Guidelines for Papers: "Impact of Europeanization on the evolution of (or new configurations of) politico-administrative relations in new member states"

These guidelines are intended to supplement the general framework of the study of politico-administrative relations for those researchers who intend to analyze the evolution of these relations (configurations, interrelations, role-set etc.) in the Europeanisation context.

General approach

As a result of accession to the European Union, Central and Eastern European states' central authorities have become directly involved in the EU decision-making process which has resulted in significant changes in the domestic institutional and policy making structure. Not only have new structures and institutions been created to improve the policymaking capacity of the core executive but a new level or dimension has emerged in which core executives have started to play a role in the very complex EU policy making process. These changes have the potential to trigger a shift in politico-administrative relations in these countries.

The term politico-administrative relations has two different but very interconnected meanings. On the one hand, this term reflects configurations of roles of elected politicians and career civil servants at different levels and stages of the policy process. This reflects not only the balance and inter-relationships of roles between ministers and the administrative head of the Ministry/Department (secretary general etc.), but also roles in networks of actors, which include, for instance, politically nominated administrators and advisors, and civil servants who provide policy advice. These roles are generally more easily observed at the level of ministries; but specific politico-administrative configurations also emerge in government commissions, government office and even at cabinet sessions where civil servants might play rather different roles (advisory roles).

On the other hand, the government policymaking process and actions of the core executive (and its support structures) have clear politico-administrative dimensions (Peters, 1998; Blondel & Golosov, 2000). The policymaking process is targeted, firstly, to the achievement of politically legitimate decisions that could receive support of members of a coalition as well as their political sponsors. In this role the core executive is focusing on the tasks and using the devices of *political coordination.* Secondly, the core executive and its support structures must target its efforts to the *administrative coordination*: for managing the elaboration and implementation of policy programs, regulations and taking decisions on technical issues. Different governments emphasize different types of coordination that also determine the general balance between political and administrative dimensions in the policy process.

For the study of changes and shifts in politico-administrative relations in one or both dimensions during the Europeanisation process we would like to propose three more or less known theoretical frameworks.

Theoretical frameworks

Three frameworks could be taken as the suggested point of departure.

The most well known framework is B. Guy Peters' 'village life' typology (Peters, 1987). The authors of the 'Who Rules?' publication, which was produced under the direction of the working group co-ordinators Tony Verheijen and Aleksandra Rabrenovic, used the 'village life' typology as its basic framework.[1] Another important reference for authors is the paper entitled 'Rebuilding the Village: Or is it merely a Campground?' which was presented to the 9th Annual NISPAcee conference in Riga in 2001.[2]

The second framework has been developed by Aberbach et.al (1981) which focuses on the specific roles of civil servants vs. politicians in making policy and governing. This framework will be especially useful for an analysis of the changing roles of officials in the policy process. In a later article Aberbach et.al (1997)[3] differentiated seven principal roles that tend to be more or less close to "politicisied" vs. expert roles. The role are:

Technicians – solving technical problems and applying specialized knowledge
Legalist - departing from legal definitions of job responsibilities, considering own position as that of implementation of legal roles and normative prescription.
Broker – mediating or resolving conflict of interests and political conflicts in the course of preparation of policy proposals and adoption at national or European level.
Facilitator – protecting interests of specific clientele group or constituents
Partisan – defending and promoting partisan interests
Advocate – fighting and representing interest of large social groups, class, protecting injustice
Trustee – role as representative of the state and its interests

The third framework – types of coordination in the policy process – would be useful for the analysis of roles of different policymaking structures, arenas and institutions within the core executive where politicians and civil servants interact in the decision-making process. This typology is summarized by the following table.

Table 1. Types of policy co-ordination as variables shaping the politico-administrative configurations.

Type of co-ordination	Focus of activity	Style of decision making	Basic support structures	Type of decisions	The aim of coordination
Political	Gaining political support, justifying actions	Bargain, logrolling	Advisors to the government as brokers, *ad hoc* commissions	Politically sensitive, conflictual	To retain in power through retaining the legitimacy

[1] 'Who Rules?' edited by Tony Verheijen is available from the NISPAcee secretariat.
[2] This paper is available to download from the NISPAcee website.
[3] J. Aberbach et.al (1997) 'Back to the Future? Senior Federal executives in the United States', *Governance*, Vol.10 No. 4

Policy	Conceptual fit of policy programs	Rational technical	Government support structures, *expert* commissions	Political priority, consultations	To ensure the consistent policy strategy
Policy process	Smooth interaction of different parts of policy process	Calculated advantages/ disadvantages parts	*Interministerial* commissions, working groups	Politically and administratively feasible; instrumental	To avoid conflicts inside executive branch, to ensure the feeling ownership for civil servants
Policy outcomes	Balancing interests of recipients of policy outcomes	Compromising	Commissions with intensive involvement of constituents	Participative and deliberative	To avoid tensions and conflicts inside society, to ground legitimacy of democratic governance

Political co-ordination focuses on the development of devices of harmonisation of decisions with the main "sponsors" as well as among the members of the cabinet. This form of co-ordination relies (due to the need to avoid overload) primarily on the permanent cabinet committees or, alternatively, on the political advisors. It presumes the important role of detailed coalition agreement (or government program) and separation of politically sensitive issues from the other issues that are either technically too complex or politically more neutral and therefore, decided outside of the cabinet.

Policy co-ordination focuses on the fine-tuning of the policy program and on the fit of various sectoral policies with each other. This type of co-ordination does not presume special structural devices, because the policy programs themselves are functioning as co-ordination devices. It also does not need extensive legitimating activities via commissions. Hence, these cabinets would rely on the relatively independent and neutral expert commissions. Effective political co-ordination would be achieved through in-house and mostly informal consultations, and coalition agreements should contain basic binding principles and policy aims.

Co-ordination of the **policy process** has two dimensions. The first is focused on the input of governance (or implementation) issues at the stage of policy formulation. These inputs could be characterised from the viewpoint of content (whether the issues of governability (Kooiman: 1993) or capability (Weaver & Rockman 1993) were taken into consideration), or from the viewpoint of actors in the policy process. The latter viewpoint could be characterised by the term "policy ownership", introduced by Pollitt (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000). It means whether those who ought to promote the policy process up to the outputs have appropriately interiorised the policy aims and means.

The second dimension of co-ordination focuses on the feedback and corrective devices of the policy implementation. I.e. whether the policy adopted is adequately

implemented; whether the controversies between the different policy sectors that could emerge in the course of implementation, could be effectively solved; and whether the devices of adaptation and correction could work and retain enough political leadership of the core executive. This dimension of co-ordination does not mean that the core executive has delegated all the co-ordination authorities to the civil servants or to the external networks. Their burden could vice versa extend considerably as the co-ordination needs permanent working arrangements.

Here, the effective co-ordination presumes either much stronger positions of the Prime Minister or very strong permanent structures of co-ordination of policy implementation at the cabinet level. For instance the existence of powerful support structures, such as the government office or the Prime Minister's office with the extensive capacities of policy co-ordination. These structures were identified by Goetz and his associates (Goetz and Wolmann 2001) as a specific variable to ensure effective coalition politics that is co-ordinated also in an administrative dimension.

Co-ordination of **policy outcomes** means that government policy could balance effectively the interests of the different constituencies in the final policy outcomes. I.e. would avoid extreme pressures from selected interests or issues. For coalition logic, it presumes the existence of intensive participation channels that the coalition is able to manage in order to define priorities and to impose losses in case some interests clearly dominated (Weaver and Rockman 1993). The coalition politics is not so much focused on the policy content, but on the development of intensive state-society relations, i.e. channels and forums of discussion. This is another side of legitimacy of coalition policy, i.e. the political dimensions of co-ordination also play here important role.

Consecutively, the **first** and the **fourth type** of co-ordination emphasise the political dimensions of the policymaking in the cabinet, but in a different way. The first form focuses on the ensuring the short-term unity and survival of the cabinet. The second focuses on the long-term legitimacy and the capability of government to develop its priorities independently as public interests. Similarly, the **second** and the **third type** focus on the administrative dimension. The second type would achieve administrative efficiency through influencing the specific content of the policies, and the third type would put emphasise on the structures and mechanisms of policymaking. The politico-administrative balance as the normative aim of effective governance could be achieved through the balancing of all these four types of co-ordination in the policy process.

In our further analysis the characters of the coalitions are considered as independent variables, and the emerging configurations of politico-administrative dichotomy at the cabinet in the policy process are dependent variables. The main problem to be analysed is **how the certain patterns of coalition would promote or restrain the emergence of certain combinations of co-ordination in the policy process.**

Those are recommended frameworks. They enable to prepare analysis and papers which could be compared. At the same time it is obviously too difficult to apply simultaneously all three approaches. We recommend to focus on one of them and study it more thoroughly in order to apply it more efficiently.

Levels of analysis:

We expect analysis of at least two levels of governance: ministry and core executive.

At the level of the ministry the changes of roles, interactions and coordination (informal/ formal) of minister, his political staff, top officials and specialists must be assessed.

At the second level changes in central decision-making and coordinating bodies must be assessed. Here we mean first of all the government support structures (notably the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Government Office, Office of European affairs (OEA), committees involved into the policy process at national and EU level): their composition, discretion in influencing policy and in preparing cabinet decision.

The main focus should be an assessment of interaction between those actors and levels of policymaking: firstly, civil servants and political appointees and the Minister at the ministry. Secondly, politicians and civil servants in inter-ministerial commissions or between different types of commissions; the third, between the ministry and central coordinating bodies in EU affairs located either at the core executive (PMO, Government office, OEA) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the fourth, between central coordinating bodies and government cabinet.

Obviously authors will focus on one of two of these levels of coordination of policy-making.

Structure of the paper:

Part One: Politico-Administrative configurations developed in the country as a result of accession

Authors are requested to present a general description of politico-administrative configurations developed in the country as the result of transition. This part must commence with a general introduction outlining the institutional setting of the policymaking process in the country (see country case studies in the 'Who Rules?' publication for examples). It is recommended that authors also take into account papers/country reports presented/published in NISPAcee conferences and proceedings. Along with a general assessment of interrelations of politics and administration through the prism of those three frameworks, it is requested that authors especially focus on the generalization of the following aspects of this dichotomy:

(a) degree of involvement of civil servants in different Cabinet level decisonmaking structures;
(b) use of political vs. administrative structures of coordination
(c) mechanism of decisions on politically sensitive issues and strategically important issues where politicians/ civil servants played certain roles;
(d) general role of the ministerial machinery for policy advice to the minister (Cabinet) vs. central administration of the governing sectors. Degree of split of roles between ministries and agencies;

(e) the availability of a central coordination body (besides of PMO), its general role and discretion in preparing policy decisions and/ or in coordinating policy implementation;

(f) the role of top officials and specialists vs. Ministers and their policy staff in preparing policy proposals inside the ministry

Part Two: Shifts in the distribution of roles and responsibilities during the accession process

The focus of the second part is on the main shifts in the distribution of roles and responsibilities during the accession process. To what extent does EU accession preparation rely on existing structures and configurations, what institutional innovations were made at this level or what new structures and practices were developed at the result of accession needs?

Do you observe dualism of politico-administrative arrangements?

Do you observe the formation of politico-administrative elites on EU affairs? Is there an increasing/decreasing role of specialists vs. politicians at the level of central coordinating bodies?

What is the leading role of political coordinating bodies vs. administrative central coordinating bodies, like the Commission of EU heads of agencies, or Higher Officials etc.?

The role of central coordinating bodies of EU affairs (domestic as well as those negotiating with EU authorities), relations with existing central coordinating bodies (PMO, Government Office, Ministerial commissions, Cabinet decision-making structures).

The focus is not on the changing role of the executive vs. legislature which could be a separate and extensive issue of changing politico-administrative balance. A separate aspect could be the balance of political (gains) and administrative (institutional capacity development) arguments during accession debates and efforts to legitimise the accession process among the population. In some countries government relied on highly political arguments like security, economic gains from assistance programs etc. In other countries the debates covered also issues of institutional fit with EU institutional settings, capacity development, gaps in level of development and controversies that could emerge in actual integration because of those controversies.

Part Three: After accession.

In this section authors as asked to analyse new changes or new trends that have emerged following membership as a result of domestic policymaking becoming integrated with the EU policymaking process. Some of the principal questions for analysis are:

■ Whether and in what direction the general interrelation of political (politics) and administrative dimensions (policy advice, implementation coordination) before accession (especially in the context of preparation of accession referenda) and after changed?

- What was the general impact of the emergence of a European institutional dimension to policymaking on the roles of politician and officials at ministries, government support structures, cabinet decision-making?
  How the roles of central coordinating bodies and their main agents – politicians and officials - evolved, especially of the central national coordinating body and EU unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What are roles of their officials vis a vis individual ministries, cabinet?
  Whether the demand of new professional roles and qualities of politicians (at different levels) or civil servants (at different levels) emerged and how institutions and actors reacted to this demand; whether some new roles and qualities started to hinder the integration into EU policymaking (for instance, language and communication skills etc.)?
- Whether there are differences in the division of roles and in the definition of competences of politicians and civil servants between EU policymaking and national policymaking. Whether this difference increased or decreased after membership? How the roles of the minister (vis à vis cabinet) evolved concerning specific EU issues.
- How the roles of top officials changed vis à vis the Minister and specialists. Whether discretion of civil service increased? How they managed with increased workload in the time of increasing autonomy? How Ministers and their political staff behaved in the context of changing roles of officials (who for instance attends Brussel meetings, communicates directly with colleagues in neighbour country's ministries etc.)
- In sum: which actors increased their power resource in the politico-administrative balance and how they reacted – on the level of behaviour or institutional changes – to that possible shift in the power resource.

Part Four: Conclusions

Present general conclusions on how the general politico-administrative balance and concrete configurations fit with policymaking needs and institutional practices of the EU. What are the general trends in the changes that have occurred (analysed through the prism of the three analytical frameworks), how changes in interrelations of agents (politicians and officials) and politico-administrative institutions meet needs of EU integration.

At the end we expect you to describe briefly the general configuration of EU policymaking at national level in two dimensions, which has been developed by Kassim, Peters and Wright (2000)

(a) Centralized mechanisms of politico-administrative coordination of national policies vs. decentralized. Which actors and institutions (structures) ensure the approach to one or the other end?

(b) Comprehensive coverage of EU policy issues by national policymaking structures vs. selective coverage. Which actors and institutions institutions (structures) ensure the approach to one or another end.

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