforms initiated in the early 1990s. The main components of these second-generation reforms are institution-building initiatives aimed at good governance and increasing citizens’ input into the policy-making process. The quest for good government and good governance includes the creation of a more professional civil service, the modernisation of local self-governments, judicial reform and the establishment of a more constructive dialogue with civil society. This task of institution building was reinitiated in 2000 in order to create the social capacity for Europeanisation (Ágh 2009).

The next stream of changes which occurred after developing democratisation and proceeding into free-market economy, involved joining the European Union (EU) pre-accession process, which took place at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. The incorporation of Poland and the other CEE countries into the EU occurred as part of the Union’s fourth wave of enlargement. With each enlargement, the candidate countries have had to surmount a higher threshold of political obligations and administrative responsibilities to gain admission to the Union. These, in substance, are non-negotiable. A basic condition of membership is that each new set of candidate countries accepts and takes account of the advances in integration made by the established member states. This has meant that over time prospective member states have had to make greater investments in strengthening their administrative capacities and adapting their political and administrative infrastructure to the increased levels of European integration.
It must be realised that integration into the European Union can only occur if
democratic systems of governance and market economies are in place. Almost
a decade after the collapse of communism (17 July 1997), the European Com-
mission evaluated the preparedness of Poland as one of ten candidate countries
from the CEE on the following elements in terms of admissibility to the EU
(Fournier 1998a):

- **Political Institutions** – the assessment was favourable and Poland was consid-
ered to already meet the conditions laid down in Copenhagen.

- **Justice** – there were specific concerns about this situation in some countries.
However, the role played by the Constitutional Court in Poland was assessed
favourably. According to the Commission’s assessment, there was a favour-
able outlook for achieving this capacity, provided that the effort under way in
Poland continued.

- **Local Government** – by 1997, Poland already had had local autonomy at the
level of municipalities since 1990, but it did not have an intermediate level
between the municipal and the central levels – this fact was noted, but not
criticised. However, the Commission stressed the need of decentralised au-
thorities for financial autonomy and made note of excessive financial depend-
ence on the central government.

- **Administrative Reform** – in this field, all accession countries, including Po-
land, needed to design and implement a coherent overall plan of adminis-
trative reforms. Major reforms were instituted in 1999. Poland at the time
faced four substantial and great reforms: administrative reform, reform of the
education system, reform of the health-care system and social-security-sys-
tem reform. However, it should be noted that in 1992, the Polish government
adopted “The Preliminary Premises for the Restructuring of Public Admin-
istration”, which were not implemented until five years later. These reforms
are still not finished (e.g. in Poland, the current government has just begun the
next set of reforms).

- **EU Related Administration** – the administrative structures devoted to coordi-
nating European affairs were looked on in a favourable light.

- **Civil Service** – Poland was one of the few countries that by 1997 had intro-
duced specific legislation governing the civil service. The first law was adopted
in 1996, and Poland introduced additional civil-service laws in 1998, 2006 and
2008. Nevertheless, the subsequent efforts to reform public administration pro-
voked much instability and considerably weakened the Polish civil service.

- **Fighting Corruption** – Poland, like almost every CEE country, suffered from
widespread corruption. Thus, there were various recommendations concern-
ing improving the effectiveness of the judicial system and police and weeding out corruption in the civil service.

However, as regards the matter of fighting corruption, the Commission’s expectations towards the new candidate states were much higher than for the “old” members. The EU has probably paid less attention to corruption in older member states because this has not been perceived as undermining the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*. Yet there are increasing signs that corruption in a number of member states represents a significant threat to the quality and functioning of democratic institutions. In addition, the extent of corruption in a number of newly added countries may undermine both the implementation of the *acquis* and the quality of their democratic institutions. The inclusion of corruption as an issue of key importance for EU accession implies that there exists an anti-corruption framework that is already binding for EU member states and to which the candidate states must conform. In fact, no such framework exists, or at least not in any formal sense (Suwaj 2005).

The nature of policy-making in and for Europe dictates that future EU members must be able to deal with European issues by involving their entire governments. Thus, Poland must have efficient co-ordinating institutions, integrate within a relatively short period of time the entire *acquis* and be able to implement effectively community directives and policies in their domestic contexts. Poland has established a central co-ordinating unit (The European Integration Committee) to accomplish these objectives.

The changes that have occurred in Poland, and other CEE countries, resulting from their access to the EU has made them institutionally similar to Western Europe. Fournier pointed out the following factors as characteristic of Western Europe in 1998; today they are basically common for all European countries:

1. **Central organisation and decision-making**

   1.1 A Constitution (a short Polish Constitution in 1992 which was replaced by the Constitution of 1997) guaranteeing the right of the people to replace those in power, the separation of powers, and the rule of law;

   1.2 A government organisation providing for effective coordination among the ministries and a direct link with budgeting, giving the Prime Minister sufficient authority to assume the political leadership of the country;

   1.3 Procedures to ensure a coordinated policy-making and implementing process, including procedures for producing laws and regulations, ensuring that they are proper from a legal and technical standpoint and making it possible to assess their financial, economic and social impact;
1.4 An organisation of ministries whereby ministers and policy staff are freed from day-to-day implementation of policies and can instead concentrate on devising policies, drafting statutes and overseeing their implementation;

1.5 A public sector which, in the areas in which it operates, is given specific tasks to fulfil with some degree of management autonomy within the framework of clearly laid-out legal structures.

2. **Territorial administration and relations with citizens and economic actors**

2.1 Some degree of decentralisation that, depending on the country, can be applied at one or more levels with varying responsibilities and powers;

2.2 Interaction between the national government’s territorial service institutions and local/regional authorities, making it possible to implement public policy effectively throughout the country;

2.3 A set of rules, sometimes laid out in a code of administrative procedures, governing relations between citizens and their government, including obligations to ensure equal access to public services, to justify decisions and respect time requirements, to conduct proceedings of which all parties have the right to be notified and an opportunity to be heard, to provide for remedies and appeals, etc. (for instance through an Ombudsman institution).

2.4 A set of rules and guidelines providing for on-going communication between the government and civil society and its components, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and unions.

3. **Means of action and control**

3.1 A professional civil service, governed by laws, with hiring and promotion based on human-resource-management policies (including merit, skills, motivation, stable work force), loyally implementing government policy.

3.2 A set of rules and ethical guidelines guaranteeing the accountability of public institutions and the reliability of administrative acts, including priorities governing the ethical behaviour of public servants;

3.3 Budget and tax authorities which can ensure that taxes are collected and those public funds are correctly managed and efficiently spent;

3.4 Internal and external institutions responsible for monitoring administrative decision-making, respected by civil servants and safeguarding against corruption;

3.5 Ready access by citizens and businesses to a court system with procedures providing for the prompt and final settlement of disputes including, where
appropriate, the development of capacities to address economic, administrative and other special areas (Fournier 1998b).

The reforms as they appeared in 2012: Lessons learned

The period after the accession of the CEE countries to the EU can be regarded as a time of transformation. Today’s rate of changes and reforms is dependent on different factors. The pace of change is slower (development drift). There is no longer the rush to change which characterised the CEE countries during the gaining of independence and democracy and during the process of obtaining EU access. Waves of reforms have been replaced by growing social expectations, financial crisis and political gamesmanship (accompanying every election). There has also been a “trend” towards the hasty copying of “fashioned” solutions such as the utilisation of the New Public Management (NPM) approaches which had been adopted in many other countries.

A recent comparative study of public-administration and management reforms in the CEE states found significant variation in the types and orientation of reforms (Bouckaert et al. 2011). Based on the classification of reforms by Coombes and Verheijen (1997) and by Pollitt and Bouckaert, it is possible to distinguish three distinct groups of countries which varied in terms of general reform type. This ranged from a radical public-management type of reform to a mixed type to an incremental reform. The study suggests that Poland represents a legalistic approach in that there has been no major interest in the NPM approach. Thus, there has been limited attention to the reorganisation of public administration. However a gradual increase of interest in public management can be observed in Poland, even though this field is still relatively new. In 2011, Jagiellonian University organised, for the first time, a meeting of Departments of Public Management which all interested Polish researchers attended.

Presently, a new and more popular idea than NPM has emerged; specifically the concept of “governance.” Thus, movements that promote the acquiring of solutions adopted from the private sector and applied to the public sphere have faded away. In this context, Poland, a country which simply did not have enough time to take a close look at NPM solutions, seems to be in a positive position. Here, the question appears – why? Poland represents an extremely legalistic approach to public-administration reform. At times Poland has had an over-productive law-making process which on numerous occasions has been characterised by poor quality and inconsistency. Consequently, the country may benefit from some delay in reform initiatives. Recently European ideas promoting a return to the source and roots of European legal culture have begun to emerge as the founda-
tion for the organising and functioning of public administration (this was discussed in the 2011 Trans European Dialogue, TED, whose main theme was the relationship between law and public management).

Of course, none of the extremes are effective. Pure NPM as a reform ideology does not seem to be suitable, and the dominant legalistic approach towards reform can turn out to be equally ineffective. Over-legislating and over-regulation are neither effective, nor efficient. An environment in which there is little respect for the law (on both the state and local levels) does not allow for efficiency in the realisation of governmental tasks or the administration of services. Instead, it creates obstacles for citizens and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, creating legal and organisational frames for a “Rechtsstaat” does not mean a guarantee of the effective functioning of the state based on Weberian principles (Jenei 2008). The functioning of a Weberian democratic system without regulating and controlling competencies and the introduction in a country of “public management reforms,” could result in uncertainty and deviations (pathologies) from the law, including potential corruption.

Against the background of heated discussion about the concept of the superiority of the Weberian state over NPM, and vice versa, numerous theories promoting a specific mix (the Neo Weberian State) have come forward (see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Hajnal and Jenei 2008; Jenei 2008; Randma-Liiv 2008; Potuček 2008, Nemec 2010). However, without considering particular models, one can agree on the suggestion of the need for a well-balanced and progressive approach to administrative changes and the implementation of modern management tools (Randma-Liiv 2008). Poland seems to adapt to all of these approaches to public-administration theory and practice in its own way.

Joining the EU forced Poland to strictly adhere to the Union’s rules – even in the areas in which theoretically the Union does not have competence such as public administration. Thus, most public-administration reforms in the country were strongly shaped and stimulated by the hope of future EU membership. Currently, however, there is the lack of a strong, outer “reform driver.” After joining the EU, ex-ante control carried out by the European Commission was replaced by considerably weaker instruments of ex-post control applied only in the cases of a lack of, or delayed, implementation of reform.

As various authors have pointed out, since the moment when full membership in European Union became a reality, the CEE countries have not had stimuli to continue with their reforms or undertake actions compatible with the pre-accession requirements. Consequently, this can result in incorrect implementation or even reverse the post-accession reforms which these countries implemented thanks
to the pre-accession requirements of the Union (Bouckaert et al. 2011; Goetz 2005; Hughes et al. 2004). The EU considers this to be an “Eastern problem” (Sedelmeier 2008). As some researchers suggest, these processes are especially likely in the areas beyond the “aquis”, which were the subject of “political conditional- ity” (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008). In contrast, Dimitrova (2010) suggests that post-accession changes will be dictated more clearly by internal policy, which has meant recession to the state as it was before accession. Meyer-Sahling (2011), while analysing the situation of civil service (and its professionalisation) in CEE after accession to EU, notes that in Poland there have been changes from pre-accession assumptions, which has produced reform-backsliding. The authors of a World Bank report (2007) which evaluated the administrative capacity of the CEE countries two years after accession to the EU came to the same conclusions. Poland was classified as weak in the areas of performance management in government, policy coordination and human-resource management.

A final issue to consider in analysing the present situation of Polish public-administration reforms is the low level of university education in the fields of public administration and public management. Arguably, the provision of, and performing of, public-administration functions in Poland is heading toward the levels of Western countries. However, the teaching and researching of public administration is a step behind American and Western European practices. This thesis can be tested by evaluating the teaching of public administration through examples taken from the European Association for Public Administration Accreditation (EAPAA). The EAPAA experience clearly demonstrates that the standards of public-administration programmes of the top Polish academies differ from European standards. In Poland there are about 200 programmes in public administration; however, only two applied for, and only one of them was awarded, EAPAA accreditation. A review of the literature on public administration shows that not many Polish researchers of administration are interested in the modern trends of administration. There are two reasons for this. First, there was neither the practice nor the tradition of teaching public administration in Poland (with the exception of J. S. Langrod, a remarkable Polish researcher who took an interdisciplinary approach to public administration – most of his writings were published after he spent World War II abroad in France). The top Polish public-administration researchers are mainly economists, lawyers, politicians or sociologists. The need to educate the public in this field occurred together with the transformation. The second reason is the language barrier which still causes difficulties for Polish scholars in participating in European, international and multinational scientific discourse.
Conclusion

There is obviously no way back to the period and the situation before the reforms. Too much has happened and changed. The very great reforms and organisational changes have resulted in numerous positive developments and have provided many solutions to Poland’s initial situation. A more or less solid legal framework has been created and effective public-sector practices are slowly being established. The gap between the quality of administration in the more advanced Western countries and Poland is decreasing.

The key moments which have influenced the content, shape, process and dynamism of public-administrative reforms in Poland are readily identifiable. After 1989, all developments can be connected to two projects – the transformation of the country in the post-communist era and the ensuing process of accession to the EU. The present period can be referred to as the post-accession period.

The first serious wave of institutional reforms was basically the constitutional reform which radically changed the political system as a whole and brought fundamental democratic instruments to Poland (Ágh 2009). In reality, the transformation was an all-inclusive project; reconstructing the framework of state and economic functioning in the direction of democracy and a free-market economy. In spite of some limitations, Poland and its people have benefitted from these changes to a much greater extent than many other countries. This can be seen, for example, in the prosperity of the country, the success of entrepreneurship in Poland, and in a huge educational boom which has taken place. The value of GDP per capita during this time has increased ten times (to $18,800 in 2010), while Polish salaries increased 16 times.

The grounds for a democratic state and its legal framework have been well established. However, the establishing of the minimum set of market-based institutions has not resulted in automatically improving the management of the economy or the total institutionalisation of the democratic state. In 2011, a new public-finance act introduced the performance budget. It seems that this will have a major effect on modern management of public tasks and public-sector expenditures.

The goal of membership in the EU helped to force the institutional processes that are taking place in CEE and opened up new possibilities resulting from freedom in the movement of commodities, capital and human recourses. For example, the exporting of Polish products alone – without services – to the EU in 2007 constituted 78% of the country’s total exports. Creating the conditions for policy development using European funds was also beneficial. In 1989, a large-scale public investment took place for the first time. The pre-accession interaction and
cooperation between the CEE countries and the EU helped lead to the reforms and changes (i.e. PHARE programme, Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Their Economies).

The speed and energy of the reforms in Poland declined considerably after the Country joined the EU. The slowing-down of the transformations can be easily observed. It is important to note that Poland, in the post-accession period, is still in the process of reorganisation and that change of the government is directly connected with both the implementation of reforms and the announcement of new reforms. For instance, some major strategic documents announcing reforms were prepared, including: Reform State Program 2005–2008, Reform State Program 2008–2011, and, announced in 2009, a major report, “Polska 2030.”

Certainly, the link between the effects of the transformation and the joining of the EU has created the basis for stability in Poland. However, in the aftermath of another global crisis, developmental drifting also endangers Poland. It is manifested by inertia as regards the decisions concerning the fundamental dilemmas of development. It is characterised by the lack of agreement on the scope or direction of changes (and on the shortage of effort that is made in order to encourage the reorganisation of policies in different branches of the government). Certainly, during a period of upturn in the economy, drifting becomes a comfortable way of following the factors of growth, but in times of downturn in the economy, it becomes a politically safe way of adaptation. In order to avoid the dangers caused by drifting, certain countries have chosen to implement a developmental model in the economic and social dimension. In the report “Polska 2030,” the following developmental factors were singled out: trust, coherence, creativity, mobility and communicativeness. It was noted that one of ten crucial challenges for an “efficient country,” and a key to deal with it successfully, is trust (“Polska 2030”).

In addition to actions taken to prevent or counteract crisis, significant reforms are concentrated in three areas: developing an active civil society in which the key principle highlights the need to provide the proper conditions for the development of the society and citizens (in 2009 Poland had about 74,600 registered NGOs, of which 64,500 were associations and 10,100 were foundations); an innovative economy which has a crucial impact on long-term economic growth; and efficient institutions which enable the effective use of public resources and the efficient realisation of pro-developmental policies and public investments, while simultaneously providing proper social security. The most recent, and strongly criticised, reform currently being undertaken in Poland which is equally supported among women and men, is extending the retirement age to 67 years.
Despite the numerous reforms undertaken in the past two decades, the challenges facing public administration in Poland are still huge. In part this is due to the unfinished reforms in governance and public management of the transition period. Accession to the EU was not a sufficient incentive to continue further reconstruction and improvement of public structures. In Poland, there is still a lack of efficient mechanisms for strategic planning, ensuring efficiency in public services, effective planning and efficient resource management.

The challenge facing Polish public administration is to take effective action to ensure the efficiency of the public sector and an active, participatory society as well. The transparencies of public administration and the promotion of ethical values are also valid challenges facing Polish public administration.

The implementation of ethical standards for the practice of administration is a critical necessity, but a participatory and strategic approach to public management also should be promoted. However, this is still a very weak point in the Polish administrative reality.

Another challenge appears to be the ability of Polish public administration and its leaders to shape public policy according to effective policy-making rules. It is necessary to be able to accurately identify key problems, carry out appropriate planning and evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken. The inclusion of ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms and the professional preparation of the implementation process, as well as efficient management of policy, is equally important. However, it seems that in many areas in Poland such knowledge is not readily available.

References


Public Administration Development in Bulgaria for the Last Two Decades

POLYA KATSAMUNSKA

Introduction

In this paper, an attempt is made to review and elaborate upon the major trends, new developments and challenges of public administration in Bulgaria. The last two decades have been significant ones for the practice of public administration in Bulgaria. During the long transitional period in Bulgaria, which is still not over, the reform process has been accompanied by dramatic changes in the social, political and economic areas.

Prior to 1989, Bulgaria, as a communist country, was administered through a system of hierarchical central planning. The political system in Bulgaria, as elsewhere, subjugated administration to the implementation of Party policy. Under the former system, the government in many cases did not really function as a decision making body, but rather carried out decisions taken at the party central level.

Bulgaria initiated intensive reforms for establishing a democratic society and a market economy in the early 1990s and the general institutional structure and distribution of powers and authority was set with the adoption of the Country’s new constitution in 1991. The government (the Council of Ministers), as the central executive authority, is collectively responsible for management and implementation of domestic and foreign policy, while the role of the Prime Minister is to direct, coordinate and bear responsibility for the overall implementation of policy. Carrying out reforms through a solid and decisive policy-making process was the main task of the new democratic government and it was expected that the stability of the government and its institutions would ensure the development and implementation of the reform efforts.

1. Public administration during the last decade of the twentieth century

Bulgaria’s first post-communist government, elected in June 1990, was led by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the successor to the Communist Party. It was forced to resign in November 1990 and, in so doing, established a pattern in which, during the last decade of the twentieth century, only the government of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) managed to fulfill its full term of office.
(1997–2001). Consequently, the political situation between 1990 and 1997 was characterized by frequent changes of government.

The same was true after 2001 and thus, over the last twenty years, Bulgaria has had twelve governments. Most of them were short-lived governments and only two of them managed to fulfill the full term of office.\(^1\) (The mandate of the current government is due to end in 2013). Thus while reforms for establishing a democratic society and market economy started in the early 1990s, frequent instability hampered the implementation of the expected reforms. Consequently, two decades later, the working of public institutions and the country’s governance more generally, lag well behind the normal standards of good governance.

When the reform process started *de facto*, these efforts were formulated as building, not reforming, the administrative system. The first public-administration reform program was announced by the government in 1998 in its “Strategy for Building a Modern Administrative System”. The government led by Ivan Kostov tried to make a major shift of policy focus during its term of office and established a framework for the free market economy and implemented a major reduction of state function in the area of regulation. In addition to encouraging major privatization initiatives and developing new policy related to economic issues, the Kostov government focused its activities on the setting of laws regulating the structure and operation of the administration, as well as its interaction with the citizens. The adopted strategy for administrative modernization identified three main pillars of change: a clear distribution of responsibilities at the different levels of the executive, unification of structures and the introduction of the civil service.

During that period, reforms were mainly focused on legislative and institutional arrangements. The adoption of legislation aiming at defining and regulating the activities within the state administration played a major role in setting the direction of reform. Important adopted legislation included the Law on Administration in 1998, the Civil Servant’s Act of 1999, the Law on Administrative Procedures and others. Secondary legislation related to these acts was also adopted and entered into force. In this way, the establishment of a professional civil service in Bulgaria started with the implementation of the Law on Administration and the Civil Servants’ Act.

In principle, the administrative management of ministries is entrusted to Secretaries-General who are civil servants, but in reality, the ministries are managed in all aspects by ministers and their cabinets of political appointees, including their vice-ministers. Administrative posts are classified into managerial, expert

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1 State Gazette 1990–2012.
and technical posts. Managerial positions cannot be filled by labor contract. The members of the political cabinets, the deputy regional governors and the deputy mayors of the municipalities, and persons implementing technical functions in the administration are not considered civil servants. There are specific statutes that regulate the judiciary, police, diplomatic corps, and other branches of public administration.

According to the Administration Act, a certain specified qualification is required for recruitment to specific administrative posts. The qualifications comprise both education and type and years of experience. Based on these provisions, the procedure and terms of recruitment for civil servants are determined. Thus, based on a uniform specification, each ministry prepares its own functional guidelines, which include the following: analysis of the activities and characteristics of department and its various units, and pay and job description for each position.

According to the Civil Service Act, recruitment is to be carried out based on competition. This procedure is elaborated upon in detail in the Civil Service Act, specifically with regard to existing competition regulations. Civil servants are appointed to office by the head of the respective administration. This is a general provision and practice referring to all categories of public servants. In order to be appointed, the following requirements have to be met: be a Bulgarian citizen; be of full age; do not be under legal disability; never have been indicted for committing a crime which could lead to imprisonment; never have been deprived by the due order of the law from the right to take certain positions; meet the specific requirements provided in the normative acts for taking the position.

At the initial stage of the reform process, the system was not career-based, and as a result the civil servants’ progress based on special skills and qualities was not formalized and institutionalized. The initiative in terms of hiring and promotion rested entirely with the respective administration.

Rank is based on the civil servant’s professional qualifications, which implies that professional qualifications are absolutely essential to the promotion process. Improving qualifications is a basis for a pre-term rank promotion. The time worked is another promotion criterion. All civil servants are promoted in rank within five years (no sooner than three years and no later than five years). Promotion is based on the evaluations of the respective civil servant.

According to the Civil Service Act, the basic salary for civil servants is determined by the Council of Ministers. For each and every position, the Council of Ministers determines the amount of the salary according to the rank and category of administration. The Civil Service Act does provide a guaranteed minimum
salary, which cannot be lower than triple the amount of the minimum salary for
the Country. The Civil Service Act also regulates payments for additional tempo-
rary work, holidays and paid leaves of absence.

As for training of civil servants, provisions in the state budget specifically refer to
resources earmarked for this purpose. Apart from state budget-supported train-
ing programs, each ministry or other governmental institution reserves the right
to seek outside (domestic or international) training funds. Language training,
specifically in English, is a priority. The command of a Western language is also
an advantage in the recruitment process.

Thus, laws adopted during the last decade of the twentieth century created the
legal basis of civil service, although changes and amendments have been made
several times since then. The main reason for many of the amendments made was
that the implementation of the civil service-related laws has been somewhat prob-
lematic. The key aspects that these laws regulate are the rules for recruitment, pro-
motion, remuneration and training in the administration and civil service.

2. Public Administration during the first decade of the twenty-first
century

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, no Bulgarian government
changed in any significant way the direction of the civil-service reforms. How-
ever, a number of programs and projects aimed at improvements in state admin-
istration were developed. Of particular note, when Bulgaria was accepted as a
European Union (EU) member state in 2007, it was expected to enact any changes
needed to demonstrate its willingness and ability to observe the European norms
and standards.

The government of Simeon Sax-Cobourg-Gotha (2001–2005) continued the ad-
ministrative reform by adopting a new Strategy for Administrative Moderniza-
tion, which focused upon civil-service training, administrative service delivery,
further optimization of the administrative structure and strengthening of capac-
ity for implementing both Bulgarian and EU law. In mid-2002, with entrance into
the EU as a stimulus, administrative reform moved higher up on the govern-
ment’s agenda and one of the important initiatives was the adoption of the Strat-
egy for Modernisation of State Administration – from Accession to Integration.
It was later updated and an action plan for its implementation was developed.

The Strategy emphasized several key issues: functional and organizational op-
timization of the administrative structures for improvement of their efficiency;
strengthening of administrative capacity for implementing both Bulgarian law
and EU law; formulation of the principles for the realization of a new integrated human resource development policy in the public administration as a key element in the modernization of public administration; creation of a favorable environment for the career development of the civil servants based on the merit principle; and creation of favorable business environment through improvement of service delivery. In addition, a Strategy for the Training of Public Administration Employees was adopted. It focused on improving the professional skills and qualifications of administrative employees and developing the capacity of the Bulgarian civil service.

Public administration reform was one of the priorities of the cabinet of Seigei Stanishev (2005–2009). It was at that time that the Ministry of State Administration and Administrative Reform was created. The Stanishev government added new aspects to administrative reform, and it paid special attention to human-resources management as an area of public administration. The result of this approach was the adoption of the Human Resources Management in State Administration Strategy 2006–2013, which, as a long-term comprehensive program, was oriented towards increasing work efficiency and improving administrative capacity.

Part of the measures were related to enhancing transparency and integrity in state administration. This led to the adoption of a new strategy for Transparent Governance and for Prevention and Counteraction of Corruption. This strategy was followed by the Transparency Program for State Administration and High-level State Officials, which contained measures related to the transparency of competitions and appointments, strengthening the position of the civil servant, initiating training for a new administrative culture, foreign languages and communication technologies, administrative regulation and improvement of dialogue with the media and the public. With this program Bulgaria joined the European transparency initiative of the European Commission aiming to intensify civil participation in the governmental decision-making process. However, public expectations concerning the results of the implementation of such programs and mechanisms have been higher than what has been achieved.

Nevertheless, government efforts and the initiatives taken to strengthen public administration led the European commission to conclude that Bulgaria “has made further progress to complete its preparation for membership, demonstrating its capacity to apply EU principles and legislation from 1 January, 2007” (Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria

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and Romania). However, the monitoring report did identify a number of areas of continuing concern which needed immediate action and further efforts such as the justice system, the fight against corruption and financial malfeasance and highlighted that Bulgaria needed to ensure the sustainability of public-administration reform.

Consequently, Bulgaria’s accession to the EU was accompanied by a set of specific accompanying measures put in place to prevent or remedy shortcomings in different areas. In the most problematic areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime, a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism was established, setting out benchmarks to provide a framework for progress and support in dealing with these shortcomings (Commission Decision of 13 December 2006). But despite the strong efforts of the Cabinet, reforms did not produce sufficient results, and it was concluded in a 2008 EU report that “the administrative capacity of both law enforcement and the judiciary is weak” (EC Report on Bulgaria’s Progress in Justice and Home Affairs).

When the government of Boiko Borissov came into office (term of office, 2009–2013), it announced that it would follow a different approach of governance and not engage in any compromises in the name of political advantage and party interest. At its outset, the Borissov cabinet was mainly composed of experts with managerial backgrounds or various governmental-sector experience. With the formation of the government, significant changes were made in the field of administrative reform. In general, most measures and actions that have been proposed by the government aim at the reorganization and optimization of administrative structures, restricting corruption and combating crime, and improving the work of the judicial system. This approach is based on understanding that the restoring of the trust of the Country’s European partners and reinstitution of the suspended European funding is of key importance for the Bulgarian economy because without European resources Bulgaria will have very difficult economic times.

Among the first changes was the closing of the Ministry of State Administration and Administrative Reform and the establishment of the Council of Administrative Reform3, created as a body with consulting functions to the Council of Ministers (Ordinance of COM № 192). In this way, the responsibility for administrative reform and the improvement of the administrative capacity is transferred directly to the government. The Council of Administrative Reform is chaired by the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. The key functions of the Council of Administrative Reform are to support the government policy aimed at strength-

3 www.saveti.government.bg/web/cc_203/1
enen and improving public administration, to propose strategic guidelines and to coordinate the government policy in connection with the implementation of projects of documents and normative acts for establishing, reorganizing and closing administrative structures.

Other important functions of the Council are connected with administrative reform at the regional and municipal levels, providing basic administrative service and facilitating e-government, issues involving the status of civil servants and the management of human resources in state administration. The Council’s administrative and technical support is provided by the Department of State Administration at the Council of Ministers. In 2010, the Council initiated a program for building a modern state administration and developed a plan for the implementation of measures for the optimization of state administration (2010–2011), in which the various activities are divided into three groups: optimization of functions, improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of administrative structures, and the reduction of certain types of administrative services.

The Council for Administrative Reform coordinates, assists with and monitors the implementation of general and sectoral strategies in the field of e-government in Bulgaria. In 2011, the Council for Administrative Reform paid special attention to the development and facilitation of e-government initiatives and approved a list of governmental administrative services that will be digitized through the “Development of the Administrative Services by Electronic Means” project. The project is managed and implemented by the Ministry of Transport, Information Technology and Communications (MTITC). The Council’s decision initiated a partnership between MTITC and various departments which manage different types of registers. The registers which are to be digitized include the trade register Bulstat, the Cadastre and Property Register, the Conviction Status Certificate, the national population database, the Register of Bulgarian IDs, electronic health records, centralized registers of the state and municipal property, local rates and taxes, and electronic deeds.

The goal of the project is for multiple agencies to be able to access and verify data that has already been registered by another administrative body, making it unnecessary for citizens and businesses to repeatedly provide the same information. Once developed, the technological solutions can be used by all administrations. It is estimated that savings of more than BGN 80 million (€41 million approximately) are expected annually. The “Development of the Administrative Services by Electronic Means” project is realized with the financial support of the government’s “Operational Programme on Administrative Capacity” (OPAC), and is funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund.
No doubt these are important positive initiatives undertaken to continue the development of effective public administration in Bulgaria. At the same time, not all actions of the government are highly esteemed by the European Commission (EC). Bulgaria’s agenda for administrative reform has been criticized by the EC, as it has been primarily focused on staff reduction which will not result in sufficient improvement in the work of state employees or enhancing the Country’s business environment.

EU experts consider that apart from reducing its workforce, the Bulgarian government is not doing enough to address problems like the lack of stability in administration, the presence of politically dependent state workers and the insufficient measures aimed at boosting their knowledge and skills. In addition, cumbersome commercial administrative procedures remain in place, undermining the impact of low tax rates in Bulgaria. An EC report also addresses the unproductive fight against corruption in regulatory bodies and institutions related to the protection of competition. As the report notes, this has a negative impact on the country’s overall economic and social development and on its ability to make effective use of EU funds.

**Conclusion**

This review and the analysis of public-administration development in Bulgaria over the course of the last two decades suggests that certain basic conclusions may be drawn. During the last decade of the twentieth century, reform efforts were mainly focused on legislative and institutional arrangements. The laws adopted created the legal basis of administration and the civil service. But implementation of the laws has been somewhat problematic and they have been frequently amended. During the first decade of the twenty-first century no Bulgarian government has sought to fundamentally change the direction of the reforms. A number of programs and projects aimed at improvements in the state administration have been developed with the goal being that Bulgaria will be able to demonstrate the ability to observe European norms and standards for the public sector.

The results achieved over the last two decades have not been enough to reform public administration according to European principles and the standards of good governance. Serious efforts and important achievements have been made, but progress has been slow and rather more limited than expected. Newly established institutions and newly introduced procedures and processes have not yet

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4 EC’s assessment of Bulgaria’s progress under the Convergence Program for 2011–2014 and The National Reform Program.
produced the expected results and do not demonstrate that the system is actually functioning effectively. The key problems identified are connected with weaknesses in administrative and judicial capacity. In addition, the unproductive fight against corruption in regulatory bodies and institutions related to the protection of competition has had a negative impact upon the country’s overall economic and social development and on its receipt of EU funds.

The future of public-administration development in Bulgaria is directly connected with the government’s degree of commitment to accelerating reforms. The nation’s political leaders are the driving force of the reforms and they are responsible for finding working solutions. Sufficient improvement in the administrative system requires much more than staff reduction. Bulgaria’s agenda for administrative development should focus on a complex combination of measures and actions for the reorganization and optimization of administrative structures, restricting and seeking to end corruption, combating crime and improving the work of the judicial system.

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1. Introduction

Slovenia is considered one of the most successful post-socialist states that introduced reforms in its public administration soon after gaining independence, and has been working intensely on these processes ever since. Slovenia underwent deep social changes, starting from independence in 1991 (gained, contrary to other countries of former Yugoslavia1, with almost no war or post-war consequences) that led to a political and economic transition into a post-socialist system2, full membership of the EU in 2004, impacts of the New Public Management doctrine and, recently, the world economic crisis. Inevitably, these changes affected the political-administrative system, as well. The public-administration reform was a more or less systematic set of strategies and activities. Compared to other Central or South or Eastern European (CEE, SEE) countries, Slovenia thus avoided overproduction or vagueness of different strategies over priorities.3

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1 Originating from the previous Yugoslav heritage, when public administration had been seen as a purely instrumental structure for executing politically set priorities of national policies within the socialist system, Slovenia underwent major development (cf. Pirnat 1993, Dujić 1997, Koprić 2013). Moreover, the heritage of public administration from past state structures (before the creation of the state of Yugoslavia in 1945, Slovenia had been subordinated to and organized in small administrative units inside large state formations of the Habsburg and the Austro-Hungarian monarchies since the 15th century) offered Slovene civil service an important platform to upgrade the existing system.

2 Slovenia underwent a complex and intense process of political, social and economical modernization that was marked by the breaking-up of the old system and the emergence of new rules. Six months after Slovenia had declared its independence from former Yugoslavia and had become a sovereign state with its own government and sole authority, the Constitution was adopted (December 1991) that established a multi-party parliamentary system. According to the Constitution, the state’s system is based on the principle of division of powers among three branches. The legislative branch is represented by a bicameral parliamentary structure, consisting of the National Assembly and the National Council. The National Assembly’s relations with the Government are similar to those of conventional parliamentary systems (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2003).

After 1996, the need for transforming public administration was closely related to Slovenia’s aspirations to become a full member of the European Union. In the years after 2000, the reform was intended to consist of constant modernization based on several pillars such as rationalization of structures, aiming to decrease the share of public expenditure in GDP (around 45%), reorganization of specific administrative entities (bodies), and introduction of a new common and unified wage system in the public sector. Even after gaining full membership of the EU (2004), the Slovene public-administration reforms were carried out with the primary goals of reduced public expenditure and user-orientation following the New Public Management model, but were conceived rather legalistically. In fact, the Government formulates public (economic and other) policies because of the relative scarcity of (public and private) goods and services with the aim of steering the allocation of resources, increasing stability in the allocative and distributive processes, and improving the satisfaction of human needs in general. The main difficulty is how to put these ideas into action – how to apply these unwritten principles in the implementation of concrete measures in specific reform areas. Modernizing a bureaucratic, closed, unresponsive, self-sufficient and often self-willed system and transforming it into its opposite requires extensive knowledge, political will and time. The process must be conducted very carefully to avoid doing more harm than good, since the correction of mistakes also has a negative effect on the reform process. Thus, the mid-term strategy on further development of the public sector adopted in July 2003 and particularly Slovenia’s Development Strategy 2005–2013 and the 2010 Exit Strategy (from economic crisis) underlined the importance of a coordinated approach to modernization. However, different documents and measures were rather unclear when distinguishing between an end and a means to an end.

According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, cf. Koprić 2013), any reform must be evaluated as to the objective pursued, which is either to maintain (what is func-

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4 The official start of the process of establishing institutional relations with the EC/EU corresponds to the signing of the Co-operation Agreement in April 1993, followed by the Europe Agreement in June 1996, when Slovenia also officially applied for the membership. After a period of pre-accession and negotiation processes that lasted approximately five years (from July 1997, when the European Commission presented the Agenda 2000 containing its opinion on Slovenia’s membership) the accession negotiations were completed in December 2002. On 1 May 2004, Slovenia became a full EU Member State, joining the euro area at the beginning of 2007 with the introduction of the euro as the country’s official currency. From 1 January to 30 June 2008, the country was the first post-socialist EU Member State to hold the presidency of the EU.

5 Analyzed for Slovenia in Kovač 2011. Generally as proved by Andrews (2010, 8–10), there is no one-best-way model of effective government, and good government means different things in different countries. But the picture mixes policy choices, outcome and institutional characteristics together, and when one breaks these up it appears that more effective governments are similar in terms of general development outcomes only, not institutional issues central to governance. Nevertheless, the effectiveness in Eastern Europe is evidently lower than in the OECD area as a whole.
tioning well), modernize (i.e. harmonize the operations with broadly accepted concepts and standards), marketize (bringing the public sector closer to the principles and operations of the private sector) or minimize the public share. Slovene administrative reforms can thus be categorized under several targets: the prevailing rationalization and wish for greater efficiency (minimization) on the one hand, and the confirmation of the existing regulation (maintenance) on the other, which we can join up into omnipresent modernization processes. Modern public administration and civil service in Slovenia are nowadays pretty capable of creatively supporting politics when coping with societal problems and implementing the goals of the state and the people. Politically speaking, the reforms of public administration were thus one of the most important projects of Slovenia – at least on a declarative level. Nevertheless, there is still a need and space for developing good administration if the latter is defined as a modern EU system, simultaneously enabling efficiency and democratization of political-administrative structures in the state.

2. **Key problems and challenges of public-administration reforms in Slovenia**

Public-administration reform in Slovenia has been underway ever since Slovenia became independent in 1991, thus changing its entire social, economic and political system. At first, the administration could not keep up with these changes, owing to some inherited patterns and the initial lack of effort to introduce changes. However, the country soon realized that the backwardness of its administration in the reform process was adverse not only to the administration itself but also to all other segments of society and that it prevented and hampered further development. It therefore set out to reform public administration in a more organized way, which included the use of reform models applied in other countries. As an independent republic, Slovenia aimed at building a democratic society founded on market mechanisms. In the first six years after proclaiming independence, Slovenia laid the most crucial and critical foundations for its functioning, especially by building its own institutions. With the disintegration of the structure and power of the Communist Party, numerous new political parties sprang to life, reflecting the instability in political orientations which blocked the develop-

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6 Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, 39–64) are convinced that when analyzing the administrative reform processes, the political context thereof is crucial. Accordingly, one needs to differentiate between individual states in terms of the following key indicators: the structure of the state; the nature of the executive government; minister/mandarin relations; the prevailing administrative culture and the nature of policy advice. Concerning the structure of the state, the authors emphasize two dimensions: vertical dispersion of authority, shared by different levels of government; and the degree of horizontal coordination of central government (e.g. how far central executives are able to “get their acts together” by ensuring the agreement between all ministers).
ment of reform impulses and caused certain characteristics of socialism to persist for several years after the country’s break-up from Yugoslavia.

The reform of public administration has been perceived since the mid-1990s as a social subsystem that needs to constantly adjust to the environment in which and because of which it operates. Worldwide, administrative reforms have been implemented as a process of modernization since the late 1980s. The term “public-administration reform” has been in frequent use in Western European democracies, being closely associated with general attempts at redefining the role and mission of state structures and the quality of governance (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, Peters and Pierre 2005), with the omnipresent need to reduce the share of public spending relative to GDP and amplify the voice of the users of public services and civil servants. Each stage of the reform is characterized by a specific trend, such as liberalization, deregulation, privatization, rationalization or user-orientation. These reform waves reached Slovenia and the rest of the post-socialist countries in the 1990s along with their respective independence processes (Pirnat 1993, Dunn et al. 2006). It needs to be underlined that the “new democracies” have been encountering, throughout the introduction of reforms, a very different kind of state-making problems than the established Western democracies – although also among the new democracies there are considerable differences as regards their evolution (Linz and Stepan 1996). Researchers have noted many characteristics of political democratization and modernization that CEE countries have in common, including an attempt to constitute a system resembling the Western societies (Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011).

Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy, with public administration being sub-
mited mainly to state government. Its origins and connections reach SEE (for-
mer Yugoslavia) and CEE and Central (German-oriented) European countries.
Despite some recent difficulties7, Slovenia is traditionally considered a rather
successful country in economic terms, being the most productive among the re-
publics of former Yugoslavia as well as on the level of CEE countries. It is a small

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7 Quotation from The World Factbook (December 2012): “Slovenia became the first 2004 European Union entrant to adopt the euro (on 1 January 2007) and has experienced one of the most stable political and economic transitions in Central and Southeastern Europe. With the highest per capita GDP in Central Europe, Slovenia has excellent infrastructure, a well-educated work force, and a strategic location between the Balkans and Western Europe. Privatization has lagged since 2002, and the economy has one of highest levels of state control in the ELL. Structural reforms to improve the business environment have allowed for somewhat greater foreign participation in Slovenia’s economy and have helped to lower unemployment. In March 2004, Slovenia became the first transition country to graduate from borrower status to donor partner at the World Bank. In December 2007, Slovenia was invited to begin the accession process for joining the OECD. Despite its economic success, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Slovenia has lagged behind the region average, and taxes remain relatively high. Furthermore, the labor market is often seen as inflexible, and legacy industries are losing sales to more competitive firms in China, India, and elsewhere. In 2009, the world recession caused the economy to contract – through falling exports and industrial production – by 8%, and unemployment to rise. Although growth resumed in 2010, the unemployment rate continued to rise, approaching 11% in 2011.”
state with a population of only about 2 million, a member of the EU and NATO since 2004 and a member of the OECD since 2010.

**Figure 1**
Facts on Slovenia (Source: The World Factbook)

The transition of Slovene public administration from the previous Yugoslav setting saw no major obstacle since Slovenia had been a relatively autonomous republic since the late 1980s (Pirnat 1993). In Weberian terms, Slovenia could well be said to have had an efficient public administration. Following independence, however, certain new structures had to be developed, such as a new customs service and the overall modernization of local self-government with further modernization of governance modes followed by Western Europe, with special focus on the rather undeveloped civil society (as a post-socialist consequence, cf. Integriteta 2012). Among the key problems in transforming the public sector as a whole, Slovenia had to tackle the issues of apolitical orientation and culture and develop professional strategic planning, such as public-policy design and participation of and with citizens. Considering the dilemmas expressed especially in CEE (see Randma-Liiv in Pollitt 2008/2009, 70–77), Slovenia and its public

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8 Having been part of several multinational states, it is impossible to talk about a “fully Slovene administration” prior to its independence. Administrative legacies include inheritance from the former Yugoslav communist system, which Slovenia had formed part of until June 1991 and which had been influenced by both the continental and French administrative examples, combined with typical pre-modern communist-party-system characteristics (Fink Hafner 2007: 813). Over time, the lack of coordination and teamwork culture were consciously regarded as a serious problem. Although Slovenia is usually considered a “laggard” in reforming public administration, it somehow managed to “muddle through” with an occasionally gradualist approach. More significant changes in this context did occur but only under long-term external pressure, particularly in relation to the EU accession process and requirements in the field of public administration (Kovačć 2006).

9 Similarly in other CE and SE countries (Dunn 2006, Koprić 2011, 14–20), where the key problems are particularly politicization and implementation gap.
administration have been facing some regional problems, such as determining the proper scope of minimal vs. strong state with the level of de/regulation or non/marketization and developing democratic over technocratic values. In institutional arrangements there is still a problem of fragmentation vs. unity of administration, but on the other hand there has been no dilemma concerning flexibility vs. stability.

In Slovenia, as in the majority of other countries in the region, the overall basis for modern administrative reforms was primarily the paradigm of New Public Management. In restructuring the vision of the state and its functions, the need to introduce managerial practices into public administration has been an important objective in CEE countries since the 1990s – most often because of external, supranational incentives (EU, OECD and the World Bank). Given the specific socio-political and economic circumstances of that time, the primary goal of introducing NPM in those countries was in fact quite different from those pursued in older democracies. The latter primarily see NPM as a tool for upgrading the democratic system making (see Ferlie et al. 2007), while the former mostly see it as a tool for stimulating effective and efficient ways of a democratic system in general, and only later on for modernization and adaptation purposes (Dunn et al. 2006). Countries of the CEE type are intent on following NPM as an organizing principle for their societies, being aware that development does not take place overnight and independently from the administrative system, i.e. adherence to the of law (cf. Pavčnik et al. 2009), legislation aimed at maintaining com-

10 As introduced by Hood (1995). The NPM doctrine is characterized by transposing business-management techniques, orientation towards values of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and market principles into the public sector. Despite the common movement throughout Europe, however, reforms in individual countries were quite different, depending on each country’s constitutional order, history, priorities of the ruling political option, etc. (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). This applies at least to the effects if not to the purpose, as for example in the case of privatization in the Anglo-Saxon world, decentralization in the German world, and participation in the Scandinavian world (Schuppert 2000). Yet in general, the impact of New Public Management was more evident in post-socialist countries than in Western Europe (cf. Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011).

11 In the light of a more effective implementation of public policies, some common trends are observed in Europe starting e.g. with the adoption of Directive 2006/123/EC (OJ L376 of 27 December 2006), aimed at promoting entrepreneurship and services on the internal market. Other convergence measures or institutions include:
- deregulation of administrative matters and simplification of administrative procedures to reduce administrative burden,
- dispute-solving outside the administrative procedure, e.g. by Ombudsman mediation,
- technological revision of regulation and implementation with IT tools (e-government),
- transfer of certain safeguards of fair procedure among non-essential procedural errors, the reduction thereof at least in some areas, or guarantee thereof also in subsequent (optional) court proceedings,
- reduction of time limits for decision and faster definition of enforceability, e.g. by excluding appeal or decision stages, non-suspensory effects of legal remedies, or waiving the right of appeal, etc. (Statskontoret 2005, Rusch 2009).
petition and preventing the emergence of monopolies, and competent staff, for example. In a way it is thus not odd that NPM in CEE countries is regarded as a framework for (overall) national reforms of the state and the overall character of its public administration to a significantly larger extent than in Western democracies (OECD Sigma 1999, Eymeri-Douzas and Pierre 2011). As time passed by, however, the understanding of NPM as the ultimate stage of development in the sense of a “Neo-Weberian” administration was overcome throughout the world and in Slovenia (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 99–100, Brezovšek 2009, cf. Table 1, based on Pollitt et al. 2008/2009, 15).

Table 1

Major problems and development trends in Slovene public administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core claim elements of Neo-Weberian State in Slovenia</th>
<th>1991 levels</th>
<th>2001 levels</th>
<th>2012 levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “Weberian” elements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State as the main facilitator of societal problems</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reaffirmation of) The role of representative democracy</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reaffirmation of) Basic principles of administrative law</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Preservation of) A public service with a distinctive status, culture, terms and conditions</td>
<td>Medium, but lowering</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. “Neo” elements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Shift from) Internal orientation towards an external, meeting citizens’ needs</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalization on resources and performance management with from ex-ante to ex-post control</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism of public service (joining up legal expertise and managerialism)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High(er)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Especially over the past few years, increasing emphasis was placed on the rationality and efficiency of administrative procedures and public administration, either in terms of implementing public interest or the mission of administrative bodies or in terms of e.g. economic development, mitigation of economic crisis, improving investment capacities, etc. (cf. Rusch 2009, 5). Recently, within Neo-Weberian state core claims, the notions of good administration and good governance have prevailed (Statskontoret 2005, Kovač and Virant 2011, Bevir et
In terms of good governance and good administration, the aim of administrative activities and their legal regulation is to resolve conflicts between public and one or more private interests, with an emphasis on restricting absolute power and rather encouraging the efficiency of public policies. Only in this manner can state authority be interpreted as democratic, legal and legitimate. Governance is hereafter understood as governmental activity with its administration operations and other societal networks included, as opposed to (as in Slovenia and SEE in general) monopolistic hierarchical authority held by core state administration (Bevir et al. 2011, Koprič 2013 and Peters 2013). Therefore, a good administration as a “well-functioning bureaucracy” is one with the capacity to support government and its partners to steer the society and the economy toward collective goals, being democratic, pursuing the rule of law and accountability and no corruption as elements of an effective political system.

The Slovene society is additionally marked by a persisting cultural and therefore political duality, evident since 1991 on different topics, such as the attitude toward the Second World War and the (post)communists, the role of the church in connection to the state and its education system, tax and social systems favouring the privileged or the weakest layers of society, etc. This duality was temporarily overcome only in the few years preceding EU accession. In Slovenia, the governmental coalitions are therefore not surprisingly in constant exchange, from left-

12 The contemporary model of good governance is based on the exercise of authority with participative strategic partnerships in the economy and civil society. Two systems of authority can nowadays be identified: on the one hand, there is the government with hard public law, exclusively public regulators, a state-centered system of democracy and hierarchically conducted reforms, while on the other hand, science and theory suggest a system of governance based on soft law that is agreement-oriented and adopted in cooperation of public and private entities. Here, democratic reforms are conducted through networking and open structures rather than authoritatively and from top to bottom (Schuppert in Bevir 2011, 289). In this context, administrative procedural law should develop in co-regulation procedures with the addressees and allow a consensual alignment of possibly opposed interests. In a system of good governance, the state (only) exercises authority and protects general social benefit but is not the exclusive or primary bearer thereof. Following the concept of good governance, this approach of the state will eventually lean from authoritative and centralized to a service-oriented and decentralized one.

13 According to Transparency International (Integriteta 2012), there are some systemic indicators of corruption in Slovenia from 2010 on, which is rather low compared to other CEE and SEE countries but nevertheless rising. In general, there is no particular concern as regards the regulatory quality and the rule of law, e-government and the degree of supportiveness of political, administrative and economic players to the economic development with or for the business sector; thus, in terms of government effectiveness, Slovenia ranks relatively high, reaching 70–85 points out of 100. The lowest development observed in Slovenia concerns the role of the civil society.
to right-wing government and vice versa. The most recent evidence of duality was the formation of the present government coalition following the December 2011 elections, where the votes and the beliefs of people and political leaders were split 50:50, blocking any option to prevail. This phenomenon is inevitably an obstacle to designing and implementing reforms in all fields, especially since Slovenia is nowadays still facing the interventionist role of the state in the administrative regulation of social circumstances, politicization in administration, or merely the economic understanding of the role of the administration in the process of public management (Pirnat 2010). For this reason, new governance modes (compared to Table 1) are to be developed in the long run.


After Slovenia had gained independence, public administration underwent a development process of exceptional intensity since it represented the key instrument of power for the new politics. Public-administration reforms were carried out in several stages following the development of the system environment, i.e. the state and the society, similarly to other countries of Central and South-eastern Europe (CEE and SEE). Slovenia undertook the path of revolution (1990–1994), transition (1995–1997) and EU accession and integration (1996–2004), of further continuous modernization through specific policies (2003–2008), and of adjustments to cope with the economic crisis (2008–2013). In Slovenia, just as in com-

14 In March 2013, the Slovene parliament elected Alenka Bratušek with a left-wing government, between 2012 and 2013 the Government was led by Janez Janša with a right-wing government; between 2008 and 2012 by Borut Pahor (left-wing coalition), between 2004 and 2008 by Janša (right-wing), between 2002 and 2004 by Anton Rop (left-wing), between 2000 and 2002 by Janez Drnovšek (left-wing), in 2000 by Andrej Bajuk (right-wing, between 1992 and 2000 by Drnovšek (left- and center-wing coalitions), and between 1990 and 1992 by Lojze Peterle (right- and center-wing). Nevertheless, in terms of the role of public administration and administrative reforms, there seems to be no significant difference between left- and right-wing governments (usually they all proclaim themselves as centered ones). This is evident in particular in light of savings due to the economic crisis: in 2010–2011, Pahor (left) proposed basically the same measures and methods as Janša (right-centered) in 2012.

rable countries, two main processes can thus be identified throughout the reform: 1) modernization in terms of political interests and in substantive and technical terms, i.e. informatization, and 2) Europeanization, both during accession to the EU and as a member thereof.\textsuperscript{16}

As confirmed also by the studies on Europeanization (see Koprič 2013), public administrations of transition or post-socialist countries exhibit elements of convergence under the EU pressures for the reform. Similarly in Slovenia, at least a shallow Europeanization on the level of convergence of discourse and decisions can be observed, especially with regard to the legal framework for civil service, administrative procedure and specific public-administration practices, such as public procurement, internal financial management, administrative justice and the like. Besides the formal requirements of the European Commission, an important impact on the development of Slovene public administration was made by the European Administrative Space as a social phenomenon integrating convergence approaches in European public administrations (OECD Sigma 1999, Koprič 2011). Therefore, during the first decade of the reform process (1996–2005), the New Public Management – which also served as the basis for EU directives (cf. OECD Sigma 1999) – was acknowledged in the development of public administration in Slovenia as a key element of transition as well as modernization.\textsuperscript{17}

The parliament and the government acted as the main decision makers in the public-administration reform design. The fact that the first strategy (see Table 2) was adopted by parliament clearly points to its political significance, whereas all further strategies or different subprograms and projects (e.g. e-government) were approved only by the government or line ministries, respectively. The responsible implementation units – acting as coordinators among line ministries or direct executors – were mainly government offices, such as the Office for EU Affairs or the Office for Informatics, while from 2004 on a specific role was played by the Ministry of Public Administration.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} See Koprič (2011, 2013), for Croatia within SE Europe, adding the processes of search for national identity and regional cooperation.

\textsuperscript{17} More details in Kovač and Virant 2011, as operationalized for instance within the government program of removal of administrative barriers, introduced in 2000 and intensified in 2006.

\textsuperscript{18} This Ministry of Public Administration assumed competence for public administration from the Ministry of Interior (responsible until 2004), with a special office for public-administration development and joined up some governmental offices. In February 2012, the Ministry was integrated into the Ministry of Justice to rationalize common services and became the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration and again public administration was transferred to Ministry of Interior and Public Administration in March 2013.
### Table 2
Overall strategic documents on Slovene administrative reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy (passed)</th>
<th>Issuer</th>
<th>Political orientation</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Level of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft – The Origins of Further Development and Organisational and Normative Regulation of the Public Sector (June 2011)***</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Left wing</td>
<td>2011–2012</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Strategy on Further Development of the Slovene Public Sector 2003–2005 was designed to integrate and coordinate all existing and planned projects since 2000–2003 that had been run systematically even though no strategy was passed in this period.

** Standing for exit from the economic crisis with reduction and rationalization of public administration (cf. Kovač 2011).

*** Not passed due to early parliamentary elections and the appointment of the new government in autumn 2011.

Following independence, new administrative structures had to be established (e.g. in defence or customs). In 1994, a radical reform of local government was implemented, whereby the functions of municipalities (local self-government) were separated from those of state administration. Municipalities (211 in total) assumed the regulation of local matters (public utilities, spatial planning, primary health care and education, etc.), while the state administration assumed – by means of general administrative districts (58 administrative units) and other territorial branches (e.g. of the tax administration) – the implementation of state regulations.

In the next stage of reforms, emphasis was put on the preparation and adoption of new laws aimed at Slovenia’s accession to the EU. The Accession Strategy pursued, inter alia, the efficiency of public administration. This regulatory framework built on the Yugoslav tradition but again introduced radical break-
throughs, particularly in the field of developing human resource management (cf. Korade Purg in Kovač and Virant 2011). A new General Administrative Procedure Act was adopted in 1999 and later on was subject to several further amendments, mainly in the sense of greater efficiency of procedure, and in 2006 new acts on tax procedure and administrative dispute were passed that modernized the already established institutions of administrative procedural law with emphasis on the rights of the parties in administrative matters. The majority of other laws were not implemented fully or in due time. An example thereof was the Wage System in the Public Sector Act which set up a single wage system for the entire public sector to ensure an equal base wage for comparable positions, motivate and reward above-average work results and performance, etc. Yet although the act had been adopted in 2002, the new wage system eventually began to apply only in 2008, after six years of negotiations between the government and public-sector trade unions, and was again partly amended in 2010 to reduce public expenditure.

**Figure 2**
Chronology of public administration reforms – phases, strategies and milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>EU integration &amp; NPM</th>
<th>Modernization</th>
<th>Adaptation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The new State Administration Act revised the system of governance in state administration (distinguishing between political functions – minister and state secretary – and the highest official positions – from director general on) and regulated the status of bodies within ministries by giving them relative autonomy for technical and politically impartial work. Gradually but distinctively, decentralization was introduced in order to develop independent regulators and leaner

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19 Administrative procedural law should not be underestimated as a part of the overall functioning and modernization of public administration (Kovač and Virant 2011), since it represents a key business process (a basic function of state administration, municipalities and bearers of public authority; also Rusch (2009, 4) defining the regulation of administrative procedural law together with the rational organization of public administration and the public-servants system as a sound reform); and it largely implies the exercise of constitutional safeguards (cf. Ziller in Peters and Pierre 2005, 261; such as the rule of law, equality before the law and equal protection of rights, exercise of fundamental human rights and freedoms, effective legal remedy, protection of the Slovene language, legality and sovereignty, hierarchy of acts, administrative dispute, prejudicing final decisions, etc.). Cf. Statskontoret 2005 and Koprič 2013.
execution of public services. Additionally, delegation of power was developed introducing the territorial organization of public administration and deconcentration of competences of the bearers of public authority even in the private sector (Pirnat in Kovač and Virant 2011). Between 2002 and 2011, state administration comprised: government offices (16), ministries (15), bodies within ministries as executive agencies (approx. 50) and local administrative units (58), together totaling 130 units with approximately 34,000 employees, as well as 211 municipalities with nearly 5,000 employees. Moreover, there were a few thousand institutes, agencies, funds and private bearers of public authority or providers of public services that had been delegated certain powers by the state or the municipalities, whereby the entire public sector of Slovenia employed approximately 160,000 persons, a third of which works in administration bodies defined as bodies that execute public tasks with prevailing or at least some authoritative notion (more details in Kovač 2011).20 One of the first measures taken by the new government in 2012 (Janša’s right wing government) was to rationalize the number of bodies, downsizing ministries from 15 to only 11 (with 12 in 2013), including 6 previously autonomous government offices, joining approx. 20 autonomous agencies and funds into ministries, combining inspection bodies within a ministry into one unit, etc. Despite heavy reservations expressed by experts as to the actual outcome of reorganization21, since no thorough functional analyses of overlapping tasks, etc. had been carried out, such measures indeed had a positive purpose, i.e. to ensure more efficient governing with less issues or policies to be coordinated at the government level since they will be previously coordinated within the joined ministries.

The Inspection Act of 2002 introduced the legal framework that permits a more efficient and more coordinated work of inspections (enlarged authorizations, establishment of the Inspection Council Coordination, a more adequate procedure regulation). In terms of organization, state inspections are positioned under the relevant ministries as separate bodies enjoying relative autonomy. In addition, the relevant ministry as a hierarchically higher body was only given powers of

20 One can suspect at least in some areas that restructuring is occurring outside the state administration mainly to avoid governmental restriction policy on expenditure (cf. from different perspectives in Bevir et al. 2011). See more about agencification for Slovenia in Koprič et al. 2012, including the comparison with Croatia, for instance.

21 Some radical changes include: joining three ministries (education, science and culture) into one, combining the Ministries of Justice and Public Administration, transforming the former Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning by bringing environmental issues under agriculture and spatial planning under transport (new Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport), joining Tax and Customs Administrations, etc. Additionally, public prosecution was transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior, which is definitely (again) a socialist relict – the opposition thus required a constitutional review of the law (questioning the principle of division of powers due to the inclusion of public prosecution under the Judiciary rather than the Executive).
authority in a specific procedure in the events of extraordinary supervisory review of an administrative procedure or a complaint filed by the inspected (legal or natural) person, whereby inspectorates were guaranteed a relative distance from politics within their ministry. Such measures were the precondition for improving the efficiency of the inspections’ work. In 2007, a specific methodology was introduced for measuring the effectiveness, quality and performance of state inspection services (comprising unified performance indicators, whose monitoring began to be implemented, on a trial basis). Moreover, regional coordination bodies were established to coordinate the work of inspectors. In 2012 and 2013, new austerity measures are in place.

The regulation of public agencies has always been one of the key EU-driven reform programs although they have not been carried out consistently. As a consequence, several models of autonomous entities have developed, with differing levels of autonomy. In 2002, Slovenia passed a package of what is known as the “reform legislation”, including the Public Agencies Act and the State Administration Act, which created the legal basis for systematic agencification aimed at deconcentration, rationalization and professionalization of public administration. The idea of independent administrative institutions is closely linked to the privatization of (economic) public services with coordination of general public and private interests. The increase of the number of state public agencies is evident – from only one in 1994 to five in 2000, 16 in 2010 and 18 in 2012. The majority of state public agencies in Slovenia operate in the financial-economic area. With the establishment of (state) public agencies, certain administrative tasks are delegated from state administration to more flexibly regulated and legally independent entities outside the constitutionally limited administrative bodies within the state itself. But here the state still seeks for stabilization and professionalism of agencies as opposed to transitional politicization, considering that some agencies established in 2008 are now being abolished based on what is known as the 2012 government rationalization program (in detail Koprić et al. 2012).

As regards the civil-service system, a new law entered into force in 2003. The main focuses of the Civil Servants Act as one of the most important “reform acts”, aiming to modernize the Slovene public administration (OECD 2009), include: reorganization of human-resource planning and employment by integration in

22 The process of agencification in Slovenia has intensified and is still progressing, especially with regard to the aspects of (personal and financial) autonomy. In 2011, the Government designed an explicit reform program regarding public agencies, institutions and funds as a part of the general public-sector reform program (“The origins of further development and organizational and normative regulation of the public sector”). The analysis and measures to be taken until 2011 were in accordance with theoretical, comparative and practical recommendations, especially the differentiation of public agencies into regulatory and general ones, the organization rationalization, and program budgeting (Koprić et al. 2012).
the budgetary procedure, decentralization of human-resource management to the level of individual bodies, greater internal mobility of staff given that the employer is the same, i.e. the state, setting up top public management from among officials rather than functionaries, a more objective system of selection, introduction of horizontal training and qualifications at the Administrative Academy under the Ministry of Public Administration, mechanisms to increase flexibility and rationalize operations (project work, reorganization, reassignment), social partnership, etc. Moreover, the Officials’ Council was set up in April 2003 with the primary goal of ensuring a professional selection of the highest administrative managers for which the act provides an open competition (e.g. directors general at ministries, principals of administrative units etc.) and developing a code of conduct for civil servants, adopted in 2011. In relation to the above, mention also needs to be made of the development of anti-corruption strategies and bodies, such as the anti-corruption commission provided by the 2010 Public Sector Integrity Act.

Under the impact of European Administrative Space principles, particularly between 2002 and 2006, Slovenia made extensive use of quality standards such as the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) with almost 100 users registered until 2011, or the ISO system with about 50 certified bodies, annual surveys on customer satisfaction, etc. However, only the intensity and extent of use of such tools can be evaluated at the moment, while the impact on better operations is still to be examined. A truly important contribution to the development of quality operations in practice was made by the Decree on Administrative Operations (2005), a kind of citizen charter. A further example of such non-legislative reform is the program for cutting off red tape and removing administrative barriers (Kovač and Virant 2011, 247). The program was initiated in Slovenia in 2000 and enforced with several hundreds of procedural and other simplifications in the existing and newly adopted regulation when transferred to the scope of work of the Ministry of Public Administration after 2006. Another significant segment is the

23 As expected, most competitions for the highest public-management positions took place in the years following parliamentary elections and changes of government (e.g. in late 2004 and late 2008, and expectedly in 2012 and within ongoing political crisis again in 2013). The number of competitions was extremely high in 2005 compared to other years, exceeding the average by 80%; a rise could also be observed in 2009 (45% above the annual average), and even in 2003–2010. Another peak was recorded in 2008 (20% above the average), when the term of office of principals of administrative units expired and around 40 competitions were launched for such positions only. The politicization in appointing top officials in Slovenia is definitely a (post)socialism relict (cf. OECD Sigma 2009).

24 Unfortunately, similarly as in the work of state administration, here, too, the goals were often only partially achieved. For example, in relation to a higher level of professionalization, the OECD comparative survey (OECD 2009) underlines the importance of defining top positions in the administration as professional positions with only the very highest being political appointments, which Slovenia intended to successfully achieve with the reform pursuant to the Public Administration Act.

25 For more in a broader context, see Kustec-Lipicer and Kovač in Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011.
e-government program introduced in 2000 with emphasis on the development of two-way interactive administrative services and on the internal informatization of administration. In 2006, amendments to the government Rules of Procedure established a system of regulatory impact assessment focusing on the reduction of administrative burden with obligatory public consultation since 2008 and the Resolution on Legislative Regulation adopted by parliament in late 2009 under the EU (and OECD) program on better regulation.

4. Main results and further challenges for Slovene reform sustainability: Lessons learned

Public-administration reforms in Slovenia may well be considered successful in an operational or technical sense (e.g. use of TQM tools, elimination of administrative barriers), and less so in the most conflicting segments of the society such as development of local government and decentralization of the service functions of the state. From a broad perspective, the following areas of reform of public administration in Slovenia can be assessed as very successful in terms of development. First, with its administrative (and political) structures, Slovenia set up a well-functioning state which actively contributes to shaping the European agenda despite the country’s relative smallness. Public administration supports and enables the activities of the state in a supranational context as well as in relation to its economy and citizens. If public administration had not responded to the new needs of the state at that time, Slovenia would not have been able to cope with the new challenges, such as introducing the euro in 2007 or holding the EU presidency in 2008 (more details Kovač and Virant 2011, 51–78). Second, there is a political and institutional differentiation between the state and administration on the one hand and the providers of service activities on the other, which is a prerequisite for further development of both segments. Third, the organizational, procedural and regulatory changes bring quality of service for the users, work processes are not doubled and run smoothly and efficiently (e.g. with programs to eliminate administrative barriers, optimization and computerization of work, higher quality of service etc.). Furthermore, under the process of Europeanization, Slovenia complied above all with the structural and macroeconomic criteria. In terms of economic indicators, the extent of public administration in Slovenia is comparable to other EU countries: under 10% of the working population employed in public administration, although recent macroeconomic indicators raise concern due to the decline of GDP to formal recession in

26 From data exchange among the bodies to inter-ministerial coordination and the EU portal, Slovenia also gained international recognition: in 2008 the UN award for the project of a single entry point for the registration of entrepreneurs, and in 2007 ranking second with Austria among the EU Member States in the development of e-services for the citizens.
2012, growing unemployment and reduced consumption (in economy, especially the construction sector).

Since 1996 and even before that, reforms in Slovene public administration have been stimulated mainly by two parallel approaches with 1) inner and 2) external driving forces of change. Internal driving forces include pressures to reduce public expenditure and the volume of civil service or use of Total Quality Management tools – put forward by domestic politicians, economy, civil service itself and academia, while external driving forces refer to EU and OECD incentives (e.g. the establishment of institutions such as public agencies, European Administrative Space standards, daily involvement in EU operations or better regulation schemes) with imported foreign public-sector scientific theories (cf. Koprič 2011, 29). This double approach is a key reason why the majority of the implemented administrative reforms can be considered rather sustainable. The most illustrative example is TQM development with simultaneous top-down and bottom-up incentives and good practices. Furthermore, the implementation of strategies and projects has been definitely more intense due to increasing the political weight and integrity of the field by establishing an autonomous Ministry of Administration in 2004. Different internal and external incentives and processes partly overlap when the internal needs of the Slovene public administration and external incentives match, such as in the case of efforts toward rationalization of public spending or elimination of administrative barriers. A certain degree of modernization of the Slovene administration could probably be achieved even without Europeanization. Yet it would occur later and less integrally (Kovač 2011).

Nevertheless, certain strategies (see Table 2) and even post-socialist processes have not been implemented fully. The main reason is not the fact that the period covered has not yet ended (some strategies are planned until 2013) or that a new government has been appointed, but rather the radical change of the key societal and economic environment compared to the one predicted at the time of the strategies’ design (2004, 2009). A minor yet evident implementation gap is observed in almost all areas (cf. Koprič 2011, 18), even in the most recent measures to downsize public expenditure. This is mainly due to the lack of consistent and persistent coordination at the highest strategic level of government in relation to reform goals and activities, which results in opposing measures taken by individual ministries (examples in Kovač and Virant 2011). As in many political systems of the world, yet more often in less consolidated social environments

27 Such as privatization of former social ownership with the consequence of opening too radically the public-sector area for neo-liberal ideology (Pirnat 1993, cf. the same for Croatia in Koprič 2011).
such as post-socialist countries, in Slovenia the reforms were often run merely in relation to a specific area or the priorities of the current government. Since coordination is a key factor of performance of cross-sectoral, especially EU-related, policies, it is evident that a certain degree of implementation gap derives from this source. The problem is not the law or the strategy itself but the difficulty to redefine administrative (sub)structures and cultures in order to ensure proper implementation of the law or strategy. Thus, specific projects are quite successful while at the same time some other projects are not being implemented or are heavily criticized by the public or simply inefficient. Additionally, several reform processes in Slovenia (as in all CEE and SEE countries) were a “copy of the Western patterns”, a shortcut to achieve the (idealistic) level of economic and democratic progress opposed to the historical experience of these countries in the past 50 years. Consequently, some of these reforms were rejected in the implementation phase as not being in compliance with the Slovene societal and administrative framework and culture. Yet even in positively assessed areas where progress is evident (e.g. in the elimination of administrative barriers, modernization of the civil-servants system, enlarged use of TQM tools), the effects would have been stronger if activities had been planned more in the context of specific societal characteristics of Slovenia rather than uncritically following external (usually EU) “directives”.

29 E.g. civil servants’ demonstrations from 2010 to 2012; pension-reform failure at the referendum in June 2011, or new employments despite the annual reduction.
30 Not surprisingly, relevant research data confirm that despite the massive export of Western quality approaches and tools to the East, their implementation there often met with a number of previously unknown, frequently politically conditioned difficulties that can be associated with the level of maturity of democratic state structure processes. In this context, a study of administrative reform in CEE countries thus reveals a merry-go-round of reforms that has hindered the successful transformation of their administrative systems, which is mainly attributable to the short-lived nature of most governments and governing coalitions and the continuing high level of polarization in party politics (Peters et al. 2005). The debates on policy-making and policy implementation in public administration are dominated by lawyers in some countries and by managers in others. Both positions and backgrounds have led to different perspectives on public administration, yet lawyers in public administration tend to maintain a different language and see obstacles instead of solutions for new policy developments and are therefore considered more of a hindrance than support. On the other hand, lawyers are inclined to apply legal reasoning and complain about the lack of respect by policymakers and managers for the rights of persons and businesses while developing new policies. Meanwhile, there are certain trends regarding the entire structure of regulations affecting the patterns of lawyers’ and public administrators’ working behaviors as well: detailed imperative norms tend to replace traditional dispositional civil-law logic, providing a framework for due behaviors. Thus, law as “art boni et aequi” appears to give way to a sort of mechanical law engineering. Additionally, the quantity of regulations raises new questions since legislative bodies tend to act as mass producers of law. The question for practice and academia is how a dialogue and cooperation between managers and lawyers can take shape, without compromising the rights related to the rule of law but also without giving up too much on efficiency and effectiveness in public administration (Dragos et al. 2011).
Another factor decreasing the success of reform activities is the over-orientation toward legalism. Ever since the beginning, public-administration reform has focused on the normative side of the reform, i.e. the segment that defines the tasks and structure of the administration. This approach has been subject to much criticism. Namely, while rule of law is central to all of the good governments, it is much more limiting in some than others, often set as a burden to the development (Andrews 2010, 10). Law should not be considered a monopolistic instrument for policy development and not primarily a normative grid within which and through which the administration may act despite the tradition and respect for the rule of law in administration activities (cf. Koprič 2013, 15). Within the development process, there should be an interrelation among the various dimensions of modification of the administration – functional, organizational, managerial (human resources, finances, IT, etc.), procedural and regulatory, and not exclusively the latter. A reform is not implemented merely with the adoption of a law, and specific changes cannot be carried out through regulations only. Instead, the reform should be based on the functional and procedural aspects to which the organizational makeup of the reform system should be adjusted. Yet all strategies of the Slovene government are based on laws, which made some sense in the mid-1990s owing to harmonization with the EU but turned out to be ineffective in the case of the 2010 Exit Strategy. The latter, for instance, again envisages the adoption of 20 “reform laws” whereby it evaluates the success of the strategy only in terms of adoption of the relevant laws and not in terms of the results they produce upon entry into force. Thus, it can be established that the Slovene public administration was reformed mainly legalistically, in relation to organizational structures and resource management, while the procedural aspect was irrelevant. This is not surprising considering that the administration acts as a monopoly with the purpose of protecting public interest; to avoid misuse of power, a high level of regulation is present. As a consequence, the reform of administration necessarily has a regulatory character, but this also implies a limited scope of reforms (Pirnat 2010). The authorities must distinguish between whether they are dealing with power, i.e. as an institution and regulative power, or with services for the people, i.e. as an organization and service provider. Consequently, public-sector reforms worldwide are nowadays refocusing and should also do so in Slovenia, from mainly legal approaches to more sophisticated and operational measures in terms of a qualitative assessment of the implemented governance approaches (Bevir et al. 2011).

31 More in Kovač and Virant 2011. Cf. OECD Sigma 2009. Koprič (2013), for instance, argues the impact of administrative education programs on law-oriented reforms since more than 30 % of study programs in the territory of former Yugoslavia are law-focused.
Particularly the latest approaches, pursued by the left-wing government in 2008–2011 and by the current right-wing government, focus on an administration that is seen as a necessary budgetary cost item holding back economic competitiveness instead of being considered an impetus and an investment into social security, development of transparency, and participative partnerships as parts of good governance and development of a democratic society (cf. Bevir et al. 2011). The strategies that envisage reduction in all areas based on a linear approach, without differentiation as to the significance and extent of operations of individual segments of public administration, in a neoliberalist fashion, are heavily criticized by academia (Pirnat 2010) due to their failure to acknowledge the role of public administration in the society in times of economic crisis.

To shortly summarize the assessment of the main results and shortcomings of reform, a SWOT analysis is provided in Table 3.32

The reform in Slovenia initially involved mainly the upgrading of legality and protection of public interest as classic Weberian characteristics of public administration with transfer of values and work methods from the private sector, such as user-orientation, work efficiency and rationalization of resources. It took account of the changing role of the state (from repressive to service functions) and thus of decentralization of decision-making and organizational structures, aimed at professionalization, improvement of vertical and horizontal coordination of work and clearer separation of powers between parliament and government, wished to regulate the status of parastatal organizations and tried to link the work of public administration to the budget. As for the future, reforms need to aim at good government and good governance. Despite certain NPM-driven reforms, New Public Management in Slovenia still implies (merely) the organization and not political theory as governance “ideology”.33 Good governance as the (de-

32 Cf. Löffler and Vintar 2004, who point out, particularly compared to older European democracies, the lack of financial resources, a strongly hierarchical culture that does not allow critical self-assessment, organizational structures that do not promote cooperation, and/or inadequate supportive role of central government.

33 As presented on the case of TQM tools in Slovene public administration in recent years (see Kustec-Lipicer and Kovač in Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011), analyzed data clearly show that there is but little direct correlation between the quality of governance in terms of modernization presented in the introduction and the actual motives for introducing (NPM-driven) reforms in a post-socialist country. It stays very much true that the use of TQM tools in the analyzed Slovene post-socialist system is more or less politically promoted as being the normative and overwhelming solution for the ineffectiveness of the public sector. A notable inconsistency in this regard is also reflected in definitions of what quality, good government and governance (cf. Peters 2013) actually mean, since it was associated by the respondents with undefined and vague terms. But a surprisingly high consensus exists among the two groups of interviewed management staff (top – ministerial and middle – public-servant) about the importance of NPM approaches for achieving quality of governance at the macro level. They both see NPM and its tools as the driving force for the quality of the public sector in Slovenia in general.
declared) objective of recent reform takes account of institutions outside the administration and underlines openness, communication, coherence, accountability of administration and participation of interested parties in the adoption of public policies (for example underlining the role of NGOs, as empirically elaborated in Integriteta 2012). In the future combining of tradition, results and societal need in the contemporary global world, Slovenia is searching its role as a typical Neo-Weberian State (cf. Drechsler in Pollitt 2008/2009: 96), focusing rather on strong state and its modernization than on minimization.

Table 3
SWOT analysis of the Slovene public administration (reform results)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths:</th>
<th>Weaknesses:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• traditionally recognized role and stability of public-administration structures</td>
<td>• overregulation, lack of efficient regulatory impact assessments and policy evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• stabilized legal framework</td>
<td>• lack of coordination among line ministries; individual bodies operating bureaucratically and hierarchically rather than as an accountable part of the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• professional competences of civil servants</td>
<td>• appointments by political orientation ( politicization in civil service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• well-functioning administration on the operational level (e.g. the relatively respected legality in issuing individual administrative decisions)</td>
<td>• decreasing macroeconomic indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EU membership</td>
<td>• relative non-transparency and low level of participation and civil-society involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• strong connections among officials in the region and some Western EU countries</td>
<td>• burden of work is not equally distributed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities:</th>
<th>Threats:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• strengthen the role of the state in the EU</td>
<td>• economic crisis with lack of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• relative smallness of the state and administration with its linkage to Europe to act as a bridge of good governance from West to East</td>
<td>• government view to take public administration as a pure inevitable cost in the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• delegate administrative tasks to non-classical administrative bodies</td>
<td>• cultural duality of society (left-right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• further depoliticization (as an antipode to professionalization and expert continuity in relation to daily politics)</td>
<td>• raise of corruption practices 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• further openness and networks to be developed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

5. Conclusions

Slovenia is a small country with a population of about 2 million and complex administrative structures developed at three main levels: state administration, local communities i.e. municipalities, and bearers of delegated authority outside the

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34 As stated by Transparency International (Integriteta 2012), the public is politically indifferent, which systematically increases the possibilities of corruption and capture of the state. Especially the civil society should be given more resources and opportunities to co-govern.
core administrative bodies, such as regulatory and executive agencies. Specific traditional patterns persist, some arising from the Yugoslav heritage, with characteristics of post-socialist processes still in the run (e.g., strict legalism, partly implemented privatization, corruption) despite the relative macroeconomic and political success compared to other countries in the region. Administrative reforms in Slovenia were planned and implemented on the basis of holistic reform strategies ever since the achievement of independence (1991) and full membership of the EU (2004) to the current actions to fight global and national economic crisis (from 2008). Internal and external driving forces (particularly the process of Europeanization and the New Public Management movement) alike led Slovenia to introduce reforms in the fields of organization, civil service, public finance, legal protection in administrative matters, quality management, e-government, etc.

Individual reforms in Slovene public administration and the whole series of activities carried out in this regard may be considered successful if the criteria for assessment are the objectives set in the reform documents (mainly strategies or draft organic laws) and comparative indicators in the EU or other countries based on good administration and governance concepts. The reforms were designed and carried out rather legalistically, with no functional analysis and lacking political coordination. Lately, a pure neo-liberalistic fashion is prevailing (strive for efficiency, rationalization and savings). Legalism and neo-liberalism are the main sources of side effects and failures of the reform objectives in different reform stages. Nevertheless, strategies and incentives triggered continuous modernization of public administration in several areas, including the simplification of processes, quality management, e-government and rational use of resources. Other reforms were introduced rather as a one-time story. If the basic objective of good governance is to build a safe and creative social community, the model, the priorities and the methods of work in public matters should, over time, inevitably adapt to the changing environment. If the society is changing, also the role of the state and authority within the society should change, which necessarily implies a different role and manner of work of public administration. Such changes run complementarily in two main directions: development of democracy and partnerships with decentralization of power, and greater efficiency to improve competitiveness and economic progress and provide for the implementation of goals of governing political options.

As for the future, if Slovenia is to pursue continuous system development, overall strategic orientation should be designed based on the vision of the role of Slovenia within its national society and international environment. The modernization of public administration is both a tool and a target by which and toward which the state can make a shift from mere public administering to New Public Man-
agement and further to integral governance and societal progress. The development of public administration thus opens new possibilities for further development of democracy. Some balance between legalism and managerialism should be found through participative governance and inclusion of civil society. A more democratic administration, which is only possible with a positive politicization and opens new political dimensions, should thus include also the socialization of norms, values and responsibilities of all stakeholders in a democratic society.

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Slovene Administrative Reforms: At the Cross-Section of Post-Socialism, Legalism and Good Administration

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Managerial Reform in Romania: A Case Study of Strategic Change

CĂLIN HINȚEA, MARIUS PROFIROIU

1. Introduction

The fall of communism in the Central and Eastern European countries represented an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, the democratic system was (gradually) introduced; on the other hand, the administrative systems faced challenges that were not understood and which could not be solved by the traditional models. Although the starting point was not the same for all Central and Eastern European countries, the years of democracy represented a continuous and yet not completed search for recipes of a functional public administration. Due to its severe communist regime, Romania had a more difficult start. The experiences from Western countries had an important role in this process. The analysis of the changes in Central and Eastern European countries proves that there were specific characteristics in the post-communist countries that had to be considered.

This case study attempts to synthesize the efforts of managerial change at the level of Romanian public administration. In the first chapter an illustration of the public administration reform in Romania is presented in an attempt to define the type of reform that is being dealt with. In the second chapter a characterization of the reform movement in Romania is made, where the resistance to change is explained, as well as the external factors that are contributing to this change. In the third chapter the PEST analysis of the public-administration reform in Romania is presented, reported to the managerial paradigms experimented with by Western societies. The analysis also presents the Romanian public-retirement system, an illustrative case study for the structural deficiencies of the public system. The forth chapter shapes the profile of the Romanian public administration, as a framework for the reform process, comprising main areas of restructuring: education reform, re-organization of governmental agencies, creating the unitary public-pay system, reforming the pension system, reforming the financial system and reforming the justice system. In the last chapter an analysis of the quality and effectiveness of the Romanian management of public administration is presented, compared with the European Union and Central and Eastern European countries. This analysis was performed based on the opinion of 203 civil servants from local and public administration from Romania, of which 71% had a managerial position.
The conclusions are pointing to the fact that Romania is just entering a stage in which there are sound prerequisites in place for a managerial reform oriented toward a post-bureaucratic model focused on two elements – performance and the quality of public services. In order for it to be successful, a strategic perspective of the reform is needed (clear definition of the targets to be reached in the mid- and long run), development of professional management in public administration, and the building of a managerial culture in the public sector from Romania.

2. The illustration of public administration reform in Romania

One of the most difficult topics to analyze in Romania is the reform of public services (based on Hîntea 2011). The challenges that arise during the reform process are so often described and discussed that they tend to be perceived as equally or more important than the main issue, namely how the public sector can be reformed in an efficient way.

What type of a reform are we dealing with? The reform of public administration? The reform of public services? The reform of the state? The reform of public management? Each answer offers a different perspective upon the possible paths for reform. In Romania most discussions referred to the reform of public administration; it has been only recently that the reform concept was extended so as to cover the entire state. The discussion regarding the reform of public management is still in its early stages.

Public administration or public management? Traditionally, Romania, similar to other Eastern European countries, operates under a legalistic approach to public services (continental model) (Verheijen 1998; Hîntea 2008). Public administration translates mostly into the implementation of the law rather than the creation/development of the law/regulations. It is structured hierarchically, and change often means the modification of the legal framework following the linear model described below:

Policy problem – new law – solving of the problem – move on to the next problem on the agenda.

Starting in 1989 Romania has undergone at least through four different stages of administrative reform:

- **Legislative reform**, more pronounced immediately after 1989 but continues even today. There are two main reasons for this stage: the real need for the development and the legalistic tradition described above.
• Reform at the level of formal structures and procedures: new forms of organization, new working procedures intra and inter institutions. Decentralization, the settling of the new relations central-local, the monitoring, control and evaluation mechanisms of performance represent such models.

• Reforms at the level of public policies: reform efforts targeting the human resources, financial mechanisms and the formulation of public policies.

• Structural reforms: the redefinition of the dimensions of the state and of the areas of priority intervention, the effort to make rational its action regarding the macroeconomic and administrative behavior.

This evolution is explicable from the standpoint of historical realities (an administrative structure specific for a totalitarian state, in which politics and administration overlap, the domination of a legalistic model, the lack of expertise in public management, the lack of maturity of the political elites). We are now (Mora and Ticlau 2008) in the early stages of phase 5 – the implementation of a managerial approach, of Western origin, focused on two key factors: quality of services and performance (management and measurement). There are several initiatives announcing this managerial stage such as the creation of the city-manager position within the local public administration or the efforts aimed at stimulating strategic planning at both the central and local levels (Hîntea 2008).

3. The characterization of the reform movement in Romania

Is there an ideal model for the reform? Is an economic boom or rather an economic crisis (due to economic constraints) the perfect moment for initiating the reform? In fact, there is no such thing as a perfect moment for the reform. It will always be looked upon with distrust, it will always generate resistance, and its success will always be contingent upon two factors: the political will of the elites and the technical expertise of the reformers. In Romania resistance to change has been very strong and has had different forms of manifestation. At the conceptual level there are at least two theories that justify it:

• The theory of the “moment”: the reforms are good in principle but the timing is bad;

• The theory of the “individual case”: Romania is a specific case; best practices from other countries cannot be applied here.

Resistance to change, doubled by deficiencies regarding political will and technical expertise needed for the reform of the public sector, have generated delays in the implementation of reform initiatives, with significant negative effects: the
chaotic development of different sectors within public administration as a whole, which do not function coherently together.

Bouckaert (2008, 13) argues that the problems which had triggered the need for reform in Western Europe concerned the macroeconomic dimension (significant deficits) and the lack of trust of the public in the traditional public institutions. The pressure was significant, not only from within the system (which is never quite up to completely changing itself), but also from the exterior: the market and the citizens. What do all these pressures mean in the context of Romania, a country where market mechanisms are far from functioning correctly and where the citizens are not aware of their power over the state institutions (Şandor and Tripon 2009) which have dominated them for a long time?

In addition, the pressure for reform from within the administrative system has been less significant than in the case of Western systems. In Romania the external pressures did not come so much from the citizens but rather from international organizations – the EU mainly, but also IMF, World Bank, or NATO. This has generated two types of effects: a positive effect since for a long time the external pressure has been the only driver for reform (it was, however, weakened after the EU integration); a negative effect represented by the slow development of the domestic capabilities for reform – those supposed to implement the reform measures perceived them as foreign, imposed from outside, and thus it was hard for them to claim “ownership” of these reforms. Another effect was the creation of institutions (at the request of foreign experts) which were not prepared at the managerial level to function efficiently on the short run and to meet the expectations of both Romanian and foreign reformers (National Agency for Public servants, National Institute for Public Administration, etc.).

With regard to Romania, the biggest challenge seems to be the shift from a pre-bureaucratic model ( politicization, limited specialization) to a post-bureaucratic type of organization, be it New Public Management or Neo-Weberianism. We have to ask ourselves if the Romanian state can undergo these transformations very quickly, burning stages, when the Western countries have had a longer time available to go through these transformations in an almost “organic” way. We refer here to depoliticization, decentralization, professionalization of public management, etc. This seems to be the main problem Romania has been facing in the last two decades with regard to public-administration reform.

The starting point is different from one case to the other. The specificity of Eastern Europe and the communist legacy of the region are new dimensions to be considered. What does the culture of performance mean in Romania? What is the level of managerial quality in the private and public sectors?
The paths of reform are perceived as ranging from an initial point (Alpha) to a desirable future stage (Omega). In the case of Romania the Omega point itself has been hard to define since it is not clear where we want to be in the future. Aside from broad goals such as the construction of a European state and EU integration, the definition of strategic objectives is still lacking. It is not about the “obsession” of creating a country project but rather about the drafting of strategic objectives to be followed in the process of reforming public administration.

Romania has been living in an incrementalism of failure, where level after level of managerial organization is built deficiently, and procedures and regulations form a precarious equilibrium, and where nothing makes sense as a whole (mostly because it was not planned as a whole). There are elements embedded in the system which have existed and influenced each other for decades, creating a system that is hard to reform at least in the short run. Reformers often run into those who oppose it (sometimes for irrational reasons), and the discontentment of the population with the status quo does not translate automatically into huge support for the reform.

We believe that the only reason that justifies the reform efforts is the enhancement of the functioning of the targeted organizations/sectors. If following the reform the functioning worsens, that justifies for the reform to vanish. Which is the type of public sector that we want? What type of change is necessary? Where are the key strategic issues that the Romanian public administration currently faces? How much reform can the system still take? Do we have the resources necessary for reform? Is it possible to have reforms without popular support? Where do we start from and how do we give reform a meaning? Any strategic reform movement in Romania should consider at least these general questions.

4. Romania – between legal, public-policy and structural reforms

As already discussed, Western societies have experimented for quite a while with the managerial paradigm with regard to the reform of public administration. Be it NPM, Reinventing Government, Neo-Weberianism, the Western societies tried (often successfully) to transform the complaints regarding the functioning of the public sector into an endeavor for building a post-bureaucratic society.

The modern administrations are facing significant political, economic, social and technological pressures (Pollitt et al. 2008), which requires a more clear connection with the evolution of society, with the citizens’ and business environment’s expectations. Public organizations from Romania are increasingly confronted with this reality but are not always able to provide an appropriate answer.
The evolution of Romania (Profiroiu et al. 2006) has been a lot more intense and chaotic, due to a process of burning stages in the transition from pre-bureaucracy to post-bureaucracy and to some deficiencies regarding the managerial capacity of the state and of the public organizations. By using the PEST analysis we strive to offer a preliminary analysis of the context of the administrative reform in Romania.

Political factors:
- The difficulty of assimilating the common strategic decisions, except for EU accession and NATO;
- Lack of know-how; the expertise of political parties in post-bureaucracy reforms is low; in terms of administrative reform, political programs are superficial and generalist;
- Lack of know-how in the key political institutions (i.e. the Romanian Parliament does not have an evaluation unit like GAO);
- The politicization of the public sector – a generalized practice in the last 20 years. The most sensitive areas are:
  - Central Public Administration/Agencies (Possible solution: limit the politically appointed positions);
  - “Deconcentrated” institutions (Possible solution: massive decrease in their number and influence through decentralization/limitation of politically appointed positions);
  - Local administration (Possible solution: limitation of politically appointed positions; growing pressure from the citizens to increase performance).

Economic factors
- The lack of strategic perspective with regard to development priorities. The lack of multiannual planning;
- The irrationality of public spending (i.e. the situation of about 40,000 public investment programs started in the past and not finished yet);
- Government revenue is at 30–31 % of GDP, while in other EU countries it is up to 38–39 % of GDP;
- Low competitiveness issues (they affect the private and public sector as well).

Socio-cultural factors
- An atypical distribution by sectors of the work force in Romania compared with the EU: approx. 30 % of the population works in agriculture;
• A high percentage of the active population who works abroad (important effects for the functioning of the public administration; they develop a comparative, critical assessment of quality of Romanian public services vs. Western public services);

• A dysfunctional educational system. There is no Romanian university among the Top 500. The international PISA study, conducted on a sample of high-school students age 15 from 65 countries, places the Chinese region Shanghai in the first positions (Hong Kong is in the 4th), while Romania occupies position 49. This is the worst ranking among the EU countries and the third worst in Europe (the last two positions are occupied by Montenegro and Albania);

• The “specific” profile of public services consumer in Romania. 61% of the Romanian citizens consider that the current problems Romania faces to be due to the functioning of public institutions. High levels of trust are related to institutions such as Firefighters: 88%, Army: 71%, Ambulance units: 81%, Postal Services: 77%, Romanian National Bank: 68%, Gendarmerie: 57%, which are not necessarily connected to elective and democratic processes. Low levels of trust concern the most important institutions and people within the democratic design, such as the members of the Parliament: 7%, City Hall: 27%, Mayor of the community they live in: 26%, NGOs: 27%, Courts of law: 21%, Ministries: 16%, Government Agencies: 13%.\(^1\) For example, the low trust in the court system represents a huge problem for a transition country, where justice should be the sector which could bring rationality and objectivity.

**Technological factors**

• Low access to online public services. In Romania, out of 20 basic public services, only 45% are available online as well (the 2nd worst position in EU according to Eurostat 2011);

• Romania ranks very low among the EU member states with regard to the percentage of households with Internet access (42%). The situation is worse only in Bulgaria (33%);

• However, between 2006–2010 Internet access in Romania has tripled, from 14 to 42% (Eurostat).

• Romania occupies the 4th position in the world and the first place in Europe regarding high-speed Internet connections, conducted by Akamai company.

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1 Sources: Trust Barometer, IRES, March 2010; Public Opinion Barometer, November 2007.
4.1 Case study: a structural illness – the public-retirement system

This section concerns itself with a case study from a specific policy area – the public-retirement system. It is illustrative for the structural deficiencies of the public system in Romania, which have developed over time through an incrementalism of errors.

According to Preda and Grigoraş (2011) there were approx. 2.5 million retired people in 1989 in Romania, and there are almost 6 million retired people now. Over 1.5 million retired people are 59 years old or younger. The number of people with disability pension grew (by 430 %) from 208,000 (1990) to 892,000 (2008). In Romania there are over 900,000 people that receive disability pensions (from a total population of almost 22 million citizens), and in some districts their number rose up to 30 % from the total number of the retired population. In other districts only 6–7 % of the retired people receive disability pensions. At present, for every taxpayer there are approximately 1.2 people that receive a pension of some sort. In 2009 the total deficit of the public-retirement fund was 1.7 billion Euros; in 2010 it was 2.55 billion Euros. If this process continues, the deficit is expected to reach at least 4 billion Euros in 2025.

This brief analysis shows the long-term deficiencies of the retirement system – the use of retirement as a means to hide high unemployment rates, significant inequalities, fraud, lack of self-sustainability of the entire system, short-term thinking which focuses on dealing with urgent matters but without considering the effects on the medium and long terms. This case study is by no means unique in either Romania or Eastern Europe. Other examples can be found, as well.

Strategic management offers a multitude of answers for public organizations that want to be reformed. Governments therefore need to institutionalize some capacity for the long-term consideration of policy for those pressing demands. The efforts made in Central and Eastern Europe, including Romania, after the fall of communism in the direction of implementation of a strategic planning mechanism did not have the expected results, mainly because administrative data have been used primarily for political purposes rather than for improving management.

An OECD analysis appreciates that some administrations in Central and Eastern Europe are “defective”, being characterized by high levels of politicization, instability and weakness of the rule of law. This state could become permanently institutionalized, which would undermine the governance capacity of the Central and Eastern European countries and their ability to effectively participate in the EU. It is suggested that central management capacity is an impor-
tant precondition for “progress” in other domains of civil-service governance (Meyer-Sahling 2009).

European Integration was considered a driving force and a symptom of a broader transformation process (Hix and Goetz 2000). Another study (Meyer-Sahling 2004) concludes that the post-communist transformation tended to lock in a pattern of civil-service governance that is characterized by high levels of political discretion which posed too many obstacles to lead rapidly to successful reforms.

Although public administration was not an explicit part of the Acquis Communautaire, several targets set by the EU regarded more or less directly administrative/management reforms in the public sector: establishing the Civil Service, e-government services, further decentralization, improving the system of financial controls to be able to use EU funds efficiently and effectively (Nemec 2008, 343–344). In Romania, external pressure, coming especially from the European Union, but also from other international stakeholders, have made the administrative reform a top priority, closely intertwined with the process of adhesion to the European Union (Hințea 2008, 277).

5. The profile of the Romanian public administration: a framework for reform

Aside from the PEST analysis, which offers us the framework within which reform efforts take place, it is interesting to analyze the profile of the Romanian public administration after more than 20 years of continuous changes. It is based on several important characteristics:

• A mentality of the public administration which favors the importance of regulations over implementation (the assumption is that once there is a law, the problem is solved);

• The precarious functioning of both public services and private ones – theoretically, the private sector should provide a model of service quality for the public sector (the citizens’ trust in publicly owned companies is 42 % while in private companies, 29 %, in state universities, 58 % and in private universities, 21 %);

• The “swing” between pre-bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy. The transition from the communist administrative system to stages of development based on “reinventing the government”, new public management and total quality management is difficult. On top of these challenges, there is also the global economic crisis;

• The lack of a managerial culture at the level of public administration and political decision-makers;
• The excessive influence of politics in public administration;
• The lack of well-defined indicators for performance measurement;
• Coordination issues of the reform process at the local and central levels;
• Problems related to organizational culture, HRM and leadership. Lack of strategic planning capacity.

By connecting the data describing the context for reform (PEST) with the profile of the Romanian public administration, we find ourselves in the presence of a state that faces significant structural challenges regarding:

a) Predictability and coherence;
b) Managerial performance;
c) Rational use of public resources.

The problems the public sector has faced and continues to face was initially addressed in an almost entirely legislative approach. As already mentioned, immediately after 1989, such an approach seemed logical, since there was no legal framework in place suited for the functioning of a democratic society. After 2000, we have the first reforms aiming at specific policy sectors perceived as crucial (the analysis was heavily influenced by the EU and other international institutions involved in the reform in the pre-accession stage):

• The reform of civil service: the creation of a body of professional public servants;
• The reform of local public administration (this is based on the enhancement of public management at the local level and the promotion of decentralization and deconcentration of public services);
• The development of the public policy formulation process (it is based on the enhancement of the coordination systems of governmental activities and the improvement of managerial capacity of governmental agencies).

The occurrence of the global economic crisis at the end of 2008 has generated a new set of reforms, structural in nature, which aimed at modifying the size, the structure and the way of functioning of the state. The main areas targeted include:

• Education reform (Classification of universities on the basis of international assessments, “funding follows the student” principle, massive decentralization of pre-university education, new performance standards for professors, focus on excellence through financial support of the best programs (based on quality indicators);
• Re-organization of governmental agencies (reduction from 223 to 112); this example is interesting from the perspective of the anti-bureaucratic rhetoric found in other countries, as well. During the economic boom some of the Romanian state agencies spent their money on yachts, training sessions in Las Vegas or on very expensive luxury cars; also, in state agencies (but also in other areas of public administration system), bonuses like: bonus for returning from holiday, bonus for birthdays, bonus for smiling etc. had become a generalized practice. All these things made them a very “appealing” target in terms of anti-bureaucratic discourse;

• Creating a unitary public-pay system. In 2008 there were big differences in the public-payment system, the salaries varied on a scale from 1 to 100 (some heads of agencies had incomes up to 20,000 Euros/month, while the lowest salary in the public sector was around 200 Euros);

• Reforming the justice (passing 4 new legal codes, “the small reform”). A new Labor Code (very criticized by the unions) is pending adoption;

• Reforming the pension system: men and women will retire at the same age – 65, discouraging the early retirements by tightening access to this type of pension, new and more stringent criteria for disability pensions that will discourage abusive retirements which are medically unjustified;

• Financial system reform: establishment of a Fiscal Council which analyzes whether government measures are included in the fiscal strategy – an effort to curb waste and to encourage rationality in public spending through external pressure, a 3-year fiscal budgetary strategy, the introduction of cost and personnel standards for public administration (limitation of the number of employees and the maximum cost by type of investment, in local government), etc.

The examples described above follow the general principles underlying the post-bureaucratic paradigm; however, they present several national characteristics as well – the continuous reform of the legal framework, the reform of the pay system in the public sector, the obsession regarding the creation of a highly trained body of civil servants. There is a mix of bureaucratic objectives – depoliticization, as well as post-bureaucratic ones – performance standards, less waste, curbing red tape. It illustrates the strategic problems the Romanian public system faces, in its effort to build simultaneously or subsequently both a bureaucratic and a post-bureaucratic model.

The Romanian administrative system is placed in a typology of the reforms built upon two main factors: the impact of the reforms (scope and intensity) and their motivation (reforms initiated due to external pressures, “must do” reforms or reforms motivated ideologically). The impact of the reforms varies from one period
to the other, based on the implication of the political actors and the macro-economic and social context. The motivation for reform is still external, more than 20 years after the revolution. This fact can be explained in various ways – lack of expertise in the field of managerial reform at the level of the political parties, lack of managerial capacity at the level of the public sector (in Romania the private sector is by no means a possible model for the public one yet) and the lack of a third sector, non-governmental, consisting of think thanks among other entities, which could generate both pressure and input for the public sector.

6. Analysis of the quality and effectiveness of the Romanian management of public administration, compared with the European Union and Central and Eastern European countries

The evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of a given field or process may be measured by using relevant indicators, or in relative terms, by comparison with the quality and effectiveness of said field or process with other comparative systems.

In their annual analysis of the quality and effectiveness of management in compared with the respective previous year, Nicolescu, Verboncu and Profiroiu (2010) are using the second approach, since it is considered that the use of the performance indicators faces at least two quasi insurmountable difficulties:

- The management-exclusive performance indicators do not exist, its performance being indirectly measured by the performance of those systems over which it is exercised;
- Assessing the quality and effectiveness of Romanian management, mainly due to the economic crisis, which has substantially altered and undermined economic performance at all levels, resulting in the management impact in this exceptional case being lower than usual.

Under these circumstances, the main way to assess the quality and effectiveness of the national management is represented by its being compared to the management from other countries and its dynamic evolution as compared to the previous year.

In 2011, in the series of yearly examination of the management quality in Romania, a survey was administered to a sample of 203 civil servants from local and public administration from Romania, from which 71% had a managerial position. The survey analyzed the appreciation of the management from Romania in 2011, compared with 2010, on different levels: at the institution of the respondent, at the public-administration sector, and, in general, at the county level.
The state of management in 2011 at the institutional level was considered to be approximately the same, by about half of the respondents (47%). Similarly, 45% of the respondents considered the management at the public-administration sector to be the same as the previous year. Nevertheless, while the management was considered to be inferior at the institutional level by 14% of the respondents and at the public-administration level by 23% of the respondents, at the county level the management was considered inferior by 46% of the respondents (see Figure 1 below).

**Figure 1**

Quality of Romanian management in 2011, compared with 2010, at the level of the institution of the respondent, the public-administration sector and at the county level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>approximately the same</th>
<th>superior</th>
<th>inferior</th>
<th>do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>institution level</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-administration level</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>county level</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey also aimed the analysis of quality and effectiveness of Romanian management of the public administration in 2011, compared with the European Union and four of the Central and Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia).

Three quarters of the respondents considered the quality and efficacy of the management practiced in the Romanian public administration in 2011 to be inferior compared with the management practiced in the European Union. Also, about two thirds of the respondents considered the quality and efficacy of the man-
agement practiced in the Romanian public administration in 2011 to be inferior compared with the management practiced in the four countries of the Central and Eastern Europe chosen for comparison (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia).

**Figure 2**
Paralleling the quality of public-administration management from Romania with those practiced in the European Union and Central and Eastern European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>approximately the same</th>
<th>superior</th>
<th>inferior</th>
<th>do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paralleling the quality of public-administration management from Romania with those practiced in European Union</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralleling the quality of public-administration management from Romania with those practiced in Central and Eastern European countries</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of quality and effectiveness of Romanian management of the public administration in 2011 highlights a constant regarding the factors that were identified as strengths and weaknesses, compared with the situation from the previous year.

The main strengths of the Romanian public administration, at the central and local levels, are considered to be: the intense transfer of managerial know-how from other countries, the development of a performance-informatics system, and the intense training activities of the employees.

The main weaknesses of the Romanian public administration, at the central and local levels, are considered to be: the poor focus on priorities, strategies and poli-
tics that are deficient or even inexistent, the low capacity to motivate employees, as well as the defective organization of the activities.

Even though the perception of quality and effectiveness of Romanian management of the public administration in 2011 registered a slight increase, compared to 2010, this remains still considerably negative compared with the management at the level of the European Union, as well as with the management of countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

7. Conclusions and lessons learned

Since its accession to the European Union, Romania has tended to discontinue most pre-accession reforms, thus continuing its post-accession transition pathway. There is no doubt that the global crisis is one of the main culprits for the stagnation of reforms and setbacks, but this proves again that Romania’s governance practice is not strong enough to deal with critical moments.

Nevertheless, we consider Romania to just be entering a stage in which there are sound prerequisites in place for a managerial reform oriented toward a post-bureaucratic model focused on two elements – performance and the quality of public services. In order for it to be successful, a strategic perspective of the reform is needed (clear definition of the targets to be reached in the medium and long term), development of professional management in public administration, and the building of a managerial culture in the public sector from Romania.

At this point the directions for reform in Romania could be:

A. **Redefining the size, the role and the functions of the state**
   - Changing the size: a more flexible, better organized state, able to be a partner for the society;
   - Redefining priorities: a state focused on good governance and quality of services.

B. **Increasing the efficiency of the state**
   - Increasing the institutional performance. Making the public institutions focus on results and performance and not only on procedures. Rational use of resources;
   - Simplifying the administrative system: better regulation, simplified procedures and enhanced predictability in the judicial process.
The strategic directions must be correlated with operational decisions which follow the logic of managerial approaches. They need to address the issues that are still sensitive in the Romanian context:

- The development of strategic-planning capacity at the level of central and local public administration;
- The enhancement of the managerial capacity and performance measurement at the level of central and local public administration;
- The development of the evaluation capacity at the level of central and local public administration;
- Contracting out the public services to the private sector and the NGOs.

In the absence of structural changes, there are few chances that reforms aimed at specific policy areas will succeed in Romania. The lack of managerial reform will reinforce the incrementalism of failure.

References


1. Introduction

The public sector worldwide has been under pressure to improve its performance in pursuit of more efficiency and effectiveness, and in order to revive the citizens’ trust in public institutions. The quest for a well-performing public sector and, more broadly, for good governance has brought the competence and development of civil servants to the center of attention by politicians, public-service leaders and academics. Modern governments depend to a great extent on the work of national civil services and their employees (Demmke and Moilanen 2010, 1). Civil service is believed to be one of the most important institutions securing democratic public governance, contributing to administrative capacity, supporting economic development and securing states’ competitiveness (Verheijen 1999; Dimitrova 2002; Meyer-Sahling 2011; Peters et al. 2011). The role of civil service as a separate institution is to attract and retain a high-quality and high-performance workforce, to establish a foundation for cooperation between government institutions and to ensure professional continuity in public administration. Also, civil service secures common and shared values among state organizations. Civil-service training has a vital role to play in meeting these objectives. The development of a new generation of professional and democratically-minded civil servants has been especially relevant in the context of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition to democracy that has demanded the formation of competent and meritocratic civil services able to support democratic policy-making and implementation. The development of modern civil services has presumed, among other things, the establishment of effective systems for defining and addressing the training needs.

A number of researchers (e.g. Goetz 2001; Verheijen 1998; Meyer-Sahling 2009, 2011; Zubek and Goetz 2010; Bouckaert et al. 2010) have already considered various aspects of public-management reforms in new CEE democracies. Yet, the civil-service – and more particularly, civil-service-training – component of these reform attempts has not received sufficient academic attention so far. On the one hand, there are a few studies that look upon general civil-service developments in CEE (Verheijen 1999; Randma 2002; Bossaert and Demmke 2003; Meyer-Sahling 2011; Randma-Liiv and Järvalt 2011) without going in depth into analyzing civil-service training. On the other hand, another group of existing studies...
(OECD 1997a; OECD 1997b; Lucking 2003; Bossaert 2008; Lavtar 2008; ReSPA 2008; Vukovic et al. 2008) focus on civil-service training with particular emphasis on training needs and the substance of training programs. None of the existing studies has paid close attention to the evolvement, design and actual functioning of civil-service training systems in the context of post-communist transition. The paper at hand proposes to make up for that deficit.

The focus of this paper is on the Estonian civil-service training system: its structure, evolvement and functioning. The aim is not to investigate civil-service training needs, but to analyze the system that addresses those needs. The following research questions are posed:

- How has the Estonian civil-service training system evolved?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Estonian civil-service training system?
- What lessons can be learnt for the development of decentralized civil-service systems?

The paper starts with a theoretical overview, which sheds light on the role of training in a civil-service system. This is followed by the presentation of an in-depth case study of the evolvement of the Estonian civil-service training system, stretching from Estonia’s regaining of independence in 1991 to 2012, an analysis of the present system, an analytical discussion and lessons learnt. Empirical evidence is drawn from the analysis of various public documents, interviews and the findings of a research project commissioned by the Estonian Ministry of Finance “The Analysis of Civil Service Training System and Development Needs of Estonia”, conducted by the authors of this paper in 2011.

2. The role of training in civil-service systems

Civil-service training reflects challenges that a particular country is facing as well as the developmental stage of and current prevailing trends in its public administration (Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram 2001; Bossaert 2008). The role of training can be divided into three levels: the individual level, the positional/organizational level and the level of civil service as a whole. On the individual level, training is part of the motivation system (Bossaert 2008) as it provides civil servants with opportunities to move to new positions and develop their careers through developing their skills and competencies. Good training and development opportunities may thus increase the attractiveness of civil-service careers. On the positional/organizational level, training is related to the implementation of tasks and focuses on developing skills and competencies in order to fulfill objectives
of the organization. The performance of organizations and their ability to implement policies depends by and large on the qualities of their members and on the organizations’ ability to learn and adapt. Training on the organizational level is highly important in transition countries as they are going through organizational changes, e.g., establishment of new management systems, structural changes or implementation of new laws (ReSPA 2008, 8; Chlivickas 2010, 361). All these changes require new skills and competencies in order to prepare and implement them successfully.

This study addresses the system level – the entire national civil-service system as a separate institution which has several functions and where training has a crucial role supporting the implementation of these functions (Van der Meer 2011, 3). First, civil service can be seen as a personnel-management system. In this regard, the main role of the civil service is to attract and retain a high-quality and high-performing workforce (Järvalt and Randma-Liiv 2010). For newly democratic countries, competent civil service is very important as countries in immediate post-communist transition face many specific challenges (e.g., building up democratic institutions, preparing and implementing a great amount of new laws and policies, supporting the development of democratic values). Regime change creates a situation where both “old” and “new” civil servants require fundamental (re)training in order to adapt to the new roles and requirements set forth to civil servants in democratic societies (Randma-Liiv and Connaughton 2005). Besides the communist legacy, most CEE civil services have been affected by the EU accession in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Joining the EU called for higher professionalism in every policy field as the EU made the establishment of a professional civil service a “soft” requirement for the EU membership and assumed new EU-related competencies from civil servants (Meyer-Sahling 2009). Finally, the main challenges following the EU accession were related to increasing professionalism in order to influence the decisions of the EU, as well as to making the decision-making processes more transparent, trustworthy and knowledge-based.

Second, civil service can function as a mechanism of accountability and control. From this perspective, civil service describes the basis of accountability of civil servants and contributes to the differentiation between political and administrative spheres by drawing the line between public positions with different principles of access. Furthermore, civil service ensures preventing the misuse of power and helps to secure the legal and transparent use of public resources. This function of civil service helps public officials to acknowledge their role and responsibility. Such an acknowledgement has been of critical importance in the post-communist countries of CEE with their need to reorient from single-party rule and serving political elite to democratic governing and serving the public. Train-
Training is a particularly valuable mechanism to raise civil servants’ awareness of their role and responsibility in a democratic public administration and to contribute to the development of public-service ethics (Chlivickas et al. 2002; Randma-Liiv and Connaughton 2005; Bossaert 2008; Trendafilova 2008). Last, and certainly not least, civil service can be seen as a system of symbols and values. Training is an instrument for the development of shared values and knowledge in the civil service, which form a basis for coherent policy-making and analysis (Bossaert 2008). The development of a common knowledge and value base throughout the civil service is likely to create a solid foundation for coordination and cooperation between different institutions and also ensure a similar development stage and management principles throughout the executive (Peters 1998). Shared values provide a basis on which to give practical ethical judgments since many civil-service daily operations are related to decisions which are value-based, and every civil-service system involves conflicting values (e.g. flexibility vs. stability, economy vs. professionalism, merit vs. representativeness). Therefore, civil service functions as a creator and maintainer of a unified identity throughout the executive, which is transferred and cemented through the training process. Whereas in “old democracies”, public-service training traditionally revolves around skills and competencies, training efforts in CEE countries are expected – in addition to skill development – to specifically focus on the role and values of the public service, because in spite of the fact that two decades have elapsed since the beginning of democratic reforms in CEE, democratic values cannot be taken for granted yet (Randma-Liiv and Järvalt 2011).

Training objectives can be achieved through a well-designed and functioning training system. However, several authors researching the CEE states have reached the conclusion that existing training systems are poorly developed and even impede the progress in public administration (see e.g. World Bank 2006; Chlivickas 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2009). Specific characteristics of civil-service training systems require a closer look in order to develop a framework for identifying system flaws and pinpointing critical factors for success.

The analysis of civil-service training systems can be operationalized by looking, first, at the relevant institutions (actors). Training in civil service is usually administered and/or organized by several institutions. For example, countries differ with regard to the presence and importance given to the central coordinating institutions responsible for training, and the role that central civil-service training centers play in the entire system (see e.g. Bossaert et al. 2001; Lucking 2003; OECD 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2009). Funding of civil-service training is another important component of a training system as different funding models operationalize roles and relationships of various actors. Funding is a fundamen-
tal characteristic that affects both the quantity and the quality of civil-service training. In general, funding schemes can be divided into two: centralized and decentralized models (Lucking 2003, 10; Dujić et al. 2006). In case of a centralized model, funds are allocated from a state budget to a central civil-service coordinator or a central training institution. In a decentralized funding model, funds are allocated to individual ministries and agencies which administer the funds for training. Governments, however, tend to increasingly mix different civil-service systems and funding models (Lucking 2003) in order to compensate weaknesses of “pure” models.

In usual Western practice, civil-service training systems have evolved over a long time and have been substantially affected by path dependency in both institutional setup and funding. The Estonian case study below will demonstrate how a civil-service training system has been developed from scratch in a newly independent country with a de-institutionalized administrative system and the freedom to choose different paths of development.

3. Estonian public administration and civil service

Estonia is a small parliamentary democracy with an area of 45,227 km² and a population of 1.29 million. The formal Head of State, the President, mainly has a representative and ceremonial role. Estonia regained independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991. Since then, the Estonian state has gone through major economic and administrative reforms. The radical shift of political regime from communism to democracy necessitated changes in the institutional structure of the state. As Estonia inherited an institutionally fragmented administrative system with a high number of relatively autonomous individual organizations, the general trend of reforms over the two decades has been toward aggregating the system and establishing mechanisms for steering, control and cooperation (Sarapuu 2011).

The executive power rests with the government. A central trait of the Estonian administrative system is its reliance on ministerial responsibility. Although eleven ministries is a small number, they form strong administrative actors that have considerable leverage over the issues belonging to their areas of governance. Such a decentralized system has effectively reproduced itself and has been reluctant in committing coordinating powers to some central units. Horizontal coordination mechanisms that have been built into the system (e.g. consultation of draft regulations, management of EU affairs) are mostly based on network-type cooperation (Bouckaert et al. 2010) and in that way reinforce the central role of ministries in deciding over the policies falling to their areas of
governance. The central coordinating units in the system such as the Government Office and the Ministry of Finance are equipped with restricted coordinating powers and, in addition, often constrained by limited resources. Since the late 2000s, the increasing demand for better horizontal integration of policy sectors and for a whole-of-government approach has been acknowledged by the government (Sarapuu 2011).

As of 31 December 2010, there were 28,340 public servants in Estonia (Rahandusministeerium 2011), forming 5% of the total work-force of the country (Statistics Estonia). The Estonian public service involves both the civil service (central government) and local-government service. Only the core of the public administration (ministries, government organizations and county governments) is covered by the open, position-based civil-service system established in 1995 by the Public Service Act. In the rest of the agencies, people work under the general labor law. A few branches within the civil service are career-based and are regulated by special statutes: foreign service, police service, border guard, the court system and a few institutions within the administrative area of the Ministry of Defence. In June 2012, the new Public Service Act was passed in parliament, which restricts the 1995 institutionally-based definition of the civil service even more and re-orient the system toward differentiating officials who are engaged in executing the public power and employees who do not have this function. The goal has been to reduce the number of civil servants. In other respects, the reform further endorses the open and decentralized nature of the Estonian civil service and aims to abolish the perceived “disparities” that there are between the civil service and private-sector employment (e.g. in redundancy benefits). The implementation of the law is expected in 2013.

The organization of people management in the civil service follows the generally decentralized setup of the government. Every ministry and executive agency is responsible for the recruitment, probationary periods, training, performance appraisal, promotion, setting of pay levels and organization of the work of its officials. Ministries and executive agencies are guided by the legal framework and centrally set advisory guidelines. Minor exceptions concern top officials. The recruitment of around 100 top civil servants is partly centralized as the central Competition and Evaluation Committee of Higher State Public Servants screens candidates and suggests the shortlisted applicants for the final selection to the relevant minister or to the Secretary General. Therefore, the final selection of top civil servants is left to the individual institutions. This scheme does not cover the Secretary Generals of the ministries who are appointed by the Cabinet.
There is no institution at the central government level with single powers to develop the government’s human-resource policy, as the management of the civil service is fragmented among several institutions (Meyer-Sahling 2009, 21; OECD 2011, 25). There are a few government institutions which have specific coordinating responsibilities:

- The Government Office (formerly called State Chancellery) is responsible for the recruitment, selection and development system of civil-service top executives;
- The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the general development of public administration, the development of personnel and training policy, the development of remuneration policy in the civil service, the planning and implementation of civil-service training and development, the promotion of quality development in the civil service, the development of the strategic planning system for the central government, the reform of budgetary procedures and financial management;
- The Ministry of Justice is responsible for general public-law development, including civil-service legislation;
- The Ministry of Interior is in charge of the development of regional and local administration.

Previous studies have indicated that the current Estonian institutional framework does not guarantee the fulfillment of the functions that a central civil-service coordinator is expected to perform (Meyer-Sahling 2009; Järvalt and Randma-Liiv 2010). Although in 2010, the Ministry of Finance was designated as the responsible institution for civil-service policy, its coordination activities have been limited in most cases to technical functions without strategic involvement in policy design. By 2012, there is neither a horizontal civil-service strategy nor a clear and targeted top-down steering of the development of the civil service. No single institution at the central government level has the power and the necessary resources to develop and implement the central government-wide civil-service policy. The analysis below will take a closer look at the development and functioning of the Estonian civil-service training system.

4. The Estonian civil-service training system

4.1 Evolvement of a decentralized training system in the 1990s

The Estonian civil-service training system has evolved over the past 20 years. The 1990s can be described as a period of institution-building and an introduction of modern personnel policies in the public service. Among other things, the im-
mediate post-communist transition in Estonia caused high turnover in the public service. Changes in personnel were especially marked in 1992–1993, when 37% of public servants were replaced (Drechsler 2003). By 2000, the proportion of Estonian public servants who had worked in the public service for less than 10 years reached 76% (Riigikantselei 2001). This clearly indicated the need for comprehensive civil-service training.

Training efforts in CEE countries after the collapse of communist regimes have been generally characterized by a frantic process of institution-building with uncoordinated and overlapping programs (OECD 1997a, 21). This is also true for Estonia. In 1992, the State Chancellery’s Training Centre was established, and its activities were directed by a Training Council located at the State Chancellery. In 1994, the Estonian Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) was created in the area of administration of the State Chancellery. EIPA was responsible for offering training, conducting research in the field of public administration and preparing study materials for civil servants. These training materials are still freely available and in use. So, EIPA had the responsibilities of a central civil-service training and competence center and was largely funded by the State Chancellery. Therefore, the early years of transition were characterized by a number of central initiatives with regard to the civil-service training.

After the adoption of the Public Service Act in 1995, the coordination and steering of civil-service training formally became the responsibility of the State Chancellery. In 1996, the Department of Public Service and Human Resources was created at the State Chancellery. The Department had the responsibility for coordinating civil-service human-resource management (personnel appraisal, training and the reserve list). Yet, the responsibility for civil-service pay and grading stayed with the Ministry of Finance. Previous analysis has hypothesized that the performance of the civil service could have been enhanced by giving the State Chancellery a mandate to develop all civil-service human-resource issues, including pay and grading (Nunberg 2000, 179). Furthermore, the State Chancellery lacked the essential power to prepare and draft the Public Service Act as well as to prepare secondary legislation, as these tasks rested with the Ministry of Justice. The State Chancellery largely had a consulting role (Meyer-Sahling 2009). Consequently, the institutional setup of the training system was fragmented between different units, and the civil-service training system lacked clear responsibilities and efficient coordination instruments.

In parallel with the adoption of the Public Service Act, the Government of the Republic Act was passed in 1995. This endorsed a highly decentralized institutional setup of the Estonian executive with very limited opportunities for institutional-
ized central coordination. The consequence for the civil-service training system was the increasing responsibility of individual public-sector organizations for the training and development of their officials. The central funding of the EIPA was gradually diminished in the second half of the 1990s and increasingly, a lion share of civil-service training costs was carried by various central and local government institutions.

In 2001, the Cabinet approved “The Principles of a Training System for Public Servants”. These Principles had a bearing effect on the system as they provided a framework and guidelines for organizing the training of officials (The Principles of a Training System for Public Servants 2001):

- “The organization and coordination of training of officials is carried out at different levels (public service as a whole, ministry with its governing area, individual public-sector organizations, officials). For each level, there is a responsible agency, unit or person nominated”;
- “A part of the training of officials is conducted centrally. Central training is provided in issues that have high priority for the public service as a whole and which require uniform understanding, know-how and principles of action to be adopted and implemented in different organizations. The need for central training is closely related to the preparation and introduction of major changes to the public service (i.e. accession to the EU, budget reform, etc.)”;
- “The organization and financing of training is mostly delegated to the organizational level.”

These principles operationalized a decentralized setup of a training system. Every institution was responsible for the development of its staff since every ministry and executive agency had its own training budget and was free to choose where to buy in training activities (Tõnnisson and Paabusk 2005).

4.2 Development of central instruments within the decentralized system in the 2000s

Further developments in the 2000s have indicated that a fully decentralized setup of civil-service training requires coordinating mechanisms in order to steer the entire civil-service training system. This has led to the reforms related to the central training institution, the central training coordinator and the development of top civil servants.

In 2002, the Centre of Continuing Studies was established at the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences under the Estonian Ministry of Interior. In 2003, EIPA was reorganized, and the Centre for Public Service Training and Development
under the jurisdiction of the State Chancellery was established. The Centre of Continuing Studies and the Centre for Public Service Training and Development were merged in 2005. The new structural unit was called the Centre for Public Service Training and Development (ATAK), and it was located at the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences under the Estonian Ministry of Interior. The formal aim of ATAK was to provide comprehensive continuing education throughout the civil service. ATAK had to (and still has to) finance all its activities from its own income sources without getting any fixed income from the state budget.

Until 2004, the development of top civil servants was addressed in a highly decentralized way by individual public-sector organizations. However, at the end of 2003, the State Chancellery started to work on the development of top civil-service competencies leading to the adoption of a top civil-service competency model in 2005. Since then, the top civil servants’ competency model has been used as the basis for the assessment of top civil servants both in the selection and development processes led by the State Chancellery. A variety of development activities have been launched for slightly less than one hundred top civil-service executives (e.g. specially designed training and development programs, individual coaching and mentoring, development of future leaders). The top civil service was institutionalized by the new Public Service Act adopted in 2012. The central development of top civil-service executives is one of a few central instruments that aim to counterbalance a largely decentralized training system.

Major institutional changes were carried out in 2010, when a new division of labor in civil-service coordination was established: the main responsibility for the coordination of civil-service development (strategic approach, performance appraisal, training) was moved from the Government Office (former State Chancellery) to the Ministry of Finance. The change was made with the aim of reducing fragmentation in the system (Riigikantselei 2010b) by uniting civil-service personnel functions in one unit, as the Ministry of Finance had so far been responsible for pay and grading in the public service. This structural reform had one exception: the Government Office remained in charge of the development of top civil servants. The Government Office also retained its functions in pre-selecting top civil servants in the recruitment process. The Government Office had developed strong ownership toward the development of top civil service, and several top civil servants demonstrated their preference for such a structural solution as they perceived the Government Office as being more “neutral” for such a central function compared to the Ministry of Finance. As a result of this structural reform, a dual system has evolved: the development of top civil service is administered by the Government Office, and other coordination activities for the rest of the public service are steered by the Ministry of Finance. Besides that,
the Ministry of Interior continued to be responsible for the development of the local governments and the Ministry of Justice stayed in charge of civil-service legislation. Accordingly, the Estonian civil-service training system continues to operate as a network with many actors, where the training and development decisions concerning civil servants are taken at different levels and institutions. The Ministry of Finance as the central coordinating body has the most important role in holding the civil-service training system together and steering its development. The Ministry of Finance is expected to use the following instruments for central coordination:

- **Planning and implementation of central training activities.** The Ministry of Finance administers the central training program by contracting out to the external providers specific horizontal training activities. The central training program can be seen as a basis for creating common practices, knowledge, skills and values across the civil service. For example, civil servants have had horizontal training on civil-service values and ethics, Estonian language, policy-making skills and human-resource management skills (Program “Central Training 2010–2011”). However, the impact of the central training program is rather moderate due to very limited funding, which allows reaching only a small share of the target groups. There are very few teaching materials produced to support the aims of the central training program;

- **Cooperation with training managers in public-sector organizations.** The Ministry of Finance cooperates with the networks of public personnel and training managers. The latter provides a valuable communication mechanism for the public-service training managers. The participating training managers have gotten to know each other through joint activities which have facilitated the sharing of training information and best practices. It has also served as a communication channel between individual public organizations and the Ministry of Finance. However, participation in the network is voluntary, and therefore not all training managers participate in the network activities, which makes its impact rather uneven;

- **Gathering, analyzing and circulating relevant information.** The Ministry of Finance gathers general statistics about training activities in individual public-sector organizations. However, the analysis of training needs and the effectiveness in the civil service as a whole has been rather modest and irregular due to limited resources;

- **Design and steering of common policies and principles.** However, as of 2012, there is neither a horizontal civil-service strategy nor clear and targeted top-down steering of the development of the civil service. As there is also no common
training strategy in civil service, this (potential) instrument is largely underemployed by the Ministry of Finance. The coordination instruments used by the Ministry of Finance have been in many cases limited to technical functions without strategic involvement in policy design.

These central coordination instruments are administered by three persons in the Public Administration and Public Service Department at the Ministry of Finance, which is a clear indication of the lack of resources and which limits the coordination ability of the Ministry. In sum, the central coordinator is institutionalized, but it lacks both a legal mandate and financial and human resources to effectively fulfill its coordinator’s role.

ATAK, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, should fulfill the role of a central training institution. Its aim is to provide comprehensive continuing education throughout the civil service. According to the formal rules, the Ministry of Finance should steer ATAK by heading the Council of ATAK, but in practice, this has not been accomplished, and the central coordinator and the central training institution have hardly any formal linkages. Although ATAK offers a considerable amount of training to civil servants, it does not fulfill several other roles foreseen by its statute (e.g. building in-house public-service-specific competencies, conducting applied research, assessing civil-service training needs, preparing training materials, training of trainers, cooperation with universities). The SIGMA report on Estonia’s public service stated that ATAK has not been active in consultancy work or research and methodological work necessary for the training of officials (Cardona and Meyer-Sahling 2007, 50). These deficiencies are partly related to the lack of a fixed budget as ATAK has to cover all its costs from its own income. This makes it a similar training provider to other external actors in the training market.

The general civil-service training market has shown constant development since the late 1990s. As public organizations came to be in charge of a substantial part of the training budget, they were free to choose training providers. In 2001, over 200 training providers offering various training activities for public servants were mentioned in the State Chancellery statistics (Riigikantselei 2002). In 2004, 410 training providers were listed (Riigikantselei 2005). According to a survey carried out by the State Chancellery (Riigikantselei 2010a), there were 354 different public, private and third-sector training institutions providing training courses for public servants in 2009. In sum, external training providers have a very important role to play in the Estonian civil-service training system.
4.3 Funding

Civil-service training activities are financed from three main resources: the central training budget administered by the Ministry of Finance (including EU structural funds), training budgets of ministries and agencies, and foreign aid (funding from smaller international projects). Characteristically to a decentralized system, most civil-service training is financed from institutions’ own budgets. For example, in 2010, total training costs in ministries and agencies were about 5 million Euros while the budget of the central training program was 332,000 Euros (Ministry of Finance).

The central training budget is divided into two parts: first, for a central training program targeted to all public servants, and second, for the development of top civil servants. Both sub-divisions are to a substantial part funded by the European Social Fund: 85% of the total funding comes from the EU and 15% from the Estonian state budget. Table 1 shows that funds allocated for the central training program and the development of the top civil servants have grown over the years. It is also evident that the development of about 100 top civil servants has been seen as a clear priority compared to the central training of over 28,000 public servants.

Table 1

Funding of top civil-servants development and central training program (in Euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Top civil-servants development</th>
<th>Central training program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>51,307</td>
<td>250,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>51,307</td>
<td>113,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>65,374</td>
<td>52,176(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>191,734</td>
<td>511,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>223,690</td>
<td>332,341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Finance

The Public Administration and Public Service Department at the Ministry of Finance carries additional costs to support networking among training and personnel managers. This budget includes costs for regular seminars and developmental events. In 2011, the budget for these activities was 14,030 Euros. Comparing these figures to the EU funds and the small number of people working on the training issues in the Department provides evidence that the central coordinator

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\(^1\) The costs were low because the program was approved for the first time in November 2008. As a result, the main costs of the period 2008–2009 arose in 2009.
is overwhelmingly occupied with the administration of the EU Social Funds and has limited possibilities to focus on the general policy design and steering.

As the development of top civil servants and the central training program are so generously financed by the European Social Fund, the recent financial crisis did not have much effect on the central funding of civil-service training. However, the impact of the financial crisis on training budgets is clearly visible at the level of individual public-sector organizations (ministries, boards and inspectorates, country governments, local governments and constitutional institutions). From 1999 up to 1 July 2009, the Adult Education Act stipulated that 2–4% of the annual payroll of each central government organization should be spent on training. As a consequence of the worsening economic situation, this requirement was abolished. This has increased the discretion of individual public organizations by allowing them to substantially cut training costs. Figure 1 illustrates training costs made by ministries, boards and inspectorates, local governments, county governments and constitutional institutions during 2006–2010.

**Figure 1**

Training costs 2006–2010 (in Euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Boards and Inspectorates</th>
<th>Local Gov</th>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>County Gov</th>
<th>Constitutional Inst</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4797575</td>
<td>1045452</td>
<td>1147963</td>
<td>148375</td>
<td>332484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5703078</td>
<td>1328187</td>
<td>1113002</td>
<td>135195</td>
<td>499988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7857987</td>
<td>1831824</td>
<td>1291701</td>
<td>114329</td>
<td>334234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2755660</td>
<td>840324</td>
<td>658719</td>
<td>49068</td>
<td>196191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3139854</td>
<td>853380</td>
<td>839572</td>
<td>83600</td>
<td>290181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Finance

During 2006–2008, the training costs increased consistently. A drastic fall in training costs took place in 2009, directly influenced by the austerity measures. A slight growth in training costs is evident in 2010 although in local governments, the training costs kept decreasing in 2010, as well.
5. Discussion

The Estonian civil-service training system has gone through dynamic development over the past 20 years, which allows it to explore critical factors that influence the setup and functioning of the system as well as to pinpoint its strengths and weaknesses (which are sometimes two sides of the same coin).

The most important actor in the Estonian civil-service training system appears to be the Ministry of Finance as the central coordinator of civil-service human-resource management. As the civil-service training system is decentralized and the organization of civil-service training is carried out at different levels – public service as a whole, ministries with their governing areas, individual public-sector organizations, civil servants – centralized coordination instruments are expected to guarantee an effective functioning and steering of the entire system. However, the absence of a central training (or HRM) strategy hinders a systematic approach to civil-service training. There are no long-term goals when it comes to the development and training of civil servants. This has contributed to a correct external assessment that Estonia has not one but many civil-service systems as each ministry has developed its own approach to personnel management (Meyer-Sahling 2009). This has resulted in a wide variety of training and development policies and practices across the public service which are likely to lead to very different professional knowledge, skills and values of public servants.

The Estonian civil-service training system is characterized by specific emphasis and considerable resources spent on the development of top civil-service executives. The aim of these activities has been declared as supporting the development of competent top executives who contribute to achieving the strategic goals of the state and who are critical in fostering the whole-of-government approach. It is yet to be seen whether the development of top civil servants will help to counterbalance the fragmentation of the central government. It can already be said that institutional changes in 2010 reduced the problem of fragmentation only to a limited extent. Firstly, because the coordination of public-service policy is still shared by the ministries of Finance, Justice and Interior. Secondly, the coordination of civil-service training is distributed between the Ministry of Finance and the Government Office. Cooperation between the Ministry of Finance and the Government Office is neither regular nor systematic. The existing setup reflects the fragmentation of the Estonian executive and has not contributed to the development of a coherent approach to the development of the civil service as a whole.

Another factor that illustrates the fragmentation of the Estonian executive is related to the central training institution ATAK. It belongs to the governing area
of the Ministry of Interior, which means that the Ministry of Finance as a central training coordinator has very limited opportunities to effectively steer ATAK, and the Ministry of Interior does not have proper instruments to hold ATAK accountable for civil-service training. ATAK has not turned into an active partner for the Ministry of Finance. Although the formal goals of ATAK correspond to traditional roles of a central training institution (building in-house capacity specific to public service, providing the public service with analysis, etc.), the confusing governing scheme, together with a missing fixed budget, positions ATAK like any private-sector firm in the training market and makes it dysfunctional as a central training institution. This, in turn, puts a heavy operational burden on the central coordinator, who, instead of steering general civil-service policy, has to administer centrally provided training activities.

The substance of Estonian civil-service training is almost entirely pending on what the training market can offer. One can argue that more than 300 training providers for a population of 1.29 million is a lot. On the one hand, a higher-education system of a small country cannot offer the specialized degrees for all professionals that the public service needs. This has to be compensated by in-service training. On the other hand, there is no critical mass of people who request specialized training activities, which often means that specific and advanced courses are unavailable. Lack of demand, in turn, means that training providers do not have enough incentives for building their own (public-service specific) capacities, which leads to the shortage of professional trainers. Consequently, most of the training providers provide similar (rather basic-level) courses based on private-sector specificity, which may not be suitable to the civil service. In a training market with so many external private-sector training providers, it is difficult to control the quality of training, and transaction costs for ministries and agencies are high, increasing the likelihood of market failure. This speaks further for the need of a central civil-service training institution, which could be especially relevant for small countries when considering the limitations of a training market.

External funding from the European Social Fund has been crucial in the provision of central training activities and the development of top officials. The availability of the EU structural funds has substantially facilitated the role that central coordinator(s) fulfill. However, a strong reliance on EU funding raises questions about the financial sustainability. 85% of the central training budget has been financed by the EU structural funds, which will end in 2013. The EU funding has created a temporary “oasis”, which may need to substantially shrink once it ends. The current funding scheme refers to a temporary arrangement and raises questions about the sustainability of centrally provided training. Moreover, substantial dependence on the EU funding mixes the accompanying accountability
### Table 2

Strengths and weaknesses of the Estonian civil-service training system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified training policies and principles</td>
<td>Absence of common training strategy in the civil service; a wide variety of training practices developed by individual organizations</td>
<td>Central coordination of public service is fragmented between the Ministry of Finance, Government Office, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior; limited human and financial resources at the Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central coordination</td>
<td>Central coordination of civil-service training is administered by the Ministry of Finance together with coordinating general public-service development, performance appraisal and pay</td>
<td>Central coordination of public service is fragmented between the Ministry of Finance, Government Office, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior; limited human and financial resources at the Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central training program</td>
<td>The Ministry of Finance administers horizontal training activities organized centrally for public servants for the dissemination of common knowledge, skills and values</td>
<td>Not sustainable because it is almost entirely (85%) based on the EU structural funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering, analyzing and circulating training information</td>
<td>The Ministry of Finance gathers training information and disseminates it through publications, seminars and information days</td>
<td>There are insufficient central resources to systematically evaluate training needs and effectiveness of training activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The network of public training managers</td>
<td>Provides for informal networking opportunity among training managers in the public sector; supports the dissemination of best practices</td>
<td>Voluntary network which does not involve all training managers and thus leads to uneven information sharing and development; no formal power of the network for influencing central training policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top civil servants</td>
<td>The Government Office is in charge of the development of top civil-service executives (about 90 persons) based on a common competency model; training activities are generously financed from the EU funds</td>
<td>Funding is not sustainable; voluntary participation of top executives leading to limited participation; imperfect coordination with the Ministry of Finance and individual public-sector organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central training institution ATAK</td>
<td>Status of a central civil-service training institution</td>
<td>Poor instruments of the Ministry of Finance to steer its activities; absence of a fixed budget; no specific in-house competence; operates like any other actor on the training market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training market</td>
<td>Market competition for training provision; cooperation between various actors of the training market</td>
<td>Training market is fragmented with many training providers (354 in 2009); difficult to assess the quality of trainers; high transaction costs in buying-in training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
framework on the part of the Ministry of Finance with the Government Office. The accountability to funders has been given a prominent role while the accountability to the target group, political leaders and citizens has not been systemati-
cally addressed.

Based on the discussion above, Table 2 attempts to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the Estonian civil-service training system.

6. Conclusions

Two decades after the fall of the Communist regime, civil-service training in Estonia still struggles with weak strategic planning, institutional fragmentation, unsustainable funding and insufficient coordination. Despite conceptual weaknesses, several lessons can also be learned from the Estonian experience. These lessons can be especially useful, a) for other CEE countries which have faced similar challenges in institution-building and upgrading of civil servants’ competencies, b) for other small states which, like Estonia, need to address specific challenges related to smallness (e.g. limitations of the education system and training market), and finally, c) for other countries with a decentralized setup of central government and with open position-based civil service.

The first lesson concerns the strategic approach to civil-service training. Above all, civil-service human-resource management should be based on a central human-resource strategy (Järvalt and Randma-Liiv 2010, 20). The training system should be a part of a systematic public-service HRM, and training objectives should stem from the needs of a civil-service system. The presence of a broad strategy is especially important in decentralized systems so that individual public-sector organizations would have a solid “backbone” on which to build their organizational programs and activities.

Secondly, high levels of decentralization coupled with absent strategic planning on the state level and poor coordination are likely to lead to *ad hoc* practices and varying training levels and contents in different public-sector organizations. In order to compensate for such weaknesses of a decentralized training system, there is a need for elaborate coordination at the center of government. A clear division of roles, responsibilities and instruments between various actors in the training system helps to avoid overlapping functions and duplication of duties. Coordination at the center of government can be more efficient if it is located in one (central) organization – otherwise a number of coordinators may face difficulties with coordinating central roles between themselves instead of taking care of the entire system. The Estonian case study shows that the formal institution-
alization of a central coordinator is not enough – it needs to have a clear mandate for steering backed with necessary human and financial resources.

Thirdly, the market alone is not enough for an effective provision of civil-service training. This is particularly relevant for CEE countries as well as for small states, which are more likely to face market failures due to underdeveloped training markets with limited provision of training activities. Although practices of various countries justify the need for a central training institution in centralized systems, the analysis of the Estonian experience indicates the need for a functioning central training institution for a decentralized system. A central training institution should be “at arm’s length” from the civil-service central coordinator and offer specific training activities (mostly those which are not available in the training market), develop training materials, analyze civil-service training needs and effectiveness, as well as building and offering specific competencies relevant for the civil service.

Fourthly, even a decentralized training system needs central funding in some of its parts and central implementation of training activities. Specific training needs exist (e.g. related to facilitating major reforms or implementing new legislation) that are better addressed centrally to ensure a unified approach across the civil service. Moreover, common training contributes to the development of common values and enables the sharing of best practices. The central training institution should (at least partially) be financed by central funding in order to develop specific competencies and not be purely based on business income. Funds allocated from the state budget guarantee financial sustainability and continuation of civil-service training activities in times of financial crisis. Additional funding sources (e.g. the EU structural funds, foreign aid) are only temporary arrangements which need to be replaced in a longer perspective in order to guarantee sustainability. The best use of such one-off funds would be to use them for the development of a training system (e.g. for building up a central civil-service training and competence center), rather than spending them on regular training activities.

Finally, investments in top civil servants’ development are vital. A civil-service training system should involve programs for top officials as they play a substantial role in initiating and maintaining changes. The importance of top executives, their competencies and cooperation is crucial in any country, but particularly so in new democracies, which need to build and guarantee fundamentally new practices in public administration.
Acknowledgements

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In many respects, Georgia is a country at the crossroads of East and West, North and South, and its way ahead combines examples of both problems and success stories of great relevance for the whole Eastern European region. Georgia went through different cycles of challenges and problems: it has seen wars and conflicts, poverty and shortages, fear of the future and nostalgic feelings about the past. But thanks to the young Georgians, we were able to rebuild our country; we were able to follow the path of democratic development based on prosperity and the fundamental values of democracy and individual liberty, which are not exclusive to Western societies, but also applicable to the rest of the world. Most assuredly, young public-administration professionals from Georgia will play an important and essential part in building the future of the country of Georgia and in pursuing the path of democratic state-building for the prosperity of the nation. In this regard, I would express my appreciation to NISPAcee for its contribution to the education of young public-administration professionals in Georgia.

Numerous internal as well as external factors have had an impact upon the system of public administration in Georgia. The development process has been very much influenced by the recent past and, in this regard, we should take into account the impact of Soviet legacy on public administration in Georgia. In that regard, I will try to formulate a general definition of the aforementioned Soviet legacy and examine its impact on developments in Georgia during different phases of the existence of this young developing democracy.

Discussing the Soviet style of management, one must begin with the leading role of the Communist party and ideology during the Soviet Era – both of which had primacy over the rule of law in many, if not all, spheres of life. The fundamental administrative rules were directed at facilitating the implementation of political tasks and did not take into account any other interests. The political party was controlling all activities of the executive branches in order to keep full control over the bureaucratic machine and to avoid any possibility of alternative approaches or the emergence of civil society based on volunteerism.

In terms of its basic foundation, we can distinguish four main pillars on which Communist governance, I believe, was based:

- Primacy of the political party component and political goals,
• Maintenance of an authoritarian bureaucratic machine which ensured full control of the decision making process,
• Corruption on all levels, thus limiting the fairness or impartiality of public servants,
• Patrimonial dependence of the regions on the center.

In talking about public administration and governance in recent Georgia, one can outline three main periods which were characterized and directed by a number of internal and external factors.

The first period carries through to the late eighties and early nineties. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the case of Georgia even before that, the former Soviet republics gained their independence. In many instances, this was unexpected for the majority of the population of those republics and led to much uncertainty. In accordance with the results of the elections in Georgia which were the first democratic elections of the post Soviet era, the national(ist) forces with anti-communist and anti-soviet platforms came to power. Those forces had the support of the vast majority of the population (around 95%) and thus had a mandate to establish a new independent national and integrated state.

This period is accurately characterized as a volatile phase in the development of the new Government of Georgia with threats and challenges of both external and internal natures. Among the most significant of these were the following: the authoritarian legacy from the Soviet Union, security problems, problems of territorial integration, limited education and training of public servants, no clear vision of priorities, weak state institutions, a vague and uncertain government decision-making process, major needs for economic development, and the struggle for recognition of Georgia as an independent state on the global map and the need to gain international support.

There were of course various positive preconditions for future development. Among them were the unity of the Georgian people around the idea of the independence of the country. This generated patriotic emotions, which produced international attention toward Georgia’s affairs, and its choice of democracy and Western values.

If one examines the style of administration by the first Georgian Government, one can clearly observe some components of the legacy from the Communist era. In that regard, it is useful to review the four pillars of the Soviet legacy that were mentioned above:

1. First, at the center of the establishment of the new independent state, along with the creation of the new political elite were a series of primary political
goals which influenced the decision-making process in all areas of the country’s life. These included the establishment of the rule of law, the creation of new democratic institutions and the endorsement of democratic values. As a result of giving first priority to these political needs, the Government paid less attention to other important areas of activity which were essential for the development of the country. As a result, Georgia’s first post Soviet Government failed to move forward with the institutional building of new democratic structures, the establishing of transparent mechanisms of decision-making and the economic development of the country.

2. Second, corruption at different levels of the public sector would widen due to the inability of relevant agencies to control new political elites and institutions. Consequently, the country experienced a very fragile rule of law, weak state institutions, a lack of state finances and unclear strategies in different areas of future development.

3. The issue of dependence on the center during that period can be divided into two sub issues:

• On the one hand, the newly independent Georgian state was not able to break away from its patrimonial dependence on Moscow. As a consequence, one can point to significant Russian influence on different areas of the new nation’s socio-economic life. As a result, developments in Moscow continued to have a significant impact upon the situation in Georgia. This included Moscow’s involvement in the security issues of the country and the dependence of Georgia’s economy on the Russian financial system.

• At the same time that this was the case, the new independent government was attempting to create a strong center in the Capital, with full control of all local issues at the sub-regional level. This attempt at restructuring center-local relationships provoked a number of challenging responses, of course facilitated by Georgia’s Northern neighbor.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, the independence movement led by President Gamsakhurdia was considered by the Government and a large part of the population as a democratic breakthrough. This independence movement at the beginning obviously promoted democratic processes in Georgia. However, afterwards a number of negative factors developed including poor and corrupt administration, ultra-nationalism, the creation of authoritarian elites and corrupt entourages and an inability to change the machinery of the Communist state. These circumstances, as well as external involvement, made it impossible to succeed in state-building and created all of the necessary preconditions for a major crisis.
And, certainly, the crisis in public management was one of the main reasons for the crisis and collapse of the Government.

Nevertheless, there were some positive outcomes which went along with the failures of this phase. By the end of this period, Georgia was recognized as an independent state by a number of countries; it had created both national armed forces and some independent financial institutions. The country had experienced the first implications of democracy, such as freedom of expression and political liberty. However, the other failures described above led to the collapse of the existing power, which unfortunately took place in a very volatile way. Thus, by the end of this phase Georgia was considered a failed state, with territorial and political problems, an unclear national-security policy, much poverty and violence, a failed economy, some civil war and internal conflicts, and limited interest on the part of the international community.

The second period in Georgia’s post Communist development covers the period from the middle of the nineties to the beginning of 21st century, before the so called Rose Revolution. After some military clashes, the former Communist leader Eduard Shevardnadze came into power with the title of president. He was obliged to deal with a situation somewhat similar to the problems Gamsakhurdia faced, especially as regards the issues of national security and the severe economic distress of the population. Thus, the Government of Georgia of this period received as its legacy a difficult security situation, numerous internal conflicts, a weak economic system, concern about the direct intervention of the Russian Federation in its internal affairs, a weak political system and very fragile democratic institutions.

In this situation, the Government was forced to prioritize these many issues according to the intensity of the threats and challenges that they provided to statehood of Georgia. As a consequence, the government attempted to normalize the internal security situation, neutralize the negative engagement of the Russian Federation in the nation’s conflict resolution process, establish bureaucratic institutions consistent with strong presidential power, promote Georgia in the international arena and double its support for the country’s fledgling economic and financial institutions.

The Government of President Shevardnadze was able to establish a relatively secure situation in the country by shutting down illegal paramilitary units and to some extent downsizing the influence of criminal elements in people’s lives. Nevertheless, the existing and remaining problems continued to have a crucial impact on developments in the country. There were the socio-economic problems of a population that included many people exiled from conflict zones. In
addition, only the Georgian elite has benefited from state economic policies – including wide-spread privatization, which has created a huge gap between the elites and the ordinary people. Links to the political establishment have remained the main source of acquiring financial capital. The President’s family, or its surrounding circles, have controlled all lucrative enterprises. All of the above-mentioned circumstances made it impossible for the Government to move forward on state-building or democracy-building or to lessen the influence of our Northern neighbor, which had direct instruments of manipulation in different aspect of Georgia’s daily life.

Once again, there were some positive outcomes during this period. At the very beginning, there was a desire for a fresh start, and there was the establishment of some democratic forms including multiple political parties, relatively free media coverage, the establishment of various governmental structures and the development of some measure of public control of the government. However, the very strong degree of presidential power greatly limited the scope of the legislative and judicial branches which, in turn, very much limited the democratic development of the country. Moreover, in the middle of the 1990s, Shevardnadze initiated the establishment of a highly dominant political party, the Citizen’s Union, which was structured in the best tradition of Soviet epoch. It had the impact of significantly limiting opportunities of opposition political parties to influence the political life of the country.

Consequently, similar to the first stage, one can see the clear impact of the Soviet legacy during the government of Shevardnadze, which, among other things, included the following:

- establishment of a non-transparent, authoritarian bureaucratic machine run by political elites;
- widely spread corruption on all levels;
- patrimonial dependence on Russia for the solution of outstanding issues.

As a result, by 2003, Georgia was widely considered to be a failed state with a dying economy. It was a country destroyed by corruption and authoritarian structures. In November 2003, after the failed parliamentary elections, a peaceful, popular revolution brought to power a young team of reformists. This was the so called Rose Revolution which forced the existing elite to peacefully transfer power to a younger generation which had ambitious plans and prospects for the country.

Thus, literally over night, young reformers were in charge of a highly fragile country located in a totally hostile geopolitical environment. Many experts pre-
dicted that there would be a major dilemma for the young reformers who would have to choose the main direction of policies and determine whether to focus on state-building or democracy-building. In reality, those two aspects of good government are very much interlinked. The new government was, in fact, ready to move forward in establishing both a strong state and a democratic state. It was also anxious to cut all links with the old-style system of governance, the so-called Soviet legacy.

Among the steps in that direction was a policy of zero tolerance toward the Soviet-style public servants who were not able to adapt to the new requests and realities and, consequently, were fired immediately. The idea behind this action was very simple. The experience of the old autocrats could not direct the country toward democratic development. Consequently, the leading forces chose to begin from zero rather than continue unsuccessful attempts to modify old autocrats. A large number of old, corrupted civil servants were fired, and a new generation took the power in their own hands.

In addition, the Government began an unprecedented struggle against widespread corruption. Thus, in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, the new Government fired the entire traffic police force. Georgia lived for three weeks without a single policeman on the street. It is amazing, but during this period the crime rates went down. One may wonder about the reason for that. This happened in part because the police themselves were largely responsible for many crimes and also because there was a shared feeling that our citizens finally had their own role and an opportunity to participate in our nation’s history at this specific moment; a moment when everything seemed possible, when democratic values became the basis of a new lifestyle and when any citizen had the feeling of inventing their own future. I think that this feeling is the driving force of our history and our best ally against existing problems. Thanks to the radical, in some cases aggressive, changes in our police force, customs, tax services, bureaucratic structures – and especially to the widespread feeling among people that they own these transformations – we have made great progress.

Democracy has been advanced in Georgia by: fiercely fighting corruption and organized crime; strengthening and making more independent the judiciary; enhancing the system of checks and balances between the branches of power; providing institutional guarantees for active engagement of the opposition in politics; bolstering political and media plurality; and taking comprehensive measures for the full-scale integration of minorities through educational and cultural inclusiveness.
The assessments of foreign experts about developments in Georgia illustrate the positive outcomes of those reforms. These include the following:

As a result of the reforms, and in contrast to the past, public confidence toward the police force stands at 90%. Probably, cleaning up the police and the bureaucracy has been our most important achievement, along with a significant reduction in crime. Today, Georgia is one of the safest places in Europe.

According to the Transparency International Index, Georgia is the leading country in the post Soviet region (except for the Baltic States) in terms of fighting corruption. Furthermore, according to the Global Corruption Barometer 2010 of Transparency International, Georgia placed fifth in the world for the low level of corruption in its police force (after Finland, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland).

According to the Index of Economic Freedom 2011, published by the Heritage Foundation, Georgia ranks in 29th place among 183 nations with respect to economic freedom.

We have built a highly favorable investment climate based on efficiency, transparency and the rule of law. As a result, we are now ranked as one of the easiest places in the world to do business; in 2011, the World Bank placed Georgia twelfth in its ease-of-doing-business report and named Georgia the top reformer among 174 countries over the last five years.

There is still a lot to be done, obviously, and probably we have had a number of important failures or mistakes. But I believe we are more committed than ever to pursuing our path of democratic reform and to continue to build our democracy.

Analyzing the period after the so-called Rose Revolution, we should underline the clear attempts of the Government to cut any links from the Soviet legacy. This was the only way to move forward. In this regard, allow me to evaluate the pillars of the Soviet legacy which I had pointed out earlier.

1. In terms of political priority, Georgia has the clear intention of building a democratic country without any dominant or superior political party or elite as we observed at previous stages of development. Thus, by its nature this direction will result in the development of transparency, greater public engagement in decision-making processes and more successful economic development.

2. One of the main achievements of the current Government is its fight against corruption. Current Georgian civil servants are not, and hopefully will not, engage in any kind of corrupt operations. This certainly makes our country more attractive for foreign partners.
3. As regards dependence on the center, there are two points to be made. First, I think that there is no doubt that the Russian establishment has only the most limited influence on the current Government of Georgia or in the overall situation in my country. As regards the control of the regions of Georgia by the central authorities, I think that Tbilisi itself is moving forward with the diversification of the power. The power of the local authorities in a number of the regions of Georgia has increased. In addition, the transfer of the parliament out of the capital, clearly shows the interest of the center in sharing its authority.

Nevertheless, we are still experiencing some lingering implications of the Soviet legacy. This involves some kind of nostalgic attitude by some parts of the population. However, we have the clear support of the vast majority of the population for democratic state-building based on the Western values. We have around 75% public support for Georgia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic family.

Based on the current developments in my country, allow me to draw a couple of conclusions.

1. Our example shows that, obviously, the choice between state-building and democracy-building would not result in any positive outcome. There is no sense trying to build public institutions without establishing democratic rules. Authoritarian rule does not have a chance to survive in our part of the world as long as there is fair competition and the example of advanced democracies. Thus, the only way to move a country successfully forward is to follow the path of building a democratic state, which by its nature would spread democratic values to different areas of life.

2. The dangerous impact of the Soviet Legacy still has its influence in the countries of our region. Georgians have not seen any other way to avoid it other than cutting all links with the Soviet past. There is no other choice if real development is to occur.

3. Finally, education and training for the public sector is essential to the solution of existing problems. Georgians have had a very difficult and tough heritage from the Soviet past, which has left the country with a relatively limited scope of educated people. Consequently, the education of society serves as an instrumental issue for the development of the country. I do believe that new educated generation of Georgia will take full responsibility for the democratic development of our country. In this sense, then, I see irreversible processes in Georgia and anticipate that our development will not depend on the will of one political power or a party of elites.
Public Administration in Slovakia – One Step forward, Two Steps back?

TOMÁŠ JACKO, ĽUDMILA MALÍKOVÁ

Introduction

The case study\(^1\) shows the evolution of the system of public administration in Slovakia since 1989. It focuses on the reform of public administration and its stages, specifics, challenges and outcomes. The authors show which legislative and administrative tools have been implemented and how they affected the current state of public administration. The case study will provide a narrative of the Slovak public-administration reform process and will explain its fundamental changes and continuities since the year 1989: decentralisation, deconcentration, modernisation and civil-service reform, politicisation and also the recently announced efforts and the actions carried out so far towards further modernisation.

Slovakia, a unitary state with a population of 5 million and close to 2900 municipal self-governments (i.e. municipalities) and 8 regional self-governments has arguably one of the most decentralised systems of public administration in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The Slovak local government is (in)famous for its municipal self-government fragmentation. Compared to Sweden for instance, which is nearly twice as populous and ten times larger in terms of country area, Slovakia has ten times the number of municipalities.\(^2\) Even compared to some countries of CEE such as Slovenia\(^3\), Slovakia is highly fragmented. This has led to some opportunities but without effective internal and external control, a history of political culture and an active civil society, Slovak decentralisation has also led to threats.

The Slovak case study is also an account of how the political elites with the official intention to create apolitical civil service step-by-step turned the system into a political patronage machinery. The system as of now (January 2013) allows

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1 An older version of the chapter with a greater focus on the aspects of Slovak local government was published under the name “Public Administration and Local Government Reform in Slovakia – An Unfinished Step Forward,” (Jacko 2013). The current chapter also includes new unpublished information about the ESO reform, a crucial development in the history of public administration reform in Slovakia, which only commenced in late 2012. The research for the chapter has been financed by VEGA, project no. 1/1322/12.


3 Slovenia has a population of 2 million and is divided into 211 autonomous municipalities only, 11 of which have urban status.
politicians who lead ministries and other central government agencies to hire and fire civil servants as they wish. In terms of decentralisation, the authors present a much more successful account worth mentioning but also with a number of shortcomings.

Special attention is devoted to the no longer existent Civil Service Office and the frequently amended Civil Service Act, which not only show Slovak peculiarities but also best demonstrate party-dominant politico-administrative relations and their consequences. Hence, the overarching theme of the case will be politico-administrative relations, which to this day pose a fundamental challenge to the system of public administration in Slovakia. The case study explains why and how politics has influenced the transitional history and both progress and regress of public administration and civil service. Finally, the chapter offers lessons learned, including the urgent need to depoliticise public administration and the public sector as a whole in Slovakia. In terms of terminology, the case study will refer to public administration in general terms – mainly to describe the system of public administration (i.e. the administration or bureaucracy of the state – ministries, government offices and agencies, administration of municipal\(^4\) and regional self-governments). The term civil service and civil servants is used only for administration staff working at the ministries and central-government agencies and local state administration. There are approximately 15 different laws and many more government provisions and regulations which specify recruitment, remuneration, promotion and dismissal of public-sector workers (Staroňová and Láštic 2011). However, the primary focus of the case study is not all public-sector or public-administration staff and the respective legislation, but central government bureaucracy and the Civil Service Act\(^5\) only.

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\(^4\) Municipalities in Slovakia refer to all local self-government units including villages and towns.

\(^5\) Not to be confused with the Public Service Act (323/2001) which was also passed in 2001 but covered only lower civil servants – i.e. “public servants” in state-administration bodies, municipalities, regional administration, etc. The law was revoked after 2 years by two newly adopted laws, Act no. 552/2003 on Performance of Work in Public Interest and Act no. 553/2003 on Remuneration of Performance of Work in Public Interest. Both laws came into force on 1 January 2004. Because of that public servants have been legally referred to since then as those who work in the public interest. The basic difference between civil servants and public servants (officially “those who work in the public interest”) is the nature of their work. Both work for the government but according to the law, civil servants carry out more qualified work, such as management, decision-making, control and expert preparation of decisions, while public servants carry out less qualified activities. Civil service is carried out for a limited group of institutions (central-government administration offices – state administration), while public service can be performed for any public administration body (e.g. local and former regional offices, town halls). Civil service is thus the only service taking care of the fulfilment of tasks of central government administration (Malíková 2006).
1. Public-administration reform process

The time between the fall of Communism and the end of the 1990s in Slovakia and other Eastern and Central European countries is often described as a period of missed opportunities (Nižňanský 2002; Verheijen 2003). The early 1990s have been a suitable era for not only democratic transformation and economic transition but also public-administration reform. However, most of the countries in the region, including Slovakia, failed to “catch up” with the West during this period. Slovakia nevertheless managed to pass key administrative reform measures – especially in terms of decentralisation and deconcentration in the early 1990s (Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1
Timeline of Slovakia’s key public-administration developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Events &amp; measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fall of communist regime in Czechoslovakia⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998–2004</td>
<td>Decentralisation &amp; Modernisation³</td>
<td>New public-administration reform strategy, creation of 8 regional self-governments (i.e. higher territorial units). Creation of the Civil Service Office and Ethical Code of Conduct for civil servants⁹. Public Service Act¹⁰ passed and first regional elections held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>EU accession</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2012</td>
<td>Politicisation</td>
<td>Civil Service Office abolished, and its roles were moved to ministerial service offices (return to resortism). Abolition of Regional Offices and fiscal decentralisation to regional and municipal self-governments. New Civil Service Act¹² removed all remaining civil-service neutrality safeguards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012–</td>
<td>Modernisation II</td>
<td>New one party government elected – public administration reform ESO commenced¹³. Plans announced to reduce the number of local state-administration offices from 613 to 79 until 2016. Regional Offices of Specialised State Administration abolished on 1 January 2013.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors.

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⁶ Three levels of public administration, which were each run by the system of national councils.
⁸ Act no. 221/1996 [Zákon o územnom a správnom usporiadani Slovenskej republiky].
⁹ Modernisation is sometimes also referred to as “professionalization of public administration” or “civil service reform”.
¹⁰ Civil Service Act 312/2001.
¹² Act no. 400/2009.
¹³ One of the first legislative measures of the reform has been Act no. 345/2012 on Some Measures Regarding Local State Administration.
However, regarding modernisation and civil-service neutrality, the Slovak public administration still had a long way to go. The general election in 1998, which saw an unprecedented level of public mobilisation against the Meciar regime, also brought in a new grand-coalition government with plans to continue with the public-administration reform – both in terms of further decentralisation and modernisation.

Table 2
System of public administration in Slovakia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public administration</th>
<th>Self-government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State administration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Local state administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central state administration (i.e. ministries, Government Office, central-government agencies)</td>
<td>Regional state administration(^{14}) (i.e. Regional Offices, Regional Offices of Specialised State Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional self-government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional self-government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8 higher territorial units or župy)</td>
<td>(8 higher territorial units or župy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal self-government</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2890 municipalities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors, Malíková and Vavrová 2011.

Since local decentralisation had already been more or less completed, the first key public-administration reform goal of the 1998 coalition government was the creation of a new, regional and self-government tier of government. The so-called higher territorial units (župy) came into existence in 2001\(^{15}\), and first regional elections were held in the same year. The Slovak case study illustrates how the lack of administrative and political culture can easily lead to a public-administration reform acting as a double-edged sword – both in terms of decentralisation and modernisation. Ever since the year 1990 Slovak municipalities, even compared to municipal governments of other Central and Eastern European countries, have enjoyed a considerable level of local and regional decentralisation – both for the good and for the bad. The chapter covers this process and points out some of the drawbacks and lessons learned from the Slovak decentralisation.

Furthermore, decentralisation efforts were supplemented with modernisation, which meant an increasing emphasis on management, control and education.\(^{16}\) The new legislation offered the means to public-administration modernisation.

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\(^{14}\) Regional offices dissolved in 2007. Remaining Regional Offices of Specialised Public Administration dissolved on 1 January 2013 and regional state administration \textit{de facto} ceased to exist.

\(^{15}\) Regional Municipalities Act 302/2001.

\(^{16}\) See MESA 10 (1999) for the complete Strategy of Public Administration Reform in the Slovak Republic.
For instance, the Civil Service Act\textsuperscript{17} introduced various innovative measures which were meant to form and uphold modern, flexible, politically neutral and high-performance civil service – just as the EU accession criteria specified and requested. Among various other measures it is worth mentioning the creation of the Civil Service Office and the introduction of the Civil Servants Code of Ethics. However, soon after Slovakia joined the EU, the Act was severely and gradually weakened until its current form which lacks sufficient political-neutrality safeguards and allows government ministers and other political appointees to hire and fire civil servants as they wish. The case will discuss these reform highlights in some greater detail below in the \textbf{decentralisation and modernisation} part of the chapter.

The key factor which influenced Slovakia’s public-administration reform process – both decentralisation and modernisation, was the accession to the EU (Košťál et al. 2012). Prior to the 2004 accession, Slovakia was required to meet numerous strict criteria – which it did more or less successfully. Since EU membership was among the top priorities for all parliamentary parties, EU conditionality also led to an unprecedented cross-party consensus on the issue of regional decentralisation and public-administration modernisation.

The case will now briefly discuss and provide short narratives of the key public-administration reform developments, including the latest ESO reform, which commenced in 2012. The paper will particularly point out challenges, results and outcomes, and also lessons learned from the specific reform efforts.

\section*{2. Decentralisation and deconcentration}

The process of decentralisation commenced soon after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Slovak municipalities were without any difficulties granted a significant level of self-government and new powers as early as 1990.\textsuperscript{18} The legislation also led to further fragmentation of local governments in Slovakia as instead of motivating municipalities to merge, it granted freedom to form smaller units. This was still at the time of wide political consensus among the new rising non-communist political forces in the country. According to Malíková and Vavrová (2011, 77), Slovak decentralisation, ever since it commenced in 1990, has included basic decentralisation principles – “decentralisation of political power, decentralisa-

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} Civil Service Act no. 312/2001. Other legal provisions were also implemented, e.g. the Public Service Act. However, the case study will focus on the Civil Service Act only, which best illustrates the challenges and lessons learned from Slovak public-administration reform.

\textsuperscript{18} Municipalities Act no. 369/1990.
\end{flushleft}
tion of governing roles and responsibilities, and decentralisation of the overall financing system.”

Hence, the first wave of public-administration reform was in the form of decentralisation and creation of municipal self-governments. Municipalities were given the right to elect their own mayors based on the strong mayor system. Later on, a similar principle was applied when regional decentralisation took place and citizens could directly elect Chairmen of regional assemblies (i.e. župan). This is very different to other CEE countries. For instance, in the Czech Republic mayors are still voted on and elected by council members who pick someone among them. However, this relatively high degree of direct democracy does not only lead to opportunities but also threats. Individual misconduct of mayors can lead to severe consequences for the municipalities. Also, in terms of transparency and open government, there are significant differences among the biggest municipalities in the country (Jacko and Šipoš 2010).

What is more, the extreme level of fragmentation arguably leads to inefficient use of resources, lack of economic growth, limited quality of public-service provision, etc. However, some municipalities instead of merging into bigger units have since then started to create “micro regions” which not only promote tourism but also lead to other means of cooperation, for instance in terms of sharing municipal property in order to save and use resources more efficiently.\textsuperscript{19} The three tiers of government each have their specific roles and functions, which however, in some cases overlap. This often results in the lack of coordination among central, regional and municipal self-governments but on the other hand also allows great opportunities in terms of cooperation.

The Slovak case of decentralisation is a rather successful one, nevertheless with a number of lessons learned. Slovakia has arguably one of the most decentralised and hence fragmented systems of public administration. This greatly supports the principle of subsidiarity and grants a significant level of freedom to the people to decide on their own what is best for their municipalities and regions. On the other hand, with great power comes great responsibility, which can be misused by elected officials. An effective checks-and-balances system is missing, and the Supreme Audit Office lacks enough resources and binding powers to penalise and remove corrupt officials (Košťál et al. 2012). Furthermore, because no quorum is set for local or any other popular elections, in a given municipality of for instance 1200 inhabitants with an electorate of 1000, theoretically only one participating voter casting a vote would decide the mayor. However, in order to remove this mayor from office, first a petition must be initiated and signed by at

\textsuperscript{19} For research conducted on Slovak micro regions, see for example Slavik and Bacík 2007.
least 30% of the electorate (i.e. 300), and then a referendum needs to be called where there must be a minimum turnout of 50% plus 1 electors (i.e. 501) and the majority of them have to agree with the mayoral recall election (i.e. at least 251). As a result, hardly any referenda especially in larger municipalities have ever reached the required turnout, and poor performing mayors and elected officials can easily remain in power and unsanctioned.

Soon after decentralisation efforts, reform and reconstruction of state administration in the form of territorial change and deconcentration followed. New districts [okres] (79 in total) and regions [kraj] (8) with new boundaries were drawn with own district and regional offices representing and carrying out tasks by civil servants on behalf of the central government. After 2001 and further decentralisation efforts, powers from district and regional offices were gradually moved to self-government bodies. The year 2007 signified an end to most regional offices. A new organisation scheme of local state administration was created, and the agenda was moved to local-state administration offices (i.e. area offices) and to regional self-government. Local state administration now carries out tasks on behalf of the central government in a number of fields such as environmental and civil protection, registration of businesses, tax collection, etc. Nearly each type of office has its own legislation, which leads to an overcomplicated system of bureaucracy and red tape. Currently, the new government is planning to address this issue. It argues that a simplification of the system of state administration and a decrease in the number of offices should bring more efficiency into the overall system of public administration. The latest developments and government plans are further discussed in the modernisation II section of the chapter.

3. Decentralisation and modernisation

The key reform year so far was undoubtedly 2001 – the year when crucial public-administration legislation was passed, both in terms of decentralisation and its modernisation. But it was also the year when a coalition crisis erupted because of different opinions on the formation of the regional self-government.

20 Act no. 221/1996 [Zákon o územnom a správnom usporiadaní Slovenskej republiky].
21 Act no. 254/2007 [Zákon o zrušení krajských úradov].
3.1 Regional decentralisation

The government coalition, which was composed both of right- and left-wing parties\(^{22}\) started to argue over various politically sensitive details of the reform, principally the regional boundaries and the number of regions. The parliamentary opposition strongly opposed the proposed territorial-decentralisation model. Both opposition parties (HZDS and SNS\(^{23}\)) preferred a smaller number of regional self-governments. In the end, HZDS played a key role in the legislative decision to form only 8 regional assemblies instead of 12. HZDS united with 2 other coalition government parties during the vote, causing not only a defeat to the official government proposition but a near end for the government of the day. The architect of the reform argues that this was a huge mistake and that 12 regions was the most suitable model (Nižňanský 2002).\(^{24}\) On the other hand, the fact that the opposition united with some of the coalition parties in favour of the final 8-regions model meant that there was a consensus across the political spectrum, which arguably led to long-term institutional and legal stability of the new regions. Hence, even when the pro-reform government was re-elected in 2002 and the original architect, Viktor Nižňanský, got another chance to work on the reform’s limitations, the number of regions and other key legal provisions remained. Regional decentralisation was not only meant to deliver a change in the structure of the central government, but also according to Viktor Nižňanský: “to form a modern, democratic, decentralised state providing its citizens with real opportunities to participate in the governance of the public matters” (Mesezníkov and Nižňanský 2002, 11).

Institutionally, the reform has been a relative success. But democracy cannot work without the people. The two rounds of the first regional elections in 2001 were signified by very poor turnout, which continued and even dropped by the time of the second regional elections in 2005 (2001: 26.02%; 2005: 18.02%; 2009:

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\(^{22}\) The 4 parties which formed the 1998 coalition government were SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition [Slovenská demokratická koalícia]), SDL (Party of the Democratic Left [Strana demokratickej ľavice]), SOP (Party of Civic Understanding [Strana občianskeho porozumenia]) and SMK (Party of the Hungarian Coalition [Strana maďarskej koalície]). SDK and SMK were coalition parties themselves. SDK in 2000 disintegrated into smaller parties and the newly formed SDKÚ (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union [Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia]).

\(^{23}\) HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko]), SNS (Slovak National Party [Slovenská národná strana])

\(^{24}\) The need to create extra territorial self-government units stemmed from EU conditionality and the NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) classification, which is necessary for EU funding. However, as a result of the 8-regions model and the NUTS classification, Slovak self-government regions still need to cooperate with other regions in order to meet the minimum regional population criteria and submit EU funds proposals. This leads to extra transaction costs, which arguably also results in poor EU-funds absorption.
22.9 %). In light of these percentages, one may argue that the regional government still struggles to attract greater public interest and political engagement. Thus, citizens’ attitudes towards democratic institutions could be seen as a crucial factor in the success of public-administration reform. To illustrate, in terms of local self-government elections, the turnout largely varies between urban and rural settlements, with some rural settlements easily reaching 70 % turnout compared to towns where turnout generally reaches 30–40 %.

Critics of the reform argue that it represented only limited structural changes to the system of public administration and that a more personal approach was missing (Ágh 2003). The reform process was predominantly concerned with the territories, their numbers, boundaries and the selection of regional capitals. This was also reflected in the parliamentary and public discourse. Instead of being granted extra rights, the public was for instance more concerned with the benefits they or their towns would get from being the regional capitals. Even Viktor Nižňanský admits (despite overall success of the reform) that further reforms should have been taken in order to bring government and decision-making closer to the people and make the government more effective. Nižňanský was at the time dissatisfied with the rise in the number of civil servants, and he also pointed out that further reforms would be needed to deliver changes that he had originally hoped for. The key architect of the reform blames the politicians and their private interests for failing to deliver a more successful administrative reform at the time (Nižňanský 2002). However, following the election of the pro-reform government in 2002, regional decentralisation successfully continued, and until 2004 more than 400 powers and competencies were devolved to the 8 self-governing regions.

According to the government of the day, the regional decentralisation was a success (Nižňanský 2002). The architect of the reform himself was pleased with the reform although he pointed out several tasks that still needed to be done (Nižňanský 2002). However, all the crucial processes already started, and most of the work on decentralisation was done. The regional elections that had been planned for autumn went ahead successfully, and the Regional Assemblies started to function from 1 January 2002. Even Verheijen (2003, 491) mentions initial success:

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26 For instance, he was disappointed with the rise in numbers of civil servants and duplicity due to the co-existence of Regional Assemblies (established 2001) and Regional Offices (established 1996) (Nižňanský 2002). For another useful summary of the reform including recommendations, see Nižňanský 2005.
The Slovak government strategy on decentralization and modernization of the public administration (1999) is another interesting example of a well-designed strategic document, even if its orientation was more towards decentralization. The implementation of the strategy had been fraught with difficulties, due to the vagaries of coalition politics in the state, but it still offers a rare case of a strategic framework that has been at least partially implemented.

Social scientists struggle to provide a more objective and informed account of the public-administration reform due to still largely missing reform evaluation, especially in terms of its impact and outcomes. Nevertheless, decentralisation in Slovakia can be viewed as being part of the overall democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe. If we define democracy simply as power to the people, then decentralisation in Slovakia indeed granted a considerable level of power to the people to autonomously run local and regional affairs. The high level of decentralisation on the one hand allows more opportunities for citizens to actively engage in public affairs, but on the other hand and in reality, the sheer number of villages and small dwellings, each with their hard-to-remove mayors and council members, often results in everything but improving local government economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

In terms of agenda setting and political discussion, decentralisation ended as soon as the second stage of the decentralisation process was completed. Various powers, functions and decision-making authority were delegated, including an increase in financial independence of self-governments from the central government and its regional state offices. In 2006, the new centre-left government\(^\text{27}\) planned to continue with decentralisation in terms of the “communal reform”, which was meant to bring more effectiveness and efficiency to municipalities through mergers and sharing of responsibilities and service provision. However, the reform has not been carried out so far, and only few municipalities provide joint services.

The other key public-administration reform effort of the early 2000s was to modernise, professionalise and depoliticise public administration. EU conditionality again played a crucial role in this effort (Staroňová and Maliková 2003; Baldersheim and Maliková 2012). However, despite various efforts, international pressure and legal provisions taken, this part of the public-administration reform was largely unsuccessful. Change in top civil servants still reflects the general election result, and high politicisation and the resulting fluctuation of staff lead to the lack of capacity necessary to carry out quality policy implementation.

and evaluation. Nevertheless, the Civil Service Act and the creation of the Civil Service Office were crucial for the administrative reform. Both measures, when implemented, signified a new modernisation wave. However, only a couple of years later, almost all reform measures were scrapped. Hence, it will be these two promising measures that the chapter will now discuss in further detail.

3.2 The Civil Service Act

The Civil Service Act of 2001 brought a number of revolutionary measures to civil service and the system of public administration in Slovakia. The main features and the changing characteristics of the Act are specified in Table 3. According to the original wording and intention of the Act, ministers and state secretaries were to remain the only political appointees in civil service. All other civil service positions were to be officially filled by the newly established and politically neutral Civil Service Office. However, as of today, the Civil Service Office no longer exists and the Act cannot effectively prevent virtually any political appointees from any position, be it in the central government (i.e. ministries) or stateadministration offices. This is because ministerial chiefs of staff are political nominees, and they are responsible for hiring and firing any other ministerial staff. Hence, through their chiefs of staff, ministers are practically able to choose the staff they want – whether at the senior position at the ministry or at the most junior clerk position at the smallest state office in Slovakia they have under control. Officially, most public-sector and civil-service vacancies have to be and are properly advertised, but in reality, nothing stops ministers and their chiefs of staff to choose “the right” candidates – whether proper or bogus auditions are held or not. Although being based on purely anecdotal evidence, it is a public secret in Slovakia that many government vacancies are filled in this way.

What is more, ministers and their chiefs of staff have not only the power to easily hire the person they want but also to get rid of the person they do not want. The current wording of the Civil Service Act does not even make it mandatory for ministerial and other service offices to issue an explanation for the termination of a civil service job contract. This way, a minister can easily, through her chief of staff, replace all the ministry’s heads of sections and sometimes even heads of departments. If necessary, the ministry officially states “organisational reasons” as the reason for making redundancies. Civil-service shake-ups have been a common practice in Slovakia ever since 1993, and each time there was a change of the government (Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá 2011).

28 See for example Malíková 2005. For the latest empirical research on Slovak politico-administrative relations and their politicisation, see Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá 2011.
Table 3
Key characteristics of the system of Slovak civil service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall strategy covering human-resource management in civil service</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Decentralised decisions</td>
<td>Civil Service Office</td>
<td>Decentralised decisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Political position</td>
<td>Centralised (via Civil Service Office)</td>
<td>Hybrid system</td>
<td>Centralised (via Civil Service Office)</td>
<td>Delegated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the head of service office (i.e. chief of staff)</td>
<td>Political position</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>“Systematization” (Number and salaries for civil service jobs are set annually)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of human resources</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Delegated</td>
<td>Hybrid system</td>
<td>Centralised (via Civil Service Office)</td>
<td>Delegated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigning of posts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes but limited to “nominated” civil servants and mass recruitment – fast stream</td>
<td>Yes (seniority principle and examination)</td>
<td>No (individual ministries set their own rules)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informing about vacancies</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Seniority principle and examination)</td>
<td>Hybrid system (“nominated” civil service created for career progression)</td>
<td>No (Nominated civil service abolished)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job contest</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career progression</td>
<td>Seniority principle</td>
<td>Yes (seniority principle and examination)</td>
<td>Hybrid system (“nominated” civil service created for career progression)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life tenure</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (Nominated civil service abolished)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration</td>
<td>Low wages in civil service (especially compared to the private sector)</td>
<td>Flexible wages in order to make up for the difference in earnings in private vs public jobs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration based on seniority</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance-related pay</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (“service performance” – point system based on performance)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination of Civil service contract</td>
<td>According to the Labour Code</td>
<td>Civil Servants could be made redundant due to reorganisation (or other legal provisions). Those thought to be dismissed without just cause could file a complaint to the Civil Service Office.</td>
<td>Right to dismiss any civil servant without reason</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Staroňová and Láštic 2011.
Nevertheless, the Civil Service Act was passed in 2001 and at the time included a number of innovative schemes. Malíková argues that “the consolidation of new democratic regimes and their legitimacy requires the institutionalization of mechanisms of government that assure effective co-operation of elected (representative) power and non-elected (administrative) power in the process of creating and carrying out social and economic reforms” (Malíková 2006, 1365). The Act indeed attempted to set rules to politico-administrative relations which would secure stability in the civil service. However, once Slovakia joined the EU in May 2004, the Act started to be gradually cannibalised into its current form\textsuperscript{29}, which allows politicians and other political nominees in central-governmental offices to hire and fire, promote and pay as they wish or as their party wishes. Table 3 shows how radical and frequent changes were in key characteristics and principles of the system of Slovak civil service and in the Act itself.

On the other hand, one may argue that the current state of civil-service legislation allows ministers to use their managerial skills to their full potential – in theory to minimise transaction costs and to be able to choose and pay the best candidates for civil-service positions. However, ministers are instead often found misusing their discretionary powers to hire and fire any ministerial staff and reward them as they wish in order to award political patronage (Košťál et al. 2012). A similar mechanism is in operation at the local level. For instance, Rončák (2012) argues that the system of local self-government is far from a polyarchy, but instead political party and business interests often set the policy and influence self-government decisions – including for instance selection of staff.

3.3 The Civil Service Office

The Civil Service Office was established in order to meet the EU criteria of a professional and neutral civil service. Hence, this body came to be the main institution responsible for upholding professionalism, neutrality and ethical conduct of Slovak civil servants. The Office was also, among other duties, meant to gather and analyse civil-service data, advertise civil-service vacancies, organise selection process and job contests, accept civil servants’ appeals, coordinate education and training of civil servants.

The first Head of the Civil Service Office was considered to be a political appointee (Staroňová and Láštic 2011) but paradoxically struggled to find support for the Office even within his former political party (SDKU-DS). Minister of Finance Ivan Mikloš was the main opponent of the newly created office. He argued that the Office was too expensive, ineffective and rigid. What is more, he contended

\textsuperscript{29} Civil Service Act 400/2009. Since 2009 it has been already numerously amended.
that most of the Office’s original duties (e.g. recruitment process) had been delegated to individual ministries through a number of Civil Service Act amendments (ibid.). The Civil Service Office was dissolved in March 2006, just 3 months before the general election by the very same government and legislators who only 5 years ago voted for its creation.

Currently and despite the recently commenced ESO reform, the system of public administration in Slovakia still lacks any coherent human-resource strategy and/or coordination. For instance, according to Staroňová and Láštic (2012; 265), the reward structure is characterised by its “extreme fragmentation”. Although the ESO reform is meant to bring a number of radical changes to the structure and processes within the system of public administration (e.g. Pravda 2012, TA3 2012), the officially produced and publicly available materials so far make no mention of any significant changes in human-resource management (Sakova 2012; MINV SR 2013a; MINV SR 2013b).

### 4. Politicisation

Following Slovakia’s accession into the EU in 2004, the obligation to implement and follow EU regulations lost importance and increasingly started to be ignored. The gradual weakening of the Civil Service Act including the complete abolishment of the Civil Service Office best illustrates this move away from the EU regulations and recommendations towards greater politicisation, political discretion, and perhaps even corruption. In terms of politico-administrative relations, it can be argued that Slovak public administration moved back to a (functional) village-life model (Malíková 2006). Regarding local and regional self-government, the abolition of Regional Offices in 2007 and fiscal decentralisation to regional and municipal self-governments meant even greater freedom and a certain level of autonomy for self-governments.

Although the wording of the current Civil Service Act states that civil service shall be based on professionalism, political neutrality, impartiality, effectiveness, stable job conditions, and ethics; it has never been easier to hire and fire and to reward a civil servant based on ministerial and hence political discretion. Once the Civil Service Office was dissolved (2006) and further amendments have been made to the Civil Service Act, including removal of all civil-service neutrality safeguards, public administration, and in this case civil service, was again more prone to politicisation (Staroňová and Láštic 2011).

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30 Civil Service Act 400/2009.
The rise in the extent of ministerial freedom has acted as a double-edged sword – what one might call managerial discretion, the other might consider a rise in politicisation. On the one hand, the minister can fully use his managerial experience and sense and can effectively manage his or her staff. It is within her or her party’s discretionary power to establish for instance a functioning reward and pay-for-performance system. She does not have to wait if she is not satisfied with individual staff performance. Instead, she can fire and then hire as she pleases. Hence, the current human-resources system resembles the private sector in certain aspects. However, such a significant level of discretionary powers can also easily lead to their misuse, for instance in order to benefit private and/or party interests. For example, the political party which nominates the minister can then in a quid-pro-quo fashion ask her to offer jobs, lucrative positions, government grants and subsidies to certain people or companies. This can then result in the institutionalised system of political patronage and in the worst case even in nepotism and large-scale corruption. Corruption charges of politicians and political appointees do get wide exposure through Slovak media, but they are hardly ever taken to court, and there have been only very few court sentences. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the significant level of ministerial and political discretion has acted as a catalyst in many corruption charges and scandals. Others might have resulted from a lack of effective checks and balances such as non-functioning police, prosecution and judiciary (Košťál et al. 2012).

Hence, the outcome of this period (until 2012) in terms of the public-administration reform has been an even greater level of freedom and granting of new powers, both for local and regional self-government; and the rise in discretionary powers of individual ministers and other political appointees – what some might call even greater politicisation. Due to the largely underperforming system of checks and balances, government ministers and political appointees can use their discretionary powers in order to serve public interest but also to increase political, private or their individual gains. However, so far a comprehensive study evaluating ministerial discretion in Slovakia has not been conducted.

5. Modernisation II

In March 2012, Slovakia saw an unprecedented election result with the Smer-SD party winning enough votes and seats that it formed the government unilater-

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31 Perhaps the best know and arguably the biggest corruption scandal in Slovak history has been the Gorilla scandal, which erupted in early 2012 and resulted in large-scale public protests (e.g. Jacko 2012). A year later the public still awaits the first politician to be prosecuted. For information on the state of corruption in Slovakia, see for example Sipoš et al. 2012.
ally and is 7 seats short of constitutional majority.\textsuperscript{32} The historically first Slovak democratic one-party government since 1989 announced a new wave of public-administration reform, dubbed “ESO” (Efficient, Reliable, Open).\textsuperscript{33} However, despite having a clear parliamentary majority and a decisive and functioning central government, depoliticisation is very unlikely. The official government programme makes no mention of changes in politico-administrative relations (Programové vyhlášenie ... 2012). Instead, the social democratic government is promising a new radical wave of public-administration reform in terms of modernisation and increasing effectiveness and efficiency, and though not mentioning it by name – very much in the \textit{new-public-management} fashion.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{5.1 State administration shake-up}

Perhaps one of the clearest government reform goals is to decrease the number of all state-administration offices from 613 to 79. The government promised and has already delivered dissolution of 64 regional offices of specialised state administration.\textsuperscript{35} It also plans to reorganise, merge and bring all remaining local state-administration offices “under one roof”. They are now based in different buildings and towns throughout Slovakia, and the plan is to have only 79 Area Offices left which would represent the 79 existing Slovak districts, ideally based in as few buildings as possible and with easy electronic contact and access points. The Minister of Interior, who is responsible for the ongoing reform, argues it will make public services and state-administration staff costs cheaper, more efficient and accessible (RTVS 2012a). The reform programme and government representatives also emphasise in a rather PR-exercise way values such as transparency, quality, client approach, accountability, citizen involvement in decision-making and a “system of strategic planning and management” in civil service (Programové vyhlášenie ... 2012, 33). If the reform is fulfilled as planned, it will arguably deliver a significant public-administration reform, primarily in terms of its modernisation but also in terms of a considerable drop in central government spending.

However, critics point out that the proposals that have been put forward so far lack goals in terms of depoliticisation and/or further decentralisation but instead bring only structural changes to the bureaucratic system and an “illusion” of a reform in terms of resources saved (e.g. Hospodárske noviny 2012; RTVS 2012b).

\textsuperscript{32} SMER-SD currently holds 83 out of 150 seats.

\textsuperscript{33} From the Slovak efektívna, spoľahlivá a otvorená.

\textsuperscript{34} For media coverage of the reform, see for example: TA3 2012; Sita 2012; Pravda 2012; Kováč 2012; RTVS 2012a.

\textsuperscript{35} Act no. 345/2012 on Some Measures Regarding Local State Administration. The 64 offices ceased to exist on 1 January 2013.
If successful, the reform will merely bring a decrease in the number of state-administration offices present in municipalities and regions but not of their officials and staff (RTVS 2012b). The amount of public resources to be saved is also put into question. The government announced that thanks to the reform it will save up to 400 million EUR until 2015 and 700 million EUR until the end of 2016 – this would account for 1% of GDP of Slovakia (Sakova 2012). However, the critics argue that if any resources are cut, these will be due to overall cuts in government spending, not because of the benefits of the reform per se (RTVS 2012b). So far, considering the sheer scale of the reform, proposed structural changes and the amount of resources to be saved, the government has produced only very few and limited reform proposals, which lack any reform analysis. In terms of politico-administrative relations, the ongoing reform is very unlikely to change the status quo, too. The reform stages which include the abolition and integration of regional offices of specialised state administration (until the end of 2013) and the optimisation of central and overall state administration (beginning of 2013 and 2014) can be seen in Table 4 below.

### Table 4

The “ESO” public-administration reform stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012</strong></td>
<td>Abolition of Regional Offices of Specialised State Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1.2013</strong></td>
<td>Integration of Regional Offices of Specialised State Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td>Optimization of State Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1.2014</strong></td>
<td>Provision of e-services by State Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014–2016</strong></td>
<td>Optimization of Central State Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2016–2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sakova 2012.

### 5.2 The future of politico-administrative relations

The overarching issue throughout the Slovak public-administration reform and modernisation in particular has been politico-administrative relations. Modern

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36 The only officially available information through the Ministry of Interior website: MINV SR 2013a; MINV SR 2013b.
systems of public administration and good governance principles focus on increasing effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, transparency and building working relationships between politicians and bureaucracy. The Slovak Civil Service Act and Public Service Act from 2001 were meant to bring more light into this relationship. However, changes which followed led to a return in politico-administrative relations back to the pre-2001 status quo. Despite the recent restart of the reform, the pattern of administrative behaviour in the Slovak system of public administration will most likely remain what B. G. Peters calls “functional village life model” (Peters 2001). According to this model, administrative behaviour and politico-administrative relations are typical for their high degree of integration of the values and goals of both politicians (representatives) and officials (civil and public servants). Efforts to professionalise and depoliticise civil service have led to a more “formal-legal model”. However, following the EU accession in 2004, legislators took a step back and gradually removed all civil-service neutrality safeguards and hence arguably the politico-administrative relations both institutionally and in practice moved back to the (functional) village-life model.

Staroňová and Láštic (2011) argue that the prevailing resortism and the lack of legal stability in terms of politico-administrative relations is the result of an electoral system which leads to coalition governments. They also conclude that Slovakia’s politico-administrative relations lead to a system of public administration which is open to political abuse of power (ibid.). Although the current government is historically the first non-coalition government in Slovakia since 1989 and has a safe parliamentary majority, it is not likely to alter the course in terms of political and administrative relations at least until the next general election in 2016.

Last but not least, despite the formally more or less completed public-administration reform in terms of decentralisation, Slovakia still suffers from problems resulting from largely non-functional multi-level governance (Malíková 2010). For instance, there is still a lack of horizontal and vertical coordination of actions by local, regional and central government politicians and officials. According to Malíková and Vavrová (2011, 91), the reform still needs to “follow new trends in building a knowledge society, developing sustainability in a broad context, furthering the effective use of all kinds of communication tools, and applying, improving and integrating all requirements of EU membership.” The current ESO reform, like all previous Slovak governments, also aspires to improve government-to-citizen (G2C) communication, both horizontal and vertical administrative interaction and the use of new e-government tools, in-

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37 See also Malíková 2006; 1376; also Malíková and Staroňová 2002.
cluding the proposed “Integrated Service Points” and “Contact Administrative Citizen Points” (Sakova 2012).

**Conclusion**

Public-administrative reform is not an end but merely a means to an end. In order to have a successful administrative reform, cross-party political support is needed, and the reform has to be accompanied by a longer administrative and political culture change. Also, perhaps the main reason why the Slovak public administration reform – especially modernisation, has not been more successful and lasting is the fact that most of the reform measures so far have been implemented not because of genuine public interest or a matter of natural administrative development but because of EU conditionality. Once the EU conditions were met and Slovakia joined the EU, the measures seemed to be no longer required, and hence they have been continually attenuated.

The Velvet Revolution (1989) signalled the first wave of change in the system of Slovak public administration. The first decentralisation phase soon followed, and only six years later the government commenced deconcentration of public administration. The year 2001 was crucial for the public-administration-reform continuance – both in terms of decentralisation and modernisation. The peak reform efforts were reached in 2004 when Slovakia joined the EU. Afterwards, Slovak civil service has experienced a move back in terms of further politicisation of politico-administrative relations. The recently announced and commenced government plan to improve the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of public administration could signal a new wave of public-administration reform, but critics remain sceptical.

The reform process experienced a number of difficulties and in the end was often far away from the originally devised plans and documents. Nevertheless, the reform process did take place and resulted in sound accomplishments. However, if it had not been for the EU-accession conditionality, the administrative reform – both regional decentralisation and public-administration modernisation would not have occurred at the same pace, and arguably would not have occurred at all.

Also, in terms of local and regional decentralisation more impact assessments are still needed to objectively evaluate the extent of the reform success. Having fragmented local government could be viewed as a good example of subsidiarity and a high level of local democracy, but in order to achieve effectiveness, political culture and active civil society must be present in the long run. The considerable
level of decentralisation and fragmentation has brought opportunities for public participation on the one hand but often at the cost of efficiency on the other.

In terms of politico-administrative relations in civil service and in the system of public administration as a whole, politicisation prevails. Politicisation occurs and affects the organisation and staff changes at the central, local and previously at the regional state-administration level, too. The current wording of the Civil Service Act and other related legislation allows ministers to hire, fire and reward as they wish. This does not only negatively affect economic growth and public competition but also threatens the neutrality and integrity of the civil service and in the end also the quality of provided services. Although the current ESO public-administration reform has sound aspirations, it is very unlikely to bring any changes to the politico-administrative relations’ status quo.

To conclude, the Slovak case of public-administration reform is a story of both progress and regress. Formally and institutionally, the reform has indeed occurred with some sound results. However, in terms of politico-administrative relations – and especially in the field of professional conduct, political nominations, ethos and managerial style of public administrators – whether at the local, regional or central government level, Slovak public administration seemed to take maybe not one step forward and two steps back, but overall rather an unfinished step forward. Current reform developments in Slovakia give hope that public administration will be closer to the people and move even further to its original purpose – to serve citizens at better quality and less cost. Nevertheless, the short modern history of public administration in Slovakia shows that there is still an urgent need for its depoliticisation and setting clear rules and stability to politico-administrative relations.

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Public Administration and Public Administration Reform in the Western Balkan Countries

DIMCE NIKOLOV

“Public service is a public trust. Citizens expect public servants to serve the public interest with fairness and to manage public resources on a daily basis.”

(OECD 2000, 1)

1. Introduction

Over the two decades of transition, Western Balkan (WB) countries went through a difficult period of unprecedented political, economic and social changes. Most of them have experienced wars, conflicts, as well as political and constitutional crises. Political instability and numerous changes of governments have prevented the rapid transition that other Central European countries enjoyed. As a result, poor economic performance have left these countries with huge public deficits, which makes PAR even more difficult.

One of the very first complex spheres in the institutional picture of the WB countries has been the transformation of the public administration (PA) in order to strengthen their overall institutional capacities and to respond adequately to the requirements of the administration functions with the European regulations.

The development of the WB countries is still in many ways controversial: a) they are (still) economies in transition, with the big burden of their painful economic and social reforms; b) these states are also post-conflict societies, still potentially vulnerable and in a process of strengthening their democratic values and institutions; c) and they are at the same time European Union (EU) membership aspirants, establishing different levels of integration with the EU. But they are also a specific group of countries in many aspects, representing a sub-region in the Balkans of shared history, culture, ethnicities and a multi-ethnic environment. These countries are both similar and different in their reforming processes, including in the PA efforts to introduce changes in this very important area of reform activities. The common heritage of history has left many traces in law, institutions and exposure to administrative and economic concepts. But at the same time, all these countries are different. Those which participated in the federation of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia have developed a common administrative system. However, it was influenced by a different heritage, during their period of history within the Ottoman and/or Austro-Hungarian em-
pires. All these elements have played an important role in (re)building their legal and administrative systems after the dissolution of the former SFR of Yugoslavia.

In spite of twenty years of independence, most of the ex-Yugoslav republics still have not built strong PA capacities that are characteristic in the developed EU countries. This is stated even in some recent studies referring to “main drivers of public administration modernization”, placing most of the WB states in the group of “very low” or “medium”.

The achievements in PA and public-administration reform (PAR) vary from country to country, although there is a common understanding that PAR cannot be separated from the economic, social and democratic context. In the EU pre-accession countries, for example, considerable efforts are being made to modernize the PAR legal framework, as it is required by the EU. However, in some of these states, including EU candidate countries, the European Commission has noted that insufficient attention has been given to areas such as implementation and monitoring correctly applied procedures, which are of pivotal importance for successful PAR, creating better conditions and career opportunities within the civil service. Also the lack of clear leadership by the governments has slowed down the reform processes.

For these countries a comprehensive PAR is a prerequisite both for their economic and social development and further successful integration into the EU. Some of the WB states are EU candidate countries, and the potential candidates already have many years of unique experience in their political and economic transition, but little progress has been made in reforming PA. Although in recent years we have witnessed a significant expansion in the scale, scope and depth of public-sector institutional reform activities in the WB, a fully implemented reform in PA is required.

Regional cooperation and exchange of good practices and positive experiences among the WB countries is of great importance, although the financial and technical assistance of the international community is still of enormous importance for implementing PAR. In this regard, the United Nations and its agencies, the EU, OSCE, individual donor countries and other stakeholders, continue to play significant roles in assisting the PAR processes in the countries of the WB region in their efforts to improve the public services.

However, the openness to experience and learning from others, as an ongoing process in Europe, even slowly, has led to some results in recent few years. There is a clear understanding by the WB countries about the need of adoption and im-

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1 South-Eastern European Administrative Studies ASsee Online Series, No. 1/2011.
Implementation of the new practices to offer good quality and customer satisfaction in PA, leaving behind the model of bureaucracy and inefficiency, and looking for a new model where service quality and efficiency mean reduction of administrative burden, leading to customer satisfaction.

Introducing information and communication technologies (ICT) and innovations in PA, which is co-occurring as a parallel process with PAR in the countries of the WB region, is of great importance, even if in some of these countries it is still in its initial phase. Not surprisingly, the “institutional innovations” which are focused at the renewal of old established institutions and the creation of new institutions dominate the PA WB innovation scene. The reality is, however, that the innovations in the PA countries from the WB region, lag far behind EU countries, although during the last few years, a clear progress has been achieved.

2. Regional overview of Public Administration (PA) and Public Administration Reform (PAR)

2.1 Background

Over the period of two decades, the WB countries have mainly focused on the reforms dedicated to the market economy and building democratic political institutions. The reform of PA, along with reforms of healthcare and other social support systems has been severely lagging behind.

One of the basic problems in introducing and implementing the reform in PA has been the transformation of the old system and its legislative framework into the new, modern public-administration/civil-service system which is predominantly used in the Western European countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo have inherited the PA system practiced in ex-Yugoslavia, which was not efficient and effective enough.²

Initially, most of the administrative reform efforts have been focused on the priority of assuring financing of the state and then on the crucial economic functions. Nevertheless, a state can only function effectively, and with integrity, if it has a constitutional and administrative framework that ensures legal certainty, sound management and effective control of public resources. Reform and consolidation of the horizontal systems of administration are now seen as essential goals. The scope and nature of public-administration reforms in the WB countries is unprec-

² However, it should be noted that the former Yugoslav states, contrary to most Central and Eastern European countries, have a very legalistic tradition and also a public-law tradition. This is why all these states have an administrative legal framework based on public law.
edented. Its complexity is even more emphasized, due to the specific aspects in local-government reform.

Although the PAR processes started years ago, the reformers in some of these countries have not yet gained the necessary support. They have learned a little from the more advanced, acceding countries from Central and Eastern Europe. But the primary responsibility for the success of PAR lies with the governments and the support of all relevant political authorities.

Finally, PAR is a process that cuts across all spheres of government and is closely interlinked with EU accession and association. The task of preparing the WB countries for their gradual integration into European structures is a priority for the EU. Their prospects for integration into the EU have been repeated to the WB countries time and again. Within the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU has set up partnerships with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, including Kosovo (as defined by UN SC resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999), and recognized them as potential candidates for membership. Croatia already benefits from its own accession partnership. However, the achievements made are different and depend on the developments and overall progress made in each country.  

2.2 An overview of the region

Over the period of the last several years, most of the governments in the WB countries have made significant efforts in the implementation of their PAR. They have undertaken varying degrees of reform, and some progress has been made. International organizations and donors in the region also encourage PAR heavily, which they see as a way of ensuring that aid is more efficiently used.

Most PA processes in the region are devoted to producing goods and services for citizens. Each of the countries in the region even has its own specific develop-

3 Croatia signed an EU accession treaty last year and should join the EU in July 2013, once all 27 existing EU members have ratified the deal. Macedonia has submitted an application for membership, and EU candidate status was granted to the country in December 2005. It is expected to open negotiating chapters after resolving the differences on the name issue with Greece. The main development in recent years has been progress on visa liberalization, with a fully-fledged visa-liberalization regime between the EU and Macedonia coming into force in December 2009. The decision also applies to Montenegro and Serbia. Montenegro applied for EU membership in 2008 and gained candidate status in December 2010. Recently, the EU has granted Serbia candidate status. Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in June 2008, paving the way for eventual EU accession. Yet the process was extremely slow and arduous owing to a lack of agreement between the country’s political leaders. Albania signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in June 2006 and submitted its application for EU membership in April 2009. Kosovo (as defined in Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council), took a step closer to European integration in March 2012 when the EU Enlargement Commission officially launched a feasibility study on an EU-Kosovo association deal.
ments in their public/civil-service systems and PAR (see country analysis), but they all have both similar characteristics and difficulties. The most present are the following:

a) **Legal framework.** All countries of the region are at different stages of progress in implementing their Law on the civil service. For most of them, there is a need for improvement by adopting a new and improved version, adjusted to the EU norms and standards.

b) Most WB civil-service systems have traditionally been based on **career models**. Gradual career development was based primarily on education qualifications and “years in service”. Over the past decade(s) most of the WB countries reformed their civil-service systems by introducing principles of **position-based models**. The most visible reforms in this respect were carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, while Montenegro has generally kept its career civil-service system in place. Emphasis has been laid on competition for obtaining a higher position, civil servants’ performance, merit and skills.

c) **Politicization.** Political appointments still account for a large part of the recruitment of civil servants in the WB. Reforms seek to limit political appointments to a small upper level of positions.

d) The lack of explicit **promotion** perspectives and the feeling that the best jobs are inaccessible to non-political professionals can be detrimental to the motivation of well-performing civil servants.

e) **Recruitment and training.** Civil servants generally receive only on-the-job training, since the public-administration training institutions are still in the process of defining and developing their activities. In some countries new and special training institutions have been created. The politicization of appointments compounds this problem, since this regularly brings in vast numbers of untrained officials. Training in modern administration techniques (such as New Public Management), which aims to introduce practices used in business administration and create a more service-oriented culture, is mainly absent.

f) **Wages.** Public-servant salaries vary from country to country. But, in general, they remain low, especially in comparison with the private sector and staff doing similar jobs for international organizations based in these countries.

g) **Overstaffing.** These systems tend to be massively overstuffed, not least because it is often impossible to discharge underperforming employees. Advocating such a policy is thus extremely risky for politicians.

h) **Corruption.** Corruption is still a great problem in all WB countries. Moreover, corruption takes the form not just of bribes paid in exchange for services, but
also the distribution of lucrative procurement contracts to cronies. This creates vested interests that later present an obstacle to reform PA, and not only PAR.

i) Reform strategy. Not all countries have a “real” PAR strategy, and in some cases, it takes a long time from drafting to adoption by the government. Formulating and especially implementing this strategy is a difficult task for all governments in the region. The efforts made by the international agencies that assist with PAR in the region could help the governments in better designing the strategy in accordance with the specific situation in each country.

2.3 The situation in the individual countries

Albania

During its period of transition and building a democratic society, PA has been one of the weakest links in the Albanian government system.

PAR has been introduced as a part of a broader reform context that included the country’s entire institutional system, inspired by the EU Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). In order to achieve the reform goals, the Strategy for State Administrative and Institutional Reform was introduced, whose main objectives are re-establishing democracy and rule of law, encouraging the political dialogue, and pursuing economic, political and social stabilization. Also the Department of Public Administration (DoPA) has been established. In line with the EU’s recommendations and based on its priorities, the Government of Albania aims to undertake amendments to the Civil Service Law; improve the functioning of PA in terms of the functioning of the institutions of the executive; draft by-laws in line with the New Civil Service Law; ensure effective implementation of the existing legal framework; make fully functional the Human Resources Management Information System; offer on-going training for effective response to development needs of the Civil Service.

Important steps in PAR have been taken, including amendments to the civil-service law, with a view to enhancing professionalism and de-politicization of PA and to strengthen the merit-based approach to appointments and promotions.

In pursuit of the EU and national objectives and under the Cross-cutting Strategy of Public Administration Reform, 2009–2013 the Albanian government with the assistance of SIGMA experts drafted a policy paper exploring various changes to be put in place by means of a new Law on the Civil Service.

The general administrative legal framework – the Law on State Administration, and the Law on Government and the Code of Administrative Procedures offers
a good base, but need reviewing to be fully compatible with common EU standards. Nevertheless, general management skills and human-resource management knowledge, particularly of senior officials, are still insufficient.

**Recruitment and promotion** are based on merit and the professional qualities of the candidates. Recruitment is carried out by means of open competition, and the hiring of new employees is managed by the central administrative body. Civil Service Commission is an independent body dealing with issues of recruitment.

**Salaries.** The level of the salaries in the civil service remains low, and it is one of the constant concerns of the administration. The salaries are above the average level, but they are not competitive with the private sector and the international organizations’ staff in the country. Since the civil-service law is based on a position system, the lack of competitiveness creates some problem for recruiting and retaining young professional staff.

**Training activities** for the civil servants have been improved significantly with the establishment of the Training Institute of Public Administration (TIPA), a governmental institution under the supervision of the DoPA. It has become a leading training center covering central- and local-government civil servants.

**Transparency** in PA is inadequate. The Albanian governments took measures to guarantee transparency, which should ensure that administrative procedures and acts are publicly available (mainly through printed media, since it is a low percentage of the population that has access to the Internet).

**Corruption.** Fight against corruption remains one of highest declared priorities, and special attention has been given to cooperation with civil society and the business community. The work of the Governmental Commission of the Fight against Corruption and the National Anti-Corruption Plan “the Matrix” (revised in 2003) have been important step forward. Nevertheless, corruption still is hampering economic and social development, and the corruption index of the country remains high.

**ICT.** Ten years ago an e-government strategy was adopted. Although it was considered as an important step forward in improving the relationship between PA, the citizenry and the private sector, ICT is not still developed accordingly and is
lagging behind the other countries in the region. However, the progress made recently is evident and encouraging.\textsuperscript{4}

*Foreign assistance* is still an important ingredient in government’s efforts for faster and better PAR implementation.

The improvement of public administrative capacities in Albania represents one of the key criteria for EU membership. Under the framework of the Public Administration Reform Strategy, 2009–2013, DoPA is working on the initiative of establishing the Albanian School of Public Administration.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

PA and PAR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is complex, just as its federal and local structure is complex. Such a structure was established by the Dayton Peace Agreement, and it is supported by strong presence, influence and extensive assistance of the international community.

B&H is ethnically divided on almost all administrative levels, with weak central institutions and strong entities, but each with their own structure: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is decentralized and includes 10 cantons, while Republika Srpska is centralized, and the third administrative unit is composed of the Brčko District. The political power in the entire country is divided among the political parties, each with a strong nationalist agenda and very often without a common vision and political will to implement a program of changes.

Given the context, PA and the implementation of PAR is quite a challenging task. Political leaders formally are committed to PAR; the PA legal framework is in place, and key reform institutions have been established several years ago (civil-service agencies and Public Administration Coordinator Office).

The success of PAR is determined to a large extent by the political will of top-level decision makers. The administrative structure is very fragmented, and the new legal framework is not compatible across the entities. The Republika Srpska (RS), as one of two entities, initiated the process of civil-service reform as early

\textsuperscript{4} The PAD website (www.pad.gov.al) has been introduced and is considered an important information source for the entire public administration and citizens as well. It has been reconstructed as a portal for public administration, especially for central state institutions. **Gov-Net**: Introduced in 2005, following the successful completion of an ambitious project, an Inter ministerial Network has been built, connecting the Council of Ministers with all Ministries, the Center of Official Publications and State Statistical Institute (INSTAT). **E-mail Service**: Based on Gov-Net infrastructure, different electronic services are being offered. One of them is the central e-mail service. All governmental e-mail messages have been centralized, and every e-mail passes through several filters before entering or leaving the governmental infrastructure. **Database for HRM**: Setting up the Human Resources Management (HRM) System is actually one of the most critical tasks of PAD. Because of its importance and complexity (integrated action with a great number of other institutions is required) a considerable amount of available resources is dedicated to this project.
as 1997, but the real PAR in B&H started by the adaptation of the document PAR: *Our Programme*, on 28 March 2003.

The Council for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement (PIC) established the Inter-Governmental Task Force for Public Administration Reform, which is an important body, and its main goal is to supervise and coordinate all activities regarding PAR. In the Federation of B&H the Justice Ministry’s Institute for Public Administration is directly in charge of matters regarding PAR, and in RS the Ministry for Local Government and Administration is in charge of state administration, organizing and managing administrative units.

PA at the municipal and cantonal levels is not efficient. Many basic public services are not provided, and even where they are, they are offered in an unsatisfactory or untimely manner. In addition, PA is overly politicized. Often, municipal and cantonal positions are assigned based on political preference, rather than merit and experience. Widespread cronyism leads to employing staff that are not qualified to perform their duties. Government authorities believe that reduction of the size and cost of PA is essential to further EU integration. Constitutional reforms beyond Dayton Agreement are necessary for the country in order to be able to manage closer relations with the EU.

The *Civil Service Law(s)* in both entities and at the state level have been adopted in 2002 by the RS and, for the state level, by a decision of the High Representative, and later on in the Federation of B&H (2003) and in Brčko Distrikt (2006). However these laws do not fully promote a merit-based system.

Recruitment and promotion are regulated by the Civil Service Laws, but there are differences. In 2002 a Civil Service Agency has been created in the RS, and at the state level. Civil Service Agencies intended to keep civil-service management out of political interference. There is a lack of accountability systems, and many staff also lack the necessary qualifications.

The politicization in the Republic of Srpska (RS) civil service is still strongly present. The situation is not different even in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H) and the common institutions (B&H). Brčko district (BD) politicians are basically unwilling to promote a professional, merit-based bureaucracy.

Salaries are in accordance with the type of the position of the civil servant. The Law on Civil Service regulates the initial basis for calculation of a civil servant’s salary, categorized in six salary grades. A few years ago, a reform of the salary system was introduced, which included politicians and public employees. The aim of the reform was to raise salaries for politicians, while none or very small increases are foreseen for civil servants.
Training is also regulated by the Law on Civil Service and it is an obligation of the civil servants to make permanent efforts regarding their on-the-job and further training as well as study and research. The CSA organizes numerous training activities for different profiles of civil servants every year. Training for B&H Common Institutions’ civil servants has improved. There are more funds from the budget available for training.

Corruption as a problem remains, and it is an important obstacle for the implementation not only of the economic reform in the country. Corruption is widespread in all public administrations. Privatization is another major source of corruption, but it mainly involves politicians, not civil servants. Health care and higher education are also fields where scandalous bribe-giving and -taking have taken place.

A positive step has been the establishment of the Public Administration Co-ordination Offices (PARCO) in 2006 within the B&H Common Institutions. The establishment of this office and similar bodies in the entities and in Brčko is of great importance for further strengthening of the capacities and opening of better paths for public administration and civil-service reform.

Croatia

The Croatian PA is well structured and placed to meet the challenges arising from the growing demands by the EU. It consists of: a) state administration, b) local and regional self-government, and c) public services (services of general interest). There are two levels and four types of state administrative bodies. At the central level there are ministries, the state administrative organizations and the central state offices. The central state offices are in the closest relation with the Prime Minister (Koprič 2011). They (20 of them) are in charge of the first-instance administrative procedures. There is also a Government’s Office mainly functioning as the Government’s secretariat.

In the whole public sector, there are four categories of civil servants (there is also a fifth category in the public sector which comprises the employees of public companies, e.g. of utility services, state oil company, state postal service, state electric power industry, etc.).

PA in Croatia has gone through numerous reforms. They included: a) transition from patrimonial to professional management; b) introducing and implementation of horizontal functional integration, instead of vertical integration, i.e. differentiation by which the society is changed and adapted through specialized activities, professions and institutions, and the public administration becomes one of the specialized areas; c) in parallel with the differentiation of the society there
was an inner differentiation of the state-governmental and other organizations around PA and related organizations, through which the government achieves its objectives.

Nevertheless, the main priority for PAR in Croatia at all levels has always been the decentralization of tasks and structures. Major PAR progress has been made in the area of legislation in order to improve PA efficiency.

European accession seems to be the main driver for PAR. Also the new changes of the Law on Civil Servants should facilitate employment in civil service, thus opening the possibility to build on administrative capacity of PA bodies, in order to implement the process of adjustment to the EU.

The Central State Office for Public Administration was also established, as a special public administration body which performs the activities of the former Ministry of Administration. The Office is headed by the State Secretary and will consist of 11 organizational units.

A new *Strategy for Public Administration Reform* was adopted by the government in March 2008. This strategy is only for state-administration reform (not the public administration as a whole because it does not include local administration).

The general administrative legal framework in the country is in place. There is a Law on State Administration, a Law on Competencies and Organization and an Administrative Procedures Law.

*Ombudsman.* There are four independent ombudsman institutions in Croatia: a general ombudsman (also in charge of protecting local and regional self-government); an ombudsman for the protection of children; an ombudsman for protecting gender equality; and an ombudsman introduced by the Law on Ombudsman for Disabled Persons (OG 107/07, in force since 1 January 2008).

*Recruitment* is based on public competition, and admission to the public service is subject to a mandatory three-month trial period. Civil servants must have qualifications prescribed by law and other regulations. The establishment of a highly professional, merit-based recruitment process, and the depoliticization of the overall human-resources management policy, is one of the priorities of PAR.

*Salaries* are determined by classification into salary classes of a group of positions, rank and work posts. Salaries in the civil service in Croatia are higher than in the rest of the region, but due to the relatively high cost of living, the problems in recruiting and retaining qualified staff is still present.

*Training.* *Professional civil-service training* is the obligation of the civil servants. The Civil Service Agency (CSA) has the task of developing the overall training
strategy. The Civil Service Training Centre is now running and has delivered a number of programs for thousands of civil servants.

*ICT* has gradually been introduced into PA. Following several years of investment in IT solutions and in the development of e-Government, the Croatian Government adopted this decision with the aim to further develop e-Government in line with the EU’s e-Government Action Plan 2011–2015.

**Macedonia**

From its independence in 1991, Macedonia has gone through a period of complex economic, political and administrative development. As a result, a number of strategies and action plans have been adopted and implemented to stabilize the overall situation of the country, including two important strategies and action plans for public-sector reform adopted in May 1999 and in December 2010. The main goals of both strategies have been the adoption of new reform legislation and the introduction of better administrative structures and processes.

Due to the complex political events and the security crisis in the country in 2001, the implementation of the Strategy for Reform of Public Administration, as well as the Action Plan, was slowed down.

One of the greatest concerns for Macedonia since the independence has been the high “politicization of the public service” that mainly involves the interference of the political parties that are in power in the organizational structure of the Civil Service and in the wider PA system. In December 2010, the *new Strategy on public administration reform (2010–2015)* was adopted. The main results of the Strategy are expected to be in the areas of public finances, human-resource management, e-Government and management and corruption.

The Law on Civil Servants was introduced in 2000, and in addition, in April 2010 the Law on Public Servants was adopted providing special treatment for all public-sector employees under the current general public law in the country.

Also, following the EU recommendations, in January 2011, a new Ministry of Information Society and Administration – MISA – was established. Its main goal in the field of PA is undertaking organizational measures and coordinating the implementation of the PAR processes in order to speed up the reforms in every sphere of the society.

MISA undertook a part of the responsibilities related to the administration and its reform that until then belonged to the State Civil Service Agency (now Agency of Administration after the establishment of the new Ministry). According to the newly enacted Law on Public Employees (expected to be implemented from
April–May 2011), the overall responsibility of the Agency of Administration is within the possibility for public employees to use training and professional development centers (within the Agency).

Corruption is still one of the obstacles to achieving better results in the civil-service system. Proceeding with the fight against corruption is still one of the main challenges that the country needs to overcome in order to have progress.

Recruitment. Civil Servant Agency responsibility is also in the areas of recruitment. The candidates should meet general requirements set up by the Law on Civil Servants, and the vacancies should be announced in at least two daily newspapers. The Agency defines criteria, standards and the procedure for employment and selection. Open competition is mandatory for all civil-service employment, and principles such as equal access, equal conditions and equitable representation (as established by the so-called Ohrid Agreement) are guaranteed by law.

Salaries of civil servants, which are also regulated by the Law on Civil Servants, are generally too low to attract and retain qualified staff. The salaries of the public employees are regulated by the General Law on Salaries and a nationwide collective agreement for the public sector.

Civil-service training is defined as a right and duty of professional development, and it is in accordance with the needs of the body where the civil servant is employed. Nevertheless, it is still carried out on an ad-hoc basis.

ICT. In recent years, Macedonia has established and developed an institutional ICT system. MISA has the responsibility, among other areas, for all issues pertaining to information technologies. Recently, the Ministry was given enhanced responsibilities in PA. It is responsible for policy and strategy in e-Government. The Commision for Information Technology has also been established, and its responsibility is to draw the country’s strategy and policy for IT.

Serbia

The development of PA in Serbia can be divided into two stages: before and after the adoption of the Public Administration Reform Strategy. This is because the Strategy is the first strategic document of PAR in Serbia. Although the reform process started in 2004, it should be noted that Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2008 and officially handed over the application for full EU membership in December 2009 (Džinić 2011).

According to the European Commission’s annual progress reports for Serbia, there has been some progress in PAR. However, the legislative framework is still
incomplete and needs to be fully aligned with EU standards. Furthermore, there is a lack of capacity and coordination in certain PA sectors.

After the breakdown of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), two main phases, each with two sub-phases, regarding the position, the role and the development of public administration in Serbia, can be identified. The first one began in 1990 and ended in 2004, when the PAR Strategy was adopted. The second phase started with the adoption of the PAR Strategy. Its first sub-phase finished in 2008 with the expiration of the Action Plan 2004–2008 for the implementation of the PAR Strategy and the adoption of the Action Plan 2008–2012, when the second sub-phase was launched.

After the secession of Montenegro from Serbia, Serbian state administration went through a serious reorganization. Some of the tasks had to be transferred to the Serbian state administration, while others had to be omitted, distended or reformulated. It is considered that the establishment of the new ministries and other state administrative bodies was rather a division of powers within the coalition Government than the reflection of real functional requirements. The Law on Ministries of 2011 has reduced the number of state administrative bodies although there have been some ideas for more radical reduction.

The government’s PAR focuses on the following issues: application of the principle of the rule of law; increasing openness to the citizenry through increased transparency; new mechanisms to comply with the responsibilities and to diversify competences; improving the efficiency and efficacy of the public administration as well as introducing institutional changes and new institutional subjects (agencies, commissions, consultative bodies, ombudsman and control agencies).

In order to meet the goals of its reform program and create a new modern and efficient PA, the Serbian government, along with the Agency for the Development of the Public Administration (APAD), has identified several principles, including: separation between politics and administration; individual responsibility for public-administration employees and training programs; incrementing job security and stability, raising salaries and drafting a general workers’ statute; introducing merit-based raises and promotions; rigorous selection procedures for public administration staff and up-to-date training.

ICT. The introduction of ICT into PA was another important step, especially from an organizational and operational point of view. It started with the creation of networks regarding human-resource management and law preparation. These innovations sped up the decision-making process and improved the functioning of PA.
Recruitment. There are two main types of civil-service positions: appointed positions as posts where civil servants have powers and responsibilities pertinent to directing and coordinating work in a state authority, and executorial positions, defined negatively as those that are not appointed, i.e. executive job positions, including the positions of officers of subordinate organizational units in state authorities. The recruitment is now focused on the ability and skills of candidates, evaluated according to objective selection criteria. Serbia has not fully implemented the merit system in its civil service.

Training of the Civil Servants. The LCS distinguishes between the vocational training and additional education. The vocational training is based on the annual general and special programs. In early 2010, the fourth General Programme of Professional Development for Civil Servants encompassing a wide range of topics was adopted by the Government. There is no training center, and the numerous training programs are carried out by different state authorities.

PAR is advancing at a slow and uneven pace. Some of the identified obstacles are:

a) partocracy as the main characteristic of the whole political situation in Serbia,
b) lack of legal culture,
c) unsatisfactory capacity of ministries responsible for managing the PAR process due to an overall lack of strategic approach,
d) poor quality of legislation,
e) hierarchic nature of decision-making inherited from the communist regime,
f) weak local-budget administrative capacities,
g) lack of capacity to benefit from foreign support.

Montenegro

Montenegro has made considerable progress toward creating a more efficient public sector. Nevertheless, the country is still facing the challenge of building a PA that ensures both the legality and the good quality of administrative actions.

In 2010, the Government of Montenegro adopted the new Public Administration Reform Strategy (PARS) for the period 2011–2016. The Strategy is a comprehensive document that provides a framework for reform in this area. It is focused on improving the management and administrative capacity, or the way of policy, organization of PA, preparation and execution of budget, employment policies, staff training, monitoring and evaluation. The strategy identifies the criteria for joining the EU, harmonized with the obligations deriving from the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which entered into force on 1 May 2010. The PARS for 2002–2009, was also an important achievement for the development of the country’s administrative system.
The Strategy comprises, as its core elements, the establishment of a professional, politically independent, civil service and the development of a rule-of-law-based and citizen-oriented system of administrative procedures. It further enhances transparency and accountability by avoiding unnecessarily complicated, formalistic and lengthy processes. The Strategy is a necessary mechanism for the creation of an efficient PA capable of integrating into the European administrative system.

The Government of Montenegro is facing the challenge of modernizing its system of administrative procedures. The Government adopted a Policy Paper on Major Elements of a New Law on General Administrative Procedure which can be seen as a milestone on the country’s path to implementing the PARS 2011–2016.

The main progress in PA and local government reform in 2003/2004 has been made in the legislative sphere. The basic goal of reform activities is to harmonize the legal system of Montenegro with EU standards. The need to reform PA and corresponding legislation, particularly as regards civil servants, is very important for Montenegro’s efforts to achieve membership of the EU. The main objectives of the PAR process in Montenegro are the creation of a professional civil service under the rule of law, the transparency of the administrative process as well as efficiency in accomplishing the policy goals established in legislation.

The Government of Montenegro has decided that the revision of the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees will be more comprehensive than merely the introduction of the merit principle. The new Law was intended to be developed in 2010 in accordance with EU requirements and standards and with the support of the Defense Sector Security Reform (DSSR) Project (Ivanovic 2010).

Recruitment on the state level is usually carried out on the basis of a public announcement, and the decision on employment is taken by the principal of the state authority or by the government.

Training of civil servants. One of the main goals of the PAR process in Montenegro has been long-term training of the civil servants, thanks to a program promoted by the Institute for Public Administration, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. On-the-job training of civil servants is executed during their training period. Every civil servant is obliged to participate in all forms of advanced training that can be organized within public authorities. The current Law on Civil Servants and State Employees does not provide a clear legal definition of the scope of the civil service, nor does it fully reflect the merit principle in recruitment and promotion. A Working Group on the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees, operating at a senior level, was formed early in 2010 and has pro-
duced a policy paper whose objective was to approximate the Montenegrin civil-service legislation to the European Principles for Professional Civil Service. The policy paper was finalized in July 2010 and adopted by the government in March 2011, albeit quite a different version than the original one proposed in July 2010. The draft law will need thorough review in order to fully meet European principles, particularly regarding the merit principle.

**Kosovo**

Immediately after the proclamation of the independence (declared independence from Serbia, on 17 February 2008) the Kosovo authorities started to build new institutional capacities and to prepare new legislations.

Nevertheless, the basis for the PA system and PAR in Kosovo as a process and integral part of overall strategy for reconstruction of PA started years before the declared independence. PAR went through three major phases. The third and the last phase was marked by the launching of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) on 31 March 2004, containing specific targets, benchmarks and timelines for the next phase of political, economic, social and administrative reform.

An important role for establishing operating policies, procedures and standards, and a political and executive management structure, was played by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and the Cabinet. PISG took the responsibility for coordination, management and implementation of PAR. This responsibility was exercised through the high-level Steering Board (SBPA), chaired by the Prime Minister, composed of senior PISG and UNMIK representatives and supported by the Technical Secretariat for Public Administration (TSPA) in order to support the functioning of SBPA. Also a special body – the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS), provided expert advice to the SBPA in the design and implementation of the PA strategy.

Public Administration Strategy for Kosovo was launched in 2003 by PISG and UNMIK. The PISG and UNMIK also set up a joint Steering Board for Public Administration (SBPA) to promote coordinated implementation of both ongoing and future initiatives to strengthen the public sector. The main tasks of the SBPA were: to develop a Vision Statement on Public Administration; approve the short- and medium-term strategy for public administration; guide the process of transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to local authorities and related successor arrangements.

The Ministry of Public Services (MPS) was created by the UNMIK Regulation No 2001/19 (amended by Regulation No 2005/15 on the Executive Branch of the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo) as one of the first ministries in the PISG to serve as a catch-all institution for those public services that were delivered by PISG and could not be immediately accommodated elsewhere. Gradually, many of these functions have been turned over to other ministries (e.g. Ministry of Internal Affairs) or have become independent ministries in their own stead (e.g. Ministry of Local Government Administration). As a result, the MPS was a comparatively rare mixture of cross-cutting topics mainly related to public administration (PAR, civil service, e-government, property management) with some inherited functions concerning the delivery of specific public services – NGO registration, cadaster and statistics.

The newly established Ministry of Public Administration has a mission to: a) create a modern, stable and impartial PA serving citizens and businesses, and b) provide quality administrative services and functional infrastructure for government institutions (see: map.rks-gov.net/en/).

Most recent activities of the Ministry of Public Administration are oriented toward the drafting of the Law on Civil Service and Law on Civil Servants Salaries, aimed to regulate the position and salaries of the civil servants. Regulation on classification of jobs is approved by the Government of Kosovo, and until the end of the year it is expected to be introduced in the classification of the employees in all institutions of the Civil Service.

Meanwhile, the Draft Regulation on allowances on basic salary and other compensations of civil servants and draft regulation for standards of internal organization and systematization of jobs are already prepared and shall be submitted to the Government for approval. The draft law on Salaries of High Officials is expected to be finalized and to be forwarded for approval.

An important institution for the development of PA and PAR has been the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration – KIPA, as an executive agency of MPS. The KIPA drafted a Strategic Plan 2005–2007 and also 2007–2009, with a slight variation. The KIPA also drafted and prepared the Development Strategic Plan 2010–2013. The Law on Civil Service defines KIPA as “a responsible institution for implementation of training policies and strategies for training, education and development of capacities of Civil Service”.

The EU has reiterated (most recently at the December 2010 European Council) that Kosovo has a clear European perspective in line with the European perspective of the Western Balkan region. The EU remains committed to playing a leading role in ensuring the stability of Kosovo through a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission in the rule-of-law area through its Special
Representative and also its contribution to the International Civilian Office. The European Commission supports Kosovo’s European reform efforts and provides recommendations and help.

3. Conclusions

In spite of the limited progress made in PA processes and the implementation of the PAR/civil-service reform in the countries of the WB in recent years, it is important to note that in some of these countries significant achievements have been made. The governments of the WB countries consider PAR one of the priority issues, and it is high on the agenda of their reform activities. The number of new institutions has been increased in all countries, in comparison to the period of few years ago, and the institutional capacities are stronger. The introduction of ICT and e-Government is already in use in many government bodies, and there is a clear understanding that this tool is an excellent investment opportunity for more efficient and dynamic civil service, opening the door to innovation and better delivery of public services. Also, in most countries in the region the general administrative (and in some of them legal) framework is already in place, which is of great importance for the implementation of PAR. The PAR implementation in most of the countries is still slow, but it is going in the right direction and leads the fulfillment of its final goal – delivering quality services to the citizens.

Compared to the situation several years ago, the overall political situation and security in the region has improved significantly, and the governments have focused their activities on strengthening the reform processes, including the reform on PA. However, the main problems in the region remain: organized crime, illegal trafficking; very high corruption in all segments of the societies (including “endemic” corruption at all level of governance), an insecure and instable judicial system that is implemented selectively etc.

For the policy makers in these countries there is a clear understanding that building a modern and efficient civil-service system through a full implementation of PAR must be one of the highest priorities in the government strategies. The cost of reforming public/civil service is a great concern, but there are also a number of other difficulties, including poor performance management; inadequate recruitment and promotion systems that do not reflect properly countries’ realities (formal education; failing to attract/promote qualified staff); politicization of the civil service etc.

Another important concern is personnel that is not properly trained and insufficiently experienced. In addition, it is often promoted too quickly to senior posi-
tions, and training is a crucial feature of almost all PAR programs. Training is not only a sensitive issue that requires well-trained staff. Training is a continuous process and should also be supported by solid long-term training programs, and to include both central government employees and local officials.

For the overall success of PAR, there is a need for continued political will and support throughout all phases of PAR, because PAR is a process, and it is a slow process that requires permanent efforts by the governments in order to adjust PAR with the EU standards. This is especially important because of their clear aspirations to become full EU member states. In that regard, learning lessons from the rest of the EU, including EU member states from the wider Balkan region, could be a useful experience.

It is important to underline that PAR is an internally but also externally driven process and based on economic necessity. PA and PAR is also expensive, but long-term investment, particularly for the WB countries and their economies in transition. But, as it is noticed, nothing is as expensive and underproductive as badly-working civil service. In transition economies, including in most of the WB states, an efficient and effective public administration is even more important.

There is still a long way for the countries of this region to build an efficient public service. It requires these countries to find appropriate measures for overcoming the gaps and weaknesses detected, together with their causes.

Some of the most important measures are the following: weak or inadequate legislative framework; insufficient or inadequate institutional structure (in particular training and educational institutions for all civil servants); poor performance management; inefficient recruitment and promotion systems for the civil servants; high politicization of the civil service; high corruption at all levels (WB countries still count among the states with the highest levels of corruption in the world); poor pay and compensation regimes (due to many factors, including overstaffing, which lead to low motivation, corruption; lack of qualified staff etc.); inefficient merit-based systems; lack of partnership between the public sector with the civil society and private sector (in order to improve the quality of service delivery); better use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and e-governance; use of international assistance and donor support in appropriate way; reduction of the over-dependence on consultants, etc.

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Public Administration in the South Caucasus: Between Western Models and Hard Soviet Legacy

GEORGE TARKHAN-MOURAVI

1. Introduction

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent states, governments have been willing, sometimes under external pressure of donors, to break with the Soviet legacy in the area of governance and carry out reforms in public management. This was also true in the cases of the three South Caucasus states, even though the process got hindered by the ethno-territorial conflicts and civil turmoil of the early 1990s.

On-going globalisation is accompanied by strengthening and restructuring of regionalisation processes, competing integration and fragmentation trends, in particular following geopolitical quails such as the dissolution of the USSR. It should not be surprising to find some similarities between any group of post-Soviet states just because they are post-Soviet per se, and also between Caucasian states due to similarity in climate and the Southern temperament of its inhabitants at the very least.

The heritage of the Soviet past in the form of underdeveloped democratic institutions and political culture, along with the scars caused by civil tensions and in some cases ethno-territorial conflicts, still continues to haunt political processes, narrowing the space for political discourse and threatening democratic transition. The legacy of the decades of totalitarian rule would not wane quickly. In particular, the legacy of the Soviet public administration was dramatically different from Western standards that the new states strived to introduce instead (or sometimes pretended to do so), whether labelled by the vague but still fashionable terms of “New Public Management” (Peters 2008), “Neo-Weberian Public Administration” (Drechsler 2005), or by any other more traditional wording. Also the transplanting of Western concepts and ideas of public administration to a different cultural and axiological milieu may turn up results that would differ from initial intentions.

Even if dramatic political change of some sort has taken place in all post-Soviet states, it is well known that bureaucracies tend to preserve their basic features and are quite immune to change. At the same time, while many publications are dedicated to political and economic transformation in post-Soviet space, insufficient attention has been given to studying the transformation of communist-era
bureaucracy into a modern system of public service, which is an essential if underestimated aspect of building a modern state.

An observant eye can easily see many structural, institutional, political, and cultural similarities between the societies of the South Caucasus, some reflecting the common Soviet past and others linked to shared cultural influences. Some of these features are relatively easy to observe.

2. Post-Soviet similarities

The current situation in the region is characterised by high volatility and unpredictability. Equally uncertain is the geopolitical environment in which the region finds itself. In the Caucasus, the heritage of the Soviet past in the form of underdeveloped democratic institutions and political culture, along with the scars caused by authoritarian suppression, civil wars and ethno-territorial conflicts, still continues to haunt political processes and civil-society-building, narrowing the space for political and social discourse, and leading to what now is commonly called “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010, see also Furman 2008) of “hybrid regimes” (to use the term introduced first by Terry Lynn Karl back in 1995). Such hybrid regimes incorporate elements both of democracy and authoritarianism, and combine a high degree of state centralisation with stripping formally democratic institutions of real content, and their methodical replacement with substitutions that are intended to serve some of their functions but without challenging the incumbent leaderships’ hold on power (Wheatley and Zürcher 2008).

There are also other commonalities, and indeed the states that emerged from the Soviet breakup were initially very similar in many respects, and they underwent equally painful withdrawal from the Soviet relations between the state and the private segments of economy, the same system of paternalistic social welfare and state control over many aspects of life. Still, for instance, the Russian language continues to serve as lingua franca throughout the region (even if in some segments of the societies it is gradually replaced by English, especially in Georgia). Many specialists, particularly of older generations, were trained in similar professional and intellectual traditions, and national bureaucracies were accustomed to working in similar ways.

Respectively, one of the interesting political aspects of our region is the similar system of governance adopted by these countries. One may speak of “post-Soviet governance contagion” (in a distant analogy with the Arab spring, or rather reminding us of the so-called “Galton’s problem”, see, e.g., Neumayer and Plümper
2010), when elites borrow from one another various models and approaches, especially related to the way to strengthen power of the ruling party and weaken opposition, but also in terms of institutional arrangements. This in the first place refers to the presidential model as a universal one in all post-Soviet states, even though some of these may have tried a parliamentary model in the initial stage, as well. While there were calls to revert to the parliamentary model again in some of the countries, and Georgia currently has moved to a more mixed model with a relatively strong prime-minister’s post, still the overall pattern is clearly visible.

Another characteristic feature is the absolute dominance of the executive branch of power, essentially the presidential power, over other branches, and the particular weakness of the subservient judiciary system, which to a great extent serves and legitimises decisions made by the executive. The parliaments, too, are mostly dominated by the executive and used as a symbolic agency for rubber-stamping the decisions parachuted from above. Police and more broadly law enforcement seem to universally be the main pillar supporting the incumbent governments, more important than armed forces. The political arena is universally controlled by the parties or coalitions controlled by the respective presidents, who are ready to use administrative resource and populism to win elections, creating what is now fashionable to call “electoral authoritarianism”. Weak and ineffective opposition is as a rule unable to create any viable alternative to incumbent elites, and any dangerous challenge would normally emerge due to splitting the former allies in power. The same ruling elite attempts, and to a varying extent succeeds, to control mass media, and in particular electronic media. Neglect for human rights, and frequent abuse of human rights by law enforcement, readiness to use excessive force against opposition and mass protests are still other specific characteristics of the post-Soviet political reality in the region. Nevertheless, the status of democratic reform is not the same in the three states. These differences are represented in a range of substantive policy categories including: human and civil rights, treatment of dissidents and opposition, rule of law, tolerance for religious and ethnic minorities, the character of the business environment, fight against corruption, or geopolitical orientation.

Other than in the case of Georgia, which tends to demonstrate more political volatility, the same political regimes rule for many years, and everywhere there is the same problem of succession – and while the same clan would retain power, the transition itself was somewhat differently resolved, as in the case of Azerbaijan (from father to son), or Armenia (from president to prime minister).

In a paradoxical way, Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the “end of history” finds a spectacular if somewhat ironic illustration all over the post-Soviet space – while
the advent of Western-style liberal democracy is still a remote possibility, all these governments have learned to imitate, although with different skills, the formal aspects of democratic institutions, and the leaders just love to talk about democracy and the rule of law, most probably interpreting these in their own surreptitious way. To some extent such imitational democracy is rooted in the old Soviet tradition of organising fake elections with single candidates and no competition but also no real power wielded by elected officials, but the pattern can easily be discovered far beyond the post-Soviet space. As a result, imitations replace real democratic institutions, empty façades without any real democratic content.

However, it is not just democracy that is imitated in these countries. Another imitation is that of the free market, as while the legislations may be quite liberal, property rights are not well protected, there is no independent judiciary to seek justice against the state (or persons close to the government), the biggest businesses are owned by those with connections within the ruling elite, and little is done to support small and medium businesses. On the surface, all the countries embrace economic freedom and private initiative, and everywhere, although to different degrees, one may observe on the one hand the capture of business by state bureaucracy, on the other, informal mechanisms for controlling businesses. This is accompanied by total defencelessness of labour due to the lack of any effective trade-unions, the increasing gap between the poor and the rich, and the high-level corruption permeating all big-scale business transactions. As a result, even when economy is growing, the poor still remain numerous, and the gap between the rich and the poor is growing rapidly. In most cases this would lead to massive labour migration, and in the case of the poorest countries of the region, remittances from migrants make a very significant share of GDP.

### 3. South Caucasus specifics

If the above features are characteristic of almost all post-Soviet states, there are other patterns more specific for Southern Caucasian countries. These features are related in the first place to different sets of values and patterns of interpersonal and intergroup relations. Some of these characteristics are related to strong kinship ties that helped to resist totalitarian pressures in Soviet times, and continue to play an equally important, even if much less beneficial role, today. Although to a different extent, important roles are also played by (sub)ethnic and territorial clans, various patronage-clientele networks and informal relationships. Respectively, often group loyalties are much more important than state patriotism, professional ethics or a sense of responsibility. This, in turn, leads to anti-meritocrat-
ic personnel policies, ineffectiveness of governance and corruption. The leader’s personality plays a very important role in all of the post-Soviet space, and politics in the South Caucasus is also personality-centred, and the personality becomes much more important than formal political ideology, agenda or declared values. These too lead to an even more imitative nature of all institutions borrowed from the Western models and bring about more political cynicism, opportunism and immorality.

The three countries in question differ not just by size (e.g. Azerbaijan is almost 3 times bigger and more populous than Armenia, although it should be mentioned that Baku actually has no control over a significant chunk of its territory), but also by population density (105–106 inhabitants per km² in Armenia and Azerbaijan vs. only 62 in more mountainous Georgia), and even more importantly – birth rate (17 in Azerbaijan vs. 14 Armenia and Georgia). Another interesting point is looking at the economic profile of the three states, and in particular at the role of energy resources in their economy: The littoral state of the Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, is rich in oil and gas, while the other two states are strongly dependent on the energy imports and in some cases on the transit of energy resources (Georgia, though, is relatively rich in hydropower potential, while landlocked Armenia does not possess any significant amount of natural resources, but also does not play any role as an energy-transit country). Size and economy are important characteristics, but still there are several issues to look at, such as e.g. confessional and cultural tradition. Georgia is predominantly Eastern Orthodox, Armenia, Gregorian Christian, while in Azerbaijan, Shiyah Islam is the dominant confession (though about one-third of Azerbaijan’s population is reportedly Sunni, and Azerbaijan has also basically been a secular state since Soviet times.

In our post-Huntingtonian era the correlation between the civilisational type and the geopolitical orientation is doubtable, and there is no simple coupling of the latter with confession or historical-cultural tradition. Rather, one may observe certain a correlation with geography. Obviously, Georgia tries its best to further integrate into the West. Armenia, landlocked and sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Turkey, formally is Russia’s strategic partner, depends on the latter for its security and houses a Russian military base in Gyumri. While strongly dependent on Russia, which, in addition to providing security, to a great extent controls Armenia’s economy, and the hostage to the victory in the Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, Yerevan tries to develop its relations not only with the EU and the US, but also with Turkey and NATO. Azerbaijan is trying to pursue a complex policy of balancing and vacillating between Russia and the West. Its attitudes are rather unstable and permanently shifting in search of better deals.
One may discuss some other characteristics, such as energy resources or the level of authoritarianism, but what was already said above is sufficient to demonstrate that along with many similarities characteristic of the South Caucasus, there is enormous internal diversity. All the above-discussed similarities and differences have played a role in influencing the system, and the reforming, of the public administration and service. Still, the most interesting topic from the perspective of the paper, where similarities and differences are to be considered, is that of public administration. Here, too, many similarities are rooted in the common Soviet past, matching the geopolitical environment and cultural proximity of the three societies.

4. Governance style

Not only did the Soviet Union’s system of state ownership produce extremely distorted incentives and profoundly bureaucratise the countries’ economy and all levels of hierarchical decision-making, the whole system of public management in the later Soviet period became essentially corrupt, clientelistic, unaccountable to the population and ineffective. At the same time, the population was already quite used to the situation when it was the state that was providing all social services, most of these free of charge or exceptionally cheap, including all levels of education, healthcare, housing, public transportation or utilities, to name a few of the more obvious ones – while in most cases unable to keep up with the quality of these services, or most of state-produces consumer goods, to any international standards.

The population also became used to regarding much of political life as just another theatrical imitation of some general ideas, such as equality (as some were obviously more equal than others), democracy (only a single party candidate would stand for elections at all levels, and there was no public control over vote count), justice (as judges and courts were fully controlled by party leadership), technological or cultural achievements (indeed demonstrated in a few areas such as space flights, some military technologies, ballet or musical performance, but otherwise exaggerated by state-controlled mass media). At the same time, the sense of ownership over any state assets or policies virtually disappeared, leading to, on the one hand, unlimited misappropriation of such assets whenever opportunity would arise, on the other, moral opportunism and the lack of a sense of responsibility or duty among the majority of state employees.

After achieving independence, it was the new elites that came to power in all three South Caucasus states that had to lead the systemic redesign of the government, although to a great extent they lacked respective skills and in addition
had to work in the critical conditions of economic crunches and ethno-territorial conflicts. It is not surprising then that on the one hand these first-generation governments, focused on ethno-national mobilisation, were not too efficient in bringing order to their respective states, and on the other, were soon replaced through rather unconstitutional means, bringing former Communist leaders back to power, at least in the cases of Georgia and Azerbaijan (in the case of Armenia, the second president Robert Kocharyan, who came into power after the first one, Levon Ter-Petrossian, got ousted in February 1998, had a much more modest communist party record, having served as a party leader of a silk factory in Stepanakert, Mountainous Karabakh), although distancing himself now from the Communist ideology.

By now the leadership in all three states has changed several times already, although after the first attempt of fair and democratic elections in the early 1990s, none of the successions have taken place in a fully legitimate and orderly way anywhere within the region, probably the most notable case being the truly dynastic succession from father to son in the case of Azerbaijan, typologically resembling the notorious cases of Syria, North Korea, Congo/Kinshasa, Gabon or Togo.

Initially the new governing elites appeared quite eager to continue the process of dismantling the government that briefly took place with the downfall of the Soviet rule. Later, however, all the efforts seemed to aim at strengthening and centralising the governance system, and perpetuating the hold on power of a single political force. This would lead to the paradoxical situation of a gap between the stated goals of decentralisation, liberalisation and democratisation of the governance system and the actual processes in the opposite directions. This in turn makes much of the policy process deeply entangled with populism, imitative and symbolic action – essentially a public-relations exercise – and inconsistency of policies.

It is interesting to observe that much of this is happening under the aegis (or disguise) of market liberalisation and new public management, and democratisation, promoted by international organisations and Western donors. In reality, some aspects of all these processes are in fact being implemented, while some others are left out, leading to a distorted reality very different from what one might expect. Still, the Western partners and donors were slow to take serious notice of such developments, though the paradox has been observed by a number of experts. So, Charles King would call the democracy built under previous Georgian president Shevardnadze “Potemkin democracy” (King 2001). Almost a decade later, he would call the incumbent president, Michael Saakashvili, a “questionable democrat” at best, ask whether Saakashvili’s governing style re-
lated more to the state of democracy in Georgia than to that of Russia, and agree with another renowned author, Lincoln Mitchell, who labelled Georgia’s democracy “uncertain” (Mitchell et al. 2009). Just very recently, Mitchell would write:

For most of the time since Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, concerns about the increasingly less democratic nature of Georgia’s regime, which people in Washington began to notice sometime around 2008, were always raised privately. A trip to Tbilisi by a visiting U.S. official would include public congratulations to the Georgian government for its democratic credentials, while concerns about the lack of media freedom, recent electoral or legal shenanigans, or the growing centralization of political power were made privately and discreetly. Similarly, Georgian officials visiting Washington were publicly greeted with platitudes about the strength of Georgian democracy, while concerns were, again, raised privately. (Mitchell 2012)

And, one still has to keep in mind that in the other two South Caucasian republics the situation with the democratic institutions and processes is by no means better.

5. Economic policies

Similar internal inconsistency can be observed with regards to economic liberalisation. On the one hand, most of the restrictions and regulations have been abolished in Georgia, the incorporation of businesses has been made easy, taxation was simplified, low-level corruption dramatically reduced (World Bank 2012), so that Georgia deserved the praise of the Bretton Woods institutions and was declared by the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) as the country to have made the most reforms in the world in 2006. The Doing Business 2007 report, which covered 175 economies and looked into the ease of doing business, placed Georgia as the 37th easiest country in which to do business in the world, up from 100th the year before. Georgia improved in six of the 10 areas investigated (World Bank and International Finance Corporation 2007). Georgia’s achievements have even been applauded by some Russian economists as an example to follow. However, on the one hand reforms have somewhat slowed down after 2006, and on the other hand, no truly liberal economy can exist when property rights are not properly protected and the courts enjoy little independence, as is the actual case. As a result, while it is easy to start a business, and many

international investors find the environment acceptable, local businesses have difficulty with developing unless they have useful connections within the ruling elite, and one may even say that “reverse state capture” has taken place, as state bureaucracy enjoys significant influence over local businesses, which may often be asked to support this or that government initiative. Of course, after the Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 one should not expect quick achievements, but even before that and even the global crisis started, things have somewhat slowed down, both in the economic sphere and with regard to the democratisation process. Also, at the peak of reforms, notwithstanding its favourable geographic location, Georgia’s GDP growth remained slower than even in landlocked Armenia (13.9 % in 2006), not to speak of oil-rich Azerbaijan (the world’s highest in 2006 at 34.6 %). However, reforms still paid off, as in 2010 and 2011 Georgia’s annual growth rate accelerated (6.8 % in 2011, 6.4 % in 2010) compared to Armenia’s 5.9 % and 2.6 %, respectively. In its turn, economic growth in Azerbaijan all but came to a halt in 2011, slowing to 0.1 % from the 5.0 % in 2010, mainly due to shrinking oil and gas production.

6. Reforms and outcomes

Like other reforms, the reform in public management also demonstrated mixed results in the case of Georgia, with some spectacular results in the earlier stage (2004–2006) of the incumbent government in power, when it enjoyed massive public trust and support. These results included finally resolving the issue of irritating energy shortages, disbanding traffic police and replacing it by newly recruited patrol police, simplifying taxation management and re-establishing fiscal discipline, mass privatisation of previously defunct enterprises, attracting massive direct foreign investment, introducing a needs-based social-assistance system and, last but not least, dramatically reducing everyday corruption. Not everything went ideally even from the beginning, and the government made a number of serious mistakes – further weakening the division of powers and political pluralism, frequently neglecting human rights, making some adventurous military moves in South Ossetia, and essentially disregarding the need to maintain dialogue and stimulate participation on the part of the civil society (apart from a few GONGOs) and the general public. However, initial success and political monopoly led to hubris and arrogance of the dominant political elite and its leadership. Things went even worse starting in autumn 2007, when unjustifiably


excessive violence was used against peaceful protesters, media outlets were harassed, elections were accompanied by massive irregularities, and government crisis was followed by months of protests and instability. The culmination of this sequence of mistakes arrived in August 2008 with the Georgian-Russian war. While the exact details of how the war started and who bears the main blame continue to cause different opinions, it is clear that the Georgian government’s handling of the situation revealed incompetence and inefficiency in emergency, and inflicted a heavy blow to the credibility of the incumbent government.

At least part of the above-described mistakes and shortcoming are related to the political and institutional culture of the main stakeholders, but also to the somewhat botched system of decision-making and public administration dominating the policy area. As in the case of democratic or economic reform, the uncanny mixture of different approaches and influences created a specific culture of public management that may sometimes appear quite effective, but the outcomes are not always predictable and may also lead to gross failures. Of course, the main problem is not just the system of public administration but the excessive politicisation of the decision-making process and the excessive securitisation of the political process, accompanied by the dominance of a single political party, in its turn dominated by a small and closed circle of supreme decision makers. Authoritarianism, lack of public and expert feedback and over-confidence in one’s own righteousness would inevitably lead to an accumulation of errors of increasing scale. However, the role of the public-management style should not be underestimated, either.

7. New trends in public management

One may say that the Soviet Union disintegrated at least one decade too late. As a result, many fashionable trends in public administration and management reached the former Soviet republics somewhat late, when their popularity in the countries of origin was already in decline, freeing respective experts for missions abroad where they could share their slightly outdated expertise. This to some extent is true with regard to the New Public Management (NPM) movement, which was at its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, and since the early 2000s has been considered by a number of experts to be in decline (Jones and Kettl 2003), competing for influence with New-Weberian Public Administration (Drechsler 2005), and the Public Value movement (Moore 1995). Indeed, while never precisely defined, NPM is based on introducing market forces, efficiency and competition into public administration, and indeed brought about significant achievements in some
areas⁴, and has made a huge influence on the actual models of public administration (or management, in this new wording). In particular, with the unfolding of the global economic crisis, and as governments have strived to become more economically and technologically efficient, government agencies started looking at outsourcing as a means to gain specific value-added benefits to the services that public agencies are delivering to the people.

However, the completion between different theoretical approaches to public administration is slightly misleading in the case of the South Caucasus, as here there is another mix that takes place behind the façade of neo-liberalism, although hyper-marketisation of public management is well described by still another British scholar and politician, David Marquand, for a different context:

*The language of buyer and seller, producer and consumer, does not belong in the public domain; nor do the relationships which that language implies. Doctors and nurses do not ‘sell’ medical services; students are not ‘customers’ of their teachers; policemen and policewomen do not ‘produce’ public order. The attempt to force these relationships into a market model undermines the service ethic, degrades the institutions that embody it and robs the notion of common citizenship of part of its meaning.* (quoted from Diefenbach 2009)

Indeed, in the transitional context, when public administration is politicised but politics is monopolistic, managerial decisions may focus less on meeting public needs than on pursuing some populist political agenda. Respectively, relying on NPM is sometimes rather fictitious, and may lead in some cases to a result opposite from what one claimed (see, e.g. Maesschalck 2004). As Thomas Diefenbach would describe:

*By referring to three crucial organizational aspects – centralization, formalization and bureaucratization … NPM’s real outcomes are quite in contrast to its original claims and objectives. There might be some improvements in the reduction of compartmentalization and internal barriers, in the intensification of internal communication and cross-boundary collaboration, as well as in making decision-making processes more efficient. However, at the same time, these are more than neutralized by an increase in bureaucracy, formal requirements, and more complex relations between the centre and periphery which all lead to an increasingly misallocation of time and resources.* (Maesschalck 2004)

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⁴ E.g., on the highly positive role of NPM in improving healthcare in the UK, see Cooper (2012).
Understanding how new public-administration models are taking root in the countries of the South Caucasus, one need not only understand the common legacy of the Soviet past still surviving even among the young generations of public servants, but also to better understand the specificities of the South Caucasus states. Given the highly personalistic context of Caucasian politics, individual leaders’ preferences play a significant role in the selection and implementation of policies. While the South Caucasus leaders were all under the influence of much the same neoliberal doctrines of management and economics, in a strange way mixed with the old intellectual pseudo-Marxist legacy, in fact their worldviews may be quite different. The more so, it is striking how so different personalities and approaches may lead to a certain equifinality with regards to how all leaders apply similar tactics to staying in power, demonstrate authoritarian tendencies, and how power struggle is intertwined with policy and public-administration modes. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that political realities in the three countries of the South Caucasus are rather different, this NPM *doublespeak* (and *double-think*) is relevant in all three cases, creating fragmental successes in some areas of public administration and failures in others.

It would be interesting to observe how far the experience of public-administration reform efforts in the South Caucasus fit into Michael Barzelay’s analytic typology of first-, second- and third-generation reforms (Barzelay 2003, see also Perlman and Gleason 2005). The first phase of comprehensive reform occurs with the articulation of new policy and management reform goals, typically undertaken by a newly established government. The adoption of a new legal, regulatory and fiscal basis for the reforms would typically follow, and then, new policies and management approaches are implemented. The second generation consists of the reform implementation being followed through by the government that initiated the reforms, while the third generation of reform begins when the original sponsors of reform leave office. At this point it is up to a new government to decide, enact and then begin to implement modifications to the original reforms, at which point programme continuity and other problems arise, where tough choices are necessary on which policies should continue, which should be modified and how, and which should be terminated. Georgia faced this stage back in 2008, and indeed some tough choices have been made, but on some key issue, while harsh criticism was voiced with regards to Shevardnadze’s previous government, policies might have continued (e.g. regarding attempts of Euro-Atlantic integration). However, it is at the lower level of the ministries where this mechanism works rather disruptively, and frequent rotation of ministerial leadership accompanied by changes at mid-level would bring in discontinuity, confusion and lack of institutional memory. This is generally characteristic of personality-
based authoritarian and hybrid regimes and creates serious problems for the consistency of reforms in public administration. Also, as the change of leadership in the short term cannot be fully excluded in any of the South Caucasian states (with the hold on power of leadership in Azerbaijan probably still the strongest), this issue of continuity should be taken very seriously also at national levels.

8. Fighting corruption

One of the most popular aspects of public-administration reform refers to the fight against corruption. Corruption is inherently difficult to measure, and for understandable reasons. So, the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index measures just a combination of expert and business perceptions of how corrupt public officials and businessmen are, rather than, how much corruption costs in either real terms or in terms of the impact that corruption has on growth. Still, it is clear that as in many other post-communist countries, corruption in the public service involving officials of governments is still a serious problem, remaining pervasive and a serious stumbling block to the promotion of good governance.

The three countries show rather different achievements in this important area, Georgia obviously being the frontrunner with regards to low-level corruption, as has already been mentioned above. However, even at this higher level, experts still observe the same old patterns and practices of clientelism and corruption, particularly obvious in the case of big privatisation tenders. So according to the recent publication of the Bertelsmann foundation:

Efforts to fight corruption by increasing the salaries of state officials have been continued during the period under review. Judges’ salaries have been raised from pre-2007 levels of $40 to $150 per month to as much as $2,600 per month by the end of 2009. In addition, court budgets have been increased and the provision of technical equipment improved. Despite these efforts, there are deficits in the administrative system’s efficiency and in building long-term capacities. The existence of a “core” team around President Saakashvili is an element of stabilization within the system. But this core team is based on personal relationships rather than democratic procedures. There have also been some arbitrary appointments to key strategic positions, such as the minister for economic matters or the ambassador to Germany. These kinds of appointments raise questions about how well-established or institutionalized democratic routines are in Georgia’s administration … While low-level corruption has been
largely reduced, whistleblowers claim that elite corruption continues. Procurement and privatization remain legal loopholes. In addition, observers suspect that legal prosecution is selective and pursued at higher levels only if an individual falls out of favor with the country’s leadership.\(^5\)

According to the report prepared by the Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership (Bayramov et al. 2011), which attempted to conduct a systematic presentation of the public-administration reforms in the EU Eastern Partnership countries, Georgia held 9 top positions out of altogether 14 indicators of the European principles of public administration analysed in this report\(^6\). Georgia is the regional leader on the respective consolidating indicator (Public institutions), even slightly above EU member states Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria. However, Georgia is lagging behind more advanced EU member states, especially with regard to freedom of expression, curbing political corruption by reinforcing accountability of high-level politicians and the independence of the judiciary.

On the opposite side the of anti-corruption ladder, Azerbaijan, too, finally started to tackle the issue in earnest. Azerbaijan has been quite successful in building a market economy, such as clear rules for the registration of businesses, a tax code, banking services, anti-monopoly measures, anti-corruption measures, a court for economic affairs, and procedures for tenders and state purchases. However, once again this is more of a façade, insofar as these procedures are often violated by rampant omnipresent corruption, or for political considerations.

While, according to the above-quoted report (Bayramov et al. 2011), Azerbaijan was statistically the region’s top performer of judicial independence, other evidence from the economy would suggest that the judiciary stays under a heavy influence from the government. The country showed no clear progress on any of the four European principles of public administration. Regional scores far below the average and mixed trends on the rule of law, corruption perception, accountability and freedom of speech, as well as diversion of public funds due to corruption have been characteristic of Azerbaijani public administration throughout the period of observation.

\(^5\) Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2012: Georgia. Available at http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Georgia.pdf

While traditionally Azerbaijani law-enforcement bodies have avoided prosecuting public officials for corruption, even though a state anti-corruption commission was established several years ago, in January 2011 the Azerbaijani government launched a public campaign against corruption; dozens of mid-level officials were arrested, hundreds of these and even some senior officials were fired.\(^7\) Opposition argues that the government acts this way in order to prevent a Middle East-style revolution in the country, but whatever the case, it remains to be seen whether punitive and somewhat haphazard measures will be able to change the situation radically.

In Armenia, the situation is not much better, although in some areas its performance is better than both Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s. So, Armenia posted top scores in the region on transparent policy-making (cf., e.g., Mkhitaryan 2008) and overcoming wastefulness of government spending, and has been doing well in improving business-related regulations and e-governance. The country stayed on a downward path, however, as far as the rule of law is concerned, as well as accountability and freedom of speech (Bayramov et al. 2011). The same Bertelsmann foundation publication describes it in rather harsh wording:

\[
\text{Despite a series of recent civil service reforms, corruption within administrative structures remains a serious challenge. Administration remains hindered by the legacy of Soviet-era practices, many of which are grossly inefficient and overly bureaucratic. ... One of the most startling lessons of the past two years is the fact that the Armenian state can no longer maintain the current economic system. If the state is to weather the current economic crisis, it must put an end to its reliance on the twin evils of corruption and oligarchic cartels and monopolies. Faced with an already apparent shortage of political legitimacy, the Armenian state can no longer sustain the closed economic system that has deformed and distorted the country in recent years.}^8
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9. Local governance

Another very important aspect of public-administration reform is related to the streamlining of local governments and increasing their authority and efficiency. While in some areas decentralisation is taking place, in reality the central govern-


ments continue to fully control power at the regional level, having reduced local self-governance to more of a technicality. Especially telling in this regard in the case of Georgia is the abolishment of local self-governance at the lowest – village communities – level, while strengthening the power of regional governors – direct appointees by the central government:

At the present stage the still unsettled administrative-territorial arrangement of the country is a major obstacle to the decentralisation process within the development of local self-government in Georgia. … The last of these changes was implemented in 2006: the first level of local self-government (town, village, community) was abolished and the two-level system was replaced with a single-level one – today the municipality (its borders actually coincide with borders of former Soviet districts) is the only territorial unit of local self-government … the new system has increased a gap between rural communities and local self-governments. Although territorial bodies are already under development in municipalities, the new system does not provide for representative bodies and independent local budgets, and local self-governments have few real competencies. Not only is it a clear breach of the very principle of local self-government, it also raises questions about the effectiveness and feasibility of the new system. (Losaberidze 2009)

In general, the existence of parallel governance structures and once again the same characteristic patterns of inconsistency and internal incongruence of territorial arrangement policy, evident throughout the South Caucasus, have been well observed by the EU rapporteur of the Committee of Regions in the case of Azerbaijan, as he:

Notices two parallel systems of governance at the local level in Azerbaijan. One consists of municipalities elected and accountable to the citizens (public) and the national parliament (Milli Mejlis) with very limited powers to deliver services to the citizens. The second, Local Executive Authorities which are a part of the state governing structure directly appointed by the President, is concerned with the very limited number of responsibilities allocated to municipalities by the law. In practice their responsibilities are even more limited and at best are related to the maintenance of municipal roads, cemeteries, parks and some aspects of the delivery of social care that are not covered by the central government. Municipalities in most cases do not have adequate capacity, training or knowledge to carry out
those limited responsibilities prescribed by law; Notes that municipalities in Azerbaijan are not defined as a part of the system of the ‘bodies of the state power’ and therefore are perceived by the general public and some experts as non-governmental organisations. (Keymer 2010)

Similar evidence of neglect towards the local self-governance and democracy is observed in Armenia, along with some positive steps. As local experts would describe:

An important change in the administrative and territorial setup of the country taken place in 2010 is that the entire territory of the republic, … is covered by communities. … Communities, as units of local self-government, continue to remain extremely fragmented and weak in capacities. No substantial changes were recorded in the area of developing inter-community cooperation. As in the previous years, neither community unions nor consortia were created in 2010. The degree of autonomy of communities and their financial independence continues to be insignificant, while the property insufficient and obsolete. (Tumanyan 2011)

10. Conclusions

The obvious task for public-administration reform in any society that claims to be democratic is to make the quality of life of the people better. This, however, would refer to many different things, such as: safety and security, life in dignity, ability to generate livelihood, comfortable and friendly social environment, efficient social services, reliable physical infrastructure, appealing natural and urban environment, ability to communicate with friends and kin, opportunity to participate in decision-making, etc.

Respectively, when discussing public-administration reform in the South Caucasus, there is an essential challenge of not going too narrow or too shallow. It is a virtual impossibility to cover in a relatively short paper all aspects of the topic, with its many dimensions, and in three neighbouring but rather different countries. As a result, we have discussed only a couple of the most illustrative aspects of public-administration reform, focusing not that much on the details but rather on the political and social roots of the respective developments.

Even this limited material was able to demonstrate the typical feature of semi-authoritarian or hybrid regimes, which is institutional pseudomorphism, or imitation: some institutions are likely to have a completely different function than
officially declared, and serve as certain simulacra for populist or other political purposes. Also, governments tend to mix, sometimes under the influence of contradictory advice coming from international consultants and various donor pressures, different models of public administration without paying proper attention to the most important aspects of reform, which is creating public value. The mixed influence of the legacy of Soviet institutional culture and of some fashionable public administration models (that, however, are sometimes hardly applicable in a transitional context) would lead to uneven and sometimes opposite results. Even when the new governments have profound public support, as in the case of Georgia in 2004–2006, the initial zeal is gradually replaced by other concerns, mostly of a political nature, while in the conditions of weakness of opposition and of the civil society there is insufficient feedback, effective checks and balances, and public pressure that should lead to the correction of mistakes made, and making a rent-seeking approach to governance impossible.

Until now, the reform of public administration in all South Caucasus countries lacked a coherent and comprehensive vision regarding its content, the direction towards which it was headed and effective implementation tools. This may be blamed on the existing organisational culture, a lack of experience on behalf of administrative institutions with the reform of public management, a lack of a strategic vision, the influence of politics, the legacy of a centralised administration system or the moral shortcoming of the ruling elites. Still, keeping in mind how little time has passed since the three South Caucasus states acquired statehood after centuries of statelessness, one has to admit that significant progress has been made toward establishing a policy environment conducive to globalisation and integration in the world community, and toward taking important steps at reforming public administration towards a more responsive and democratic model, even if this path has not always been smooth or straightforward.

References


Public Administration Developments in Post-Soviet Central Asia

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Introduction

In the West, everybody is now talking about the economic and financial crisis. The term “crisis” has become a buzzword within both academic and policy communities. There is an enormous upsurge of scholarly interest in the effects of this crisis on public-administration systems and the role that public administration plays in these processes. The underlying belief is that the public administration through the knowledge, competence, professionalism, commitment, strategic foresight and the action of its human resources can play a crucial role in mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis. The NISPAcee region is no exception to these debates. It is apparent that the current crisis has, and will continue to have, a huge impact on patterns of governance in the NISPAcee region, thereby bringing fresh attention to the issue of the role of public administration in preventing such crises. This might imply that each country is compelled to reexamine and reform its institutionalized paradigm of public administration and governance.

It should be noted that not all countries in the NISPAcee region are affected by the crisis. The issue of crisis loses its importance when it comes to the five “stans” of the NISPAcee region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The “crisis” is not the main issue of concern in Central Asian public-administration debates, since Central Asian countries have been minimally affected by the global economic crisis. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, all Central Asian countries are recording GDP growth up to 8–10 percent annually. Thus, public-administration debates in Central Asian countries have little to do with the interplay between the economic crisis and public-administration systems; rather, the greatest emphasis of public-administration debates in post-Soviet Central Asia has been on issues of authoritarianism, kleptocracy and corruption, clans and regional patronage networks, persistence of administrative command methods, ethnic-diversity management, and religious fundamentalism and extremism. While public-administration reforms in Central and Eastern Europe were motivated by EU accession incentives, there was no real incentive for post-Soviet Central Asian governments to reform their public-administration systems. Although significant differences do exist among the Central Asian states, the analysis of public-administration developments since 1991 shows that Central Asian coun-
tries have made limited progress toward establishing democratic governance and rule of law. I will elaborate more on these in subsequent sections.

**Main issues of concern in Central Asian public administration debates**

**The resilience of authoritarian regimes in Central Asia**

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, leaders of each of the Central Asian countries declared their strong commitment to democracy, rule of law, and human rights, and adopted a constitutionally limited, representative form of government in accordance with international standards. However, many commentators now argue that Central Asian countries made little progress in promoting good governance and rule of law, and that many formal institutions of government have achieved merely a showcase quality. Rather, policy strategies adopted by the five new governments of Central Asia led to significantly different policy outcomes and strengthened authoritarian practices in the region. While the nature and specificity of authoritarian regimes differ from one Central Asian country to another, their basic features are similar across the region with regard to human-rights abuses, ill-treatment of dissidents and opposition, intolerance for religious, ethnic and territorial differences, etc. In this respect, much of the literature regarding Central Asia tends to treat authoritarian practices as one of the main barriers for public administration reforms in the region (Kubicek 1998; Luong 2002; March 2003; Melvin 2004; Noori 2006; Starr 2006; Perlman and Gleason 2007; Collins 2009).

**Clans and regional patronage networks**

“Clans” and “patronage networks” are commonly used terms in Central Asian public administration debates. As Joel S. Migdal (2001) observed, clans are one of the traditional social structures that vie for power to set rules and deplete state’s organizational prowess in many developing countries. Although the Soviet state was able to diminish the political influence of clans and regional patronage networks, the post-Soviet transition period has reinvigorated an informal system of governance. As soon as the Soviet system collapsed, clans emerged as strong political actors, thereby deeply penetrating into formal arenas of the state. Thus, “clan politics” – the politics of informal competition and deal-making between clans in pursuit of clan interests – has become a buzzword in academic and policy circles. A growing body of scholarly work on Central Asia asserts that public-administration developments in the region are highly influenced by informal politi-

Omnipresence of corruption and kleptocracy

Many commentators now argue that Central Asian states have made little progress in promoting the rule of law and good governance, and that corruption is rooted in systemic features of political regimes. In this regard, one of the main issues of concern in Central Asian public-administration debates is corruption. According to the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, released annually by Transparency International (TI), Central Asian countries are among the 10 most corrupt countries in the world (TI 2011). Also, the “control of corruption” indicator of the World Bank Governance Studies shows an extremely high level of corruption in Central Asian countries (Libman 2008).

Understandably, post-Soviet Central Asia has been the subject of a great surge in academic research and writing on corruption. Much of the literature tends to concentrate on macro-level topics and state-centered approaches, focusing on kleptocratic elites in the upper echelons of the state organization, malfunctioning public-administration structures, administratively-commanded economic policies, inefficient post-Soviet agricultural reforms, corrupt law-enforcement agencies, and inadequate ways of dealing with corruption on the part of state authorities (Luong 2004; Ergashev et al. 2006; Wegerich 2006; Kandiyoti 2007; Trevisani 2007; Markowitz 2008). The bulk of these authors argue that the struggles among these various state actors to gain control over scarce resources have resulted in contradictory state policies, thereby making corruption and bribery a “survival” strategy among ordinary citizens. At the same time, these studies also claim that corruption and bribery may be practiced by state elites themselves for more predatory reasons, which have nothing to do with “survival”. Another portrait gleaned from scholarly works suggests that it is the penetration of clans and regional patronage networks into official structures that deplete the state’s organizational powers and cause corruption and inefficiencies in public-administration system (Kubicek 1998; Luong 2002; Pashkun 2003; Collins 2006; Ilkhamov 2007). There is also a penchant to explain the ubiquitousness of corruption in Central Asian countries as an outcome of its communist past (Staples 1993; Gleason 1995; Ergashev et al. 2006).

Ethnic diversity management

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, all five Central Asian countries have launched their national-identity projects in pursuit of legitimacy and popu-
lar support. Although national-identity policies helped Central Asian states in their transition from communism to market economy, these strategies led to the resurgence of nationalism. In this regard, issues of ethnicity, nationalism and statehood are among the most pressing issues in Central Asian public-administration debates. Recent ethnic conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan shows that there is an urgent need for ethnic-diversity management. Hence, democratic governance of multi-ethnic communities is one of the main issues of concern in Central Asian public administration debates.

**Optimal scenario for public administration developments in Central Asia**

There was a widespread euphoria in the 1990s in Central Asia and the outside world that the introduction of Western-style political institutions and a Western-style legal system would promote democratic governance in post-Soviet Central Asian states. All five Central Asian states have proclaimed the creation of a secular democratic society based on the ideals of democracy, human rights and social justice. The Western world and international financial institutions have shown their strong willingness to support democratic transformations in post-Soviet Central Asia through financing and initiating innumerable democracy, market-economy and human-rights projects. The underlying belief that Western intervention, as a whole, has a positive effect on the democratization and economic development of the Central Asian region has rarely been questioned. However, the analysis of the two decades of public-administration developments shows that the Central Asian countries have made little success in reforming their public-administration systems. Rather, conditional loans, technical assistance and other types of aid from the West have not been means of public-administration reform, but have actually preserved many of the existing informal structures and regional patronage networks. These informal networks, which regained momentum in the post-Soviet period, have been reinforced by the economic, political and normative resources provided by the Western donor community. Public-administration reforms have often been hampered by the inflow of foreign aid. Due to the corrupt nature and illegitimacy of recipient regimes, Western intervention runs the risk of undermining the credibility of the public-administration reform process in the region. From this perspective, any Western intervention in Central Asia should be made with awareness of the fact that it is not the state capacity, but mainly the social structure that determines the final outcome of public-administration reforms. Hence, progress in public administration could not be achieved by changes in the formal institutions of government, but the ef-
ficient functioning of these institutions would be dependent on the strength of social structures.

**Social structure of Central Asia**

Despite Soviet modernization policies, conventions and habits of traditional society are still strong in Central Asia. The traditional structure of Central Asian societies has been more strongly reinforced in the post-Soviet period due to the national-identity politics of new Central Asian governments. Bonds linking individuals to their birthplace, ethnicity, kinship and community remain strong in Central Asia, even for city dwellers. Networks of solidarity are based on kinship, regional affiliations, ethnicity and patron-client relations. It is the social norm in Central Asia that the individual shares his economic resources and political influence with his social networks and kin once they become available. In this regard, these networks of solidarity prevail in politics, business and social life in Central Asia, since such a collective nature of society limits the scope and penchant for individual choice. Therefore, maintaining loyalty and respect for such networks and kin often comes at the expense of formal structures, thereby leading to an omnipresence of corruption and rent-seeking behavior in formal arenas.

Social structure of this kind contributes to the emergence of informal, regional groups such as clans and regional patronage networks that continually render influence on public-administration developments. Although these social structures might seem like “mafia-like organizations” to Western observers, they are inalienable part of political processes in Central Asia. This pinpoints the key feature of social structure in Central Asia – collectivism. While the cornerstone of the Western model is individualism and self-interest; the cornerstone of the Central Asian model is collectivism, loyalty and obligation. In other words, the sense of community in the Western world is based on the free choice of individuals, whereas in traditional Central Asian societies collective interests prevail over individual choice. Western public-administration initiatives in this respect should be sensitive to the collective nature of social and political life in Central Asia.

There has been very little interest in using the untapped potential of the mosque-based social networks of Central Asia. It is apparent that there are advantages and disadvantages associated with relying on ethnic, kinship and religious organizations. The disadvantage of such traditional structures is that they can strengthen age and gender hierarchies and exacerbate already existing status-based relations. However, given the enormous influence of social structure on political processes, it is important not to ignore their influence and to incorporate them where useful and possible. Despite its flaws, the incorporation of tra-
ditional *mahalla* structures into the public-administration system in Uzbekistan represents one example of public-administration reform. Since the two decades of Western public-administration interventions have made limited progress in Central Asian states, there is a growing belief in academic communities that the respect for traditional forms of association can bring about success in public-administration reforms. One possible inference is that social and cultural factors seem to be more influential than institutional factors in affecting administrative change in Central Asia.

**Welfare reforms – a pathway to genuine public administration reforms?**

Although Central Asian states continue to enjoy economic growth in times of global economic crisis, few Central Asians reaped the rewards. The continuing flow of labor migrants from Central Asia to Russia indicates that economic and social policies of Central Asian countries have failed to secure the basic needs of citizens. These developments might have far-reaching repercussions for state-society relations in Central Asia, leading to a legitimacy crisis of the states.

As Kamp (2004) noted, Central Asian societies not only stay dependent on the state for their basic needs, but they continue to believe that the state’s primary role is to provide for them. However, due to the restricted extent to which the Central Asian states could provide social welfare to their populations, the social contract between the states and their population became very strained. As post-Soviet Central Asian states have retreated from offering social-welfare services to society, so is society retreating from loyalty to current governments, evidenced by increased popular disobedience to the (secular) legal system, growing informal economy and rise of radical religious movements. The Western European development experience in the postwar period shows that the formation of politically stable democratic nation states and the development of welfare states was closely correlated. Since Central Asian states continually record strong economic growth, even in times of crisis, one might ponder whether the strong welfare measures could serve as a pathway to genuine public-administration reforms in Central Asia.

**References**


Section I.C

Public Administration in and after the Times of Crisis
The Public Finance Crisis: Can New Public Management Help?

JURAJ NEMEC

Introduction

The economic crisis of the past several years not only had a powerful impact on major macroeconomic indicators, but even today, its consequences on public finance is critical. Several European countries have already needed financial help to avoid bankruptcy, and, in several cases, this situation is still problematic. Short-term solutions in the form of budgetary cuts and tax increases might not be enough to help public finance systems to survive. Massive public expenditure and efficiency improvements are necessary. In the core part of this paper, the question of whether New Public Management (NPM) might be helpful or whether it is a distortive solution in the current situation will be discussed. In this regard, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe will be examined.¹

1. The crisis of public finance

The world economy, and particularly the most advanced economies, slowed down substantially in 2008 and had gone into a deep recession by 2009. The forecast was for a return to positive growth in 2010, but the USA and Europe remained stagnant at best. The transition/post-transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were also significantly affected by the crisis. The situation did not improve in any meaningful way for the years 2011 and 2012.

The response to the economic crisis has been partly a global one, through measures such as increased resources for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and policy co-ordination between central banks on monetary policy and, to an extent, between national governments on fiscal policy. Central banks, including the European Central Bank, have engaged in continual interest rate cuts to historically low levels, but have coupled this with a measure called quantitative easing, which is close to simply increasing the money supply. But, this deficit spending and process of quantitative easing cannot be carried on indefinitely. It will have to be paid for, and that means constraining spending and increasing taxes in the years to come. This will have an impact, in some countries a very large impact, on all areas of government spending in all countries. This problem was largely

¹ The preparation of this paper was supported by the GACR project P403/12/0366: Identification and evaluation of the region specific factors determining success of NPM reforms – CEE region.
hidden at the time, as the emphasis was on avoiding a prolonged economic recession, but many authors (for example, Dvorak 2010) immediately warned that it would have an increasing effect. Today we can clearly see that the situation has already arisen (Table 1).

Massive government interventions to cope with the economic crisis, decreasing governmental revenues during the economic crisis and long-term non-sustainability of public-finance systems (pending pension reforms, increasing health-care expenditures, etc.) opened a trap into which small economies (but, today, also countries like Italy or Spain) have fallen.

The recent financial crisis has had a significant impact on the public finances of the European economies. Public deficits in nearly all countries reached record highs, and public debt began to grow much more quickly. A dramatic decline in public revenue and a stabilization of expenditures have revealed problems that many European economies have. What at first glance looked like a liquidity crisis has proven to be a much more serious problem which threatens the stability of the Euro itself. This paper will try to assess the probability of this happening and calculate debt sustainability of the CEE countries mentioned below.

In Table 2, one can clearly see the impact of the financial crisis on the public budgets of the Euro-zone countries. This paper mainly focuses on the countries with recent major fiscal problems. In the year 2009, when the crisis was at its worst, Greece, Ireland and Spain reached double-digit deficits, which indicates serious financial problems. The deficits of Portugal and France were also extremely high. The task for these countries in the coming years should be to reduce deficits and ensure a balanced public finance. However, Italy’s main problem is not an enormous deficit, but rather its permanently high government debt. Greece has both problems, high deficit and enormous government debt that is around 145% of GDP.

How should the CEE and all other governments react to this difficult situation? Obviously, the first reactions to the public-finance problems were cuts in spending and tax increases. However this was not enough, the situation is too complicated (we may also add, for example, the fact that economic theory goes against expenditure cuts and tax increases during periods of recession). According to our findings, the core question (and task) for revitalizing public-finance systems is how to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations. In the following text, the potential of New Public Management (NPM) approaches for helping during these difficult conditions, will be discussed with particular focus on one example – contracting.
### Table 1
Public-finance trends in selected countries (% GDP)

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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010
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<td>–1.7</td>
<td>–5.5</td>
<td>–6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>–2.2</td>
<td>–4.5</td>
<td>–3.8</td>
<td>–4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>–6.1</td>
<td>–7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission 2010

2. Is NPM still an acceptable solution for “healing” public finance and the public sector?

The role of NPM can be analyzed from two different angles – NPM as the ideology proposing the minimization of the role of government vis-à-vis society and NPM as the set of tools and instruments supporting the improvement of the internal performance of the public sector (for more see de Vries and Nemec, forthcoming in International Journal of Public Management).

2.1 NPM as the ideology of “minimum state” – cannot help today

As previously indicated, decreasing public expenditures and increasing taxes were the typical short-term solution for solving public-finance problems. Past experience indicates that such strategies do not help much. The dramatic decline in GDP, public revenues and the necessary stabilization expenditures reveal the
urgent problems that many countries face. It is in those circumstances that industry, banks and also common people turn to their governments and demand solutions which cannot be provided for by the market nor by a minimalistic public sector. It is not sufficient just to increase taxes and to implement cross-sectoral general cuts. In such a severe situation, it becomes obvious that the one-size-fits-all solution of minimizing the influence of government has serious drawbacks and that the ideology behind NPM has reached its limits.

There is a lot of discussion about the possible causes of the current global crisis – “market failure” and “government failure” are among them. Where is the truth? Somewhere in the middle of these two possibilities? In any case, current global experiences indicate that the role of the state in modern society is no longer diminishing and, in light of this discussion, might be said to have diminished too much. In many countries there is already a visible increase of state involvement.

To cope with current problems that may be symptoms not only of cyclical, but of systematic crisis, we need effective governments (smaller or bigger depending on concrete conditions), able to respond to and to reflect on the main principles of the Neo-Weberian state (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) or modern governance (governance is most frequently connected with principles such as legitimacy and voice, participation, direction, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, transparency, fairness, rule of law, reliability, predictability and coherence).

2.2 NPM tools: Possibly increasing efficiency (and quality), depending on the local environment

It was indicated above that neither cuts nor increased taxes are effective long-term core solutions to the current fiscal instability. Efficiency of public operations should be the focus, and we have to admit that many NPM-based tools and instruments are still used and optimized in order to support necessary improvements (Nemec, 2011). Let us, to highlight their potential, focus upon the example of contracting (our main research focus for many years).

The general theory suggests that contracting/outsourcing has the potential to improve efficiency without sacrificing quality, as compared to direct supply by public organizations, so long as certain conditions are met. The potential beneficial impacts of contracting are connected mainly with increasing individual choice and improved cost-effectiveness, quality and equity (for example, Lane 2000; and many others). However, such potential was never fully confirmed by hard data, and many empirical studies (e.g. Bel and Costas 2006) cannot even confirm the effect of outsourcing on costs, which has been the main positive argu-
ment for this. Moreover, some authors stress the many barriers and also negative impacts connected with the use of competition and contracting (Øvretveit 1995, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, Lane 2000, and many others). For example, Lowery (1998) discusses three types of quasi-market failure, two of them, market-formation failure and preference error, are clearly connected with contracting-out. Market-formation failure results from a lack of competition, often due to the small number of potential suppliers for many public services. If privatization merely substitutes a private monopoly for a public one, then savings will likely disappear after the initial contract. Preference-error failure is connected with limited information and principal-agent theory (Arrow 1985, Cooper 2003, Kettl 1993, and many others). The potential of contracting is also connected with the theory of transaction costs (for example Prager 1994).

The theory summarized above indicates that in developed countries, contracting may, but will not necessarily, improve the performance of the public sector. The final outcome depends on local conditions, including the capacity of the implementing body to execute the contracting process.

In transitional countries, the situation is much more complicated since several socio-economic preconditions for successful contracting are insufficiently developed. In such situations – due to the immature markets and democratic institutions of developing countries – internalization may be a desirable decision. Potentially competitive markets may still not be well developed, and thus, transitional countries may be characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic structures and behavior. Given this fact, it is rather unrealistic to expect a comprehensive supply of competitive bids. Under these circumstances, the possible unit-cost-savings argument is far more controversial than in developed countries. It is difficult to measure corruption, but the data indicate higher risks of corruption in developing transition countries compared to developed countries. Expectations at the beginning of the transition were optimistic, but today it is clear that the twenty-year CEE transition period has not seen a sustained development of democratic institutions and norms. The lack of a sense of individual responsibility, paternalism and fiscal illusion remain important features of citizens’ behavior. It is clear that many CEE government officials do not routinely respect the law, and, perhaps the core problem, citizens do not require them to do so. The administrative base (guidelines and quality of legal norms) is also inadequate. Outsourcing occurs with no explanations, recommendations or guidelines for users. The current systems of public-sector control/auditing employed in most, if not all, CEE countries are predominantly the old-fashioned administrative procedural types of control. Effective mechanisms to measure and create real efficiency, effectiveness and quality in public-sector institutions and processes are still missing (Pav-
el and Beblavá, 2008). Finally, several CEE countries exhibit extreme territorial administrative fragmentation. Small municipalities struggle with contracting if there are no economies of cost nor economies of administrative capacity.

**Conclusion**

NPM as an ideology cannot help during the current financial crisis. However, many of its instruments may help to improve the efficiency of public expenditures if properly implemented. This means that many important NPM solutions are available and “ready to use” for governments in the CEE regions. Nevertheless, the question still remains: Do CEE governments/societies have the needed implementation capacity? Do local environments allow for successful implementation of (controversial) NPM instruments? For the CEE region, we need to be aware that the “painfulness” of necessary changes connected with typical problems of the environment – like over-politicization of economic decisions; increasing paternalism; and frequent corruption, may block positive changes.

**References**


1. Introduction

The study, and the practice, of public administration has always been characterized by contradictions. As Herbert Simon (1947) famously pointed out, most of the concepts that we have used to describe administrative systems, and to prescribe reforms in those systems, tend to come in dichotomies. Both sides of these dichotomies have some virtues, and if the system is at one point, the opposite often appears desirable. If a system is highly centralized, then the virtues of decentralization are apparent, and vice versa.

Although these contradictions and dilemmas have always been present in public administration, contemporary administration is perhaps more vexed with these problems of choice. This exacerbation of problems of choice has been in part a function of the New Public Management and its questioning of many of the older virtues in administration (see Hood and Peters 2004). The dilemmas also arise from competing and contradictory demands on the public sector, and on administration within the public sector. Perhaps the most fundamental paradox has been that while along many dimensions public administration has improved much of its internal performance, it is currently regarded publicly as even more inefficient and ineffective than ever.1

This short paper cannot discuss all the dilemmas and contradictions within contemporary administration (but see Peters 2011). I will instead focus on two related contradictions. The first is the simultaneous decentralization and centralization in governing systems. The second is the simultaneous demand for flexibility and predictability of the operations of public administration, and government more generally. These contradictory demands are present in contemporary administration and are likely to persist for some time.

2. Decentralization and control

As noted, the New Public Management has had a significant impact on public administration during the past several decades (Christensen and Laegreid 2007).

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1 Public administration has become less bureaucratic over recent decades, but yet “bureaucracy” is perhaps more commonly used as a pejorative to describe the public sector and its perceived dysfunctions.
Although this impact has been variable and sometimes difficult to distinguish, one common influence has been to make the public sector less centralized and unified than it has been in the past. A string of words that in English begin with “d” – decentralization, deconcentration, devolution, delegation – can be used to describe these changes in governing, they add up to a “decentered” public sector.

This decentering is in part a function of NPM, but it also has been a function of political pressures. Some of these pressures have been demands from local governments for more autonomy and more capacity to make decisions on their own. Similar arguments have been made for the efficiency gains that may come from moving programs from ministries to more autonomous public agencies (Verhoest et al. 2010). And many analysts and politicians have argued that public programs could be delivered more efficiently and effectively by market or third-sector organizations. These demands have been supplemented by democratic pressures that assume that popular control can be increased if more programs are moved out of central government.

There have been other political pressures from the center itself, generally attempting to avoid blame for policy failures (Weaver 1986; Hood 2011). This movement could be seen in the use of administrative agencies to deflect blame from ministers within difficult policy areas. The movement has to some extent accelerated in the economic crisis as central governments do not want to be responsible for telling the public all the bad news, and also can offload expensive programs onto sub-national governments with relative impunity.

Leaving aside some of the consequences of the more politicized versions of decentering government, many of these attempts to move responsibilities to different actors within the public sector, and beyond, have appeared to improve the performance of the public sector. But those gains have not been without their costs, and have provoked a “recentering” of government. In fairness some of the pressures toward more centralization might have occurred without the more extreme versions of decentralization, but the changes mentioned above have created more of a perceived need to restore the center.

Again, there are both administrative and political motivations for the reforms within the public sector. The administrative reasons for recentering are a reflection of the continuing problems that the public sector faces with coordination and coherence (Jennings and Krane 1994). This inherent problem in governing has been exacerbated by delegating authority to a large number of organizations that may well assume that they are meant to act autonomously. Further,

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2 The famous dictum of Osborne and Gaebler (1991) that governments should “steer and not row” is, of course, relevant here.
performance-management requirements tend to focus the attention of managers in these organizations on performance of that single organization, rather than broader systemic demands for good governance.

The economic crisis beginning in 2008 has tended to heighten the demands for recentralization within the public sector. Crises tend to demand priority-setting within government, and priority-setting tends to drive decisions into the center – presidents and prime ministers and ministers of finance in particular. This expected movement of decision-making has certainly been true for the contemporary crisis (Peters et al. 2011) and at the extreme some governments have opted for technocratic governments rather than more politically motivated governments in an attempt to establish clear and consistent priorities.

There have also been political motivations for moving more decision-making back to the center of government. This movement has been in large part to attempt to restore the “primacy of politics” in governing, meaning that prime ministers and presidents elected to govern, they thought, have found that much of their assumed control over the remainder of the political system has been given away to agencies, sub-national governments or the private sector. For democratic reasons, and perhaps because of some need for power on the part of politicians, these leaders have asserted the necessity of restoring some control over the remainder of government.

Perhaps the first manifestations of the desire on the part of political leaders to shift power back into the center of government was the “joined-up government” program of Prime Minister Blair in the United Kingdom (Bogdanor 2005). This initiative was soon followed by a number of other attempts to restore the control of these executives within government (Pollitt 2003). After the initial attempts to restore the center in Westminster democracies there has been some general movement in this direction in most developed democracies, and many other political systems as well (Dahlström et al. 2011).

All of the efforts at restoring the powers of prime ministers have been associated with the “presidentialization” of the offices, building larger staffs in the cabinet offices and the personal offices of these executives. They have also contained programs that enabled the political leaders to establish and implement priorities within government, including creating cross-cutting programs to address not only political priorities but also the need for enhanced coordination (Kekkonen and Raunio 2011).

These two seemingly contradictory movements within public administration and governance then pose a particular challenge, and opportunity, for public admin-
istration in the future. These two apparently contradictory patterns of movement within the public sector are likely to continue, and the task of “knitting” the two movements together is likely to fall to the senior public service. These officials are the conduits between the delegated parts of the governance system and the central decision-makers. This role would to some extent represent a strengthening of one of the traditional roles of the public service, one that has to some extent been denigrated during the dominance of the New Public Management.

3. Strategic change and credible commitment

A second dichotomy facing contemporary public administration and governance reflects the competing demands for a public service that can adapt, and adapt strategically, to changes in the environment of the public sector, and a public sector that can create a predictable environment for its citizens. On the one hand, the environment of the public sector can be easily argued to be even more fluid than in the past, and the problems faced by government now correspond more closely to the classic definition of wicked problems (see Hoppe 2011). On the other hand citizens and business want governments to make “credible commitments” so that they can make reasonable judgments about important choices they may want to make. The public sector is therefore in the position of having to balance these two values.

Strategic Agility is one interesting approach to the problem of adaptation within the public sector (Hämäläinen et al. 2011). Borrowed from the private sector, like the management ideas associated with the New Public Management, the concept behind this approach is to some extent an extension of the coordination discussed above. The strategic emphasis in this approach involves not only creating coherence within the public sector, but also considering coordinating around longer-term goals.

One standard critique of government has been that it concentrates on short-term issues rather than on longer-term strategic issues, and this approach is an attempt to place greater emphasis on where the government, and its society, wants to be in ten or twenty years. Likewise, many of the “wicked problems” now confronting governments may require longer-term solutions (Head 2008). While there are important political and democratic issues about maintaining commitments to these longer-term goals, the credible commitment (Majone 2001) produced through the longer-term perspective may permit governments to address comprehensive policy issues.
The above having been said, however, governments also need to adapt to changing conditions – economic, social and political. Again, as something of a contradiction, while governments are criticized as being unpredictable, they are also criticized as being rigid and unresponsive. Perhaps most importantly democracy demands that those elected to office produce policies reflecting their platforms and promises (Rose 1976). Even without the democratic responsiveness issues, there are objective transformations in the environment, and perhaps also changing understandings of policy issues and possible remedies, that could alter the manner in which governments approach policy.

Thus, the challenges arising from the strategic agility notion is not dissimilar to the logic of integrating centralization and decentralization reforms, although the challenges may be even greater. The challenge of integrating long-term policy commitments with flexibility is difficult. Again, senior public administrators may be crucial actors in balancing these conflicting demands in governance. The civil service is the most stable component of government, but also must be politically sensitive. The increased politicization of the public service (Vanhoonacker and Neuhold 2012) may heighten that sensitivity, while perhaps also reducing their commitment to longer-term goals.

4. Summary

Managing in the public sector has always required coping with contradictions and dilemmas, and we should not be surprised that the future of public administration now faces similar challenges. For the countries in the NISPAcee area these challenges may be even greater. Public administration in these countries is functioning in systems with fewer economic resources than in Western Europe, and perhaps with less trust from the public. Thus, attempting to balance multiple and competing demands is likely to be more difficult. That will be especially true of the need to balance demands for policy stability and demands for political responsiveness.

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The Fiscal Crisis and the Future of Public Administration in the NISPAcee Region

RINGA RAUDLA

1. Introduction

The current fiscal crisis in Europe affects the countries in the NISPAcee region to different degrees: while some countries in CEE are more directly impacted by it, others (e.g. in Central Asia) have been only marginally influenced. Nevertheless, it seems that some form of crisis (be it financial, economic or social) is going to be part of the public-administration reality in our region for some time; thus, it is necessary to discuss the implications of the crisis for the future of research in public administration in the NISPAcee region.

In particular, I would like to point to three dangers that we as scholars in the NISPAcee community should be particularly aware of in the context of crisis. These dangers emerge from temptations to oversimplify. In the midst of prevailing uncertainty created by the crises, we are likely to be tempted to provide overly simplified descriptions, resort to overly simplified explanations, and offer overly simplified prescriptions. Thus, when analysing the situations in our countries and offering policy advice in the areas of public administration and public policy, we should keep three things in mind: First, we should not be blinded by a few simple indicators when assessing the (economic) situations in our countries. Second, we should be very wary of simplified causal explanations and conclusions. Third, we should be sceptical of simplified recipes offered as solutions to the prevailing problems. In the following sections, I am going to discuss these three dangers one by one.

2. The danger of oversimplified descriptions

First, we should not confine ourselves to just a few simple indicators when assessing the (economic) situation of any given country. In order to understand the economic and fiscal situation the different countries are in, how vulnerable they are, and how prone they are to external shocks, it is not enough to look at two or three indicators such as the public-sector deficit or public-sector debt. When evaluating the vulnerability of economies, for example, we should also look at the total external debt the country has, including private-sector debt. Indeed, as the latest empirical studies show, those countries in the NISPAcee region that had accumulated the largest levels of private-sector debt faced the largest declines
in GDP and those that had the largest public-sector debt in fact faced the smallest contractions (Connolly 2012).

It is instructive to look at the Baltic countries in that regard. The Baltic countries had the lowest public debts in the region in 2007, but because their private-sector debts were high (exceeding 100% of GDP in Estonia and Latvia), the governments ran into difficulties in 2008–2009, finding it very expensive (or even impossible) to borrow in the international financial markets. Government bonds of the Baltic countries were perceived as highly risky because the rating agencies looked at the total external debt of the countries and feared that the private-sector obligations might soon shift over to the public-sector balance sheets.

Before the crisis hit, the government in Estonia, for example, was primarily “obsessed” with three indicators: economic growth, budget balance and public-debt level. Since all looked stellar between 2000 and 2007, the political elite felt that the country’s economy was doing extremely well and was, as a result, almost overtaken by blissful oblivion. However, a closer look at other indicators (like soaring current-account deficits, rising private-sector debt, and wage growth that was exceeding productivity growth) should have hinted at increasing imbalances in the economy.

Thus, the lesson for the future is that is that as public-administration scholars, we in the NISPAcee community might have to be the ones to draw the attention of the policy communities to a more diverse set of indicators describing the economy and to the potential implications of these indicators.1

3. The danger of oversimplified explanations and conclusions

In addition to being aware of the limitations associated with concentrating on overly simple indicators, we as PA scholars in the NISPAcee community should also be wary of overly simplified explanations and conclusions. In particular, we should be very careful about drawing “lessons” from few idiosyncratic cases. For example, we should be sceptical of claims that fiscal austerity in general or certain types of austerity measures in particular “will definitely lead to recovery and growth”.

The Baltic countries are again cases in point. A number of scholars are currently tempted to draw the conclusion that it was the austerity measures in the Baltic countries, undertaken in 2008–2010, that led to an economic recovery and return to a growth trajectory (see, for example, Aslund 2012). While the superficial

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1 In fact, in Estonia it was primarily the PA community (at Tallinn University of Technology) that was pointing to the growing imbalances in the economy and warned of the pending crisis.
glance at economic indicators does indeed show that the Baltic countries implemented austerity measures amounting to between 8 and 10 % of GDP in 2009 and they recorded economic growth figures between 5.5 and 7.6 % in 2011, it would be a gross oversimplification to attribute the recovery and growth of these economies to the austerity packages they had adopted.

When we look at the numbers a bit closer and try to figure out where the economic growth came from in 2010–2011, it becomes clear that it did not come from the austerity measures. In fact, the Baltic economies came out of the deepest slump thanks to the fact that their main trading partners (the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Poland) were growing; hence, it was the exporting sectors of the Baltic countries that got the economies going again (for a more detailed argument, see Kattel and Raudla 2012).

In his report on the Baltic recovery, Aslund (2012) remarks that cuts made in the education and health sectors in the Baltic countries, especially in Latvia, promoted economic growth. One would think, however, that cuts in education and health care are exactly the kind of cuts that would hurt the economy badly in the long run. Investing in the health and education of the citizens would seem like a more reasonable way out of the economic slump than keeping people uneducated and sick.

Furthermore, cutting in areas where the interface between the state and citizens is the strongest would seem like the fastest way to the social crisis we are so afraid of. As Christopher Pollitt (2010, 20) put it, “Citizen disillusionment with the school system or the police is arguably far more harmful than disillusionment with the particular political leaders of the day. … The principal welfare state services are the main influence on citizen perceptions of the government and on trust and legitimacy.”

If people are disillusioned about the state, however, its legitimacy weakens. Thus, by cutting into sectors that hurt the people most – literally, in the case of health – the state also hurts itself the most. Furthermore, if austerity measures make life unbearable for certain groups of the population, they are likely to consider the ultimate option: exit. And indeed, in the case of the Baltic countries, the austerity measures contributed to extensive emigration, especially in Latvia and Lithuania (Kuokstis and Vilpisauskas 2010).

In any case, we as public-administration scholars in the NISPAcee community should not blindly believe the statements from mainstream economics, which, at least in some cases, may be driven by an ideological stance rather than firm empirical evidence. We should be sceptical of simplified conclusions concerning
The public sector and its role in economic development and probe deeper in order to uncover the more complex mechanisms that are likely to be at work in reality.

4. Danger of oversimplified prescriptions

In the context of crisis and scarce resources, we as a scholarly community in the NISPAcee region should be especially sceptical of overly simplified solutions, often coming in the shape of administrative reform fashions. Indeed, during the crisis and austerity, governments are likely to be lacking in funds, but there certainly will not be a lack of reform advocates (Pollitt 2010, 26), including consultants keen to sell quick-fix recipes. During austerity, governments cannot really afford to experiment with fashions. Rather, governments should be concerned with making sure that the “basics” are running properly, instead of diverting attention to the newest fashions.

Taking again the example of Estonia, it could be observed that in the middle of the deepest crisis and austerity in 2009, when the public sector consolidated its budget by around 9% of GDP and undertook wage cuts and layoffs, the officials in the Ministry of Finance were engaged in preparation for performance-budgeting and performance-management reform and bought expensive analyses from different consulting firms about how to proceed with the reform. By now, the reform process has stalled for various reasons (see, e.g., Raudla 2012a, b for a more detailed discussion), and the opportunity costs of the funds used for preparing the reform were significant.

It also looks like during the crisis, NPM (especially in its worst forms) is coming back under all kinds of new names (see, e.g., Lodge and Hood 2012). In that light, the PA scholars in the NISPAcee community should pose the following question in their research: In what areas of the public sector would the application of NPM techniques be especially dangerous, given the need to strengthen the states and the policy capacity of the administrations?

In doing that, we should also keep in mind that the paradoxes of the NPM measures come to the fore especially strongly in the context of crisis and a general atmosphere of austerity. For example, during times of austerity, the ideas of measuring performance for allocating resources resurface again, but we should not forget that measurement itself can be very costly, and it may divert limited time, attention and resources away from the core tasks themselves. Also, contracting-out may resurface as an “attractive option” for saving money. But the empirical experience tells us that it can often be very costly, in terms of transaction costs...
and erosion of policy-making and administrative capacities in the public sector (see Raudla 2012b for a more detailed discussion).

Besides analysing the potentially damaging effects of NPM practices on the administrations in the NISPAcee region, PA scholars should also pay special attention to the question of how to improve policy-making and administrative capacities in the public administrations in the region. Strengthening these capacities is crucial for steering the economies out of the current crisis and for taking steps to prevent the future one(s).

5. Concluding remarks

Besides the dangers of over-simplified descriptions, explanations and prescriptions, we in the scholarly community of NISPAcee should strive to keep on asking relevant research questions that could be useful for the governments and public-sector organisations in our countries. We have to be aware of the dangers that lurk in the desire to look more “scientific” to our neighbouring disciplines (especially political science and economics). In our attempts to look more scientific, we may easily be drawn into ways of doing research that are driven by methodology and formal modelling rather than being inspired by questions that emerge from reality and need a mix of different “methods” to be addressed. Finally, after asking relevant questions and finding the answers to those, we should have the courage to “speak truth to power”: to address problematic issues in our countries and to draw the governments’ attention to these problems, even if these truths are inconvenient.

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PART II

NISPAcee in the Mirror
Part II of this book contributes to the enlargement of NISPAcee’s institutional memory which has developed during the past two decades as the Association has interacted with both its external and internal environments. In the course of its history, NISPAcee has collected a series of memories consisting of event memories, process memories and decision memories. These are well documented by the NISPAcee website, by the proceedings of the annual conferences, by the annual reports and by other documents.

The contributions to Part II seek to translate historical data into useful knowledge and wisdom. Several of these contributions look back to the initial history of the organization in the early 1990s. Taken together, they describe essential processes and policies, as well as the development of the organisation. Several involve eyewitness accounts of individuals who have been worked long and hard for the implementation of NISPAcee’s objectives. They provide experience-based, relevant information containing lessons and conclusions for the future.

The institutional memory of NISPAcee would not be complete without the acknowledgement of the late Mzia Mikeladze, President of our Association for two different terms and who made a very significant contribution to the work of NISPAcee. She served NISPAcee and Georgia with an extraordinary sense of responsibility and commitment and with empathy and tolerance toward her colleagues. She was a professional colleague and a trusted friend at the same time. When she passed away, a huge void was created that can never be filled. Her heritage is our obligation to continue to develop quality-oriented activities as well as promote good governance and public administration reforms in the region.

The external and internal reflections in Part II illustrate the role that NISPAcee played as one of the driving forces of public administration reform and modernisation in the region. As they indicate, NISPAcee has had a significant impact upon:
• the restoration and implementation of the Rule of Law ("Rechtsstaat") in place of a party-state system
• the increase of the institutional capacities of public agencies
• the encouragement of the use of market incentives and the creation of competition in the public sector
• the implementation of the standards and values of the European Administrative Space
• the shift from government to governance
• the on-going reform and development of local governments.

Discussions around the chosen topics of the annual conferences, books based on the research of the working groups, articles in the NISPAcee Journal and other important NISPAcee activities have supported the on-going reform efforts of the various countries in the region. NISPAcee has also sponsored regional and specialised conferences and workshops which have influenced the modernisation of public administration systems. Among them, the Trans-European Dialogue (TED), has been of outstanding importance and has been organized in cooperation with the European Group on Public Administration (EGPA).

Participation in NISPAcee activities has helped to provide substantial background for participants who have assumed important governmental advisory functions. The first Executive Secretary of NISPAcee, Iveta Radičová, became Prime Minister of Slovakia. Martin Potuček and Călin Hîntea became key advisers to the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Romania. Last, but not least, one of the most outstanding examples of a career leading from theory to practice is Barbara Kudrycka. Having been President of NISPAcee, and an excellent academician, she was elected to the European Parliament and later assumed the position of Minister of Science and Higher Education for the Government of Poland. Barbara Kudrycka has become an emblematic personality of NISPAcee as she has traversed the quite complicated path from theory to practice while leading efforts to modernize the science and higher education sectors of her nation.

As the contributions to Part II suggest, NISPAcee has had a quite significant impact on the quality of public administration education in many different countries. NISPAcee activities have directly and indirectly initiated reform efforts in the area of public policy and management improvement programs through:

• the provision of text-books on current topics of public finance, public policy, public management, and public administration law
• supporting bilateral and multilateral cooperation in creating curricula and teaching materials
• encouraging systematic exchange of knowledge and experience on the development of new public administration, public policy or public management programs

• fostering cooperative research programmes for scholars of different countries in the region and connecting them with West-European and US scholars as well

• providing a supportive atmosphere and background for mutual cooperation and productive partnerships among many institutions in the region (including cooperation in the management of professional journals issued by Universities, assisting in the creation and implementation of dual degree projects and many collaborative efforts).

In Part II, one finds basically two mirrors: external and internal. Sometimes, one can have the feeling that rather than mirrors one is looking at two kaleidoscopes expressing different views and approaches which are formulating various conclusions and recommendations. However, all of these perspectives have messages on the main trends of NISPAcee history based on relevant experiences.

Part II begins with three very important speeches presented at the conference. The first is by the brother of the late Mzia Mikeladze and serves to capture her wonderful contribution to NISPAcee, her country and the region. In the second speech, Barbara Kudrycka, provides a marvellous description of the complexities that face academics as they move into the world of practitioners. In the third and final speech, the late Haiyan Qian, a long-time friend and associate of NISPAcee, discusses the organization’s relationships with the United Nations and its contributions to efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

The central element of the external mirror consists of short papers written by professionals who have been NISPAcee partners in the international and professional world of public administration and research. These outstanding scholars have been extremely supportive in the implementation of NISPAcee objectives and in the management of joint projects.

Allan Rosenbaum, a long-time partner and supporter of NISPAcee, provides an overview on the joint actions of NISPAcee with the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA) and the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) which has involved both the strengthening of cooperation on the Euro-Atlantic level and the encouragement and facilitation of NISPAcee’s growing worldwide involvement. These are both organizations in which he has played an important role in creating the connection with NISPAcee.
Geert Bouckaert, the Past-President of the European Group on Public Administration (EGPA), the European partner organisation of NISPAcee, points out that NISPAcee has and must continue to have a major focus upon Europe. NISPAcee has demonstrated this through its conferences, publications and interventions. One of his messages is that capacity building and dialogues have been, are and will be important vehicles in the development of NISPAcee’s identity. His second message is that EGPA and NISPAcee should maintain and strengthen their institutionalised partnership for the long run.

Jak Jabes was, and still is, a legendary friend of NISPAcee. He has provided an overview on the concerns and achievements of the external key supporters and advisers of the organisation, especially during its early days.

Michael Brintnall, the Executive Director of the American Political Science Association, writes about the financial and professional support of institutions in the United States in the early years of NISPAcee and their efforts in promoting the development of the internal capacities and independent development of NISPAcee.

Theo Van der Krogt, who has been helping to build the quality of public administration education in all its aspects, with a focus upon didactical models, best practices and quality assurance, elaborates upon NISPAcee’s role in these efforts.

Rolet Loretan, the Director General of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), focuses upon the importance of the institutional position which has been achieved by NISPAcee in the past decades. He stresses NISPAcee’s role in building networks in the world of international organisations and communities.

Through the internal mirror, various contributors, all of whom have served on the NISPAcee Steering Committee, focus upon the special values of NISPAcee. Wolfgang Drechsler outlines an essential characteristic of NISPAcee as compared to other international scholarly organisations – specifically, the duality in its functions:

- in the first place, promoting the development of NISPAcee scholars and researchers
- on the other hand, promoting the development of “western” research standards in the region

He raises the issue of whether there can be an appropriate harmony between these two functions.
In another contribution, Jacek Czaputowicz, points out that NISPAcee contrib-
uted greatly to the development of both public administration and local govern-
ance reforms in the region and provides details on the impact of NISPAcee activi-
ties in Poland. Two additional contributions by Juraj Nemec and György Jenei
focus on NISPAcee’s development and the challenges the organization is facing.
A special value of the internal mirror is the eyewitness memories on the achieve-
ments of the Working Groups. They illustrate the extent to which Working Groups
have become a substantial and organic part of the day to day life of NISPAcee.
They have helped to develop public administration theory in the region, espe-
cially in the transition toward fully democratic governance, the functioning of a mar-
et economy and the preserving of social cohesion. They also have encouraged
comparative studies in the region while implementing the international stand-
ards of research methodology. Of particular significance, they have improved
cooperation between various schools and institutes of public administration, not
only in the region, but have also strengthened the various partnership patterns
necessary for meeting supra-regional challenges.

The papers in Part II create a substantial and solid basis for drawing lessons from
the past which can be applied to the present and the future. They suggest the
need for the following steps for the further development of NISPAcee:
• The need to develop a new financial strategy which seeks state support from
the region and the working out of new ways of fundraising and communica-
tion strategies.
• The need to more effectively integrate the “Eastern Partnership countries”,
Central Asia and the West-Balkan countries into the organization and thereby
increase their role in the NISPAcee community.
• The need to look for new ways of influencing the quality of public admin-
istration higher education and training in the region and also support such
programs in seeking EAPAA accreditation.
• The need to increase NISPAcee’s impact on the modernisation and reform ef-
forts of public administration systems in Central and Eastern Europe.

All of the contributions share the conviction and conclusions, that:
• We should and will meet all current challenges because NISPAcee is a well-
organised, efficient and effective organization with a short, but wonderful,
history. It has given identity, collegiality and visibility to Central and Eastern
Europe in the international, professional communities of public administra-
tion education and research.
• In addition to its efficient management and highly motivated secretariat, the organization benefits from a committed and dedicated membership possessing increasing skills to work actively in their home countries and the world at large. Their continuing efforts, combined with a wide array of international projects, will continue to provide the basis and the opportunity for NISPAcee to shape its own future in dramatically changing times.

• The bridging role between practice and academia must continue to be strengthened. Public administration practitioners are facing many challenges and NISPAcee, its member institutions and individuals associated with it, can assist them in coping with these challenges.

• European public administration principles and values, including those associated with strategic decision making, quality of policy making and policy implementation, politico-administrative relations and overpolitization, the development of society and citizens, trust in government and improvement of judicial systems, anticorruption and the resolution of ethnic tensions are still, and will remain, high on the agenda of future joint activities.

The Central and Eastern European region is facing both old and new challenges. On the one hand, the Caucasus and Central Asian countries continue to cope with the legacy of the Soviet past in the form of underdeveloped democratic institutions and political culture, authoritarian suppression and the emergence of clans and regional patronage networks. This is occurring at a time when the impact of globalization and on-going crises appear to be threatening the basic principles of the social welfare state. As Raudla concluded, “after asking relevant questions and finding the answers to those, we should have the courage to ‘speak truth to power’ to address problematic issues in our countries and to draw the governments’ attention to these problems, even if these truths are inconvenient.”

This is not an easy task as Peters confirms, “Managing in the public sector has always required coping with contradictions and dilemmas, and we should not be surprised that the future of public administration now faces similar challenges. For the countries in the NISPAcee area these challenges may be even greater. Public administration in these countries is functioning in systems with fewer economic resources than in Western Europe, and perhaps with less trust from the public. Thus, attempting to balance multiple and competing demands is likely to be more difficult.”

Finally, it is increasingly evident that the NISPAcee region is continuously changing and this includes its relationship to the remainder of Europe. As Geert Bouckaert has noted, “It is interesting to see that Central and Eastern Europe, which is a geo-political concept, is changing. Also the definition of ‘Europe’ is chang-
ing. Perhaps the Baltic States are more central than Eastern Europe and perhaps Poland is becoming more Western than Central Europe, and perhaps Slovenia is more Western than Southern.” Consequently, the geography of NISPAcee remains an open question. This is all the more the case with the Western Balkan region seeking to join the EU. There are also numerous issues regarding the relationship of NISPAcee to the Caucasus countries and the very different developments in the Central Asian countries where public administration may be based more on the traditional values than on “western” models of governance. Such geographical differences obviously represent a major challenge for NISPAcee’s future development.

The above represent a few examples of issues and ideas found in this book and which will obviously be a driving force for NISPAcee and will consequently help to shape the future development of the organization. In that regard, the words of one of NISPAcee’s most active and prominent members, György Jenei, provide a final message for all those concerned with the future of both the region and NISPAcee:

• We need a strategic solution. The requirements of this strategy are clear: To create viable communities – among the nations – in which the people are free to dispose of their own lives in politics, in their workplaces, at home. Only tolerant and pluralistic societies may provide the key to overcoming a state dividing the regions, drowning all progressive initiatives in abject hatred and unfruitful arrogance.

• Our common past obliged us, members of NISPAcee, to strengthen our empathy toward each other, to strengthen our solidarity, our professional integrity, and our commitment to look for new ways and opportunities in the application and improvement of knowledge transfer and exchange of experiences.
Section II.A

Speeches
In Memory of Mzia Mikeladze

MALKHAZ MIKELADZE

It is as great an honor as it is a sad occasion to be with you today, both to talk about the last twenty years of Public Administration (PA) in Georgia in place of my late sister, NISPAcee President Mzia Mikeladze, who so suddenly passed away last December, and also to accept for her the Alena Brunovská Award for Teaching Excellence, which was conferred upon her posthumously. Allow me, therefore, a few remarks about Mzia.

First of all, I truly appreciate the invitation to the conference, and I would like to thank NISPAcee very much for the attention to, respect for the work, and memory of my sister, not only for myself, but also on behalf of her entire family, especially of Mzia’s father. Five months have passed since we do not have Mzia amongst us anymore. Believe me, this completely unexpected tragedy was a disaster for all members of her family, and for everybody who knew Mzia.

I think it is worth mentioning on this occasion that during the funeral ceremonies, many people whom I did not even know came to me, saying that just a few days previously, they had been in touch with Mzia to get some advice or to ask for help regarding professional or personal matters. I really do not know how it was possible for her to manage all of this, but she was always there to give advice, and to share with people their troubles and joys as if her own. Indeed, she was the best, a kind person, a professional colleague and a trusted friend. We never expected her to go so quickly.

Mrs. Ľudmila Gajdošová made special arrangements to come to Georgia to be at the funeral, which indicates the great support she had from NISPAcee, a wonderful expression of respect for Mzia and her activities within NISPAcee. This effort was really appreciated by my family, Mzia’s students and all that knew and loved her. We are deeply grateful for the NISPAcee Steering Committee’s decision to award to Mzia the important Alena Brunovská award for Teaching Excellence in PA. We also thank you for the booklet issued by NISPAcee commemorating Mzia Mikeladze, and it was especially meaningful that Ľudmila and Elena Zakova presented it to our family in person.

NISPAcee was a central part of Mzia’s professional life. For two different terms, she was elected President of the Association; she considered that assignment a great honor and put her heart into it. She had an extraordinary sense of responsibility, always doing her best in all she did, and I know that she made a significant contribution to the work and activities of NISPAcee. Even during what we now
know were the last days of her life, she was devoted to the work and well-being of the Association.

Mzia herself also gained much from the cooperation with NISPAcee – she understood better the European environment, the problems of governance in Europe’s small and large countries; she extended her own knowledge, she learned lessons in the management of schools and institutions by working closely with young people, colleagues, scholars. In conjunction with her NISPAcee Presidency, she was often traveling, not only within Europe, but around the World. She was always excited by the possibility of seeing how like-minded people around the world were working in the same direction. She valued very much all the possibilities and opportunities that NISPAcee gave her in getting to know and understand the experiences and traditions of many different countries.

Mzia was very much charmed by the warm and friendly atmosphere in NISPAcee, and she gained many friends during her travels and work for the Association. She had a real sense of being a member of a very large family, and I would like to underline this important achievement of NISPAcee. Her experience from NISPAcee was widely applied in Georgia, in particular at the Caucasus University and the International School of Economics, which is part of Tbilisi State University, the two institutions where she worked during the last years of her life. Mzia strongly believed that education is an essential tool for young independent countries, for fledgling democracies, and that there is a real need for educational exchange among students and professionals alike. She understood that they had to share their experiences in order to facilitate the creation of the proper basis for state-building, especially in our part of the world.

Mzia dreamed of seeing our countries grow and prosper, with honest and responsible governments, governments that would work hard to establish a positive environment to ensure the well-being and happiness of all the people – not just of the elites at the top. That is why she was part of NISPAcee. She understood the need to be au courant in the field of public administration, and her reward in life was seeing the fruits of her work, more and more young professionals, working effectively in our countries, and positive changes taking place.

Since she cannot continue her good work anymore, our family has decided to do so by supporting the public-administration education of young people in Georgia to the best of our abilities. We have therefore established the Mzia Mikeladze Fund dedicated to assisting young Georgian PA professionals in their studies and research efforts. And, of course, we want to actively engage Mzia’s colleagues and friends in the work and activities of this Fund; so, all are welcome.
We think that this continuation of her work will be the best possible tribute and way to show respect to the memory of my sister.

Mzia had great expectations for this conference and had already made many preparations for it. Unfortunately, her plans could not be implemented, as she left us. But she also left great love and dedication to the many initiatives within NISPAcee. And I would like to wish to all of you great success in your work. I do believe that Mzia’s dedication and commitment are widely shared by the members and staff of NISPAcee. I also wish success to this conference, which is an important forum and timely venue for discussing very important issues for our region.

Thank you all once again and I do hope to see even higher expectations and new achievements for NISPAcee: for the good of young people, for the good of our countries and for the good of the entire world. Mzia would have wanted that too!
From Theory to Practice: A Cabinet Minister’s Experience

BARBARA KUDRYCKA

The topic of the NISPAcee conference, “Public Administration East and West: Twenty Years of Development” provides a marvelous opportunity to explore a variety of important themes, concepts and ideas that have impacted on our field and region during the past two decades. Even better than that, it provides an opportunity for someone like myself, as an academic concerned about theory, to discuss some of the issues that arise when one moves from higher education into the world of practice as a cabinet minister.

One of my major concerns as a minister has been to recognize the many problems of administration and practice that we must solve if we are to avoid making major policy mistakes that can have significant negative consequences for our country. Many of these problems are captured in the notion of trying to move from the making of political-party-based policy to the carrying-out and developing of evidence-based policy. In addition to this major area, three additional problem areas stand out. These are: first, the issue of engaging in routinized administration vs. innovative administration; second, the task of innovative administration in carrying out systemic change; and, third, the need to provide communication as opposed to simply information.

As regards the issue of political-party-based policy-making vs. evidence-based policy-making, there has been, during the course of the past five years, a great deal of progress in this regard. However, because we began at a very low starting point, there is still much to be done. For much of the past two decades, almost all decisions in Poland were made on purely political grounds. When upon occasion there were disputes between ministers, or when there were issues that needed to be resolved, the combination of political party positions and opinion-poll ratings were almost always the deciding factors. As a result most policy decisions were made based on the desires of political parties and the intuitions of party leaders.

Shortly after assuming the role of minister, it quickly became evident that while it might be in the short-term interest of party politicians to make politically based decisions on matters of policy, it was definitely in the medium- and long-term interests of the political party, and the politicians involved, to base decisions on evidence rather than short-term political conditions. Doing so ensured better public policy and significantly lessened the risks of major mistakes in policy that
would come back to haunt the political party and politicians involved and, consequently, have long-term negative consequences.

As regards the issue of innovative administration vs. routine administration, this has represented the need to make major changes from what was the normal approach (highly routinized, bureaucratic and politicized) for much of our history in the Central and Eastern European countries since World War II. Consequently, it was important to ask ourselves, what do the people want from their public administrators? Sometimes, they do want routine administration, but they want it to be both user-friendly and efficient. Obviously, there is often a conflict between these two goals. Nevertheless, routine administration with both efficiency and responsiveness to users must be ensured at all times in every country.

As regards innovative administration, this often is very much wanted, but it is often hard to achieve. Often the best way to do so is to utilize new projects and their management to encourage innovation and change. It is very encouraging how quickly, in very routine-bound and formalistic administrations, the more talented senior civil servants will embrace new projects and undertake new initiatives that involve significant change once they have observed successful examples of this.

The next major concern of my recent experience as a minister has been how to balance the reality that innovation is often incremental with the frequent need for systemic change. As a precursor to systemic change in public policy, it is important that members of the government, whether in Poland or elsewhere, accurately describe and assess the social and political implications of the change being proposed and, of course, its impact upon public finances. For those of us in new democracies, it is important to look at and understand how these problems are solved in both European Union countries and other highly developed countries.

In many cases, major systemic change in public administration involves the introduction of large, new computer-based systems. Such systems are often difficult to conceive and expensive and, consequently, subject to a high degree of bureaucratic and commercial lobbying, which in turn opens up the threat of corruption. One way of dealing with these problems is to have a highly formalised public-procurement procedure, as we have in Poland, but this becomes very time-consuming and inflexible. It is very hard, but necessary, to find a balance between our formalized procedures and the need for new computer-based systems. Thanks to the new technology and science, in the field of higher education, we have achieved shorter periods for changing administrative procedures, as well as faster access to the data and information needed for decision-making.
The final problem is a very interesting one, namely the need for communication as opposed to simply providing information. In order for policy to be effective, it must be well communicated, but communication is not information. The reality is that information is not communication if no one is listening. Administrators and politicians in contemporary democracies cannot force modern people to listen – thank goodness. The best way to make people listen is to stimulate them. However, this is often very hard to do. Fortunately, sometimes accidental events can stimulate wide debate when government has tried and failed.

We have recently had a very interesting example of this in Poland. My administration introduced far-reaching reforms in science and education in 2010 and 2011. We tried intensively to communicate information about these reforms to key stakeholders with very little success. However, recently comments on the quality of Polish graduates by a leading businessman opened up a major debate about limitations in our educational system. Various commentators and analysts proposed a variety of diagnoses and prescriptions as to how to solve this problem.

To their surprise, it turned out that we had carried out the same process of diagnosis ourselves and had already introduced many of the changes that were now being proposed. Thanks to the debate, the relevant stakeholders obtained a much better understanding of the reforms. In this instance, the debate provided much better communication than we had been able to do with a simple information campaign. Thus, what we were not able to achieve was done by accident.

This brings me back to my initial issue, how do we avoid policy mistakes? I do not have any universal prescriptions for this, of course. However, by engaging in systemic change for policy and program innovation, based on evidence rather than political interest, we have tried to do so. Apparently, we have been somewhat successful since our government was elected to govern Poland again for a second time and this is absolutely unusual in terms of the democratic history of our country.

Speaking of the electoral success of our government, I would like to identify some factors which helped us to win this most recent election, but are equally important for public administration and public administrators. The first one is rapid access to key information. The second one involves drawing upon the competing centers of knowledge and analysis that exist within any democracy, both within and outside of one’s own country. Next, of course, comes team-building – which is very important for any electoral success. Finally, there is the expert knowledge of politicians. As regards the question of rapid access to key information, it is important that every top policymaker have his or her own information-gathering unit, independent of the formal bureaucracy. I think that the realization of this
fact is the reason for the activation of the Downing Street policy unit by UK Prime Minister, David Cameron. This is a major function of the Prime Minister’s policy unit. It is also the reason that ministers have political advisors. Of course, there are several departments in the Prime Minister’s office and in the cabinet which also are often sources of important information.

The important second factor is competing centers of knowledge within the bureaucracy, as well as a close relationship between the minister and the bureaucracy with which they work. Principally, we need confidence in the data presented by the bureaucracy. This is very important because even the smallest error can be used by the media in its position against the government. That is why it is important to obtain information from various sources within the bureaucracy and also from outside experts and academic leaders. For instance, in my ministry, we compare our own information with the data found in various reports from the European Commission, Eurostat, United Nations, OECD and the World Bank.

For a policymaker, a key first step is to create a small team of close collaborators. In the case of Cabinet Ministers this would include deputy ministers, political advisors and key members of their analysis and finance departments. The next step is for each member of this team to create their own team of co-workers and advisors at their own level. Such a process involves at least a partial transition from a purely formalistic structure to a team-based flexible administrative structure which is capable of crisis management, project management and innovation in public administration.

The expert knowledge of politicians is also an important factor. This is particularly needed in times of crisis. I am convinced that Poland avoided the recession that was a part of the global economic crisis, and has grown faster than any European country in this period, because, among other things, we had a team of highly professional economists in charge of finance throughout the crisis. Poland was also the only European country to refuse to buy swine fever vaccinations in winter 2009–2010. This saved the country at least 250 million euros when other countries spent many times this amount quite unnecessarily. Poland was able to make the right decision because it had a highly qualified physician as its Minister of Health. In normal times, it is often considered that the Minister of Health should not be a physician because they are too close to the problem. But, in times of crisis, things are different.

To summarize, the Polish administration has in recent years adopted new approaches to public administration and has come a long way from a formalistic administration which is based on the routine actions of civil servants. It has moved toward becoming an open-to-new-challenges administration which is
based on innovative methods of project management. We had a good lesson in this regard during the time of the Polish Presidency of the European Union. At that time, we had to coordinate the work of 27 countries, which was often very complicated and required a flexible and adaptive public administration. We also had to negotiate many complex situations in these difficult times of crisis while preparing the first draft of a new financial perspective for 2014–2020.

Before concluding, let me share with you some personal reflections. When I worked as a professor, I never dreamed of becoming a minister. Many of my fellow professors at that time often complained that policy makers do not read our books and they do not even listen to our ideas and that theory is far from practice. When I started attending the NISPAcee conferences, I met many outstanding professors and individuals. Discussions and presentations during these conferences made me aware of how many common problems, we, as Central and Eastern European countries have.

At that time, Poland was widely regarded as a country of Eastern Europe. After the accession of ten new countries to the European Union in 2004, Poland started to be considered as a country of Central Europe. Now we aspire to be recognised as a country of Northern Europe. In an interesting way, this shows the great progress that has occurred in the region during the last twenty years. In Europe today, there is no longer a single division into East and West.

In conclusion, I can say that there is little difference between working in the theory of public administration as a professor and working in the practice of it as a Cabinet Minister. As a professor and as a minister, I need to gather lots of information, rely upon knowledge, make valid selections and draw correct conclusions. As a professor and as a minister, I compare situations in other countries and seek the best solutions for use in Poland, while taking into account our specific position, historical traditions and social conditions. Of course, I listen to the opinions of professors, rectors, students, young scientists, and many others.

Is this different from what NISPAceee does during its conferences? Obviously, it is not. Thus, on the occasion of NISPAceee’s 20th anniversary, I wish all its members and its steering committee, and its Director General, Ľudmila Gajdošová, successful and effective work, many good papers, scientific books and scientific discussions. These will stimulate the stable development of our region – both in theory and in practice – for the next 20 years. What has been important for me personally is that NISPAceee was a platform to make good friends. That is why I would like to wish NISPAceee to continue being a platform for creating international friendships between its members. That is why I would also like to thank Ľudmila Gajdošová, Allan Rosenbaum, Juraj Nemec, Mirko Vintar, Geert
Bouckaert and many other friends. I have learned a lot from you, and I am sure that our discussions helped to build my personality and my personal skills and I know wherever fate puts us, we will always remain good friends. Thank you very much.
NISPAcee, the United Nations and the Millennium Development Goals

HAIYAN QIAN

The 20th anniversary conference of NISPAcee on the topic of “Public Administration East and West: Twenty Years of Development,” is very significant for at least two reasons. First, it will serve to underscore the importance of the modernization of administrative systems in the context of effective governance in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, through both policy advice and intensive personnel training. These are areas that have always formed the core of NISPAcee activities. Second, the event also marks the twentieth anniversary of NISPAcee, the institution that, since its commencement, has played a significant role in helping countries in economic transition develop their public-administration systems and overcome transitional difficulties. NISPAcee has always demonstrated the value of networking, dialoguing, and experience and information sharing. These are critical elements for the successful implementation of much needed socio-economic reform.

The need to address the problems of the public-service profession, currently in rapid change, has been stressed by the crises and mounting challenges faced as a result of the massive transition in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and beyond. Although it would be wrong to generalize regarding the prevailing conditions in the region, there can be little doubt that transition has been difficult in many countries and that some are still struggling with recession. In some of these countries, government administration has been adversely affected in many ways, prompting large-scale dismissal of employees. Therefore, it can be argued that the urgency of reform is only matched by its complexity.

Not all measures of reform can be taken simultaneously. However, it is certain that economic and social progress in the countries concerned largely depend on the effectiveness of public-service reform. This is especially critical at times of the unfolding financial crisis, which has yet to fully collect its toll, particularly in Europe.

The urgency for reform was underscored at several recent forums organized under the auspices of the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union and the OECD. Common to all these meetings was the priority accorded to reinforcing the professional core, ethical standards and role of the public service. The political divide, which for decades separated Europe into East and West, has now ceased to exist. However, to translate the will to cooperate into a palpable
reality, we still need enabling frameworks. I am not afraid to say that NISPAcee is one such framework, which for a long period, on many occasions together with the United Nations Department of Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM), relentlessly worked to help enhance the role, prestige, performance and professionalism of the public service.

In this connection, I would like to highlight two areas where NISPAcee and DPADM have cooperated most fruitfully. The first area of cooperation has been in the development of the United Nations Public Administration Network – UNPAN, of which NISPAcee became one of the first institutional members. The success and impact of UNPAN has dramatically increased the number of its users and the quality and quantity of its content. This is in large part thanks to the expert contributions of NISPAcee. Certainly, the deliberations and outcomes of this 20th Conference of NISPAcee will also be reflected in UNPAN, further improving its content and relevance to the needs of the public-administration community worldwide.

The second area is the development of leadership capacity in the public service. This theme is particularly important to DPADM. This is true not only because it echoes the division’s work in building and strengthening capacities in governance and public administration, but also because the same theme is at the heart of the efforts of the DPADM and NISPAcee collaboration in developing leadership capacity in the wider region of Central and Eastern Europe.

For quite some time, but more specifically since the Millennium Summit of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2000 and the Millennium Declaration it endorsed, leadership-capacity development has been at the top of our agenda. We believe that the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals – the MDGs – can only be pursued with support of capable leadership. Whether we are talking of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; or ensuring environmental sustainability and developing global partnerships for development – all of which are very critical goals for sustainable human development – we need to bear in mind that they can be tackled only by bold, capable, innovative, inspiring, persevering, and trustworthy, as well as people-sensitive leadership.

In this context, building leadership for modernization and effective governance cannot be just an exercise for intellectual or academic satisfaction. As we reflect and discuss the topic, we need to bear in mind that the ultimate purpose of leadership worldwide, especially in developing countries, must be the development
and well-being of people. Modernization and effective governance are relevant only to the extent that they contribute to the improvement of the quality of life for everyone, especially for the disadvantaged groups. From studies that have been undertaken, including studies on the implementation of the MDGs, it is clear that countries with weak leadership capacity, particularly in the public sector, tend to lag behind in the progress of development goals. We must, therefore, acknowledge that such ambitious human development targets will not be reached without strong and committed leadership at all levels and in all sectors.

The presence of all of you gathered here makes us appreciate the significance of the work that will be accomplished here this week in pinpointing the role of leadership for development and for meeting the challenges confronting the world today and in the future. The challenges are many, and they express themselves differently from region to region and from country to country, and are highly contingent on the current socio-politico-economic and cultural conditions.

In Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS region, many countries have already embarked on large-scale transformations in order to bridge the development gap between themselves and the rest of the world. This task requires knowledge, skills, attitudes and networks that enable working with stakeholders, balancing and managing long-term and short-term objectives in the context of change, creating a shared vision and strategy, and empowering people.

We are approaching the deadline for the full implementation of the MDGs, which is 2015. In that regard, the United Nations’ member states have requested that all stakeholders throughout the world start thinking about the post-2015 development agenda.

I hope that in the course of this Conference, the discussions on how to build leadership capacity for development and modernization beyond 2015 will open new horizons for DPADM’s traditional cooperation with NISPAcee. This will lay the groundwork for empowering leaders in the region to work towards ensuring a peaceful, developed world where life is equally enjoyed by all.
Section II.B

NISPAcee in the Eyes of the External Community
NISPAcee and the Institutionalization of a Discipline: Views from Brussels and the United States

ALLAN ROSENBAUM

Whether viewed from Brussels or the United States, NISPAcee has been, quite simply, a grand success. Few academic organizations, and certainly none in the field of public administration, have had the kind of impact in relatively few years that NISPAcee has had in its two decades of existence. This is obviously both a bold statement to make and one that is somewhat difficult to demonstrate empirically. However, as often is the case with important realities, they are not readily susceptible to empirical analysis. Nevertheless, anyone who has been exposed to the development of the field of public-administration education and training in Central and Eastern Europe will recognize and understand the importance of NISPAcee to the development of public-administration education and training in the region.

Whether one is looking from the perspective of the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA), located in Brussels, Belgium (with its worldwide membership), or from across the Atlantic, at the headquarters of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) in Washington, DC, the name NISPAcee today is synonymous with public-administration education and training in Central and Eastern Europe. That this is so is really not surprising. Since shortly after its founding 20 years ago, NISPAcee has been recognized as the single most important organization in the region in terms of promoting the development and improvement of public-administration education and training.

The importance of NISPAcee goes well beyond public-administration education and training, in that the organization has had a significant impact on development of good government and effective public administration throughout the region. Through the many workshops it has organized and its extensive array of publications, NISPAcee has emerged as a major force in promoting public and professional awareness of, and concern about, the principles of good governance and effective public administration. In so doing, it has both documented and helped to shape the process by which Central and Eastern Europe has, in a very short period, transformed itself from a region of authoritarian regimes to one of vibrant democracies, which, if not perfect, are certainly thriving.

Not surprisingly, in perhaps no other region of the world is a public-administration association so closely identified with the academic community it serves as is the case with NISPAcee and the field of public administration in Central and
Eastern Europe. In part, this is due to the fact that NISPAcee emerged as an organization at roughly the same time that public administration emerged as both an academic discipline and as a profession in Central and Eastern Europe. The transition that took place in the region a little more than two decades ago also gave rise to the need both for trained, professional public administrators and for new institutions that would train future generations of individuals to be involved in government in the CEE countries. NISPAcee has played a very important role in helping to encourage the development of and sustain those institutions from throughout the region that were tasked with responding to this need.

There are a number of functions which professional associations in any field or discipline, and certainly in the field of public administration, should perform. These include, among other things, providing a forum or space for individuals in the field to interact with one another, encouraging the professionalization of training and education, encouraging research and the creation of knowledge and establishing standards of excellence for the field. In each of these areas of activity, NISPAcee has been extraordinarily successful and, very quickly, established a standard that many other similar organizations are now striving to equal.

Certainly, one of the major areas of achievement has been in the area of creating knowledge. The reality is that NISPAcee has become one of the most important producers of knowledge and information about political institutional and administrative development throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, there is probably no other organization that has produced a comparable amount of research publications on that subject. Similarly, the NISPAcee conference has become the most important annual event for anyone interested in public administration and its development in Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the conference has evolved in a way that very closely reflects the evolution of public-administration education, training and research in the region. As the conference has grown over the years, the quality of the research being presented and discussed has grown dramatically as well. Today, the annual NISPAcee conference is the equal of any public-administration association conference in the world in terms of the quality of research and papers being presented.

While the focus of NISPAcee has certainly been on Central and Eastern Europe, the organization and its members have always demonstrated an interest in interacting with comparable individuals and groups from other parts of the world, and it was this concern that brought NISPAcee into contact with the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration. The relationship between IASIA and NISPAcee has, since its inception, been a very special one which has been highly positive for both organizations. While there certainly had been inter-
action between individuals active in IASIA and NISPAcee participating in each other’s conferences, the first formal collaboration between the two organizations involved a joint seminar which included NISPAcee, IASIA and the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs. This event occurred in Bratislava, Slovakia, from 6 to 8 December 2001 and was organized under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic. The focus of the seminar was on the role of public-administration education and training in supporting processes of state modernization, with particular emphasis upon decentralization. Towards that end, numerous papers were presented by individuals associated with the two organizations, which resulted in a widely distributed book which was published by the United Nations in 2003 and entitled, State Modernization and Decentralization: Implications for Education and Training in Public Administration.

Subsequently, several other joint events have taken place that have brought NISPAcee and IASIA members together. These include two very successful seminars in China, which involved the leadership of not only NISPAcee and IASIA, but of ASPA as well. The first of these occurred in 2010 in Beijing and the most recent one took place in Guangzhou in 2012. Both of these events were hosted by the Chinese Academy of Governance, perhaps the most influential public-administration training organization in the world in terms of its ties to the top-level leadership of the government of its country. These events not only helped to bring NISPAcee as an organization to the attention of the Chinese hosts, but they represented great opportunities for the leadership of each of the organizations to interact with one another and share ideas which they could then bring back to their home organizations.

The first conference in China also served to connect NISPAcee, both formally and informally, with the 9,000-member American Society for Public Administration, the USA’s largest public-administration organization. One consequence of this interaction was the decision by each organization to invite the other to formally organize a panel (which would be recognized as its panel) at the other organization’s annual conference. The result have been highly stimulating panels at each other’s conference, which in turn calls attention to the organizing group’s involvement with the host organization.

Obviously, there are many other specific connections, both formal and informal, that have occurred between NISPAcee and both IASIA and ASPA. However, the purpose of this brief essay is not to document that history, but rather to note that as NISPAcee has grown into what is, if not the most successful, certainly one of the most successful academic associations in the field of public-administration education and training, It has continued to reach out and connect with colleagues
throughout the world. Thus, NISPAcee has extended its reach well beyond the borders of Central and Eastern Europe. The result has been the development of an extraordinary organization which, in turn, has had a powerful impact upon the community which it has served so well.
“Institutions” are not just what we study, but also what we help to build and improve through our research, teaching and training, and advice. At the meta level, our community also contributes to “institutions” that allow us to conduct research, to provide teaching and training, and to advise. It is essential to have this institutional infrastructure, such as universities, national schools and also learned societies such as associations, organizations, consortia, groups and networks.

NISPAcee, the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe, is a special institution that was founded in a special time window, under special circumstances, twenty years ago. NISPAcee is not just an organization, it is an institution, created after the Fall of the Wall, to build capacity in universities and public sectors, for all those contributing to public administration in countries that left the Soviet Union.

It would be interesting to develop an anthropological study of the changing and changed PA community in these twenty years, and to see the impact of this on systems and institutions. It would allow us to see how new supply of new ideas, how new demand for new ideas, how new matches of supply and demand of PA ideas have been triggered. It would allow us to see how established disciplines such as law and economics have been reorganized to “dialogue” with public administration; or how political science, sociology and philosophy have been developed to address new themes of public interest; or how the content of teaching programs has been adjusted to new needs. It would be interesting to see how and where PA capacity has been developed at CEE universities, or how new universities have been created to fill gaps. Also the circulation of elites is happening: old ones, new and renewed ones, coming from abroad back to their original home countries. How has consulting affected the market of ideas, especially since the saying “who pays the piper, calls the tune” is still very relevant? How did language affect PA. How has the dialogue with the “West”, especially the NISPAcee/EGPA TED Dialogues, affected us.

Three issues could be raised. First, NISPAcee is European; second, change is possible; third, dialogue within Europe is essential.

It is interesting to see that Central and Eastern Europe, which is a geo-political concept, is changing. Also the definition of “Europe” is changing. Perhaps the Baltic States are more Central then Eastern Europe, and perhaps Poland is becoming more Western then Central Europe, and perhaps Slovenia is more West-
ern than Southern. Two things are clear from this thesis. NISPAcee is European and should pronounce this clearly, also in its name for the next twenty years which could be NISPAcee. Also, as it belongs to the European continent, its future is in Europe, not in another continent. This will be important for the future mindset of a further development of Europe, whether it is North or South, or East or West, or Central. It also demonstrates that NISPAcee has a specific role in “Europe” which is complementary to EGPA. There is some geographical “overlap” for the European Union and the shared “acquis communautaire”, but here also there is complementarity because of the path dependency of the past and the related transition. In the NISPAcee coverage beyond the EU, there is specificity and expertise which is undisputable for its relevance and its reaching out to the East, the Balkans, the South, and even to the Mediterranean as such.

This brings us to the second issue of change, reform, and transition of systems and institutions. NISPAcee has demonstrated through its conferences, its publications, its interventions that transition has happened, is happening, and will happen. Change is possible, sustainable change is also feasible. However, there are some conditions which seem to be emerging. Blind imitation of solutions is not sustainable; however, examples of comparable cases are useful to learn, also in order to know what needs not to be done. Changes take time to be absorbed in institutions and to be owned by these institutions. Chains of governance are as strong as the weakest part of the chain, which includes the private sector, the public sector, civil society and political parties. All parts of the chain were strengthened in the last twenty years. Capacity-building remains crucial, too, and that includes not just people, but also data and institutions.

Finally, dialogues are an important vehicle to define and develop identities. Therefore, dialogues, not just Europe with the rest of the world, but also within Europe, remain essential. Dialogues are not monologues. Dialogues are not double monologues. Dialogues are exchanges of ideas, values, attitudes. It is a continuous procedure of exchange where a combination of speaking and listening in an equilibrated and mutual way allows to share, to enrich, to test our ideas, our values and our attitudes, in respect and transparency.

Since the Tallinn-Agreement between NISPAcee and EGPA, there have been TransEuropean Dialogues (TEDs) on different shared themes: Neo-Weberianism (Tallinn, 2008), Citizens vs Customers (Helsinki, 2009), E-government (Lubljana, 2010), Law and PA (Vienna, 2011), Agencies (Budapest, 2012), and PA and Teaching (Potsdam, 2013). PA and teaching remains a crucial element of capacity-building of institutions within Europe with its Bologna process, its Erasmus exchanges, and its quality-control and accreditation policies. The NISPAcee/EG-
PA-shared project and our common organization of EAPAA, the European Association of Public Administration Accreditation, is another fine expression of our togetherness in Europe. These platforms have resulted in shared research programs and platforms, such as COST Actions (e.g. CRIPO), where PhD candidates were circulating and comparative research has been launched, across Europe. NISPAcee was essential for the Dialogues, for EAPAA, for research platforms. This will remain so for the future.

What kind of dialogues do we need for the next twenty years? There could be geographically based dialogues, but perhaps there is more need to dialogue between North and South, or between the UK (plus Ireland) and the continent, than between the West and CEE. There could be a dialogue based on generations: old and young. There could be a dialogue between disciplines that are useful for PA (economics, law, psychology, political science etc.). The future of dialogues will depend on the maintenance, recognition of and respect for diversity and variance in the European context. This includes languages (28 countries use 24 official languages), research cultures, geography (space) and past (time). This will allow us to turn diversity into an asset through dialogue by organizing comparative research in the European Research Space (ERC), by having continuous dialogues within Europe, to be able to dialogue outside Europe with the rest of the world. NISPAcee, not NISPAcee, will be indispensable for a convincing European public administration in a globalized world. Then, NISPAcee is not only an institution, but a living community which continues to make a positive and significant difference to create a better Europe in a better world.
NISPAcee and the International Community: Recollections about an Unlikely Story

JAK JABES

In late January 1994 at the call of the Federal Training Academy of the Austrian Government, a few representatives from universities in countries bordering Austria got together for a second year to discuss their institutions’ developments since transition and how they were responding to the momentous changes that the post-Soviet times brought about. The SIGMA program of the OECD, at the time funded by the European Union, a number of OECD member countries and the OECD itself were also invited to attend. I participated representing the SIGMA program, and at the end of the two-day meeting the small group of participants coalesced to form a professional network which would represent schools and institutes dealing with public administration in the Central and Eastern European region to serve the interests of academics and practitioners living in those countries.

While there was enthusiasm about association, participants raised a legitimate concern that centered on the funding needed to launch and sustain such a network. As the potential member schools were coming out of years of communist-guided educational administrations, they were finding themselves poor, without a vision and somewhat clueless on how to deal with change. On the other hand, support from the West seemed attractive. To quell the funding worries, I recall arguing that we would be able to convince donors to fund this initiative. Basically, it would be relatively inexpensive, I thought, to support such a network for well under $100,000 a year to cover administrative costs of a secretariat, holding an annual conference and an annual training seminar. At the beginning a modest work program was agreed upon. Funding was needed because most if not all participants from the Central and Eastern European countries would have to be financially supported in order for them to participate in activities. As well, a secretariat was needed to keep everyone focused, drum up membership and organize events. And, so NISPAcee was launched.

Until early 1993, I had spent my professional career as a university professor with limited exposure to development, donor policies and, more importantly, donor-funding strategies. My naïve thinking was that the international community would financially support a recognized need, especially if the work was de-

1 Over the years, this situation improved and many from the CEE region were able to cover their participation costs to events as the geography covered by NISPAcee widened to include countries of the former Soviet Union, most of whose participants then required support.
livered competently and was of quality. The early years of transition proved me right. However, it proved me right because the early years of transition were a very special time, and donors, whether they were bilateral or multilateral, did not apply the rigid decision indices and performance evaluations for which they are so well known. Had donors applied the rigid criteria they typically use at the inception of NISPAcee, it might have been impossible to launch the network and even less possible to sustain it. There was excitement about the enormity of the change that transition from communism necessitated and an understanding that such transformation required significant funds. Early on, there were few multilateral or bilateral aid agencies which understood the problems associated with transition and good governance as well as few qualified professionals who could help. But, there was a perceived need and enthusiasm about wanting to bring change about.

Availability of funding initially through the Austrian government, the Pew Foundation, the Open Society Institute and the SIGMA program at the OECD ensured that NISPAcee would have a successful takeoff. And when one donor pulled out, NISPAcee was lucky to replace them with other international donors. In one way or another, for the first ten years of the network funding was relatively easily available. Against that funding, NISPAcee held annual conferences, trained quite a few young academics in different subjects taught in public-administration and policy schools, produced textbooks for the educational market in transition economies and translated a significant number of SIGMA publications in varied fields of public administration into national languages. Not a mean feat for a small investment by donors. In other words, there were quite a few outputs for a relatively modest investment. But, by the end of the twentieth century times were changing and donors were emphasizing outcomes rather than outputs in their evaluations, and therefore funding requests paid much attention to such criteria. Also ten years into transition donors had a better understanding of problems and had their preferred solutions. Many of the solutions emphasized direct support to institutions, and therefore a regional body such as NISPAcee started to drop off the radar screen.

By the mid 1990s it was becoming clear that for most Central and Eastern European countries the road to become members of the EU and the OECD was opening up. The EU was starting membership discussions with many of the countries, and the OECD was advising a selected number of countries on regulatory changes required for membership. This turn of events led the EU bureaucracy to change funding approaches significantly to put them in line with membership requirements. The EU set membership as the desired outcome and provided funds towards that goal by actions that transformed institutions, laws and regulations in
areas covered by the *acquis communautaire*. The SIGMA program’s interventions were curtailed and now targeted towards selected outputs dictated by European bureaucrats. While the SIGMA program continued its support to NISPAcee, over the years it too disengaged slowly and progressively.

Change had come to transition countries, but a decade or so after transition, with membership of some to the OECD and preparations for membership to the EU, money became scarce. Bilateral donors started dropping out, the EU started asking bureaucratic questions that donors like to ask, which usually curtails innovation. At the same time the Open Society Institute, which through its Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) was a significant supporter suggested that in the future its support would be to projects. In other words, direct support would go down significantly; NISPAcee would have to propose projects of interest to the LGI, and also charge better for its services such as reducing travel grants for participants at its annual conference. It was time to treat NISPAcee like any other NGO rather than recognize its special and privileged position in Central and Eastern Europe. The organization had to stand on its own.

These constraints resulted in helping build a stronger network, which learned how to survive and sustain itself in a fast evolving environment. NISPAcee moved to the second decade of its existence strengthened by an increase in its membership, enlarged its geographical coverage, added a number of working groups to its annual conferences, offered new training seminars with other partners and put in place a publication program consisting of a journal, newsletter and books. Its secretariat was invited to conferences organized by US and European Networks representing similar institutions. Demand for collaboration with NISPAcee and its member institutions followed.

Existing American, European and international organizations of public-administration schools did not jump in with financial support. However, as it became clear that NISPAcee was going to be a player, and because many educational institutions in the West were vying for contracts and/or privileged bilateral MoUs with some schools in the CEE region, attendance at NISPAcee conferences by representatives of these organizations started to go up. And soon, there was individual support by senior administrators especially of US professional networks.

NISPAcee survived and prospered against all odds. Professional networks, it turns out, are not institutions which donors typically support. Such organizations are too diffused and difficult to control for donors. Further, they may have programs of work that can go counter to donor predilections and whose outputs might be difficult to satisfy donor-determined outcomes. Regional work rarely
takes precedence in donor preferences, and when it does it is through bringing civil servants from neighboring countries together or involving neighbors in infrastructure projects. NISPAceee covered a wide region, had few public servants participating in its activities and was managed by a democratically elected steering committee made of academics from the region. The special conditions that permitted funding to be available early on during the inception and first years of NISPAceee would be difficult to replicate today. The exception is the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) significant initial funding support to launch a similar network in Asia called NAPSIPAG. Unfortunately, this support was not sustainable because the champions at ADB left or retired and support then evaporated. This Asian network continues, but has never garnered the traction, engagement or financial independence of NISPAceee.

On its 20th anniversary NISPAceee was recognized as the representative network of public administration academics and practitioners working in the CEE and NIS institutions, whose utility is not questioned anymore. And, while it needed the international community’s largesse in its beginnings, it can now sustain itself. Having learned to be financially lean at inception, it has applied program-management approaches, which other well established networks took time to emulate.

There have been various attempts to put in place networks similar to NISPAceee in Asia and Latin America, with limited success. In retrospect, one could ask whether such networks have the opportunity to flourish without donor support. In a book, Sobis and de Vries document the waste of assistance to transition in the first fifteen years. They show that much of this waste was because of experts who knowingly participated in what from the outset were badly designed projects. NISPAceee was lucky to have dedicated experts both from and outside the region that were able to put the meager funds to good use. The NISPAceee story suggests that initial funding over a number of years is necessary along with good management and high motivation by the secretariat and membership. One should have faith that the outputs of such networks will ultimately have positive and desired outcomes, advancing knowledge, good governance and public administration even if such outcomes may be difficult to demonstrate tangibly for evaluation purposes. There had been no need to produce logical framework matrices, or numerous pages of objectives and sub-objectives required to receive funding for NISPAceee. All expenditure was minutely accounted for and controlled by independent auditors. Those donors brave enough to fund a vision such as NISPAceee have been well recompensed over the years in seeing that their funds have edu-

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cated and informed those in the former communist countries tasked with educating the civil servants of the future.
International Organizations and NISPAcee: NASPAA and Early US Cooperation

MICHAEL BRINTNALL

NISPAcee is a partnership in many ways. At its heart it is, of course, a network of the schools and institutes that comprise its membership and its work. But early partnerships helped to shape and sustain NISPAcee, too, and I want to recognize here some elements of collaboration from the international community. NISPAcee faced a dual challenge as it started – one was, of course, to achieve its vision of the practical application of public-administration education in the region as an agent of transformative change. The other was less appreciated externally, which was to build and sustain itself as a persistent NGO that could carry the work forward for the long run.

International aid was itself bifurcated – on the one hand, helping to achieve regional administrative change, and on the other, helping to build and sustain the capacity of NISPAcee itself to go forward. Cooperation came from several directions. Western European nations and institutions had a meaningful interest and made strong contributions – both of funds and of program direction. United States institutions also were active, with NASPAA and US foundations, and later the USAID, providing donor support to assist with both of these goals.

US support for NISPAcee in its earlier years was focused particularly on the organization itself – on infrastructure support – to aid in general operations and capacity of the secretariat. Initial funds from the Ford Foundation and Pew Charitable Trusts were largely unrestricted. Pew Charitable Trusts and NASPAA provided financial and in-kind support for NISPAcee’s executive director, Ľudmila Gajdošová, to get NGO management training for herself in the US, with time for what was in effect a fellowship in the NASPAA offices. This provided time for direct observation of how the US NGOs operated in this realm, and probably most importantly for building collaborative working relationships with a number of US academic deans, faculty and program directors that have carried on throughout NISPAcee’s 20 years. As the project report indicates, the activities introduced the NISPAcee leadership to the alphabet soup of US PA associations and NGOs:

The NASPAA and Pew support for the Secretariat has allowed Ms. Gajdošová to pay a study visit to US in June 1997. She visited NASPAA, ASPA, NAPA, ACIPA, several universities and other American institutions working in public administration. This visit was particularly useful, it helped her to observe, better understand and learn on site the ways of
improving the management of the not-for-profit non-governmental organization working in the field of public administration education and training like the NISPAcee.

As NISPAcee moved forward, the opportunities for funding for direct operating support dried up on both sides of the Atlantic, with Open Society Institute stepping in at an important time. NASPAA was able to develop a collaborative project funded by the USAID on something of a transitional model, with direct programmatic objectives to link PA education with applied field work, but with support of NISPAcee operations built into the funding. As noted in program documents: the primary focus of the project was to implement a program of applied policy research linking governments and higher education in the region, providing added technical capacity for government problem-solving and building civic capacity through sustainable partnerships between government and higher education. The second part of the project was providing technical assistance efforts to aid emerging higher education institutions in the region in strengthening their capacity for government partnerships and for building a new public service. The project drew heavily on the existing capacity within the NISPAcee network which has emerged as an NGO, allowing it to leverage the resources of stronger public administration (PA) programs that have successfully developed in the region. Its main principle was a partnership, primarily between schools, institutions and public administration in the CEE region, and between schools and PA institutions of the CEE region and USA.

The program called for project teams involving NISPAcee affiliated schools, US-based faculty and national or local public officials in the region, and was inherently designed to support institutional capacity and partnerships as well as to achieve specific public-management objectives, consistent with initial strategies for international partnership with NISPAcee.

NISPAcee is today extraordinarily effective and efficient. It is a well-managed, stable NGO that has adjusted to dramatically changing fortunes while still keeping a clear focus – all in contradiction to concerns that the post-transition region could not sustain such organizations. NISPAcee has done all that a professional community should – carried out its projects effectively and given identity, collegiality and visibility to its members. It has clearly moved what may have been isolated individual scholars and schools into a stronger, mutually reinforcing network.

NISPAcee has modeled in itself the kinds of success and contributions to public service that it is seeking to further in its members. It has built strong and motiva-
tional social bonds among leaders in public-service education and broken down regional barriers to cooperation. It has planted the seeds for good scholarship and significantly advanced the quality of policy analysis in the region.

International cooperation helped – in sustaining NISPAceee as it was taking form, and in highlighting the importance of independent, internal capacity, NISPAceee was given a chance to shape its own future. It has moved forward with remarkable success.
The Significance of NISPAcee for Public Administration Education in Central and Eastern Europe

THEO VAN DER KROGT

After twenty years of NISPAcee we can look back at the contribution this organisation has made to the (quality of) public-administration education in this region. We can distinguish three facets that also more or less coincide with three episodes of NISPAcee.

1. establishing and modernising public-administration degree programmes by organising and facilitating assistance of foreign universities and organisations;
2. improving quality of education by stimulating quality research;
3. assuring quality of education by endorsing and stimulating accreditation of degree programmes.

In the remainder I will say a few words about the first two episodes and then go a little bit deeper into the last episode: stimulation of accreditation.

NISPAcee was founded in 1994 with the objective to assist, mediate and facilitate joint research, educational and training programmes and discussions between instructors, civil servants, trainers, public-sector managers and politicians in the CEE region.

Of course individual universities also organised foreign aid themselves, as the Babes Bolay university in Cluj (Romania) did, that sought (and got) the support of several American professors of Romanian origin. Some of them still are attached to the programme as visiting professors.

Research was an important aspect for NISPAcee from the beginning. Rightly it was seen that improving the quality of the research at the Central and Eastern European universities would enhance the quality of public administration and the quality of public-administration education, as well. By joint research projects (again with foreign aid) individual researchers learned, and the public sector got relevant research results.

After a while research became the dominant aspect of NISPAcee. The annual conferences focused on research papers on a diversity of themes. Comparative research became more important, also to learn from the developments in other Central and Eastern European countries. Because the quality of research is considered a good indicator of the quality of the faculty, and, to a certain degree, also of the quality of the education, this focus of NISPAcee on research indirectly
helped a lot to improve the quality of the public-administration education in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, apart from information on the existence (and few details) of public-administration degree programmes in the region on the NISPAcee website, education as such did not get special attention from NISPAcee. There was no specific Working Group on education, and only occasionally education was the topic of a conference contribution.

In 1997 there was a change. In that year a few Western European programmes, which met during the annual conference of the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA), took the initiative to discuss the possibility and desirability of an European system of accreditation of public-administration programmes. The idea was inspired by the example of our US sister organisation NASPAA, which had a long-standing system in place, but was not willing (at that time) to accredit non-US programmes. Some programmes from Central and Eastern Europe regularly visited these EGPA conferences and so became aware of the EAPAA initiative and participated in the discussion.

In 1999 the European Association for Public Administration Accreditation (EAPAA) was founded. Three programmes from the NISPAcee region from Poland (Bialystok), the Slovak Republic (Matej Bel) and Slovenia (Ljubljana) immediately became members of EAPAA with the purpose to compare their quality of education with the EAPAA standards, and to become accredited in due time. Also individual NISPAcee members became involved in EAPAA as members of site visit teams, the Accreditation Committee and the Board. At that time there was no direct formal involvement of NISPAcee in EAPAA, although presentations about EAPAA were scheduled during the annual conferences, and the director of the NISPAcee secretariat was a member of the EAPAA board.

Since 2005 there have been discussions among EAPAA, EGPA and NISPAcee to strengthen the ties between EGPA and NISPAcee on the one hand and EAPAA on the other. This has resulted in a proposal for a change of statutes of EAPAA by which the programmes are no longer EAPAA members, but instead EGPA and NISPAcee. This change was also important because in order to become registered in the European Quality Assurance Register, EAPAA has to cut the formal ties to the programmes it wants to accredit. Both EGPA and NISPAcee now nominate two members of the EAPAA board (and they jointly nominate a chair from “abroad”). This change of statutes became effective on 1 January 2011.

1 In the meantime they all have accredited programmes.
So NISPAcee and EGPA have taken a direct responsibility for the quality of public-administration programmes via accreditation. The accreditation system is voluntary, although both organisations promote accreditation among their members. Both organisations have chosen to offer the “accreditation services” as an “extra” for their members, for which they have to pay an extra fee. EAPAA hopes this will be a temporary situation so that, in the end, accreditation becomes a “standard” service for all members, which is paid for through the NISPAcee membership fee. Also, from my point of view, it would be a good idea to develop a strategy aimed to stimulate accreditation much more, for example by stating that a “normal” NISPAcee member programme is an accredited programme. This would mean that NISPAcee urges programmes to become accredited in a couple of years and to stress that students actively will be pointed towards accredited programmes only. Not being accredited needs to become an exception and should be a warning sign for national accreditation authorities because the programme does want to be compared against international minimum standards.

EAPAA accreditation helps to improve the quality of public-administration programmes in still another way. More and more persons from NISPAcee member programmes become involved in the EAPAA accreditation. They are members of site visit teams, and some of them are invited to become members of the EAPAA Accreditation Committee (which decides about accreditation). Most of them experience participation in a site visit team as very instructive: “I certainly learned at least as much as the programme we accredited.”

Also EAPAA stimulated the coming-into-existence in 2011 of the Working Group on Public-Administration Education within NISPAcee. The goal of this working group is to stimulate the discussion and exchange of ideas and experiences about public-administration education in all its aspects: didactical models, best practices, quality assurance, research on education, training formats, e-learning, etc. Through paper sessions on these subjects, and maybe also training sessions on certain methodologies or techniques, this WG wants to contribute to the enhancement of the quality of the public-administration education in Central and Eastern Europe. In this way NISPAcee’s annual conferences not only are interesting for public-administration researchers, but also for those who are (more) involved in public-administration teaching (the reason of existence of most, if not all, NISPAcee members). This WG also was a necessary complement for NISPAcee.
NISPAcee, IIAS, EGPA, and IASIA: Cooperation Now and in the Future

ROLET LORETRAN

The cooperation between NISPAcee and IIAS started on the basis of individual contacts between several academics of the two networks. The first contact was established between members of the European Group for Public Administration, the regional group of IIAS and members of universities from Central and Eastern European countries. The cooperation between universities from both networks was the first stepping stone of the current agreement between NISPAcee and EGPA, which was later formalised by a Memorandum of Understanding for organising the Trans-European Dialogue (TED). The Corvinus University (Budapest, Hungary) and Katholiek Universiteit Leuven (KUL, Belgium) developed a strong cooperation between their departments for Public Administration. The contacts between the directors of these departments facilitated the current cooperation as they know each other very well and they anticipated the needs of each group for establishing the dialogue. This was the first step of cooperation: TED. This cooperation provided the members with a platform for exchanges on main issues in PA.

The second step of the cooperation was the representation of NISPAcee in the statutory bodies of the IIAS and its entities. Distinguished members of NISPAcee have a position as board members on the IASIA board of management, as observers on the EGPA Steering Committee and as members of the IIAS Programme and Research Advisory Committee (IIAS PRAC). The representation of NISPAcee in the different committees ensures that the two partners are well informed about their ongoing projects and their respective scientific strategy. This is very important to further develop joint initiatives.

The third step of the cooperation was the institutional membership reciprocity. NISPAcee became an IIAS corporate member in order to be among its partners. As IIAS cannot, as an international association for Public Administration, become a member of NISPAcee, the IIAS Director General became an individual member of NISPAcee. This membership’s reciprocity provides our institutions with a coherent and an institutional basis for strengthening the cooperation between our two networks.

The fourth step was to organise, as with our other key partners (ASPA, IPAC, IPAA …), IIAS/EGPA/IASIA panels during the NISPAcee annual conference, as
last spring in Ohrid. We organised panels on current key themes which were interesting for both IIAS and NISPAceed members.

The fifth step will be to reinforce the current cooperation and to organise joint events and/or workshops on current topics in public administration. We can underline together the key trends in public management and share our views and visions regarding the futures of PA.

In 2012 IIAS organised a panel during NISPAceed’s annual conference. It was co-organised by IIAS-IASIA in Ohrid. The panel was entitled: “Global Trends in Public Sector Reform”. The panellists were renowned academics from different parts of the world, members of the Board of Management of IASIA, chairs of Committees of IIAS and the Vice President of IASIA. Panellists focused on the main trends in public-sector reform. They underlined the different shifts regarding the models for governing and reforming systems: from NPM to new governance models. They pointed out the key elements of the public-sector reforms and provided the audience with an international overview. They stressed the various contexts in which different models of reform emerged and highlighted some common features, such as the rule of law, reliability, openness and transparency; accountability and responsibility; participation and effectiveness. The participants also described the different possible options reforming the public sector facing the current financial crisis, but they also identified the long-term strategy for deeply reforming the public sector. They showed on the basis of comparative analysis that the public-sector reform path was no longer solely dominated by one paradigm. The panel also emphasised the diversity of reforms worldwide and the changes that occurred within the last twenty years.

A second panel was also organised by the regional group for public administration: EGPA. During the EGPA panel, the participants underlined the main lessons of the Trans-European Dialogues (TED). TED has been firmly established as a joint EGPA-NISPAceed event in the “Tallinn Declaration” of the two organisations in February 2008. It is a high-level conference focused on a timely topic in Public Administration (PA) that will profit from bringing together experts from different regions, thereby facilitating exchanges and discussions across Europe and even including Central Asia and the Caucasus. As previously mentioned, this dialogue has been based on a long-term cooperation between the different partners for more than 20 years. The panellists pointed out the key elements of the dialogue: philosophy, format, challenges and perspectives for the future. They also highlighted the main trends for Public Administration: major developments, convergences and divergences, common challenges and different solutions. They provided the audience with a brief overview of current reforms in public sectors.
in order to draw out the lessons emerging from current developments. These lessons from our Trans-European Dialogues are, of course, crucial to design public administration and public policy as well as to identify the next steps for reforming PA in Eastern and Western European Countries. Dialogues between our 2 networks are essential for PA future.

IIAS and NISPAcee address the challenges of public administration in different geographic regions and environments, but both are striving to make a contribution for improving public administration; to create a forum where academics and practitioners meet and discuss the emerging problems to find common solutions.

Each year, both institutions identify key challenges of public administration and set the thematic direction for research and scholarly activity; both institutions share the same approach in addressing those key challenges. NISPAcee identifies challenges pertinent to Central and Eastern Europe, whereas IIAS identifies challenges of public administration on the worldwide basis. The cooperation of the two institutions leads to sharing innovative ideas.

The disintegration of the centralised system of public administration in the former socialist block and the transition to democracy enabled the re-integration of Eastern Europe and Western Europe. NISPAcee is one of the leading organisations in the domain of public administration that has a large network in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics. In the 20 years of its history, the organisation was able to produce results, make significant contributions to the area of public-administration research and excel in many areas of their work. They are active beyond the European borders.

The ongoing cooperation motivates us to launch new projects and to search new synergies. The different activities organised together with well-known partners will open new opportunities and will encourage new initiatives. The systematic comparison of the NISPAcee/IIAS/EGPA/IASIA working/study groups shows us the shared concerns we have. We are dealing with the same governance issues, and we can develop common platforms for debate. IIAS has a regionalisation strategy and has regional groups in different parts of the world. NISPAcee is perceived as a major partner in the region of Eastern Europe and in the European Neighbourhood. The collaboration of the two organisations has a very promising future.

As IIAS Director General, I will be pleased to support the cooperation agenda of our two networks and to make sure that we will develop joint projects in the near future. These projects cannot be realised without the substance and the structure
but these joint ventures also depend on relations between the members of our networks, their willingness and their enthusiastic involvement.

Finally, I want to emphasise how much the many interactions of NISPAcee with IIAS, EGPA and IASIA have enriched me, not only on the scientific level but also from the human (personal) point of view. The atmosphere of warm-heartedness and the spirit of courtesy, within the context of scientific rigour, always characterised our meetings in NISPAcee and made us not only academic partners but also genuine friends! A long life to NISPAcee!
Section II.C

NISPAcee in the Last 20 Years: The Internal Reflections
PART II | SECTION C

NISPAcee in its Second Decade:
Towards Excellence in Public Administration
Scholarship

WOLFGANG DRECHSLER

My affiliation with NISPAcee began almost at half time, with receiving the Alena Brunovská award in 2001, and it culminated in receiving the NISPAcee Merit Award in 2010 after the maximum of six years, 2004–2010, on the Steering Committee. My formal accomplishments, perhaps, include co-editing the 2003 Annual Conference proceedings, for the first time as a selective book; co-founding the Annual Conference’s General Session in 2005, allowing scholars to present any of their work, never mind whether it fit into a (usually funded) working group; co-founding the NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy in 2006; co-founding the Trans-European Dialogue format from the NISPAcee side (together with Geert Bouckaert, the primary father, from the EGPA one) in 2007 as a high-level discussion forum; and delivering the 2010 Annual Conference keynote address in Warsaw. It has been said that the hard work that Steering Committee members have to undertake, travailler pour le roi de Prusse, is a major asset for the organization, and it may well be so, but I think that the many friendships alone that were forged during my time there, as well as an unrivalled and unparalleled increase of knowledge and understanding of Central and Eastern Europe, its countries and administrations, each were very well worth any effort.

If I can speak of an overall substantive project of mine, it would have been that of increasing and consolidating NISPAcee’s role as the place of scholarly excellence in Public Administration (PA) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In that endeavor, I have to single out my friend and colleague György Jenei as my main ally, but it was not really something that had to be done against the will of just about anyone on the Steering Committee. It was more a matter of prioritization and perhaps also a certain amount of tenacity.

NISPAcee is specific among the Public Administration societies of the world – EGPA, ASPA, NASPAA, IASIA, IIAS, and so on – in that it always had a remedial, or melioristic, element as well, i.e. the role to improve the academic standards of Public Administration as a scholarly discipline in the former Second World. It was founded, as we know, with a vague but pronounced normative impetus well beyond working PA, and certainly in line with the standard “Western” public-ethics canon of its times, but the main focus was improving PA both as an activity and as a scholarly discipline (and in the end, NISPAcee mostly worked on the
former via the latter).\textsuperscript{1} And this goal, as we all said in Ohrid and say, I am sure, in the present volume, was successfully reached to a very considerable extent.

But all the more, for the sake of its region, itself and its members, in my opinion NISPAcee needed to be an organization that would – at least eventually – deal eye-to-eye, and not as a supplicant, with its partner institutions and the “West” generally, and this would then also be true for Public Administration as a scholarly discipline in our region, as well. (In the PA world, “Global PA”, in scholarship, clearly does exist.) And this could only be the case if NISPAcee scholars were as good, on the academic level, as their “Western” colleagues. And that again would be particularly important for the “high end”, i.e. for the best scholars the organization and the region would entail. PA in CEE, ideally, would be on the global level but, because of its specific experience, both recently and earlier, a bit different from the “Western” kind, which, during the two decades we are looking at, and even today, is certainly not a fully satisfactory gold standard for anyone interested in the Good Life in the Good State, normatively as well as epistemologically.

There was a two-thronged approach to this: First, by promoting the scholarly development of NISPAcee scholars (which may have come automatically as well, or at least not primarily due to NISPAcee support) and, second, by the bringing-in of all leading CEE PA scholars not already part of the organization. It can fairly be said that the latter goal – that there should be no serious CEE PA expert outside of NISPAcee – was accomplished very well, even if pulling in some of the high-flyers from the outside at the “expense” of those working in the trenches for years if not decades might have been hard to swallow for some of the latter. As was noted in some assessment of NISPAcee, while one can be a serious PA scholar in some “Western” region and not belong to, say, EGPA or ASPA, in CEE, one practically had to belong to NISPAcee somehow. (I am not sure whether one can put it so clearly, but it does become true when one combines work in the region and about the region.)

As a result, from the beginning, or at least from the time since I joined NISPAcee, this has been an organization with a “functional elite” of maybe 25+ people who “run the show” (under the direction of its Executive Director, Ľudmila Gajdošová, who is really its central figure). An interesting aspect of this is that this group does encompass a group of “Westerners” who cannot serve on the

\footnote{1 This created a classic problem for NISPAcee in the region, especially going East: If I help a “bad” regime to improve its PA, does that stabilize the system and thus works against the people, or does it, at least in the long run, work towards either genuine improvements for the citizens or even towards change in the system? This problem was exacerbated through the New Public Management (NPM) fashion dominant during a great part of NISPAcee’s existence, because NPM is well-suited to make bad regimes more effective and thus leads to what has been called “reactionary modernism”.}
Steering Committee but who have a strong functional say on where NISPAcee is going, as well. And this includes the key academics and the key organizers, arguably, of “Western”, i.e. American and European PA – representatively, B. Guy Peters, Allan Rosenbaum, Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert.

All the more is it really a nice proof of the accomplishments of NISPAcee that a quick check of the attendees of the 20th Anniversary conference (which is not an entirely accidental selection) showed that, among the 25 top scholars present, 12 were from the CEE region and just 13 from the “West”.

What this check also showed, however, is that all these top scholars from the NISPAcee region came from the CEE “research banana”, a virtual shape that begins at the Adriatic Coast of Slovenia and ends at the Baltic Coast of Estonia. Most of the leading PA scholars in CEE are from the two schools at the end of the shape – the University of Ljubljana and another one – and one in the lower middle, Corvinus University of Budapest; the other schools on the way generally have a few outstanding scholars, but these three have sustainable, “Western”-level research teams. These schools sometimes seem over-represented in NISPAcee affairs and on the Steering Committee – but, weighing by scholarly output, they are actually not.

Now, one could say that such regional clustering is the same in Western Europe: Almost all of the leading “Western” scholars in Ohrid came from one of the sides of the Channel, i.e. they worked either at English or at Dutch or Flemish universities. But for NISPAcee, this actually presents a problem, because in 20 years, it has not been possible, with all the financial and institutional help from the “West” – and serious prodding, in its second decade, by its main sponsor, the Soros foundations –, to create a leading scholarly scene East of that banana (which, as György Jenei pointed out, is also the border, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, of the “Latin” cultural sphere).

2 Based on a non-manipulated h-index score of all participants, which is the ideal – if still imperfect – measure for this purpose, as it shows very well the integration into the global Public Administration discipline.

3 Romania, and there especially Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj, appears, by many indicators, to be the coming place in CEE PA, and the Romanian PA scene clearly seems to have targeted that goal as well, although it is not situated within the banana.

4 The 2009–2010 initiative of the three top CEE PA departments and NISPAcee to form a “South Caucasus PhD School” to be located in Tbilisi would have been the perfect long-term, sustainable project along these lines, reacting as it did to grassroots demands and genuine needs from the South Caucasus region. Unfortunately, the cancellation of Soros money for this enterprise as well – although it was still in line with the respective priorities – and, then, the untimely death of Mzia Mikeladze, NISPAcee’s President, in late 2011, who would have been the Tbilisi director and coordinator of the School, led to the failure of one of the best proposals in second-world PA development I ever came across.
This, however, poses a question for the future. In times of financial duress, which NISPAcee faces after the end of the sponsorship of the Soros foundations, can the organization really accomplish the goal? Who will deal with the “Eastern Partnership countries” and Central Asia, without resources and without outside prodding – countries which, to a large extent, do not really want to be substantially “Westernized”, partially for good reasons, partially for not so good ones, interesting and important as especially Central Asia is, at least in my opinion? Can NISPAcee also be changed so as to include practitioners to a meaningful extent, which it tried for two decades but, frankly, never successfully managed to do? Or should NISPAcee rather “become what it is” – an academic Central and Eastern European, and even mainly Central European, Public Administration society? But then, what would be the *raison d'être* of NISPAcee, especially seeing that the functional NISPAcee elite from CEE consists, almost by definition, largely of people who actually do hold leadership positions in “Western” PA societies and can hold their own at any “Western” conference as well and thus need it the least?5 Would NISPAcee still be interesting enough for them to survive?

My own answer to this question is in the affirmative, but, to close more trivially than is actually permissible, only the future will show what NISPAcee will do (the tendency, as it seems, is towards the solution to try again to become what NISPAcee is supposed to be, rather than what it is), and even later, whether this was the right path to take. Seeing that the project is definitely not complete, and that NISPAcee is a great organization that one would not want to miss in the global chain of PA societies, and even for oneself, one can only hope that it will truly succeed – *ad multos annos*!

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5 The trailblazing November 2010 Joint CAG-IASIA-CSOAR-IIAS-NISPAcee-ASPA seminar on “Governmental Response to the Global Economic Crisis” in Beijing at the Chinese Academy of Governance and in Nanning at the Guangxi Institute of Public Administration was both an impressive symbol of, and a further facilitator for, the integration of the global PA as a scholarly discipline on the leadership level and for NISPAcee’s indubitable participation therein.
As a member of the Steering Committee, my experiences with assisting NISPAcee’s development and with working alongside the other members of the Steering Committee have been enjoyable ones. In turn, if I were asked to explain how we have benefited from NISPAcee, and how relevant the organisation had been, I would focus on three main areas: first, on NISPAcee’s contribution to the means of conceptualising public-administration reforms in Central and Eastern Europe; second, on the interest Poland has in NISPAcee becoming more visible and in there being an ever-closer relationship with it and with fellow members; and third, on the activity within the NISPAcee region that KSAP has engaged in.

NISPAcee has indeed contributed greatly to the development of public administration and local governance practices in the CEECs, both by building on good traditions and by ensuring that great new opportunities are seized. Of particular value here are the annual NISPAcee conferences, and the opportunities for publication that these entail. Where Poland is concerned, enthusiastic participation at NISPAcee events has tended to be seen as a must by Polish academics and practitioners alike. For its part, the organisation has been there to help them mature, gain in confidence and become better researchers and lecturers. While academics have developed their research projects and themes in this way, practitioners have been able to develop new ideas for public-administration reforms.

Operating alongside the events, the NISPAcee Journal has likewise had its crucial role to play already, when it comes to the conceptualisation of public-administration reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. And that role could become yet more significant in the future, as I feel it would be useful to work further on a conceptualisation of a public-administration model for the Central and Eastern European countries. An in-depth discussion on this subject held three years ago bore fruit in a special edition of the NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration, in which the views of those regarding the Neo-Weberian State model as of value in conceptualising administration here could be set against those holding that the system in the CEECs might be better characterised by a post-Soviet model. While the Soviet system was a bureaucratic one, this was not a Weberian-type bureaucracy. Of decisive importance were the relations with political authority, of course quite different in the formerly-communist countries, as opposed to the...
Western-style democracies. This comparison is not just for Central and Eastern European states.

So the challenge lies in changing the opinion in question, with NISPAcee advancing its own conceptualisation of the public-administration model which applies to its states. This must be detached from any Soviet roots and must stress the now-democratic nature of countries. Some of them are also EU member states. Having counteracted what remained of the communist system, the states of Central Europe are returning to their historical roots from the inter-war period, when the Continental model prevailed. Development in the direction of New Public Management is not very probable, thanks to the cultural differences, while a move towards New Public Governance (though desirable) is not very possible, i.a. because of the need for the proper sequence of development to be passed through (i.e. with New Public Management first), as well as on account of the weakness of civil society.

That said, the truth, in Poland and in other countries of our region, is that the last two decades have brought a genuine transformation, in which a key feature has been the development of a quite new state system founded upon democratic principles, and being based on respect for the rights of citizens, personal liberty, the rule of law, openness in public life and the right to self-govern through the decentralisation of power. The Poland of today has a structure centring around divisions of responsibilities and tasks that were put in place by key, far-reaching reforms. The most important of these concerned local authorities at the municipal level (as long ago as in 1990), the government’s economic centre (in 1996), and the tiers of administration and the roles they play (in 1999). This period thus saw the shaping of a modern administration under the powerful influence of near-universal aspirations that the quality of service and efficiency achieved by public institutions should be improved. External factors, such as integration into the EU, were also important, but there were always indigenous factors, too. Administration has remained a domain for the member states, yet there was standardisation in certain areas of functioning here also, the civil service of key importance amongst them.

The discussions taking place at the NISPAcee meeting in Ohrid, Macedonia, in May 2012, nevertheless made it quite clear that the CEECs are not confining themselves to a single model of public administration. Today’s dividing line is rather between countries that are already in the EU and the rest. The further East we go, the more tangible the legacy of communism.

Two years ago we at the National School of Public Administration (or KSAP, as it is known) were privileged to organise the 18th NISPAcee Annual Conference in
Warsaw. The Conference – on “Public Administration in Times of Crisis” – coincided with the 20th anniversary of our own institution’s founding, and the event was followed by KSAP’s publication of a book arising out of the Conference discussions. We also co-published with NISPAcee the book “Public Administration in Times of Crisis”, which brings together a selection of the most interesting Warsaw Conference presentations.

In October 2011, I had the honour of inviting NISPAcee President Prof. Mzia Mikeladze to the Warsaw DISPA Meeting, the gathering of Heads of Schools and Institutes of Public Administration from across the European Union, organised at KSAP, during the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU. At this important meeting, Prof. Mikeladze spoke on “The Need for Public Service Training in Central and Eastern Europe and the Development of NISPAcee”. This excellent presentation gave full weight to the status, mission and activities of NISPAcee, it being emphasised in particular how valuable the network is, how much experience it has accumulated, and how important its role is as a bridge between Europe’s Western, Central and Eastern countries. It was Prof. Mikeladze’s contention that, in a “wider Europe”, NISPAcee has displayed a very particular capacity to link in the Balkan, Eastern, Caucasian and Central Asian regions. Furthermore, while the network has been becoming more and more academic in tone, it has also served as a bridge between academia and practice.

At that time, it was also my pleasure to invite other partners from the NISPAcee region, i.e. Prof. Yuriy Kovbasiuk, the President of the National Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of Ukraine (NAPA) and Mr. Suad Musić, Director, Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA) from the Balkan Region. They each presented their respective institutions, and it is fair to say that all three presentations were received with considerable interest by the representatives of Europe’s other Schools, who enjoyed an unrivalled opportunity to learn more about public administration in our wider region.

The position of Poland within the European Union is such that the need for the role of the Eastern European countries in the EU to be supported has always been clear to our country. It has also been very important for Poland, and in particular for our National School of Public Administration, to develop close relationships with other countries in CEE and beyond. In this way, we simultaneously commit ourselves to the principle that knowledge frontiers between the European Union and our partners from the East should be neither put in place nor built up. We have to exchange experience and share our knowledge and skills.

Such strategic thinking was at the fore in October 2011, when Poland’s National School of Public Administration officially opened the Eastern Partnership Acad-
emy of Public Administration in Warsaw, an institution that found specific reflection in a Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit convened in Warsaw, which was signed in the Polish capital on 29–30 September 2011. Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership Academy, civil servants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have been, are being and will be trained on such issues as public-private partnerships, communications with the public, public-sector economics, management (including project management) in public administration, and EU institutions and law.

Last – but not least – let us not neglect examples of lively bilateral cooperation within the NISPAcee Region. Poland’s National School of Public Administration is delighted to pursue many fruitful contacts of this kind with the public administrations and schools of public administration within the NISPAcee Region, including those of Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan, amongst others.

It is from these perspectives that I offer my full support for the NISPAcee Strategy for 2012–2015, fully concurring with that document’s conclusion that NISPAcee has facilitated the creation of academic networks and fostered cooperation by which best public-administration-related practices may be transferred, through the bringing-together of the best experts in the fields of public administration and public policy. It is very good that the mission of NISPAcee gives prominence to excellence in research, to the implementation of international standards in the achievement of research projects and to the promotion of theoretically-sound, practice-oriented MA/BA programmes and doctoral studies. Our aim must be to raise further the quality of public-administration science in our region.

In conclusion, it is indeed my firm belief that NISPAcee has created remarkable opportunities for many experts to learn from one other and to explore new opportunities for cooperation. The network has a great potential for future development internationally. To my mind, the core NISPAcee activities of the very greatest value are: the annual conferences; other specialised conferences and workshops, mainly TEDs; the publications, especially the Journal; and the way in which relationships with partners from outside our region are maintained. If it is to go from strength to strength, NISPAcee should remain specific as regards its involvement of academics in particular, should work to ensure the further development of the Journal, and should be fully engaged in the dialogue, also involving Western networks of similar activity and interests.
How we Started and where we are: A Few Personal Considerations

JURAJ NEMEC

I was lucky to be “on board”, when NISPAcee started to work. This happened almost immediately after the democratic changes in “socialist” countries – with the first conference already in 1992. As almost all organizations, NISPAcee started to grow from a small group of public-administration teachers and experts supported by the SIGMA OECD (Jak Jubes) and the Austrian Academy of Public Administration (Anita Weiss Gaenger). The core donor from the beginning was LGI Budapest. After twenty years NISPAcee represents one of the major international organizations, fully recognized by the main “players” – like the European Commission, OECD, EIPA, IIAS, IASIA, EGPA and many others – a really great success. However, did we achieve all that we expected?

NISPAcee today is extremely successful from the point of view of “academic” outputs – it would be difficult to find any other international organization with so many publications issued in a relatively short time and with so many academic activities. The core “hard” products are own research books, textbooks, proceedings and some specific publications, plus the journal with high ambitions, providing the opportunity for authors to publish and to readers to learn and improve their knowledge.

On the other hand, NISPAcee is less successful from a financial point of view. The organization started as an almost fully externally financed body – LGI and founders as main donors, with LGI providing large sums of money for NISPAcee core functions. Few specific projects, especially in co-operation with NASPAA and financed by USAID provided some extra resources. Is self-financing possible in the near future? A not so simple, if possible task in the CEE conditions.

NISPAcee was also only partly successful in influencing the quality of PA higher education and training in the region. This statement does not mean that the organization did not try and did not do much. Many times results do not depend much on inputs from actors. The future challenge in this area might be the international accreditation of PA programs. Together with EGPA, NISPAcee is responsible today for the European accreditation of public administration university programs. However only few CEE schools are currently accredited, and the perspectives are not very positive. I do not feel that this problem is connected with the system of the EAPAA accreditation process, but it is just a mirror of the...
current CEE environment. Problems of the CEE higher-education area are visible to all who want to see them.

Last but not least I have to mention the role of NISPAcee towards better PA practice and better policy-making. Starting with positive issues – many of the NISPAcee “core” members served and serve in top positions on the level of national governments. It is impossible to mention all of them, but some examples are necessary. The first executive secretary Iveta Radicova was appointed to the position of Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic. NISPAcee president Barbara Kudrycka has served for two election terms as the Minister of Higher Education and Science in Poland. Martin Potucek and Călin Hințea are known as “core” advisers to the Prime Ministers in their countries (Czech Republic and Romania). Etc.

On the other hand the quality of policy-making and policy implementation in the region is still doubtful. NISPAcee has the capacity to catalyze needed changes – our experts drafted and submitted many analyses, recommendations, guidelines and other relevant documents. Why is the impact so limited? Why are CEE public-sector reforms frequently slow, badly prepared, reversible and not based on political consensus? I leave the answer to these questions to all readers …
The Importance of Strategy: 2008–2010

GYÖRGY JENEI

In this period we were facing various challenges. One of them was the financial stability of NISPAcee. The Local Governmental Initiative, the main supporter of NISPAcee gave our organisation the warning that the global financial crisis will be a long-term process and requires a new strategy from NISPAcee.

1. Preparing a new strategy

With the support of LGI we prepared a new strategy with the involvement of the Steering Committee members and the key actors of our organisation. It was a genuine iterative process.

The result was a new NISPAcee strategy entitled: NISPAcee Strategy for 2009–2012. It was finalised by December 2008 and it was appreciated by LGI. Based on their positive evaluation they guaranteed the continuation of their financial support for the coming 2 years and, with certain preconditions, for 2 further years.

What were the main achievements of the new strategy?

First of all it maintained, continued, and confirmed the traditional values of the previous strategy. But it confirmed – sometimes in a modified version – basic statements which are up to date even now, as well.

The strategy confirmed that NISPAcee mission objectives and activities should be connected to the modernisation and reform needs of public-administration systems of the region.

The strategy has given geopolitical meaning to Central and Eastern Europe, which means that Russia as a whole, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus region were also included in the so-called “NISPAcee region”. The conclusion was that five major groupings of countries were identified in the NISPAcee region. They were and are as follows:

- new EU member countries
- non EU member countries in Eastern Europe
- countries in the West Balkan
- countries of Central Asia
- countries in the Caucasus
The strategy defined a mission statement which confirmed and updated the previous mission statement that had been defined in 2001.

Basically this strategy is valid for the current situation and for the foreseeable future. According to the strategy “the current mission of NISPAcee is to promote and strengthen the emergence of effective and democratic governance and the modernisation of public administration systems throughout the NISPAcee region” (NISPAcee Strategy for 2009–20012).

The strategy defined the strategic goals of the organisation, which are also relevant for the current situation. NISPAcee was defined as a network-oriented organisation with bridging functions partly between East and West, and partly among the countries in the NISPAcee region.

2. Formulating innovative actions

An essential contribution of the strategy was the suggestion of innovative actions contributing to the financial stability and to the increase of professional prestige of the organisation. NISPAcee was launching new innovative activities and projects to implement its basic goals.

We were building partnerships with other international organisations. An example was the support of ReSPA (Regional School of Public Administration for Western Balkan), the initiative of the European Commission. In the framework of the partnership NISPAcee worked out and offered special training programmes and other networking activities. This partnership has great importance nowadays, as well.

We were trying to strengthen relationships with academics and professionals of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the West Balkans. It was an ambitious plan, but we could not achieve convincing progress in these projects. We could strengthen individual and organisational contracts to countries in the West-Balkan (Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia) and Georgia, but we could not make significant progress in Central Asia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On the other hand a genuine success story was the development of the partnership with EGPA. The EGPA partnership has strategic importance, and based on this value statement the leadership of EGPA and NISPAcee signed an agreement of cooperation between the two organisations already in February 2008, the so-called Tallinn Declaration aiming at

- cooperative efforts in supporting administrative reforms in Europe
• fostering joint comparative studies and the development of administrative theory within a European perspective
• and creating joint networks related to common research interests amongst European professionals.

In the period of 2008–2010 we, together with the EGPA leadership, organised annual joint actions, called Trans-European Dialogue/TED. TED1 was organised in 2008. The location was Tallinn and the topic was the concept of the Neo-Weberian state. TED2 was organised in 2009, and it was has hosted by Helsinki. TED3 took place in Ljubljana. All three conferences were jointly organised, dealt with substantial problems of public administration, and every year a special edition of the NISPAcee Journal of Public Policy was prepared, based on the conference papers.

In 2008 the first joint EGPA-NISPAcee book was published under the title Public Administration and Public Policy Degree Programmes in Europe: The Road from Bologna. The project was initiated and financed by LGI/OSI (The Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute), Budapest, Hungary, and the book was published in October 2008. The objective of this book was to analyse and evaluate reforms of public policy and management programmes in different parts of Europe, with special emphasis on the difficulties faced by countries in Eastern and Central Europe. It is thus based on the conviction that European countries face some common challenges and can learn from one another. At the same time, it sought to highlight differences both between and within different regions on the Continent. The volume also followed the tradition of openness to the global academic and professional community that had been characteristic to both organisations from Ireland to Italy, from Spain to Armenia. American scholars made valuable contributions to the book. Moreover, a chapter looked beyond Europe and discussed the experience of non-European countries around the Mediterranean.

The chapters of the book contained different approaches to the evaluation of past efforts, the overview of the current situation and the analysis of the avenues of future developments. With this diversity, the book itself represented European values. Only this diversity can provide opportunities for an efficient and effective co-operation.

Another innovation was the “Selection of Country Papers”. After the annual NISPAcee conferences only a limited number of papers were selected in the Proceedings of the conferences. We initiated to put together all papers from a single country and in addition to that we can involve papers from the respective country, and altogether these papers could provide a thick description of the state of
the art of reform and development in public administration in these countries. The aim was to create a volume written by domestic scholars and professionals supporting the implementation of public policy and management reforms, a volume which is applicable as teaching material in the academic programmes. The first selection was prepared by the Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca Romania and it was financed by national resources and was published with the NISPAcee logo. It gave NISPAcee more visibility in Romania.

Last but not least we came to the conclusion that a new fundraising strategy was needed. Beside the financial support of LGI we began to explore new financial resources. NISPAcee had to enlarge and strengthen the diversity of financial resources which had existed before.

The core institutional funding was provided by LGI. They were ready to continue that for the coming 2+2 years. Apart from that we had to prepare applications for projects, because without them the financial stability of NISPAcee would have not been provided. It resulted in the situation that the financial stability was provided in the period of global financial crisis.

It this challenging and exciting period – with the essential support and commitment of the Secretariat – NISPAcee has begun to develop the capacities and activities which are important preconditions for the survival and the long-run future of our organisation.
Section II.D

Reports and Reflections from NISPAcee Working Groups
NISPAcee Working Group on Politico-Administrative Relations

ALEKSANDRA RABRENOVIC

The working group on politico-administrative relations was one of the most active NISPAcee permanent working groups, which operated over the period of nine years. It was created at the 1998 NISPAcee conference in Prague and held its last session at the conference in Kyiv in 2007. The objective of the working group was to analyze the development of politico-administrative relations primarily in Central and Eastern Europe, drawing on insights from history, law, political science and sociology and using comparative analytical methods.

There were four key phases in the operation of the working group.

In the initial phase of development (1998–2001), the WG concentrated its research activities on studying the general institutional framework of politico-administrative relations in CEE by investigating the attitudes and role perceptions of elected politicians and appointed officials and the impact of transition politics on their relationships from a comparative perspective. As the lack of a well working politico-administrative interface was singled out as one of the main impediments to the administrative development process in Central and Eastern Europe, it was decided to develop comparative case studies on politico-administrative relations in Central and Eastern Europe and, on the basis of these studies, to formulate possible ways of breaking the stalemate in politico-administrative relations. A framework for the development of comparative country studies was developed by the two co-chairs of the working group, Tony Verheijen and Aleksandra Rabrenovic. On the basis of this comparative framework, a first series of country studies was developed and discussed during the NISPAcee annual conferences in Sofia in 1999, the intermediate meeting of the WG members in Bratislava in 1999 and at the NISPAcee conference in Budapest in 2000.

As a result of almost three years of research work, the book *Who Rules?* (2001), edited by Tony Verheijen, was published. The contributors to the book were researchers from more than 10 states from Europe, the CIS and beyond. The first part provides theoretical and methodological insights into the study of politico-administrative relations. The second part consists of nine country studies, mainly from Central and Southeastern Europe and the Baltic States, but also includes a study of Kyrgyzstan with comparative sections on other Central Asian states. The third section highlights key aspects of politico-administrative relations. The final section contains comparative conclusions. The working group promoted the
use of the textbook through the organization of teacher-training seminars in English and Russian. The book was used as a teaching material at several universities and training institutions. In current research literature it is often cited as a theoretical and empirical source of CEE studies.

The focus of the second phase of the WG operation (2001–2002) was a research on politico-administrative relations under coalition governments in the CEE countries. At the 9th NISPAcee conference in Riga in 2001, the members of the working group found this topic essential for the better understanding of the political conditions as it provides serious additional limitations to the professionalization of administrative systems in the region. More detailed guidelines for this research were provided by Dr. László Vass, who prepared a concept for a more comprehensive research on politico-administrative relations under the coalition governments in the CEE countries. The first drafts of the country cases were presented at the 10th NISPAcee annual conference in Krakow, Poland, in 2002.

The output of the second phase of work is a second book of the WG: Coalitions of the Unwilling? Politicians and Civil Servants in Coalition Governments, edited by B. Guy Peters, Tony Verheijen and László Vass and published in 2005. This volume attempts to answer the question to what degree new patterns of coalition governments and management have started altering traditional systems and notions of politico-administrative relations. The presented case studies give particular attention to CEE states, as the majority of them have developed political systems that favor the emergence of coalition governments, but also include several examples from Western European countries. This study both provides an inventory of shifting realities in coalition politics and its impact on civil-service development and attempts to provide an answer to the question of how a new equilibrium between changes in the mode of political governance and the quest for stability in civil-service development can be found.

In the period of 2003–2005, the WG expanded the analysis of politico-administrative relations from traditional “top down” relationships in government to governance to incorporate the presence, impact, necessity and contribution of other actors and stakeholders in the policy-making arena. The working group focused on the study of involvement of civil-society actors in the policy process and the emergence of new discourse arenas. Traditional approaches to government were supplemented with the theoretical perspective of modern governance.

The new research protocol “Bureaucrats and Politics: Expanding the Analysis” was prepared by the new co-chairs of the working group, George Sootla, Bernadette Connaughton and B. Guy Peters. Based on the protocol, around twenty papers were presented at the 11th Annual NISPAcee conference in Bucharest. The
new methodological approach was continued and confirmed at the following NISPAcee conferences held in Vilnius, Lithuania, in 2004 and in Moscow in 2005.

As a result of a three-year research endeavor, the WG prepared its third publication: *Politico-Administrative Dilemma: Traditional Problems and New Solutions*, edited by B. Guy Peters, George Sootla and Bernadette Connaughton. The papers contained in this book addressed the on-going themes of the NISPAcee working group on politico-administrative relations over the period of 2003–2005. The book represents another step in the development of the WG’s understanding of how governments in Central and Eastern Europe are transforming themselves. The papers in the first section cover familiar themes such as policy-making roles, accountability mechanisms and politicization, examining the ways in which politicians and bureaucrats in several countries in Central and Eastern Europe are able to work together to govern or compete over power within government. Case studies on Belgium and Ireland also consider similar patterns in Western European countries. Papers on the Baltic countries examine the emerging and increasingly significant patterns of interaction between state and society in Central and Eastern Europe.

Over the fourth phase of operation in 2006–2007, the working group further extended its focus on the interaction of politicians and bureaucrats to include issues of coordination and policy advice. At the Ljubljana conference in 2006, thirteen papers were presented on the proposed theme – including the role and functions of the Office of Prime Minister and Office of President in several CEE countries and the role of special advisers in selected Eastern and Western states. In 2007, the work on this issue was taken further by proposing a new methodology of examining politico-administrative relations at the center of Government. The project was entitled “Administering the Summit”, and its objective was to explore the roles and functions of actors (elites), structures and processes that serve the “summit” in CEE states following the first phases of transition. At the Kyiv conference in 2007, several country studies addressed the interplay of politico-administrative roles at the core executive, in particular the role and specific structures of the Prime Minister’s Office (Hungary) and the administration of the President (Russia). One of the sessions focused on evaluating the role of elites such as political secretaries and special advisers as actors providing advice and political coordination to the summit. The most interesting papers on the above subjects were published in the conference proceedings.
Politico-Administrative Relations: Extending the Focus

GEORG SOOTLA

These are notes of the second stage of activities of the NISPAcee first working group “Politico-Administrative Relations”. This stage started already at the 2002 meeting in Krakow when Tony Verheijen and Aleksandra Rabrenovic resigned as working-group coordinators due to new challenges in their academic/expert careers. Georg Sootla (Tallinn University) and Bernadette Connaughton (University of Limerick) were appointed at a NISPAcee business meeting as the new coordinators of WG 1. Actually we had previously worked closely together not only in WG 1, but also in the framework of other EU and UNDP supported projects on curricula development. So the continuity of WG 1 was largely retained.

In the previous period the WG focused first of all on the analysis of evolution civil service vis-à-vis political elites/actors and trends in politicisation/professionalism in CEE countries. The main papers focused on the country studies of civil-service acts and their implementation, which was important as an exchange of information about public-service reform on the eve of the development of regular Internet channels. One should take into account that political science and public-administration research had only recently been launched in CEE at that time. At universities in the region the research was largely secondary due to the urgent need for establishing public-administration curricula and development-teaching capacities for the need of EU accession. The integration and gradual development of academic/research resources for this study field that is clearly focused – and central for PA development – has in itself a very important mission for the EU accession process that had started.

The accumulation of academic and research resources and their advancement at that period might be only a gradual and complicated process. At the Budapest meeting in 2000 the conceptual perspective of “public service bargain”, elaborated by Ch. Hood, was proposed as a new framework for the analysis. But apparently it was too sophisticated for CEE researchers at that time to be successfully implemented. So the focus on the impacts of coalition government in politico-administrative configurations was selected.

So, there was a need to supplement the WG 1 traditional research framework with new ideas and challenges. The change in focus was easier than expected, because the research profile of Tony (public management) and Aleksandra (law) was different from ours, which was inclined towards political science/public policy. Our task

became even easier after the visit of B. Guy Peters to Tallinn in fall 2002, when the first ideas of further development of the WG took shape. We decided to approach the politico-administrative relations from the policy-process perspective and to supplement the study of roles of top politicians and officials with the governance perspective. At the beginning of 2003 the new proposal “Bureaucrats and Politicians: Expanding the Analysis” was proposed to the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative – Open Society institute. This means the study of political and administrative roles of all participants in the policy process, among them non-government actors, and considering the pattern not as a dichotomy of conflicting roles but as a kind of network, as the policy-making arenas. This approach draws on the presumption that the transition should not be merely aimed to restore the traditional roles of politicians as policy decision-makers and top officials as policy implementers, but presumed a merger of their roles and also a strong participatory dimension of the policy-making. It was a rather fashionable approach after the NPM domination in science of administration in the 1990s. However, presumably, the majority of CEE countries were not yet ready to put this trend into practice, whereas they were still admiring NPM rhetoric and practice, which presumes, on the contrary, the clear split of those roles and actors. Moreover, the EU conditional- ity criteria, which draw heavily on Continental traditions, presumed first of all the stabilisation of the politico-administration dichotomy in the framework of classical politico-administrative roles.

The shift in the focus was mirrored immediately in the structure of the papers and in headings of WG sessions at the Bucharest meeting in 2003. The WP 1 programme still consisted of the traditional session of civil service even though the sociological focus of the issue emerged. But other sessions focused on new directions of research. At first, attention was paid to the development of conceptual issues of the study of state-society relations in the policy process. WG 1 started to debate papers prepared as studies in the CEE comparative perspective, which were based on profound and truly comparative empirical studies. Papers with clear methodological perspectives (at this conference, rational choice and normative institutionalism) became more frequent on our agenda. More and more papers did not take a normative/legal stance in considering politico-administrative patterns but focused on detailed empirical – usually well designed – case studies. Another new trend was asserted here (already pronounced at the Krakow meeting): the participation of young graduate students with independent and with papers of high methodological quality. Probably this trend became characteristic to all working groups and resulted in the introduction of NISPAcee’s “Best graduate student paper” award.
The second innovation was the focus on the analysis of politico-administrative patterns and roles in the policy-making process in specific areas/sectors (health, social protection, agriculture, environment protection, forestry) but also of policy-process studies in general (i.e. the adoption of secondary legislation, policy strategies and complex laws). Those were as a rule national/sectoral case studies and provide very interesting insights and empirical data. Although we planned at the end of the Bucharest meeting to form sub-groups of policy areas, in actuality we were not able to effectively bind together those studies of the policy process into a coherent methodological direction of analysis.

There was also the third important shift in focus, which became more evident at later meetings. Session four of Bucharest focused on the interaction of levels of governance in the policy process. I.e. the analysis started to involve not only a larger set of actors, but also of different levels of governance, starting from supranational actors and EU policy-making to sub-national actors and local/regional policy-making.

The next meeting in Lithuania (Vilnius) was held immediately after eight CEE countries gained membership in the EU in 2004. This important change was not mirrored exactly in our WG agenda except the framework paper presented by SIGMA representative F. Cordona, which defines the main weaknesses of those countries’ policy process and, hence, the main outlines of improvement of the policy-making process in order to ensure effective participation of politicians and officials in the EU policy process. In this meeting, however, a new important issue came to the centre: the study of politico-administrative roles in the organisation and the management of the reform process and different patterns of coordination of reforms; these studies were initiated by M. Temmes (Finland). The Moscow meeting in 2005 followed the routes designed at the Bucharest meeting. It was a time of summing up the results and providing outputs.

In spring 2005 the preparation of the new (third) book Politico-Administrative Dilemma: Traditional Problems and New Solutions, edited by B. G. Peters, G. Sootla and B. Connaughton, began. New directions of studies of politico-administrative patterns in the policy process as well as traditional role analysis of politicians vs. civil servants were summarised in fourteen chapters. After the editing of the book the coordinators and the NISPAcee secretariat faced the question of how and whether to continue. On the one hand, the fact that the new book was issued one year after the second book of WG 1 indicated obvious success in developing conference papers into structured chapters. On the other hand WG 1 was still not able to integrate a sufficient extensive core of participants who were able to strictly follow the research protocol in developing papers for publication. One
part of the researchers participated in only one meeting, and their contribution did not result in papers published.

Finally the decision was made to apply to the LG&PSR Initiative with a proposal but with a much clearer and more narrow focus. The main idea of this proposal was to focus on the interplay of political versus administrative coordination and advice mechanisms at the core executive, i.e. at support structures for higher political officials. In designing the idea of the proposal we took the shape from the book *Administering the Summit: Administering the Core Executive in Developed Countries* by B. Guy Peters, R. A. W. Rhodes and V. Wright (Houndsmill: Macmillan, 2000). Thanks to B. Guy Peters we also had access to preparatory notes and the research framework of that book. Thus the research was broken into three sub-directions – patterns of coordination and advice at the Cabinet secretariat (Prime Minister’s Office), at Presidential Administrations (in countries where the President is a chief executive), and advisors to the Ministers.

The topic was current in CEE countries because of the imbalance of these coordination/advice mechanisms and of institutional settings in ensuring this coordination in CEE countries. One part of the countries overestimated the need for political coordination in policy-making, which results in gaps in the implementation of radical reform initiatives. The other – and larger – part of countries’ elites prefers to develop policy with low-profile politics because for a long period the party politics was considered a source of non-professionalism in policy-making. As a result the policy and political conflicts became highly personified, the policy fragmented and this resulted in the creation of personally loyal civil servants as a form of their politicisation.

At the first meeting in Ljubljana in 2006 we somewhat changed the usual format of sessions and devoted much time to the discussion of the extensive research protocol prepared in advance (it was similar to the Riga meeting in 2000) to streamline the focus, structure and logic of different papers. The protocol paid special attention to the specifics of politico-administrative cultures in the countries involved as a variable in explaining differences in institutional and coordination patterns. This made it possible to increase the comparative dimension of national case studies. In Ljubljana the paper of M. Keris (Tallinn University, Estonia) won the NISPAcee award for “The best graduate paper”, which was an important incentive and recognition to members of our WG. In 2007 in Kiev the last WG 1 meeting was held, which also finalised the preparation of the next and last book issued by WG 1. M. Keris’ paper was selected the best graduate paper once more.
In the editing of the book *Politico-Administrative Relations at the Centre: Actors, Structures and Processes Supporting the Core Executive*, the main burden was on Bernadette, hence the order of the editors list changed in comparison with the previous one, with Bernadette as the first editor. We were not able to collect papers from all CEE countries (to follow the format of *Administering the Summit*), which is not surprising, for we did not have special research funding for ironing out papers. But our version of “the summit” provided three different focuses on politico-administrative coordination (President’s, PM and Minister’s offices) and this was its original contribution. These three focuses were introduced in the book by conceptual chapters by O. Protsyk (Germany), G. Sootla (Estonia) and B. Connaughton (Ireland). Today it is obvious that this edition may have benefited if we had published our well elaborated research protocol, which might have been used later as a conceptual framework for further studies of the issue in the future and in other CEE regions.

To sum up: The ten years in which NISPAcee’ first Working Group on Politico-administrative relations existed have left a mark on the history of the development of public-administration research in Eastern and Central Europe. We evidenced during this period the emergence and fast increase of research and analytical capacity of researchers that enabled them to be integrated into the research community of Europe at the end of the 2000s and to become eligible for EU research funding. This development resulted in four thematic books on politico-administrative relations in CEE. There are only selected cases of such continuity of research networks in the current period. From the mid-2000s this development of research capacity and proficiency gradually started to expand in the South-East direction. After the end of the WG 1 activities this mission has been promoted by other NISPAcee Working Groups. I give my regards of success to new coordinators of NISPAcee WGs. Hopefully some of the lessons of our WG can serve as a know-how for coordinators to be successful in promoting the mission that is followed by NISPAcee.
Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

DIANA IANCU, VERONICA JUNJAN, MICHEL S. DE VRIES

Introduction

Public Administration Reform (PAR) is at the heart of the developments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Central Asia (CA). It was not just a reform from centrally steered to market economies. Huge efforts were also made in order to transform and modernize the public sector. NISPAcee’s working group on PAR addresses the issues involved in such reforms. It aims at giving an account of what happens within the public sector in CEE and CA countries. As there are many myths and prejudices about the reforms taking place in these countries, it was deemed necessary to discuss studies in which actual and current regional reforms were described and analyzed, to provide a broad range of explanations for success and failure in PAR, and to arrive at conclusions regarding the reforms and the factors of success and failure. PAR also attempts to investigate whether the existing theories on public-sector reform are valid for the interpretation of the developments in the NISPAcee regions.

Below we give an overview of the preliminary conclusions arrived at and the need to address the issues surrounding public-administration reforms further. Before these issues are addressed, we first give a short overview of the developments in the working group itself.

The developments within the PAR working group

The working group is still very young within the NISPAcee context. It was established as such in 2009, at the 17th NISPAcee Annual Conference (in Budva), after two pilot panels that were held at NISPAcee Annual Conferences in 2007 (in Kiev) and 2008 (Bratislava). Since then, it received huge attraction from scholars both from the CEE and the CA regions, as well as from Western Europe. Every year, up to twenty-five selected papers are presented and discussed within the working group at the Annual NISPAcee conferences.

In 2009, our focus involved classic Public Administration issues, mainly the complexities and varying effects of: decentralization, the reforms before and after New Public Management, the impact of the EU on CEE democratization, and those of the Western assistance in reforms in general. Impacts of different theo-
ries on public-sector reforms were extensively debated. In 2010 the papers addressed more critical issues, such as the perverse effects of reforms, the myth of pseudo-reforms, the lacking capacity to evaluate reforms, the problems in public-procurement contracts and in amalgamations of local government. The discussions became more fundamental. In the working-group sessions comparative approaches in researching PAR were discussed, as well as the explaining factors for the success or failure thereof, with special attention to international influences and the costs and benefits involved in Public Administration Reform. The preliminary conclusions derived from these sessions suggested that valid comparative data about PAR were lacking, that theory building and in-depth research was in need of such data, that case studies did enlighten us about actual developments taking place in various CEE and CIS countries, but that they were not yet robust enough to arrive at testable hypotheses and that there were many reforms that are reforms only in name. It was necessary to distinguish such reforms from real PAR. That needed a theoretical framework as well as some comparative data. Furthermore, more evidence was presented regarding the broad range of explanations for success and failure in PAR. As mentioned above those studies still stressed that the context and common inheritance of CEE and CIS countries was very important.

One hypothesis derived from the discussions showing the increased skepticism of the working group was that when countries became members of the EU they lost the incentive to reform further, and the process of PAR stopped. Whether that was true or not became one of the prioritized issues for the PAR working group.

In the past two years the PAR working group achieved maturity by receiving an increasing amount of comparative papers, dealing, among other things, with CA countries. In fact, in 2011, a special session was devoted to the outcomes of comparative analyses, as well as to the developments taking place in the Stans (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan). Overall, the papers of 2011 ardently debated good-governance issues: transparency (of PAs), participation (of communities in CEE, CA and the Balkans) and efficiency (of old and new public managers).

In 2012, we concentrated on a more in-depth approach to studying PAR. As such, we opened the floor for: EU-related issues and the impact of external pressure and advice in general; normative issues, including values, transparency, accountability, public-service motivation and responsibility on the positive side and corruption and hypocrisy as their counterparts; reforms under very adverse circumstances, such as those taking place in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, and also the present-day views on New Public Management reforms.
Below, these general findings are made more concrete by summarizing some of the specific findings of the research conducted within the frame of this working group.

**Main findings in 2009**

From the Baltics to the Balkans and from Central Europe to Eastern Europe and to Central Asia, the PAR working group focused on reforms: drivers of change, convergent patterns, scale and alternatives. It was observed that post-totalitarian institutions led CEE and CA countries to develop certain patterns of reform. Success stories seemed to have been correlated to the presence of entrepreneurial political elites and trans-border cooperation. A number of conflicts (and sources of conflict) in conducting reform were identified: conflicts between external pressure to reform (on behalf of international organizations) and domestic path dependencies (as discussed in papers written by H. Huik and H. Lootus; by D.-C. Iancu; and by P. Katsamunska); conflicts of interest within public organizations (as analysed by Z. Hajdu), and a lack of skills, knowledge and attitudes within the public sector (as examined by E. Shaskolskaya and S. Melkishev).

For CEE and CA countries, the transition in Public Administration Reforms seemed to have tried to move from one extreme (state) to the other (market) and, eventually ended somewhere in between (administrative market) (as discussed in the paper by T. Brandsen).

**Main findings in 2010**

Our working group focused on two research questions: a) What explains successful public-administration reform (in post-socialist countries)? and, b) What effects are visible because of public-administration reform? There was a high level of interest, many abstracts were submitted, and eventually 30 papers were presented during the six sessions reserved for our group. One of the first answers the papers offered was that political will, leadership, and financial and human resources usually set the lines between failure and success in PAR. International donors (like the EU) might also make the difference. Moreover, reforming in scarce times appeared to be a puzzling process as shown by authors like: M. Profiroiu, A. Profiroiu, and T. Andrei; G. Suleymanova; T. C. Țiclău and S. D. Șandor. Theories of public administration were also debated: D. Fuller and V. Junjan analyzed the classic Weberian perspective in contrast with New Public Management, F. Van den Berg proposed different interpretations to the classic Chinese literature on government as a way of invigorating the European perspectives, while I.
Sobis and M. S. de Vries focused on steering professionals involved in complex projects from an inter-organizational perspective.

**Main findings in 2011**

The year 2011 offered us the perfect forum for both academics and practitioners to discuss whether international donors (EU, World Bank, IMF) were capable to steer reforms in the public sector and if there was a path dependency observed within the region. Prestigious researchers, young academics and policy makers worked together in five sessions analyzing PAR theory and case studies from CEE, the Balkans, the Caucasus, CA and Afghanistan. Be it focused on *civil-service reform* (such as the papers presented by M. Aminova and A. Karini), *leadership* (I. Sobis, F. Van den Berg, and M. S. de Vries) and *consolidated administration* (M. Karadzoski; A. Profiroiu, T. Andrei and M. Profiroiu), or concentrated on debating stretching concepts like *good governance* (T. Tanev, R. Urinboyev), *New Public Management* (as G. Hajnal; N. Shekiladze; and J. Urbanovic) and *professionalism* (T. Brandsen, J.-K. Helderman and M. Honingh), PAR nurtured fruitful exchanges of practices and theoretical arguments on PAR across the region. We also hosted the “Best Comparative Paper” presented at the Conference, co-authored by V. Junjan and D.-C. Iancu.

**Main findings in 2012**

A wide debate in PAR studies was developed by the East-West cleavage and the “Return to Europe” logic of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. In Ohrid 2012, NISPAcee celebrated 20 years of active conferences and projects across and beyond CEE and raised the challenge of assessing PAR performed in the East (also) in the presence of the West.

With such a generous point of departure at hand, our working group brought together scholars and practitioners interested in analysing multiple institutional settings, traditions and expectations in: the Baltic States (as discussed by J. Mikolaityte and O. Mejere; K. H. Pedersen; A. Pilkaite and A. Chmieliauskas; R. Raudla; and J. Urbanovic and M. Honingh), Central Asia (in the contributions of I. Bankova; G. Suleymanova and C. Suleyman; R. Urinboyev), Central and Eastern Europe (for papers of S. Gallai; D.C. Iancu; D. Klimovsky; I. Sobis and M. de Vries; Z. Xhaferri) and the Balkans (I. B. Berceanu; Z. Jankulovski et al.; M. Karadozki; A. Patoska and B. Dimeski; M. Ristovska and N. Pelivanova; and M. Stankovic). Civil service de-politicisation, territorial reorganisation and inter-ministerial coordination were some of the topics the presenters and most certain-
ly the participants of the NISPAcee Conference lingered on, in an attempt to construct methodologically sound tools for assessing the success or failure of PAR.

**Conclusions**

So far, the PAR working group especially discussed the causes of absent, slow and ineffective reforms. By the first NISPAcee conference, the main causes were still sought in conflicts between external pressure to reform and path dependencies. The context and common inheritance of CEE and CA countries, including the previous role of officials, denial of the importance of competence, absence of a merit system and lack of public service were deemed to be of crucial importance. The variance in speed of progress in different countries was also quite important. Explanations were found in conflicts of interest within public organizations, lacking skills, knowledge and attitudes within the public sector, and the seemingly inevitability of such problems. The PAR working group looks forward to discussing what the future brings for reforms sustainability. What challenges should we look at further? Is the CEE region becoming a possible model for the Western Balkans? These questions remain to be addressed by the next conferences. The increase demand for the sessions of our working group suggests that there is a huge interest in the public-administration reforms that take place in the NISPAcee regions. Moreover, an increasing part of the papers addresses questions from a comparative perspective. Reforms regarding normative questions in reforms and change in governance are increasingly addressed and the analyses become more realistic in that the problems, conflicts of interests and power relations are increasingly addressed as factors inhibiting and accelerating reforms in the public sector.
Working Group on Public-Sector Accounting and Finance: A Brief Flashback

ŽELJKO ŠEVIĆ

Every jubilee opens up a tremendous opportunity to look back and see what has been done, what could have been done, and also through reflection of the past, look forward to the future. NISPAcee, as an organisation aiming at improving the teaching of and research in public administration in the geographical space of Central and Eastern Europe and the former republics of USSR, has been around for 20 years and certainly can boast remarkable achievements across the board during these 20 years. The Working Group on Public Sector Finance and Accounting has been part of the NISPAcee legacy for 8 years, started late in 2001 and ended early in 2010, when it renamed itself the Working Group on Fiscal Policy in 2010–2011 and continued to respond to the new challenges of fiscal stringency initiated by the worldwide crisis. Again, in 2013 the group will be working under the name Working Group on Public Sector Finance and Financial Management. I have chaired the working group from 2001 to 2007, at which point I retired, leaving the leadership of the group in the capable hands of Dr Lucie Sedmihradská, of the Prague University of Economics.

Thematic working groups began to emerge as a form of NISPAcee activities in the late 1990s, most notably with the now also defunct group on Politico-Administrative Relationships. In the late 1990s there was an increasing number of papers in public finance submitted to the NISPAcee annual conferences, and quite often they were directed into various sessions and hence, there was never a critical mass of papers in the area. In order to strengthen the research capacity in this area and create a network of researchers, the working group was launched at the 9th NISPAcee Annual Conference, held in Riga in 2001. However, the initial idea for the establishment of the group, in fact, appeared a year before, and it took some time to conceptualise the group and its aims and secure support from the secretariat and at the same time the OSI/LGI, which has regularly supported the activities of the group and its publications.

From the very beginning the group attracted participants from both East and West. However, in the very early years, the major contribution came from scholars from Western countries, most notably from the US, and from the former USSR republics, especially from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Papers presented in the first years, very primarily descriptive, focused on presenting the current situation in a rather chronological manner. Papers were longish, required a substantial amount of editing, but at the same time, they fully reflected the state of the
art of public-finance scholarship in the region. During the decade of the group’s existence maybe one or two papers were presented in the broadly defined area of public-sector accounting. And, again, many colleagues would probably classify them rather as a contribution to knowledge in the field of taxation. Despite many promotional attempts, accounting scholarship did not feature on the group’s agenda. In addition, the peer-review process, in principle semi-blind, was instituted in the process of accepting papers. One may ask why a “semi-blind” process, and not a fully blind process? Technically speaking, the process was blind, but as the group was rather small, and papers were most often country-thematic, the reviewer was able to guess pretty well who the author was and from where he or she would have hailed. An editorial selection was also present as the first selection filter, but as the idea was to raise the capacity, the role of the co-ordinator was more of an advisory and coaching role, advising authors on how they could improve their papers, and some of the work was sent for peer review after two or three iterations had already happened, informally or semi-formally. It is a pleasure to see that some colleagues, who began from a rather low base, have developed and now produce quality work.

As with all group efforts, a small group of devoted members developed fairly quickly on both sides of the Atlantic. For instance, Phil Bryson was a regular attendee at a number of meetings, always happy to undertake a fair share of peer-review activities, advise novice researchers and engage in discussions with colleagues, often exhibiting an enviable knowledge of reform attempts in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Finally, his work on Czech and Slovak sub-national finance has been published (see Bryson 2010), making a significant contribution to knowledge. Phil thanked the colleagues that he met because of his activities in the group, who assisted him in finalising the work in the group. Phil has since retired from Brigham Young University and the group, but has continued with his scholarship in economic thought and fiscal decentralisation. The group has, since its inception, attracted a healthy balanced membership of both academics and practitioners, and this ratio has been changing. In some years, especially the early ones, more members hailed from practices (ministries of finance, local municipalities, private companies and NGOs), whilst, as the group has become more established, academics have come to prominence and have somewhat taken the primacy. However, I personally would still like to see that practitioners are welcome – and I am sure they are; as good research in public finance, and especially public-financial management, has to be problem-based.

Although the group had to produce a detailed research protocol and promote a particular topic for a NISPAcee Annual Conference in order to secure renewed support by LGI, it always accepted a limited number of papers that were unso-
licited and did not correspond at all to the promoted topic. This path was often used to support young scholars, applying to the group for the first time, and applicants coming from a country where no member of the group operated. Notwithstanding the fact that the group met formally only once a year, it has been a lively network of researchers throughout the year. In a number of cases, colleagues initiated joint research and supported each other in other domains.

The beginning in Riga, in 2001, was, well, modest. The topic was general, looking at the state of public finance in CEECs and CIS, and no particular research protocol was in place. There were some broad guidelines, but the members could exercise their freedom to the largest extent. This is probably why we had to wait with the publication of the presented works, but once the publication activity had begun, the publication following the meeting became, more or less, a must. The first book took some time to materialise, as in the first two years, the selected papers presented at the group’s sessions were selected for publication in the conference proceedings, as the flagship NISPAcee publication. The book entitled Financial Decentralization and Grant Transfers: A Critical Perspective appeared first in 2005, and it captured both theoretical and practical aspects of decentralisation and the use of grant transfers in supporting the decentralised delivery system. The book attracted attention and has provided, for the first time, a good read on comparative practices. It has been produced to serve both as an informative professional read and also to be used as supplementary material for public-finance courses in decentralised public finance, focusing on European transitional countries. In fact, in the late 2000s, a number of US universities have listed the book as an auxiliary material. From the very outset, NISPAcee itself has always perceived the working-group publications as potential teaching material and has accordingly promoted the outputs on its website.

After the first publications (Šević 2005), others followed (Šević 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Sedmihradská 2010a; Sedmihradská 2010b; Sedmihradská et al. 2011). The group also prepared a book for Edward Elgar publishing in 2008, assessing a decade and a half of public-sector reforms at the local (sub-national) level in Central and Eastern Europe (see Šević 2008). The book received very good reviews and has been a success in itself, being rather often quoted when the decentralisation and functioning of sub-national government in CEE is assessed. A few of the presented materials have been translated into other languages and have found a place on public-finance courses’ reading lists across the region. It is indeed a pleasure to look at the distinctive improvement in the quality of the work presented at the working-group sessions and consequently in the produced texts. A number of authors have been more or less regulars in their contribution to the publication, and their progress can be easily observed.
Topics for research have been decided annually, although on a number of occasions, we have tried to have a medium-term framework agreement on the research topics, i.e. to have a list of topics ready for the following three years. Despite the fact that it was difficult to define the topics well in advance, the annual consultation process was always more or less quick and, by the end of the NISPAcee Annual Conference, the research topic was agreed and usually by mid-September the research protocol was finalised. Virtual consultations have become a matter of routine, and the group functioned like a social network between two annual conferences, i.e. the group’s formal meetings.

In the past decade the group has grown, keeping its core membership. However, the members’ turnover has not been high, but rather a natural attrition. Senior members have retired, for one in mid-career it was time to try new challenges, and the junior members have matured and again taken on more responsibilities in their own institutions and hence had to find a new work balance. The group has had a distinctive, albeit limited influence on the development of public-sector finance in CEE and fSU countries, but only time will tell to what extent this influence has permeated the curriculum and teaching and research practices in these countries. On a personal level, it has been a pleasure to see one of the group’s publications in libraries from Slovenia to Tajikistan, and from the Baltic States to Montenegro.

And what the group and its members should be congratulated for most was the agility and timeliness with which it was capable to find new topics of research, even when it looked as though the options had dried out, and also to be attractive to new, young researchers equally in 2000, when the idea emerged, as today in 2012/2013. It has survived two generations of leadership, different management styles, many conference and research topics, and will certainly be capable of reinventing itself again in the years to come, to serve some other populace, as it has done in the last twelve years. And, for me personally, coordinating the group was one of the most pleasant professional experiences, and I can only thank those colleagues who were ready to join me on that journey. Happy anniversary NISPAcee and WG!
PART III

NISPAcee: An Overview of the Historic Record
This book has been developed on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of NISPAcee. It attempts to provide an overview of both NISPAcee and the state of public administration in the region over the last twenty years. The goal is to present to a broader audience some of the organization’s most important results.

The great majority of the contributions included herein are based on the papers and presentations delivered at NISPAcee’s 20th Annual Conference, in May 2012, in Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia; however, some of the contributions have been prepared for this book separately.

The first two parts of the book focus upon both NISPAcee’s academic and professional contribution to the development of the region, and some of the most important trends and developments over the last twenty years. In at least some instances NISPAcee’s role in these processes in the region has been extensively described, analysed and evaluated by the different authors.

The part of the book that follows seeks to provide readers with a comprehensive review of relevant facts and information about the organization which should help to complete the picture of major NISPAcee activities and simultaneously acknowledge the many individuals who contributed to these achievements.

Section III.A is a collection of some basic data and facts about NISPAcee, starting with the legal status, mission, functions, leadership and management, including individuals who have served as Presidents, Steering Committee members, working-group chairs and winners of various NISPAcee Awards. This section also confirms the NISPAcee external relationships and partnership with all major similar organizations in Europe and worldwide and fundraising achievements by a list of partners, donors and collaborative efforts. This is followed by a full list of activities which reflects the organization’s extensive reach and its versatile portfolio of conferences, workshops, research activities, projects, publications, etc. over the last twenty years.
Section III.B chronologically describes NISPAcee development while pointing out the most significant steps and core events of each year. The recorded chronological history is accompanied with selected photo documentation for a comprehensive memory.
Section III.A

Review of Facts and Data
1. Legal status

NISPAcee was legally registered under Slovak legislation as a non-profit, non-governmental, international organization in October 1995. The Executive Secretariat was and is located in Bratislava, Slovakia.

2. Mission

The mission of the organization has been reviewed several times during strategy meetings organized regularly every 3–5 years. The most recent NISPAcee Strategy was adopted in May 2012:

The mission of NISPAcee is to promote and strengthen effective and democratic governance and modernization of public administration and policy throughout the NISPAcee region (New Member States of the EU, neighbouring countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, the Western Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Turkey).

3. Functions and Objectives

The organization is led by its President, who is part of a five-member steering committee, and its Executive Director and staff. Throughout its history, the functions and objectives of NISPAcee have been and are likely to continue to be:

• Facilitating training and education
• Fostering research
• Promotion of public administration and policy as distinct fields

4. The NISPAcee Steering Committee

Present Steering Committee

President

Mirko Vintar, Faculty of Public Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia (since May 2012)

Members

György Jenei, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary (since 2007)
Marius Profiroiu, University of Economics, Bucharest, Romania (since 2010)
Ringa Raudla, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia (since 2010)
**Patrycja J. Suwaj**, Bialystok School of Public Administration, and Polish Association of Public Administration Education, Poland (since 2012)

**Former Presidents**


**Barbara Kudrycka**, Bialystok School of Public Administration, Poland (April 2002–May 2004)

**Martin Potůček**, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic (April 2000–April 2002)

**László Váradi**, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary (March 1997–April 2000)


**Former Steering Committee Members**

**Jacek Czaputowicz**, National School of Public Administration, Warsaw, Poland (2009–2012)


**Stanka Setnikar-Cankar**, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia (2004–2010)

**Sergey Pushkarev**, Ural State University, Yekaterinburg, Russia (2003–2009)


**Barbara Kudrycka**, Bialystok School of Public Administration, Poland (2000–2006)

† **Mzia Mikeladze**, Georgian Institute of Public Administration, Georgian Technical University, Caucasus University, Tbilisi, Georgia (2001–2004, 2006–2012)


**Martin Potůček**, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic (1997–2003)


**Todor Tanev**, Sofia University, Bulgaria (1998–2001)
Tiina Randma-Liiv, University of Tartu, at present Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia (1997–2000)

Krystyna Plaza, School of Public Administration, Lodz, Poland (1995–1998)

Mirko Vintar, School of Public Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia (1994–1998)

Bohdan Krawchenko, Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine (1994–1997)

Steering Committee Advisors


5. Executive Secretariat

Ľudmila Gajdošová, Executive Director (since 1995)

Juraj Sklenár, Information & PR Manager, Project Manager (since 1996)

Elena Žáková, Project Manager (since 2001)

Ján Andruch, IT Consultant & Webmaster (since 2002)

Viera Wallnerová, Project Manager (1996–2012)

6. Membership

The present NISPAcee membership encompasses Member Institutions, Associate Members, Individual Members and Governmental Members:

Member Institutions: membership is open to educational, training and research institutions from the NISPAcee region.

Associate Members: membership is open to relevant institutions from countries outside the NISPAcee region.

Individual Members (launched in 2007): membership is open to professionals involved in teaching, research, training and practice in public management and administration.

Governmental Members (launched in 2012): membership is open to governmental institutions and agencies other than educational and training ones that subscribe to the purpose of NISPAcee.
**Initial status**

25 Member Institutions

**Present status**

110 Member Institutions  
24 Associate Members  
32 Individual Members

The full list of members is available on the NISPAcee website.

**7. Partners and Donors**

NISPAcee has signed Memoranda of Understanding/Cooperation with the following organizations:

- **United Nations – UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), USA** in 2001, cooperation in the UNPAN (United Nations Public Administration Network)
- **European Group of Public Administration (EGPA), Belgium** in 2008
- **European Association of the Public Administration Accreditation (EAPAA), The Netherlands** in 2011
- **American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), USA** in 2011
- **Chinese Academy of Governance (CAG), China** in 2011
- **National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NAS-PAA), USA** in 2012

**NISPAcee is a member of**

- **EAPAA**, Enschede, The Netherlands  
- **IASIA**, Brussels, Belgium  
- **IIAS**, Brussels, Belgium  
- NISPAcee was invited to participate in **EUPAN** (European Union Public Administration Network) as an observer in 2011.
Collaborative efforts with major partners and donors

- **The Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI)** (formerly the Institute of Local Government and Public Service)/**Open Society Institute (OSI)**, Hungary, has supported the Executive Secretariat, numerous summer schools, distribution of LGI Discussion Papers, translation of SIGMA and other publications into national languages, project on Evaluation of PA programmes in CEE countries, NISPAcee research working groups, NISPAcee Occasional Papers, the Newsletter, the development of a textbook on Public Management and its translation into two local languages, and the NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, continuously from 1994 to 2011.

- **The Austrian Federal Chancellery**, through the **Austrian Federal Academy of Public Administration, Austria**, supported the NISPAcee annual conferences from the first one to the year 2000. The Austrian Federal Academy, Vienna, also supported the Steering Committee meetings. In the years 2001 and 2002, the Academy supported the development, publishing, printing and distribution of the NISPAcee conference proceedings.

- **SIGMA/OECD, France**, participated in the support of annual conferences, a summer workshop in 1998, Steering Committee meetings, and NISPAcee publications from 1994 until 2000.

- **The Pew Charitable Trusts, USA**, awarded NASPAA a grant to support NISPAcee for three years from 1995 to 1998 and a subsequent grant for 1998–1999. This helped support the costs of the Secretariat, Exchange Programmes and the development of two textbooks and their translations into several CEE national languages.

- **The International Institute of Public Administration, France**, supported the NISPAcee Civil Service Forum in 1997.

- **The European Institute of Public Administration, The Netherlands**, supported a 1998 Meeting on the Implications of New PHARE Programming for Institutes of Public Administration, the Second NISPAcee Civil Service Forum in 1999, the Conference on Administrative Capacities Building for European Integration in 2000 and the NISPAcee translation project by providing copyrights for the translation of many of the EIPA publications into local languages.

- **USAID, USA**, founded a joint NASPAA-NISPAcee Governance Improvement Co-operative Project with a three-year grant in the fall of 2000. Based on the successful implementation of the project, USAID awarded this project funds for an extension of activities in the year 2003 and again in the year 2004.

- **UNDP Regional Centre, Slovakia**, awarded NISPAcee a grant for a one-year project: “Building Advisory Capacities in Central and Eastern European
Countries, South-Eastern European Countries, Russian Federation, Caucasus and Central Asia” in the year 2001. Based on its successful implementation, UNDP awarded NISPAcee an additional grant for the continuation of this project in the year 2002, in order to support the implementation of an advanced training-of-trainers course and two training programmes for advisors. In the year 2003 UNDP approved additional grant funding for the continuation of project activities and the enlargement of the training programme with a special focus on EU accession countries and the development of an Annex to the manual and implementation of modified training programmes in EU accession countries in the years 2003–2005. In the fall of 2003 additional cooperation with UNDP involved a project focused on the establishment of a new NISPAcee Working group on “Strategic Leadership in Central Government” for the years 2003–2005. In 2011, UNDP supported a study visit of Belarusian legal experts to Slovakia and a project on “Supporting Reform of Municipal Financing in Montenegro through Experience Exchange” in 2012–2013.

- **High Education Support Programme (HESP)/OSI, Hungary**, supported the NISPAcee Summer School in 2001.
- **Volkswagen Foundation, Germany**, supported the 2002 Summer School.
- **US Department of State, USA**, awarded **Iowa State University, USA**, a grant to work with NISPAcee on the project: “Managing Cities for Economic Development and Citizen Satisfaction” in 2001–2003.
- **Thematic Network of Public Administration (TNPA), European Public Administration Network (EPAN) and the European Association for Public Administration Accreditation (EAPAA), The Netherlands**: NISPAcee organized a conference and different meetings of these organizations in Bratislava, Slovakia in June 2001. This enabled more individuals from NISPAcee member institutions (with participation being supported by the Thematic Network of Public Administration) to participate in these events and establish contacts with these organizations. It also provided a valuable opportunity for the members of the NISPAcee Steering Committee to meet with representatives of the above organizations. Reduced membership fees for NISPAcee institutions were accepted by these organizations, representatives of NISPAcee were appointed members of the Accreditation Committee of EAPAA, cooperation between the NISPAcee Working Group on Politico-Administrative Relations and the EPAN Working Group on East-West Cooperation was initiated. In 2003, NISPAcee implemented a Summer School in cooperation with EPAN in Bratislava, Slovakia and in Leuven, Belgium, in 2004. Workshops on the “European Accreditation of Public Administration Programmes” were organ-

- **International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA), Belgium**: in cooperation with UNDESA, USA, NISPAcee organized a joint seminar with the IASIA Board of Management, “Public Administration Education and Training in a Framework of Modernization and Decentralization: Comparative Perspectives and Challenges for Slovakia” in Bratislava, on 6–7 December 2001. A joint meeting of the NISPAcee Steering Committee and IASIA Board of Management was held in Bratislava on 8 December 2001, during which other possible cooperation involving both organizations was discussed. In 2003 the joint UN-IASIA-NISPAcee publication “State Modernization and Decentralization – Implications for Education and Training in Public Administration: Selected Central European and Global Perspectives” was published with the financial support of UNDESA. Cooperation continued in an IASIA/UN initiative focused on the development of “Standards for Excellence in Teaching Public Administration” within the years 2004–2008 and the utilization of the Standards in practice in 2009 and 2010. Two joint seminars in collaboration with China Academy of Governance, ASPA and IIAS were implemented in China in 2010 and 2012.

- **European Group of Public Administration (EGPA), Belgium**: A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in February 2008. A new joint conference was launched in 2008, called Trans-European Dialogue (TED). Six TED conferences have been held and five special issues of the *NISPAcee Journal* based on TED contributions have been published.


- **Council of Europe, France**, – NISPAcee has established cooperation with the Council of Europe for the development of a project focused on anti-corruption issues. A Working group on this topic was established and supported in 2002–2004. The outcomes of the research were published in a book titled “Anti-Corruption Training Programmes in Central and Eastern Europe” in 2005.

- **Open Society Institute, USA**, awarded NISPAcee a grant for a project focused on the establishment of a working group on public health policy and management in 2003. Based on the successful implementation of this project,
OSI awarded NISPAcee an additional grant for the implementation of a second phase of the project from 2004 to 2006.


- **UNDESA, USA**: NISPAcee became a regional centre of *United Nation Public Administration Network (UNPAN)* launched by UNDESA for CEE countries in April 2002. UNDESA supported the NISPAcee Secretariat and its IT development. UNDESA provided NISPAcee with additional support for the implementation of the “High Level Meeting on the ‘Capacity to Govern in CEE’”, in Prague, Czech Republic, in December 2003. NISPAcee representatives were invited to participate in the UN expert group on Ethics, Integrity and Accountability in the Public Sector and in the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration. NISPAcee IT experts regularly participate in UNPAN trainings. A joint workshop on Ethics was implemented in St. Petersburg, Russia in 2006 and followed up with a joint Programme on Leadership, Ethics, Accountability and Professionalism (LEAP) in the Public Sector for the years 2007–2010. The programme included cooperation in the preparation of several meetings implemented within the 7th Global Forum on “Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government”, held in Vienna, Austria, in June 2007 and the High Level Workshop on LEAP for Central Asian Countries which was held in Turkmenistan in 2007. NISPAcee continues to participate in UNPAN activities focused on these topics.

- **Consortium TRIAS, The Netherlands**: The consortium is led by the University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law and included eight additional member institutions from EU countries. NISPAcee participated in an advisory board of the project which focused on an investigation of the training needs for civil servants of the European member states responsible for the implementation of E-government policies and programmes and on the development of training modules on that subject. The project was awarded by the Leonardo da Vinci programme of the EC for implementation in 2006–2007. A one-week Master Class on E-Government Training Methods and Tools was jointly organized in Hague, The Netherlands in July 2007.

- **Faculty of Public Administration, Ljubljana University, Slovenia**: NISPAcee cooperated with the Faculty on the preparation and implementation of the “Symposium on the Development of Public Administration in Southeast Europe” held in Ljubljana, Slovenia in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011.
• **European Commission, Brussels**: NISPAcee was invited to participate in the implementation of the project “Regional School of Public Administration for the Western Balkans” (ReSPA). NISPAcee experts participated in several meetings during the course of the project implementation and provided experts and trainers for trainings organized for the Western Balkan countries within the framework of the project in 2007–2010.

• **Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA), Montenegro**: NISPAcee provided experts for several trainings organized by ReSPA after the School was established in Danilovgrad, Montenegro in 2010, and delivered two training courses there in 2011 and 2013.

• **Slovak Aid Bratislava, Slovakia**, awarded NISPAcee a grant for the project “How to Be a Better Policy Advisor in Public Administration Reforms in Selected Balkan and Central Asian Countries” implemented in 2005. In 2008, Slovak Aid awarded NISPAcee a grant for the project on “Sustainability and Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations in Kyrgyzstan” implemented in 2008–2010. Another project, “Managing Public Investments on Municipal Level in Georgia”, was implemented in 2010–2012; Slovak Aid support and the project “Montenegrin Capacity Building for Approximation of EU Legislation” are currently underway.

• **Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands**: NISPAcee is a member of the consortium led by the University for the project “WILCO: Welfare Innovations in the Local Context”, supported by the 7th Framework Programme of the EU, 2010 to 2013.

• **Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia**: NISPAcee is a member of a consortium led by the Faculty for the project “DEPOCEI: Development of Policy-Oriented Training Programmes in the Context of European Integration” supported by the TEMPUS Programme of the EU in 2012–2015.

• **ICARUS – International Consortium for Administration Research and University Studies**: a consortium of 7 universities and NISPAcee emerged in early 2012 with the aim of facilitating international academic exchange, developing academic and scientific relationships and supporting collaborative research.

• A lot of **institutions and governments from the NISPAcee** region which have supported implementation of NISPAcee activities (see item 9 below).

### 8. NISPAcee Award Recipients

**Alena Brunovská Award for Teaching Excellence in Public Administration**

Presented to the following recipients:
2012 – † Mzia Mikeladze, posthumously, Caucasus University, Georgia
2011 – László Vass, College of Communication and Business, Hungary
2010 – Juraj Nemec, Matej Bel University, Slovakia
2009 – Mirko Vintar, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
2008 – Attila Ágh, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Corvinus University, Hungary
2007 – William N. Dunn, Pittsburgh’s Graduate Centre for Public Policy and Management in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
2006 – Tiina Randma-Liiv, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
2005 – György Jenei, Corvinus University, Hungary
2004 – Martin Potůček, Charles University, Czech Republic
2003 – Emilia Kandeva-Spiridonova, Bourgas Free University, Bulgaria
2002 – Michal Kulesza, University of Warsaw, Poland
2001 – Wolfgang Drechsler, University of Tartu, at present Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia

**NISPAcee Merit Award**

This prize is awarded to nominated individuals for their substantial support of and contribution to NISPAcee development and their active participation in NISPAcee activities.

**Awards 2012**

Michael Brintnall, Executive Director, American Political Science Association (APSA), USA

Jacek Czaputowicz, Director, National School of Public Administration, Warsaw, Poland

**Awards 2011**

Stanka Setnikar-Cankar, Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Geert Bouckaert, Director of the Public Management Institute, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium

**Awards 2010**

Wolfgang Drechsler, Chair of Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Allan Rosenbaum, Director, Institute for Public Management and Community Service Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA

B. Guy Peters, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, USA

Awards 2009

Juraj Nemec, Professor in Public Management and Public Sector Economics, Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University, Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

Tiina Randma-Liiv, Professor of Public Administration and Policy, Institute of Public Administration, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

László Vass, Rector of the Budapest School of Communication and Business, Budapest, Hungary

Mirko Vintar, Professor of Information Systems and E-government, Vice-Dean for Research, Head of Institute for Information if Administration, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Best Graduate Student Paper Award

This award is for a paper presented by a graduate student at the NISPAcee Annual Conference.

Award 2012

Ionut-Bogdan Berceanu, Romania, PhD student at National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania

Paper: “Reforming Governments in Emerging Administrations. Case Study: South-Eastern Europe”

Award 2011

Simona Sora, Romania, PhD student at Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romania


Award 2010

Dana Mihaela Murgescu, Romania, PhD student at the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania

Paper: “The Influence of the Global Economic Crisis on Regional Differences in Romania”
Award 2009

Catalin Daniel Dumitrica, Romania, PhD student at the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania

Paper: “Building a Metropolitan Area Model for the Romanian Administrative Space”

Award 2008

Astghik Mavisakalyan, Armenia, PhD student at the University of Sydney, Australia

Paper: “Development Priorities in an Emerging Decentralized Economy: The Case of Armenia Local Development Programs”

Award 2007

Maria Keris, PhD student at the Tallinn University, Estonia

Paper: “Minister’s Advisors Interfacing at the ‘Summit’: The Case of Estonia”

Award 2006

Maria Keris, PhD student at the Tallinn University, Estonia

Paper: “The Role Patterns of Minister’s Personal Advisors in Politico-Administrative Dichotomy: Comparative Case Study of two Estonian Ministries”

Award 2005

Krisztina Toth, PhD student at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland


Award for the Best Comparative Paper Presented at a NISPAcee Annual Conference

Award 2012

Karin Hilmer Pedersen and Lars Johannsen, Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University, Denmark

Paper: “Pluralism in Public Administration and Shared Values: The Baltic Countries”

Award 2011

Veronica Junjan, Department of Social Risks and Safety Studies, University of Twente, The Netherlands,
Diana-Camelia Iancu, Faculty of Public Administration, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania

Paper: “Post EU Accession Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries: Who Will (continue to) Bother?”

9. Activities

9.1 Annual Conferences

- 1st Meeting of Representatives of Regional Institutes and Schools of Public Administration organized by the Austrian Federal Academy of Public Administration in Vienna, Austria, January 1993
- 2nd Meeting of Representatives of Schools and Institutes of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe organized by Academia Istropolitana in Bratislava, Slovakia, 27–28 January 1994 – at which time NISPAcee was formally established
- 3rd NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Administration in Transition” organized in cooperation with the School of Public Administration, University of Ljubljana, in Bled, Slovenia, 23–25 March 1995
- 5th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Professionalization of Public Servants in Central and Eastern Europe” organized in cooperation with the Tallinn University for Educational Sciences and the Estonian Institute of Public Administration in Tallinn, Estonia, 23–26 April 1997
- 6th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Administration and Social Policies in Central and Eastern Europe” organized in cooperation with the Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic, 18–20 March 1998
- 7th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Improving Relations between the Administration and the Public” organized in cooperation with the Sofia University, and the New Bulgarian University in Sofia, Bulgaria, 25–27 March 1999
- 8th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Ten Years of Transition: Prospects and Challenges of the Future for Public Administration” organized in cooperation with the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration in Budapest, Hungary, 13–15 April 2000
• 9th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Government, Market and the Civic Sector: The Search for a Productive Partnership” organized in cooperation with the Latvian School of Public Administration in Riga, Latvia, 10–12 May 2001

• 10th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Delivering Public Services in CEE Countries: Trends and Developments” organized in cooperation with the Polish Association for Public Administration (SEAP) Bialystok, and the Malopolska Institute of Local Government and Administration (MISTIA) in Krakow, Poland, 25–27 April 2002

• 11th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Enhancing the Capacities to Govern: Challenges Facing the CEE Countries” organized in cooperation with the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest, Romania, 10–12 April 2003

• 12th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Central and Eastern European Countries Inside and Outside the European Union: Avoiding a New Divide” organized in cooperation with the Lithuanian Public Administration Training Association in Vilnius, Lithuania, 13–15 May 2004

• 13th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Democratic Governance for the XXI Century: Challenges and Responses in CEE Countries” organized in cooperation with the School of Public Administration, Moscow State University, and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia, 19–21 May 2005

• 14th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Administration and Public Policy in Emerging Europe & Eurasia: For Professionalism, Impartiality and Transparency” organized in cooperation the Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 11–13 May 2006

• 15th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Leadership and Management in the Public Sector: Values, Standards and Competencies in Central and Eastern Europe” organized in cooperation with the National Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of Ukraine in Kyiv, Ukraine, 17–19 May 2007

• 16th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Policy and Administration: Challenges and Synergies” organized in cooperation with the Institute of Public Administration, Bratislava, and the Institute of Public Policy, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 15–17 May 2008

• 17th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “State and Administration in a Changing World” organized in cooperation with the Human Resources Management Authority, Government of the Republic of Montenegro in Budva, Montenegro, 14–16 May 2009
• 18th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Administration in Times of Crisis” organized in cooperation with the National School of Public Administration in Warsaw, Poland, 12–14 May 2010

• 19th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Administration of the Future” organized in cooperation with the Varna Free University “Chernorizets Hrabar” in Varna, Bulgaria, 19–22 May 2011

• 20th NISPAcee Annual Conference: “Public Administration East and West: Twenty Years of Development” organized in cooperation with the University “St. Kliment Ohridski” – Bitola in Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 23–26 May 2012

9.2 Summer Workshops

• 1st Summer Workshop “The Education and Training of Public Servants” organized in cooperation with the School of Public Administration, University of Ljubjana in Portoroz, Slovenia, 29 August–4 September 1994

• 2nd Summer Workshop “Public Finance and Comparative Public Administration Curricula Development and Teaching Methodology” organized by NISPAcee in Stará Lesná, Slovakia, 24–31 August 1995

• 3rd Summer Workshop “Information and Communication Technology as a Driving Force of Change in Public Administration” organized in cooperation with the Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic, 8–13 September 1996

• 4th Summer Workshop “Administrative Law” organized in cooperation with the Budapest University of Economic Sciences in Budapest, Hungary, 1–5 September 1997

• 5th Summer Workshop “Teaching of Public Management” organized in cooperation with the New Bulgarian University in Borovets, Bulgaria, 6–10 July 1998

• 6th Summer Workshop “Ethics and Responsibility” organized in cooperation with the Bialystok School of Public Administration in Bialystok, Poland, 20–30 August 2001

• 7th Summer Workshop “Assessing the Quality of Governance: Developing the Common Assessment Framework for CEE Countries” organized in cooperation with Volkswagen Foundation, and the University of Potsdam, in Potsdam, Germany, 1–7 July 2002

• 8th EPAN-NISPAcee Joint Summer School “European Policy Management in Comparative Perspective” in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 29 June–5 July 2003
• 10th NISPAcee Joint Summer School: “Public Administration Education and Training: Innovations in the Teaching Techniques and Process of Education” organized with the School of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University in Moscow, Russia, 25–30 June 2007

9.3 Working Groups

Working Group on Politico-Administrative Relations

*Duration:* 1999–2008


Working Group on Social Security: System of Social Security with Special Emphasis on Problems of Unemployment, Poverty and Gender

*Duration:* 1999–2002


*Activities:* WG annual meetings 1999–2002


*Duration:* 2000–2008


**Activities:** WG annual meetings 2000–2007


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**Working Group on Governing Multi-Ethnic Communities**

**Duration:** 2001–2008


**Activities:** WG annual meetings 2001–2007


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**Working Group on Public Finance and Accounting**

**Duration:** 2001–2010


**Activities:** WG annual meetings 2001–2010


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**Working Group on Public Health Management and Policy**

**Duration:** 2002–2003

Activities: WG meeting 2003


Working Group on Capacity Building of Civil Servants’ Training System According to EU Requirements

Duration: 2003–2009


Activities: WG annual meetings 2003–2009


Working Group on Strategic Leadership in Central Government

Duration: 2003–2006


Working Group on Degree Programmes of Public Administration/Public Policy Education

Duration: 2005–2006


Activities: WG annual meetings 2005–2006

Publication: Public Administration and Public Policy Degree Programs in Europe: The Road from Bologna (2008)

Working Group on Preventing Corruption in Public Administration (2002–2003),


Duration: 2002–2008

Activities: WG annual meetings 2002–2008


Working Group on Public Sector Transparency

Duration: 2008–2009


Activities: WG annual meeting 2008


Working Group on Local Government

Duration: 2007–ongoing


Activities: WG annual meetings 2007–2012


Working Group on E-Government

Duration: 2002–ongoing


Activities: WG annual meetings 2002–2012


Working Group on Civil Service

Duration: 2009–ongoing


Activities: WG annual meetings 2009–2012

Publications: Joint publication 2012 (see WG on PAR), Conference CDs (2009–2012)

Working Group on Public Administration Reform

Duration: 2007–ongoing


Activities: WG annual meetings 2007–2012


Working Group on Internationalization and Networking of Public Administration Studies and Civil Servants’ Training Systems

Duration: 2010–ongoing


Activities: WG annual meetings 2010–2012


Working Group on Fiscal Policy

Duration: 2010–ongoing


Activities: WG annual meetings 2011–2012

Working Group on Public Policy Analysis Development Issues

**Duration:** 2008–ongoing


**Activities:** WG annual meetings 2009–2012

**Publications:** Joint publication 2012 (see WG on PAR), Conference CDs (2008–2012), NISPAcee proceedings (2009)

Working Group on Public Administration Education

**Duration:** 2011–ongoing

**Coordinators:** Călin Hințea (2011–present), Theo van der Krogt (2011–present)

**Activities:** WG annual meetings 2011–2012

**Publications:** Conference CDs (2011, 2012)

Working Group on Administration & Management of Internal Security Agencies

**Duration:** 2011–ongoing

**Coordinators:** Hannu Kiehelä (2011–present), Sander Põllumäe (2011–present)

**Activities:** WG annual meetings (2011–2012)

**Publications:** Conference CDs (2011, 2012)

Working Group on Good Governance, Human Rights and Development in Weak, Crisis and Post-Conflict States

**Duration:** 2011–ongoing

**Coordinators:** Tetyana Malyarenko (2011–present), Stefan Wolff (2011–present), David J. Galbreath (2011–present)

**Activities:** WG annual meetings (2011–2012)

**Publications:** Conference CDs (2011, 2012)

**9.4 Publications**

Almost all of the publications which are listed below were published with the financial support of the LGI/OSI, Hungary for which NISPAcee is most grateful.

**Proceedings**

*Developing Organizations and Changing Attitudes: Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe*
Proceedings from the fourth Annual Conference held in Tirana, Albania, 28–30 March 1996; Ed.: Jak Jabes

*Information and Communication Technology as a Driving Force of Change in Public Administration*
Proceedings from the third Summer Workshop held in Prague, Czech Republic, 8–13 September 1996; Eds: Mirko Vintar, Heinrich Reinermann

*Professionalization of Public Servants in CEE*
Proceedings from the fifth Annual Conference held in Tallinn, Estonia, 23–26 April 1997; Ed.: Jak Jabes

*Administrative Law*
Proceedings from the fourth Summer Workshop held in Budapest, Hungary, 1–5 September 1997; Ed.: Glen Wright

*Civil Service Training: Challenges and Prospects*
Proceedings of the first Civil Service Forum held in Paris, France, 23–24 October 1997; Eds: Jak Jabes, Marie-Christina Meininger

*Teaching of Public Management*
Proceedings from the fifth Summer Workshop held in Borovets, Bulgaria, 6–10 July 1998; Ed.: Jak Jabes

*Public Administration and Social Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*
Proceedings from the sixth Annual Conference held in Prague, Czech Republic, 18–20 March 1998; Ed.: Jak Jabes

*Openness and Transparency in Governance: Challenges and Opportunities*
Proceedings from the second NISPAcee Civil Service Forum held in Maastricht, The Netherlands, 28–29 October 1999; Ed.: Michael Kelly

*Improving Relations between the Administration and the Public*
Proceedings from the seventh Annual Conference held in Sofia, Bulgaria, 25–27 March 1999; Eds: Joanne Caddy, Jak Jabes

*Building Higher Education Programmes in Public Administration in CEE Countries*
Eds: Tony Verheijen, Juraj Nemec; 2000

*Ten Years of Transition: Prospects and Challenges for the Future of Public Administration*
Proceedings from the eighth Annual Conference held in Budapest, Hungary, 13–15 April 2000; Ed.: Jak Jabes

*Government, Market and the Civic Sector: the Search for a Productive Partnership*

Proceedings from the ninth Annual Conference held in Riga, Latvia, 10–12 May 2001; Ed.: Glen Wright

*State Modernization and Decentralization: Implications for Education and Training in Public Administration: Selected Central European and Global Perspectives*

Proceedings from the seminar held in Bratislava, Slovakia, 6–8 December 2001; Eds: Allan Rosenbaum, Ľudmila Gajdošová

*Delivering Public Services in CEE Countries: Trends and Developments*

Proceedings from the tenth Annual Conference held in Cracow, Poland, 25–27 April 2002; Eds: Jane Finlay, Marek Debicki

*Enhancing the Capacities to Govern: Challenges Facing the Central and Eastern European Countries*

Selected Papers from the 11th NISPAcee Annual Conference in Bucharest, Romania, 2003; Eds: Bryane Michael, Rainer Kattel, Wolfgang Drechsler

*The Capacity to Govern in Central and Eastern Europe*

Proceedings from the High Level Meeting held in Prague, Czech Republic, 18–20 December 2003; Ed.: Martin Potůček

*Institutional Requirements and Problem Solving in the Public Administrations of the Enlarged European Union and Its Neighbours*

Selected Papers from the 12th NISPAcee Annual Conference in Vilnius, Lithuania, 13–15 May 2004

*Democratic Governance in CEE Countries: Challenges and Responses for the XXI Century*

Selected Papers from the 13th Annual Conference held in Moscow, Russia, 19–21 May 2005; Eds: Alan Rosenbaum, Juraj Nemec

*Post-Communist Public Administration: Restoring Professionalism and Accountability*

Proceedings from the 14th Annual Conference held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 11–13 May 2006; Eds: David Coombes, László Vass, 2007
Leadership and Management in the Public Sector: Values, Standards and Competencies in Central and Eastern Europe

Public Policy and Administration: Challenges and Synergies
Selected Papers from the 16th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Bratislava 2008; Eds: Katarína Staroňová, László Vass, 2009

State and Administration in a Changing World
Selected Papers from the 17th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Budva 2009; Eds. Juraj Nemec, B. Guy Peters, 2010

Public Administration in Times of Crisis
Selected papers from the 18th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Warsaw 2010; Eds: Rainer Kattel, Witold Mikulowski, B. Guy Peters, 2012

Teaching and Training Materials

Public Finance: Theory and Practice in the Central European Transition
Eds: Glen Wright, Juraj Nemec; 1997
English, Russian and Serbian languages

Politico-Administrative Relations – Who Rules?
Ed.: Tony Verheijen, 2001
English and Russian languages

How to Be a Better Policy Advisor?
Manual for advisors; Eds: Miroslaw Grochowski, Michal Ben-Gera, 2002
English and Russian languages

How to Be a Better Policy Advisor?
Manual for trainers; Ed.: Ieva Lazareviciute, 2003
English and Russian languages

Building Better Quality Administration for the Public: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe
Eds: Joanne Caddy, Mirko Vintar, 2002

Public Management in the Central and Eastern European Transition: Concepts and Cases
Eds: Juraj Nemec, Glen Wright, Richard J. Stillman, 2002
Public Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: Theories, Methods, Practices
English and Czech languages

Health Care Delivery Systems: Opportunities from Public Management Education in CEE
Eds: Allan Rosenbaum, Juraj Nemec, Kenneth Tolo, 2004

Implementation: The Missing Link in Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe

Reference Guide for Horizontal Integration
Eds. Peter Goldschmidt, Marta Daruľová, Toni Niculescu, Anton Stemberger, 2006

Fiscal Decentralization and Grant Transfers: A Critical Perspective
Ed.: Željko Šević, 2005

Coalitions of the Unwilling?: Politicians and Civil Servants in Coalition Governments
Eds: B. Guy Peters, Tony Verheijen, László Vass, 2005

Local Government Financial Capacity Building in Transition Countries: Selected Country Studies
Ed. Željko Šević, 2006

Local Government Non-Tax Revenue Sources in Transition Countries: User Fees and Charges
Ed.: Željko Šević, 2006

Politico-Administrative Dilemma: Traditional Problems and New Solutions

Debt Management in Transition Countries: Experience and Perspectives
Ed.: Željko Šević, 2007

Strategic Policy Making in Central and Eastern Europe
Eds: Martin Brusis, Katarína Staroňová, Radoslaw Zubek, 2007

Public Administration and Public Policy Degree Programs in Europe: The Road from Bologna
Eds: György Jenei, Karoly Mike, 2008
Politico-Administrative Relations at the Centre: Actors, Structures and Processes Supporting the Core Executive  

Public Management Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe  
Eds: Geert Bouckaert, Juraj Nemec, Vitalis Nakrošis, György Hajnal, Kristiina Tonnisson, 2008

Public Integrity: Theories and Practical Instruments  

Corruption and Anti-Corruption Measures in Central and Eastern Europe  
Eds: Katarína Staroňová, Emília Beblavá, 2010

Metropolitan CEE: Big Cities, Capitals and City-Regions in Central and Eastern Europe  
Eds: Gabor Soos and Markku Temmes, 2010

Municipal Asset Management in CEE Countries: Selected Case Studies  
Ed.: Lucie Sedmihradská, 2010

Property Tax in Economies in Transition: Case Studies  
Ed.: Lucie Sedmihradská, 2010

Local Government Finance in Times of Crisis: An Early Assessment  
Eds: Lucie Sedmihradská, Nadezhda Bobcheva, Mihály Lados, 2011

Public Sector Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe  
Eds: Juraj Nemec, Michiel S. de Vries, 2012

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy


Editor-in-chief:
Juraj Nemec, University of Matej Bel, Slovakia

Editorial Board:
Geert Bouckaert, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
Wolfgang Drechsler, Tallinn Technical University, Estonia
György Jenei, Corvinus University, Hungary

Volume I, Number 1, 2008
The first issue of a series of annual volumes devoted to public administration and policy.

**Volume I, Number 2, Winter 2008/2009**
Special Issue: A Distinctive European Model? The Neo-Weberian State
Guest Editors: Christopher Pollitt, Geert Bouckaert, Tiina Randma-Liiv, Wolfgang Drechsler

**Volume II, Number 1, Summer 2009**

**Volume II, Number 2, Winter 2009/2010**
Special Issue: Citizens vs. Customers
Guest Editors: Steven Van de Walle, Isabella Proeller, László Vass

**Volume III, Number 1, Summer 2010**

**Volume III, Number 2, Winter 2010/2011**
Special Issue: Public Management Now and in the Future: Does Technology Matter?
Guest Editors: W. Drechsler, R. Moody, Ch. Pollitt, M. Vintar

**Volume IV, Number 1, Summer 2011**

**Volume IV, Number 2, Winter 2011/2012**
Special Issue: Law and Public Management Revisited
Guest Editors: Dacian Dragos, Marton Gellen, Polona Kovac, Philip M. Langbroek

**Volume V, Number 1, Summer 2012**

**Volume V, Number 2, Winter 2012/2013**
Special Issue: The Politics of Agency Governance
Guest Editors: Koen Verhoest, Sandra van Thiel, György Hajnal, Kulli Sarapuu, Călin Hințea

**NISPAcee Press**

The Story Behind Western Advice to Central Europe during its Transition Period, Iwona Sobis and Michiel S. de Vries, 2009
Translation project implemented under LGI support

Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute (LGPSRI), Budapest, Hungary, grant awarded to the NISPAceee translation project for the period 1998–2011. More than 300 books (including NISPAceee publications) were translated into 16 CEE national languages during the project period. A detailed list is available on the NISPAceee website.

NISPAceee Newsletter

The Newsletter has been published quarterly since 1994, and since 2010 in electronic format.

CDs from Annual Conferences

All presented papers were published in a form of electronic publication on CDs since 2007:

“Leadership and Management in the Public Sector: Values, Standards and Competencies in Central and Eastern Europe”, 2007
“Public Policy and Administration: Challenges and Synergies”, 2008
“State and Administration in a Changing World”, 2009
“Public Administration in Times of Crisis”, 2010
“Public Administration of the Future”, 2011
“Public Administration East and West: Twenty Years of Development”, 2012

9.5 Trans-European Dialogue

The Trans-European Dialogue (TED) is an annual scholarly conference organized jointly by the two principle professional association’s public administration in Europe, NISPAceee and EGPA, launched in 2008.

TED1 “Towards the Neo-Weberian State? Europe and Beyond” organized in cooperation with Tallinn University of Technology in Tallinn, Estonia, 30 January–1 February 2008

TED2 “Citizens vs. Customers” organized in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance in Helsinki, Finland, 6–7 July 2009

TED3 “Public Management Reforms Now and in the Future: Does Technology Matter” organized in cooperation with the Faculty of Public Administration, University of Ljubljana in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 11–12 February 2010

TED4 “Law and Public Management Revisited” organized in cooperation with the Austrian Chancellery in Vienna, Austria, 9–11 February 2011
TED5 “The Politics of Agency Governance” organized in cooperation with the Corvinus University of Budapest in Budapest, Hungary, 2–3 February 2012

TED6 “Education and Training in the European Public Sector” organized in cooperation with the Potsdam Center for Policy and Management (PCPM), and the German Federal Academy of Public Administration (BAKÖV) in Potsdam, Germany, 6–8 February 2013

9.6 Training Programmes, Study Tours, Civil Service Forums, Development and Technical Assistance Projects, other joint activities with partners, other projects

The majority of all these additional NISPAcee activities were prepared and implemented in collaboration with different partners and/or with the support of NISPAcee donors as listed above under item 2.7 Partners and Donors. These activities are mentioned there under the heading of a relevant partner or donor. The detailed list of these activities would be too large for the scope of this publication, therefore, for more details please see the NISPAcee website: www.nispa.org
Section III.B

NISPAcee Chronological History
1993

1ST MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF REGIONAL INSTITUTES AND SCHOOLS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTED BY THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL CHANCELLERY ORGANIZED BY THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, VIENNA, AUSTRIA

MIRKO VINTAR AND LUDMILA GAJDOŠOVÁ PARTICIPATED SINCE 1993 IN ALL 20 NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCES

1994

2ND MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF CEE SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA

NISPAcee SECRETARIAT LAUNCHED AT ACADEMIA ISTROPOLITANA IN BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA

ALENA BRUNOVSKÁ ELECTED FIRST NISPAcee CHAIR

FIRST GRANT FROM LGI/OSI RECEIVED

SUPPORT OF SIGMA/OECD STARTED

FIRST SUMMER SCHOOL ORGANIZED IN PORTOROZ, SLOVENIA

QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER INITIATED

BUILDING OF NISPAcee DATABASES INITIATED

LUDMILA GAJDOŠOVÁ OFFICIALLY STARTED TO WORK FOR NISPAcee

Handmade illustration of NISPAcee by Alena Brunovská in 1994

Austrian Federal Academy
1995

3rd NISPaee ANNUAL CONFERENCE: “PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN TRANSITION”, ORGANIZED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA IN BLED, SLOVENIA

NISPaee BYLAWS ADOPTED
FIRST STEERING COMMITTEE ELECTED BASED ON THE BYLAWS
NISPaee LEGALLY REGISTERED UNDER SLOVAK LEGISLATION
25 MEMBER INSTITUTIONS ENLISTED
COOPERATION WITH NASPAA STARTED
FIRST GRANT FROM THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS RECEIVED
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS OF STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS INITIATED

Meeting of the first Steering Committee, Vienna, Austria.
Steering Committee members in the second row (from the right): Alena Brunovská, Krystina Plaza, Mirko Vintar, Ľudmila Gajdošová (Executive Director), Bohdan Krawchenko, (László Váradi was absent).
Advisors in the first row (from the right): Anita Weiss-Gänger, Jak Jabes

1996

4th NISPaee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, TIRANA, ALBANIA
FIRST NISPaee STRATEGY ADOPTED
FIRST PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE SUMMER SCHOOL PUBLISHED
THE SECRETARIAT GROWS TO 3 FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES
1997

- 5TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, TALLINN, ESTONIA
- LÁSZLÓ VÁRADI ELECTED NISPAcee PRESIDENT
- FIRST TEXTBOOK ON PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLISHED
- FIRST CIVIL SERVICE FORUM ORGANIZED IN PARIS, FRANCE

1998

- 6TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
- FIRST TWO RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS LAUNCHED
- NISPAcee ANTHEM COMPOSED
- TRANSLATION PROJECT STARTED
- COOPERATION WITH EIPA STARTED
1999

7th NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, SOFIA, BULGARIA

FORMAT OF REGULAR RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS DEVELOPED AND TWO MEETINGS ORGANIZED AT THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE

2000

8th NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

THREE RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING

MARTIN POTŮČEK ELECTED NISPAcee PRESIDENT

SECOND NISPAcee STRATEGY DEVELOPED

BASED ON COOPERATION WITH NASPAA FIRST GRANT FROM USAID RECEIVED

BECOMING A MEMBER OF IASIA
2001

- 9th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Riga, Latvia
- Five Research Working Groups Running
- First Books Published Based on the Results of Working Groups
- First Alena Brunovská Award Presented to Wolfgang Drechsler
- Cooperation Begun with UNDP Regional Center, Bratislava, Slovakia
- First NISPAcee Training Programs Developed
- Cooperation with EPAN and EAPAA Initiated
2002

10th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Krakow, Poland

Six research working groups running

Barbara Kudrycka elected NISPAcee President

Cooperation with UNDESA and participation in UNPAN started – ICT capacity of the Secretariat supported

The Secretariat grows to 5 permanent employees

NISPAcee Steering Committee (from the left): László Vass, Mzia Mikeladze, Martin Potůček, Ludmila Gajdošová (Executive Director), Barbara Kudrycka, Juraj Nemec

UNDESA/UNPAN representative Haiyan Qian

Barbara Kudrycka

NISPAcee Secretariat (from the left): Ján Andruch, Juraj Sklenár, Ludmila Gajdošová, Elena Žáková, Viera Wallnerová
2003

11TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, BUCHAREST, ROMANIA
SEVEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING

2004

12TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, VILNIUS, LITHUANIA
SEVEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
LÁSZLÓ VASS ELECTED NISPAcee PRESIDENT
EIGHT COUNTRIES OF THE NISPAcee REGION BECOME MEMBERS OF THE EU
THIRD NISPAcee STRATEGY DEVELOPED

Strategy meeting (from the left): Theo Toonen (EPAN), Geert Bouckaert (EGPA), Mirko Vintar (NISPAcee), Nicolas Dubois (SIGMA/OECD)

Strategy meeting, Budapest, Hungary (from the left): Tiina Randma-Liiv (NISPAcee), Mzia Mikeladze (NISPAcee), Violeta Zentai (LG1/OSI), Allan Rosenbaum (IASIA), Stanka Setnikar-Cankar (NISPAcee)
2005

13TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, RUSSIA
SEVEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
FIRST TRAINING PROJECT FOR WESTERN BALKAN AND CENTRAL ASIA SUPPORTED BY SLOVAK AID
BEST GRADUATE STUDENT PAPER AWARD LAUNCHED

2006

14TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, LJUBLJANA, SLOVENIA, GENERAL SESSION FIRSTLY INTRODUCED IN THE PROGRAMME
NINE RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
MZIA MIKELADZE ELECTED NISPAcee PRESIDENT

2007

15TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, KYIV, UKRAINE
SEVEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
TWO ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES OF THE NISPAcee REGION BECOME MEMBERS OF THE EU
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP LAUNCHED
PILOT ISSUE OF THE NISPAcee JOURNAL PUBLISHED
EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE NISPAcee IMPACT ON THE REGION PERFORMED WITH VERY POSITIVE RESULTS
2008

- 16TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, BRATISLAVA, SLOVAK REPUBLIC
- SEVEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
- GYÖRGY JENEI ELECTED NISPAcee PRESIDENT
- MoU WITH EGPA SIGNED IN TALLINN, ESTONIA
- FIRST TED ORGANIZED IN COOPERATION WITH TUT, TALLINN, ESTONIA,
- FIRST DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTED IN KYRGYZSTAN UNDER SLOVAK AID SUPPORT – START OF NISPAcee TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE FROM EU COUNTRIES TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE EU

MoU with EGPA signed by Mzia Mikeladze, NISPAcee President and Geert Bouckaert, EGPA President

2009

- 17TH NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, BUDVA, MONTENEGRO
- SEVEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
- NISPAcee MERIT AWARD LAUNCHED
- FOURTH NISPAcee STRATEGY ADOPTED

György Jenei

NISPAcee Merit Award
2010

18th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Warsaw, Poland

Eight Research Working Groups Running

MZia MikeLadZe elected NISPAcee President

MoU with ICPA-Forum and JCPA Signed

NISPAcee Newsletter Changed from Print to e-Version

Warsaw Conference (from the left): Rolet Loretan, IIAS Director General, Allan Rosenbaum, FIU, Valeria Terminy, IASIA President, Ludmila Gajdošová, NISPAcee Executive Director, Jacek Czaputowicz, Director of the National School of Public Administration in Warsaw, György Jenei, Corvinus University, Pan Suk Kim, IIAS President

2011

19th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Varna, Bulgaria

Seven Research Working Groups Running

MoUs Signed with ASPA, EAPAA and CAG

Observer Status of EUPAN Received

Becoming a Member of IIAS

Becoming a Member of EAPAA

Award for the Best Comparative Paper Presented at a NISPAcee Annual Conference Launched

MoU with ASPA signed (from the right): Antoinette A. Samuel, ASPA Executive Director, Meredith A. Newman, ASPA President

MoU with EAPAA signed (from the right): Theo van der Krogt, EAPAA Secretary General

MoU with CAG signed (from the right): Hong Yi, CAG Vice President
2012

- 20\textsuperscript{TH} NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, OHRID, MACEDONIA
- TEN RESEARCH WORKING GROUPS RUNNING
- MIRKO VINTAR ELECTED NISPAcee PRESIDENT
- MOST RECENT NISPAcee STRATEGY ADOPTED
- MoU WITH NASPAA SIGNED
- MoU WITH INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND UNIVERSITY STUDIES (ICARUS) SIGNED
- 110 MEMBER INSTITUTIONS, 24 ASSOCIATE MEMBERS, 32 INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS ENLISTED
- DATABASE OF MORE THAN 250 EXPERTS, 6000 INDIVIDUALS, 2000 INSTITUTIONS MAINTAINED
- GOVERNMENTAL MEMBERSHIP LAUNCHED
- TURKEY INCLUDED IN THE NISPAcee REGION

MoU with NASPAA signed: Nadia Rubai, NASPAA President

Mirko Vintar

NISPAcee Strategy presented by the Steering Committee members (from the right): Ringa Raudla, Marius Profiroiu, György Jenei
Future Challenges and Opportunities

THE QUESTIONS OF HOW THE GOVERNANCE, AND ESPECIALLY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN OUR REGION, WOULD OR SHOULD CHANGE, HOW THE CONTINUED CRISIS MAY PLAY OUT, AND WHAT ALL OF THIS MEANS FOR THE ROLE OF NISPAcee AND THE SCOPE OF ITS ACTIVITIES

PARTNERSHIP IN IMPLEMENTATION OF MoUs SIGNED WITH PARTNERS AND MEMBERS, AND JOINT COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS IN THE REGION

Closing Roundtable of the Anniversary Conference 2012 explored the above questions, presentations of the speakers are included in this book (from the left): Ringa Raudla, B. Guy Peters, Wolfgang Drechsler, Rustamjon Urinboyev, Juraj Nemec

MoU with ICARUS signed (from the right): Călin Hințea, Babes Bolyai University; Stanka Setnikar-Cankar, University of Ljubljana; Taco Brandsen, Radboud University Nijmegen; Pavel Pavlov, Varna Free University; Milena Neshkova, Florida International University; Wolfgang Drechsler, Tallinn University of Technology; György Jenei, Corvinus University of Budapest; Ľudmila Gajdošová, NISPAcee

The NISPAcee region
Geert Bouckaert is Professor of Public Management at the KU Leuven, Belgium. His research topics include public-sector reform and performance in the public sector. He is a past President of the European Group for Public Administration and currently chairs the Scientific Committee of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. He is a recipient of the NISPAcee Merit Award.

Michael Brintnall is Executive Director of the American Political Science Association. He formerly headed the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, and has served as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Mount Vernon College in Washington, DC, and directed a program evaluation unit at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. He has held faculty appointments in political science at Brown University and Mount Vernon College. Brintnall is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and serves as President of the National Humanities Alliance. He received the Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1976. He is a recipient of the NISPAcee Merit Award.

Jacek Czaputowicz is Head of the Methodology of European Studies Unit at the European Institute, Faculty of Journalism and Political Sciences, Warsaw University. He served as Director of the National School of Public Administration (2008–2012), Deputy Chair of the Public Service Council (2007–2009), Director at the Department of Foreign Policy Strategy and Planning at the MFA (2006–2008) and Deputy Head of the Civil Service (1998–2006). Prof. Czaputowicz was a Board of Management Member IASIA. He was a Member of NISPAcee Steering Committee (2009–2012), Deputy Chair of the Administrative Council of EIPA in Maastricht (2004–2010), Member of the Executive Committee IIAS (2004–2007), Deputy Chair of the OECD’s Public Governance Committee (2000–2005) and Member of EIPA Scientific Council (2000–2003). Jacek Czaputowicz holds the Officer’s Cross of the Order of the Rebirth of Poland and NISPAcee Merit Award.

Michiel S. de Vries is full Professor and Chair in Public Administration at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. He is also Professor at Masaryk University Brno and Professor in Governance of Small Systems of Law at the University of Aruba. He is president of IASIA and the Chair of the IASIA Working Group on
Local Governance and Development. Until 2012 he was the Chair of the NISPAcee Working Group on Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Wolfgang Drechsler is Professor and Chair of Governance at the Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, and Vice Dean for International Relations of its Faculty of Social Sciences. Currently he also serves as professeur invité, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium. He received an Honorary Doctorate from Corvinus University of Budapest in 2013. Formerly he was Advisor to the President of Estonia, Executive Secretary with the German Wissenschaftsrat during Reunification, and, as an APSA Congressional Fellow, Senior Legislative Analyst in the United States Congress. He received NISPAcee’s (first) Alena Brunovská Award in 2001, was on its Steering Committee from 2004 to 2010 and in 2010 received the Merit Award and held the keynote speech at the Annual Conference. His founding activities include the Journal, the Trans-European Dialogue with EGPA and the Annual Conference General Session.

Ľudmila Gajdošová, is the Executive Director of NISPAcee from the organization legal establishment since 1995. Since 1992 she worked as a Programme Manager of the newly established School of Public Administration of the Academia Istropolitana, Bratislava, Slovakia. Within this position she was also responsible for international relations, and she participated in the 1st Meeting of Representatives of Regional Institutes and Schools of Public Administration organized by the Austrian Federal Academy of Public Administration in Vienna, Austria, in January 1993 and she was responsible for the organization of the 2nd Meeting of Representatives of Schools and Institutes of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe organized by Academia Istropolitana in Bratislava, Slovakia in January 1994. Afterwards she was heavily involved in the NISPAcee development till its full legal registration under the Slovak legislation, in Slovakia, in October 1995.

Călin Emilian Hințea is Professor at Babes Bolyai University, Romania and Associate Professor at Michigan State University. He teaches Public Management and Planning in the public-sector courses. Professor Hințea is the Dean of the College of Political, Administrative and Communication Science at BBU. He is also Former Secretary of State, Head of the Strategy Unit, Prime Minister’s Office (2008–2011) as well as Former Chair of Public Administration Department at BBU (2004–2012). He serves as Senior Editor of Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences.

Diana-Camelia Iancu is Lecturer in European Administration at the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) and, as of 2012,
Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration (SNSPA) in Bucharest, Romania. She was also course leader in Good Governance at the School of Management, Radboud University in Nijmegen, Netherlands (in 2012). At NISPAcee, Diana-Camelia Iancu is Co-chair of the Working Group on Public Administration Reform (since 2011). She co-authored the article “Post EU Accession Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries: Who Will (Continue to) Bother?”, which received the first NISPAcee Award on Best Comparative Paper in 2011.

**Jak Jabes** was a visiting professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy between 2008 and 2012. Prior to that, he was Practice Team Leader for Democratic Governance and Coordinator for the Asia Regional Governance Programme at UNDP’s Bangkok Regional Centre where he assisted governments in building partnerships and promoted regional capacity-development initiatives to UNDP country offices. Before joining the UNDP he was Director of the Governance and Capacity Development Division of the Asian Development Bank. Between 1993 and 2000 he worked at the OECD in Paris. As Senior Counselor heading the Public Administration Reform Strategies group in the SIGMA program at the OECD, he assisted Central and Eastern European governments to develop public-administration reform strategies and adapt their administration to become members of the European Union. He started his academic career at the University of Ottawa where from 1973 to 1993, he undertook research which focused on organizational renewal, rewards in the work place, job motivation, public-policy issues and surveys of managerial attitudes.

**Tomáš Jacko** is a PhD candidate in European Studies and Policies at the Institute of Public Policy and Economics, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University in Bratislava. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations and a master’s degree in Public Administration from the University of Manchester. Since 2010, he has also worked for Transparency International Slovakia as a programme coordinator.

**György Jenei** is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Public Policy and Management at Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary and has been Chairman of the Centre for Parliamentary Management since 2012. He holds the following degrees: MA in History and Philosophy, University of Eötvös Loránd, 1965; PhD University of Eötvös Loránd, 1972; Candidate of Science in Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1981; Habilitation in Political Sciences and International Relation, 1998, Budapest University of Economic Sciences; Academic Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Political Sciences and International Relation, 2010. He has been a Steering Committee Member and President, and Past-President, of NISPAcee since 2007. In 2005 he received the NISPAcee Alena Bru- novská Award.
Veronica Junjan is Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration, School of Management and Governance, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands. Previously, she occupied positions with the Department of Public Administration, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, and was involved in a range of projects in Central and Eastern Europe. Since 2008 she has been involved as co-chair in the coordination of the work within – first the Panel, then the Working Group on Public Administration Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In 2011, she received the Award for Best Comparative Paper presented at the 19th NISPAcee Annual Conference, Varna, Bulgaria, for the paper titled “Post EU Accession Reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries: Who Will (Continue to) Bother?”, paper co-authored with Dr. Diana-Camelia Iancu of the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Faculty of Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania.

Polya Katsamunska is a full-time Associate Professor at the Department of Public Administration and Regional Development, Faculty of Management and Administration, University of National and World Economics, Sofia, Bulgaria. She was awarded a PhD. in 2006. She is a member and Principle Representative of NISPAcee. Since 2003 she has been a regular participant in NISPAcee conferences and joint training programs in Leuven, Belgium, Bratislava, Slovak Republic, Kiev and Odessa in Ukraine.

Tatiana Kostadinova is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University (FIU) in Miami. She received her M.S. (1997) and Ph D. (2000) in Political Science from Florida State University with Comparative Politics, International Relations and Public Policy as areas of specialization. Kostadinova’s first academic job was at the University of Minnesota Duluth, where she was Assistant Professor between 2000 and 2004. Then she joined the faculty of FIU to teach Comparative Politics courses on Russian and East European politics, democratization, political parties and institutions, as well as research methods in political science.

Polonca Kovač has been an Assistant Professor and a researcher on legal and developmental aspects of public administration at the Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana, since 2001. She has finished PhD Studies in 2006 at the Faculty of Law in Ljubljana. Her career started at the local administrative unit, and afterwards she was employed at the Ministry of Interior (1997–2003) and the Ministry of Public Administration (2006–2009). She is a member and former president of the national Officials Council. The author is active in many national and supranational committees and networks (NISPAcee, TED, EGPA, OECD etc.). Within NISPAcee she is active in the WG on HRM in annual conferences, as
an author in NISPAcee Journal, as a regular participant and in 2011 a member of the TED organizing committee.

Barbara Kudrycka is the Minister of Science and Education in Poland. Prior to that, she represented Poland as a Deputy of the European Parliament. She served for many years in the Committee of Experts in Public Administration of the UN-DESA. She holds the full Professor degree and for many years she served as Rector of Białystok School of Public Administration, Poland. During her academic carrier she served in the NISPAcee Steering Committee in the years 2000–2006 and as the NISPAcee President from April 2002 till May 2004.

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Malkhaz Mikeladze is Ambassador of Georgia in Mexico, concurrent to 7 Central American and Caribbean countries. From September 2006 until September 2010 he performed the duties of Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Georgia to the United States of America, Mexico and Canada. Among his responsibilities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Georgia he has been Ambassador at Large and Deputy Director of the Military-Political Department. At the Parliament of Georgia, he acted as Leading specialist of the Committee of Sectors of Economy. His educational skills include studies on Arms Control at the NATO Defense College (Italy), the International and Security Studies at the Marshall Centre (Germany) and Tbilisi Technical University (Georgia).

Juraj Nemec is Professor of Public Finance and Public Management at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic and at the Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia. He is regional Vice President of IRSPM and a member of the IASIA Board of Management, editor in chief of the NISPAcee Journal in Public Administration and Policy, member of editorial boards of several other professional journals. He has published, as author, co-author or editor, more than 350 books and professional
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**Dimce Nikolov** is an international, independent consultant and a former senior career diplomat with over two and a half decades experience in international relations: various diplomatic posts and duties in ex-Yugoslavia, and Macedonia, a former UN staff member, Consultant and Advisor; Head of International Office for Foreign Investments of the Republic of Macedonia in Italy.

**B. Guy Peters** is Maurice Falk Professor of American Government at the University of Pittsburgh and Professor of Comparative Governance at Zeppelin University. He previously taught at Emory University, the University of Delaware and at Tulane University, and he has had visiting appointments at a number of universities in Europe, Latin America and Australia. He has also worked as a consultant for the UNDP, World Bank, OECD, UNICEF and a number of national governments. Professor Peters has been active in NISPAcee for some years, including being co-chair of Working Group on Politico-administrative Relations. He has received the NISPAcee Merit Award.

**Marius Profiroiu** is Professor at the University of Economics in Bucharest (ASE) and lectures in public policy, European institutions and policies, good governance and strategic management. He has been Dean of Administration at the Public Management School, ASE Bucharest and President of the Association of Schools and Institutes of Public Administration in Romania since 2005. Dr. Marius Profiroiu was Director-general of the European Integration Department in Romania from 2001 to 2002 and also held the post of state secretary within the Ministry of Public Administration between 2002 and 2004. He was in charge of the co-ordination of the public-administration reform and responsible for the Phare program in the field of the civil-service reform and decentralization process in Romania. Marius Profiroiu is the author of numerous publications in the field of civil service, decentralisation, governance and strategic management.
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Ringa Raudla works as senior research fellow at the Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. She holds a doctoral degree in Economics (with a specialisation in Public Finance) from the Faculty of Law, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Erfurt, Germany. She has taught courses on Public Administration, Public Finance, Financial Management, Law and Economics, and Research Methods at three different universities (University of Tartu, Tallinn University of Technology and University of
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**Georg Sootla** has been Professor of Public Policy at Tallinn University since 1995. He graduated from Moscow State University in Philosophy and got a PhD in 1981 with a dissertation in Political Sociology (Trends of practical consciousness of Western working class). In 1994 as the coordinator of TEMPUS he was at its origins, also as the first head of the unit of public-administration teaching at Tallinn University, Institute of Political Science and Governance, which is currently the largest PA training unit at Estonian universities. From 2002 to 2007 he was the coordinator of NISPAcee WG 1 Politico-administrative relations and edited two NISPAcee books.

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About the Authors

Željko Šević is Professor of Accounting, Finance and Public Policy at the Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland, where he served as Dean of the Caledonian Business School from 2009 to 2011. Prior to joining Glasgow Caledonian University, Dr Šević was the Professor of Accounting, Finance and Public Policy and Director of Research, Outreach & European Affairs and Director of the Centre for Financial Studies at the University of Greenwich Business School in London. He has also held a number of visiting academic/research positions in Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Japan, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine and the US and has gained professional experience in both public and private sectors, at a senior level, before becoming a full-time academic in the mid-1990s. He was twice a visiting scholar at the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Professor Šević holds terminal degrees in law and financial economics, has gained accounting professional qualifications, and is a Certified Fraud Examiner. He was the founding Coordinator of the NISPAcee Public Sector Accounting and Finance Working Group from 2001 to 2008.

George Tarkhan-Mouravi, is Co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Tbilisi. He is also chairman on the board of the Georgian Political Science Association (GPSA). He was involved in developing the civic sector in Georgia and Eastern Europe, having initiated and/or headed a number of NGOs, including the Prague-based international association of think tanks PASOS. He authored and co-authored a number of publications in the areas of ethnic studies, regional security, political analysis, policy research and conflict.

Rustamjon Urinboyev works as a researcher at Lund University (Sweden), in the Department of Sociology of Law, where he received his Ph.D. in February 2013. Rustamjon has conducted ethnographic fieldwork in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, Central Asia, where his doctoral thesis examined the interlinkages between welfare and political stability. He received his MSc in Public Policy (2008) from Maastricht University (Netherlands) and his LLB from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Uzbekistan). In parallel with his LLB studies, Rustamjon worked as a researcher at the NGO Center for Political Studies in Tashkent, and did a research internship at the Parliamentary Ombudsman of Uzbekistan. In 2007, Rustamjon received a full scholarship from the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University (Netherlands) to study MSc in Public Policy and Human Development.

Theo van der Krogt has been Secretary-general at the European Association for Public Administration Accreditation since 1999. Until his retirement in 2012 he was a Programme Coordinator at the KISS, KennisInstituut Stedelijke Samenlev-
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Mirko Vintar is Professor of Administrative Information Systems and E-government at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Administration and Head of the Institute for Informatisation of Public Administration. He has been actively involved in the founding and further development of NISPAcee, its steering committee member (1993–1998), organising its two annual conferences (Bled, 1995, Ljubljana, 2006) and two Summer Schools (Portorož 1994, Prague 1997). He has been co-chairing the E-Government WG, the WG on Public Sector Quality as well as several other NISPAcee Working Groups. He is co-editor of several books published by NISPAcee. He is a recipient of the NISPAcee Alena Brunovská Award and NISPAcee Merit Award. Currently Professor Mirko Vintar is President of NISPAcee.
List of Abbreviations

ADB  Asian Development Bank
ASPA  American Society of Public Administration
ATAK  Centre for Public Service Training and Development (Estonia)
BA  Bachelor of Arts
B&H  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CA  Central Asia
CAG  Chinese Academy of Governance
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs  Central and Eastern European countries
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CSA  Civil Service Agency
DPADM  Department of Public Administration and Development Management
EAPAA  European Association of Public Administration Accreditation
EC  European Commission
EGPA  European Group of Public Administration
EIPA  European Institute of Public Administration
EPAN  European Public Administration Network
EU  European Union
EUPAN  European Union Public Administration Network
FIU  Florida International University
GDP  Gross domestic product
HDI  Human Development Index
HRM  Human Resource Management
IASIA  International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration
ICT  Information Communication Technology
IFC  International Finance Corporation
IIAS  International Institute of Administrative Sciences
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IT  Information Technology
KIPA  Kosovo Institute for Public Administration
KSAP  National School of Public Administration (Poland)
KUL  Katholiek Universiteit Leuven
LEAP  Leadership, Ethics, Accountability and Professionalism
LGI  Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative
MA  Master of Arts
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MISA  Ministry Information Society Administration
MPS  Ministry Public Services
MTITC  Ministry Transport Information Technology Communications
NAPA  National Academy of Public Administration
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NASPAA  National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration
NGO  Non-governmental organization
NISPAcee  The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe
NPM  New Public Management
NUTS  Nomenclature Territorial Units for Statistics
NWPA  Non-Western Public Administration
NWS  Neo-Weberian State
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSI  Open Society Institute
PA  Public Administration
PAR  Public Administration Reform
PARS  Public Administration Reform Strategy
PHARE  EC Programme (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies)
PhD  Doctor of Philosophy
PISG  Provisional Institutions Self-Government
PM  Public Management
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Public Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReSPA</td>
<td>Regional School of Public Administration</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Republic Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
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<td>SBPA</td>
<td>Steering Board for Public Administration</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
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<td>SIGMA</td>
<td>Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>TED</td>
<td>Trans European Dialog</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>TNPA</td>
<td>Thematic Network of Public Administration</td>
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<td>TQM</td>
<td>Total Quality Management</td>
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<td>TUT</td>
<td>Tallinn University of Technology</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPAN</td>
<td>United Nations Public Administration Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTC</td>
<td>United Nations Thessaloniki Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
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<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
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The past two decades have been quite extraordinary ones for Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, this period has also been a most extraordinary time for the Network of Schools and Institutes of Public Administration of Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) which was established twenty years ago for the purpose of encouraging, assisting and chronicling the transition in the field of public administration which has taken place in the region during this time. The volume, The Past, Present and the Future of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe has been designed to assess both the events that have taken place within the region in terms of the development of effective public administration and the role of NISPAcee in helping to influence and shape these developments. Thus, this book is a celebration, both of the very significant achievements of the past two decades in building and consolidating effective public administration throughout Central and Eastern Europe and of the role of NISPAcee in helping to achieve that goal. As such, it provides both an historical review and insights as regards the future of the region.

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