

ENHANCING THE CAPACITIES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO POSTCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT: Central governments worldwide are suffering from paralysis in decision making, policy formulation and intelligent linkages to their own constituents as well as to transnational populations. While globalism and supranational governance present challenges of their own, states have not resolved policy questions with sound solutions on even an *intra or intergovernmental* level. Politicians are immobilized by incapacity while bureaucrats seem mired in the Weberian “machine” model. The paper examines this “intellectual deficit” and concludes that “knowledge workers” are urgently needed. In the absence of vastly improved policy decisions, that impinge not only on home constituencies but transnational populations, the public at large will continue its disdain for and mistrust of “philosopher king” politicians as well as for bureaucratic technocrats. A new view of “governance” is necessary. Failing this, the 21st century will be ruled by failed decision making and isolated individuals.

1.0 The Problem. A widening gap between civic society and its political governors has arisen and is worsening. Every survey indicates a lack of trust in public institutions. While the “developed” countries have their Enrons and Arthur Andersens, this paper will concentrate on the postcommunist countries. The difference is only one of “degree,” not kind.

1.1 The public in postcommunist countries can simply not wait for decades of incapacity when governance solutions are not improving the lot of citizens. Whatever politicians and bureaucrats are doing they are not solving urgent problems. In some cases, they are exacerbating problems. Energy problems are solved with nuclear reactors that contaminate the environment. Agriculture produces surpluses in some states and deprivation in others. Worse, even in developed societies, modern agriculture utilizes chemicals to enhance productivity while endangering the health of entire populations. Power, particularly based upon weapons proliferation, has terrorized the world while enriching arms sellers. International organizations created to prevent war seem disempowered. Globalization disrupts markets, unnecessarily, while the pursuit of greater profits or market share seems unrelated to societies’ needs or, in the case of oil, seems to have driven the world into hydrocarbon addiction. Worse yet, is the dependence of populations on leaders and their subordinates who less and less seem in touch with their constituencies.

- 1.2 The third estate (media) seems harassed and endangered by regimes unhappy with transparency particularly in the form of political critique. The number of journalistic deaths seems to continue seemingly with neither little response from either government officials nor from apathetic publics.¹ Were it not for the media, the level of criticism of governments would be, indeed, muted. The public can only read between the lines in many news accounts due to journalistic harassment. The public is left to demonstrating in the streets of the world while law enforcement contains if not abuses these freedoms. Even politicians have met an early demise for “obstructing” government policies.
- 1.3 Politicians and bureaucrats dismiss public antagonisms as either uninformed or anti-regime. The public is seen as either professional agitators or, perhaps, revolutionaries. Yet the public has few other outlets for “voice.” This alienation of publics from their elected representatives creates an isolation phenomenon in which politicians and bureaucrats deal increasingly with the few elsewhere in power whether they reside at home or in powerful transnational states. Referenda seem likely only in those cases where either democracy has partly penetrated the system (possibly because of supranational pressure) or in cases likely to support the regime.
- 1.4 The growing economic imbalances among states seem to harden economic borders against immigration and lower priced goods while marginalizing publics against mobile labor markets as well as international travel and transnational communication. Political freedom as present in Central Europe has not been accompanied by financial means for average citizens to travel or vacation elsewhere, particularly to the west. Thus, while incomes have barely regained pre-1989 levels, the social safety net has deteriorated (though governments have sought to avoid this) while unemployment rates have risen, in certain locations drastically, while price liberalization has strained quite severely what would normally be called the middle class. In Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), these conditions are worse. A bi-polar distribution of incomes lumps intellectuals and professionals well below the small upper income group creating terrible gini coefficients and living conditions which ex-Communists could hardly have imagined. Progress for large numbers of postcommunist publics seems stagnant.

2.0 Issues.

- 2.1 Short of revolution, governance changes, normally, incrementally. Regime changes are not particularly prevalent in the 21st century though severely oppressive regimes do face the prospect of change by force. This paper addresses the state that has lost touch with its constituents. Proposals for change are often, if not always, threatening. Force is not contemplated. Nevertheless, the paradigm for governing is in need of change. I assess the existing paradigm as follows:

¹ See, for example, Adam Jones, “Introduction: Towards A Comparative Model of Press Functioning,” *The Press in Transition: A Comparative Study of Nicaragua, South Africa, Jordan and Russia*, Hamburg: Deutches Uebersee-Institute, 2002, 1-26.

Elections are held; the winners take over; the public supports its government since it voted them in in the first place; governments attempt to satisfy the voters' utilities and preferences; public management is driven by the Weberian machine model; politicians make changes just prior to elections; a gap develops and widens between the public and its leaders and administrators as leadership subsides and evaporates. Politicians' primary goal is to stay in power and limit transparency to a minimum. The public, were it to know more about what its elected officials actually do, might not respond much differently than it does now. It is bored, detached, and, uninterested and not surprised about political performance.

- 2.2. Political activity in Russia, affects a small portion of the electorate, most of which resides in the upper or upper middle class. An estimated 60% of the population may have difficulty meeting its daily nourishment needs or, if slightly better off, cannot afford but a minimum of clothing. Oil production sharing agreements do not seem of interest to a large portion of the population. Not even Robin Hood economics seems to prevail in Russia. Trickle down economics seems prevalent. West of the Former Soviet Union, Robin Hood emerges, approaching the welfare state model in Central Europe. Yet, the same apathy for politics prevails. The departure of Vaclav Havel seemed to supply the final nail in the coffin following ten years of otherwise diminished capacity in postcommunist governance.²
- 2.3. While Havel's preparation had been as a playwright, it is hard to imagine what possesses most other postcommunist politicians. They whisper when in a room as if someone is still listening in. They could ride the metro without, for the most part, being recognized. Victor Orban in Hungary rode the crest of FIDESZ with the promise of young, enthused political leadership. More recently, apparently sensing a rightist inclination within the public, he sounded like a different person. Today's postcommunist leaders act more like apparatchiks than politicians. Some, of course, were such, in the past. While Lukashenka is entertaining, Putin must regard him as a former collective farm manager; which he was. How can the public warm to such images? Publics occasionally get out ahead of their politicians. Leaders who fail to link with their publics seem prevalent not only in postcommunist countries but increasingly throughout the world. One Czech opined that she was "...embarrassed by the inability of national leaders to elect a president...I think the presidential election process has been a mockery...I think the government should be able to choose a

² For an interesting "eulogy" on behalf of Havel, see Jan Urban's "President Vaclav Havel's Legacy: Moral Success, Political Failure," *RFE/RL East European Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 6, March 20, 2003, www.rferl.org/edeppreport/

president early and act together, rather than what is happening now. It is a dishonor to the country.”³

- 2.4. *Trust* levels indicate low public support for government.⁴ Further, voters seem disinclined to actually vote. It is possible to interpret this in two ways: (1) the public is satisfied and needs not vote; or (2) voting will not make any difference; the result will be preordained and nothing good will happen. Yegor Gaidar has commented on this⁵: “No matter who is in power, there is no regime change. The same people end up in power and nothing changes.”⁶ Presumably, democracy would change this in Russia. Yet democratic countries are experiencing the same ennui. No one expects a regime change and no one seems likely to sound “neo-Marxist” by proposing one. Neo-Marxists sound unconvincing having endured 70 years of the USSR and accepting its implosion in the absence of purposeful action (despite Gorbachev’s final attempts).
- 2.5. It is tempting to repeat the litany of diagnoses over the past 10-12 years of postcommunist countries: low economic development; unrepresentative government; flawed elections; unequal incomes; tenuous rule of law; corruption; harassment and physical harm to the media. Yet postcommunist publics seem inured to such behavior. With few exceptions, they talk more about lack of pride in their countries and politicians; diminished socio-economic status, and economic uncertainty. While the young argue for enhanced economic opportunity, the old reminisce about the “glory” of the communist system. The young want the government not to interfere in the economy, the old wish it would open the sarcophagus of the communist “cradle to grave” system. The young have not tasted restricted freedom and ask, “Now that we have it, what can we do with it?” The old refer disparagingly to the affluent western tourists, contemplating their own likelihood of vacationing with canned goods from home possibly in Croatia but hardly in the west.

3.0 Central Argument. It is the central argument of the paper that the primary problem is not politics and economics, *per se*, but models of governance. Interestingly, this seems true in “developed” countries as well as in the postcommunist countries. With the exception of New England townhalls, the world tends to govern from the top down using machine bureaucracies which Weber promised would be the most “efficient.” However, they are only efficient if you are not in the public trying to obtain service. And the public is part of the problem. It has accepted what passes as efficient government to be the only model. Business does not accept this (while business is often efficiently

³ *The Prague Post*, February 5, 2003, www.praguepost.com/PO3/2003/Art/0205/news5.php; The Czech president is elected by parliament.

⁴ See Richard Rose, ‘Advancing into Europe? The Contrasting Goals of Post-Communist Countries: Nations in Transit,’ www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2002/rose_essay2002.

⁵ “Gaidar: The Limits to Growth,” *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, February 6, 2003, in *Johnson’s Russia List*, # 7050, February 6, 2003, www.cdi.org

⁶ This was C. Wright Mills’ thesis about the U.S. *Power Elite*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.

organized internally, it must cope with lethargic government bureaucracies). Why does the public? Primarily since government has a monopoly. However, even public enterprises can operate within reasonable levels of competence if *led* and *administered*.⁷ The nexus of the failure lies in a weakened strand between the mendicants and supplicants of government largesse and the “governors” or “gouverneurs.” More to the point, the public is not *participating* in governance. The so-called public private partnership is weak and dying. The public has other things to do. The *gouverneurs* are just as happy to deal only with the same group of demonstrators on the city street. If someone from the public were to say, “Hey, I want to change the way you are doing things,” the *gouverneurs* might choke in silence and put down their batons.

3.1. The EU White Paper on Governance presented one of the first opportunities at transparent government. The EU Commission put the white paper out on the internet, asking for response.⁸ It received over 100 responses from eminent academics and other professionals. The responses offered constructive criticism.⁹ While it is impossible to summarize 100 lengthy responses one can immediately see that many points addressed the proposed model of governance as being inappropriate. Essentially, the responses pointed to two important aspects (certainly there were many more) of governance: process and substance. The EU Commission was challenged to slow down in its process model. Specifically, it was moving quickly toward the “top-down” model. Many assumptions were identified or simply glossed over in which the participating states were either not being asked for input or the process was more a *fait accompli* model. Secondly, the essential components identified as being the core of *good governance* were normative and platitudinous. While the respondents did not sketch out an improved model for governance, this paper will suggest certain changes prompted by their constructive work.

3.2. The fastest rising group of individuals in the professional world has been identified by Peter Drucker¹⁰ as “knowledge workers.” Knowledge workers possess an expertise earned either in academia, the professions, or real life, which they are finding has a world market. Not only is it the fastest rising group, but they will not accept the typical model for use of their services. In Gouldner’s terms, they are ‘cosmopolitans’ and not “locals.”¹¹ They are at home anywhere in the world. They are often specialists in certain fields that have transnational significance. Whether it is capping an oil well,

⁷ See Robert Kramer, “Beyond Max Weber: Emotional Intelligence and Public Leadership,” paper presented to the 10th Annual Conference, Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe, Krakow, Poland, 2002.

⁸ See Commission of the European Communities, “European Governance: A White Paper,” Brussels 25.7.2001, Com (2001) 428.

⁹ For example, see <http://www.iue.it/RSC/Governance> and <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010601.html>

¹⁰ “The Next Society: A Survey of the Future,” *Economist*, November 3, 2001.

¹¹ “Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2, 1957.

teaching applied economics, mediating a labor dispute or establishing an information technology system for a country, they are only an airplane ride away. For most, it is not the money that will attract them (there are, of course, exceptions but forget them). They want a challenge. They want to build and create something. They are interested in the future even more than the present. They will not work for long in an organization. They will, not for a moment, work for an authoritarian personality. They are not loners but they are fiercely protective of their expertise and persona. More on them later.

4.0. Globalization

- 4.1. Governance problems are transnational. Every country is trying to create a tolerable society with equal rights for citizens, work opportunities, economic development and minimal inequality of incomes. But they are failing. Governance seems to have devolved to interest groups in lieu of effective performance by elected representatives. Governance by interest groups can be self-serving and deluding. It is representative of those participating. But, few in the world join such groups. In postcommunist countries, the large number of NGOs seems to have grown through international aid largesse that has grown tired of directing funds to officials in government (corruption and incompetence). Having invested billions in Russia, 90 million dollars per year in Armenia, and billions more around the world, one searches in vain for an effective result. Aid programs have interests of their own. Either their governments pursue foreign policy through the grant channels or the professional employees grow tired of indigenous bureaucrats, or, continue to pursue aid models that have now been discredited by economists now detached from the official arena.¹² Professional objectivity is often lacking. Russia, for example, has stopped accepting IMF loans since 1999. Since that time, it has started to cope with its own problems which it should have done long ago. Notwithstanding the high price of oil that has benefited the country, it has wisely reduced some of its debt rather than either direct it toward investment or a larger social safety net. This decision might not have occurred without its own economists awakening from a sleep while oligarchs were placed on the run by Putin.
- 4.2. National capacity for governance in the postcommunist countries is affected by globalization. Many transnational leaders have fallen into the borrowing trap while failing to curb the appetites of oligarchs for increased earnings. In some cases, they, the oligarchs, work closely with governors¹³ who depend on their expertise. But dependence on such expertise is useless. Oligarchical expertise cannot function in a non-monopolistic market and the absence of competition as well as underdevelopment of small and medium businesses continues to plague postcommunist countries. Neither trickle

¹² See Gregory Palast, on Joseph Stigler, *Guardian Unlimited*, April 29, 2001, www.guardian.co.uk/archive/article/0,4273,4177445.00.html

¹³ I shall continue to refer to leaders in power in the government as “governors.”

down nor Robin Hood economics will solve the problem. New governance is needed.

- 4.3. It is becoming apparent that there IS a reservoir of expertise in the world that can offer efficient and effective expertise. It lies with the knowledge workers. Russia, alone, has numerous scientists who are underemployed. Were it not for the Russian space program, these scientists would be drawn into weapons' projects that serve only to enrich the arms merchants. Because of collaboration with American scientists over the past few years, the Russians are now prepared to assist in powering the space shuttle flights as well as to work **jointly** with the Americans on civilian projects utilizing their prior military expertise. Their motivations to prove their worth, in the absence of significant Russian government support, could benefit the industrialized world and trigger entirely new industries which could spill over to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as elsewhere.¹⁴ There are other examples in the natural sciences that could affect environmental protection, modified seed technology, micron technology, organic farming, hydrogen automobiles, etc.¹⁵
- 4.4. In slightly less technical areas, governance has many examples of improvements in bureaucratic methods already extant. Until recently, only New Zealand provided application for a visa through the internet. Armenia has become the second country to do so.¹⁶ The proposal required coordinating the efforts of several computer application people in Yerevan as well as convincing the Armenian consular service that the prior paperwork and time delays were unnecessary. When technology meets bureaucratism, the latter often wins. Anti-systemic proposals require skill, persuasion, and a great deal of patience.
- 4.5. Change needs to occur quickly in postcommunist countries. It will not come from within without political will. Governance change is not regime change. The paper yields to politicians to make political decisions regarding security, national defense and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, there are policy options that might be explored with knowledge workers. The recent crisis over war in Iraq triggered numerous suggestions simply from readers of international newspapers. While some were farfetched, the suggestions seemed to represent a wide range of feelings among publics who sensed that there were no other avenues for expression. There was no way to express "voice" directly to the U.S. president nor to indicate the valence or amount of support for such a suggestion. Graham Allison's recount of the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the wisdom of vigorous debate among advisers and

¹⁴ See Special Issue on Science and Technology, JRL Research and Analytical Supplement, *Johnson's Russia List*, # 6607, December 19, 2002, www.cdi.org.

¹⁵ The U.S., through its Energy Development Department, has agreed to start a cooperative effort with the European Union in bringing hydrogen-powered cars and electricity generated from fuel cells to market over the next two decades. Some of the funds will be targeted toward research among automakers, utilities and oil companies to develop fuel-cell technology and an infrastructure of hydrogen service stations. "U.S. and EU Cooperate on Hydrogen Fuel," *International Herald Tribune*, March 11, 2002, p. 13.

¹⁶ Anna Hakobyan, "Technicalities: Armenia's Virtual Reality," *Transitions Online*, October 31, 2002, www.tol.cz.

experts with JFK, in this case within a bureaucratic setting.¹⁷ Seemingly all possible scenarios were explored with a president who was willing to listen and evaluate. How true is that of today's governments? It is this process which has excluded vast numbers of experts, well-intentioned people, and knowledge workers outside the power base, that seems missing. Toward the end of the pre-war Iraq debate, the issue seemed to devolve to: who was for us and who was against us rather than is war justified?

4.6. Funding

If knowledge workers were to be increased in governance analysis they would have to be paid. Most of them are in situations in which their social safety net provisions are already established. In fact, they are not particularly interested in large sums of money (notwithstanding the debacle at Harvard with Andrei Shleifer and Jonathan Hay¹⁸). It is the challenge that interests them. They have the advice to give. If you do not want it, so be it. Don't bother them with hierarchical arrangements. They are not interested. They have their profession. They can always go teach in some New England college. The response to the EU white paper was almost alarming. They represented some of the best brains in the world. They sat down and crafted ideas that were worth substantial sums of money. But they were not looking for overseas bonuses, hardship bonuses or billing time. They could have sat by the fireplace and turned the computers off. But they responded. The analysis that they provided could fill textbooks while bearing directly on point to the problems of today's governance. They want their expenses and a few thousand dollars more. The world may not have seen people like this for a long time. But, they have their pride. Do not treat them like subordinates. They will be back on the plane. Postcommunists assume that anyone from the west has income and volunteering or not getting paid for long periods will not phase a capitalist expert. It will. Forget it. Knowledge workers want to be paid. But it is in acknowledgement that they are worth something. Don't give them the, "we are poor argument," or, "what can we do, the bureaucracy controls the pay requirements in our country." They will leave, saying, "then change the bureaucracy." It is they who have the power. They can withhold their knowledge. The world had better get used to these people. They are not like everybody else.

4.7. Funding from Whom?

If postcommunist governments will not spend the money for knowledge workers (including their own), they may consider the philanthropic sector. Russian scientists are already well aware of foundation money. Foundations have different priorities than aid-giving governments. The amount of

¹⁷"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII, (September 1970).

¹⁸ See "Yale Connection to Harvard Russian Fraud Case," *Yale Insider*, March 24, 2003, www.yaleinsider.org/view_supportinfo.jsp?infold=15

money available is estimated to be in the trillions of dollars.¹⁹ Most of this money is available for social sciences though certainly not entirely. Foundations and other sources must give their money away. However, they are becoming numb in the support of social programs that will not or cannot provide effective evaluation of sums spent. Philanthropists want this. Social giving is now a fledgling industry and has academic recognition at Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Stanford.²⁰ Social giving is now looking for measurable indicators of success. They should be approached by postcommunist governments and they should utilize knowledge workers in providing the work. In fact, the knowledge workers could probably write effective grants since they are primarily interested in results. Unleashing some of these workers into the foundation board-rooms will almost certainly get the attention of philanthropists who are tired of their own special projects which do not seem to be producing successful outcomes.

4.8. Preparing the Governance Model

The paper proposes a governance model that departs from the typical Weberian hierarchy extant in most of the world. The EU white paper started out to repeat that catastrophe and the respondents tore it to shreds. The respondents identified four weaknesses in what the white paper was suggesting:

1. The governance model can be based on transparency, due process, rule of law and hierarchy.
2. The EU Commission will propose the legislation (extant in most cabinet governments in Europe).
3. In cases of dispute among member countries, the Commission will establish hearing officers who will resolve the disputes.
4. The governance model will be proposed by the Commission and ratified or amended by the EU members.

The respondents pointed to the following problems:

1. A supranational government is being proposed from the top-down; it should be proposed from the bottom-up
2. The member states are not being asked to *participate* in formulating the governance model; they are being asked to *react* to it
3. The model is not constructing an interactive communication network unless it continues to utilize methods such as the white paper to involve EU members in policy discussions

¹⁹ "A Survey of the New Rich," *Economist*, June 16, 2001.

²⁰ See Kristina Anna Gazarian, *New Philanthropy Benchmarking: Wisdom for the Passionate*, Providence, R.I.: United University Press, 2001.

4. The structure of the EU is rapidly approaching the Weberian hierarchical model, a model that has outlived its usefulness and should be abolished.

5.0 The Model

This paper proposes the following model of governance for consideration by postcommunist governments at the national level:

1. Non-hierarchical structure; flat oriented
2. Use of knowledge workers
3. Transparent with interactive decision modes
4. Channels of communication for members inside and outside the organization

5.1 Non-hierarchical

1. There is too much structure in government. Some of the most innovative government practices have emerged from *ad hoc* commissions, committees and groups. A group needs to have a team leader whose primary function is to set agendas and preside at meetings. Following that, teams or working groups need to assemble, debate and seek consensus. Committees and sub-committees need to be open to outsiders (assuming non-classified agendas) at the invitation of team members.²¹ Knowledge workers who might be invited to participate would volunteer their services in most cases. Should they be required to join a study or working team, compensation could be discussed. Committees would have permanent staff whose responsibility would be to summarize meetings and conclusions.
2. The politico-administrative mix has been a failure. Politicians do not trust bureaucrats and vice versa. Simply strengthening civil service procedures will not improve the mix. Corruption will not be stopped with ethics, morals and incantations. It will be stopped with prosecutions and election and appointment of honest people. Those with the most expertise work outside of government. Bring them in when needed. Contract out the building of a bridge. If it falls down. Sue the contractor. The public does not have time to wait for honest bureaucracies. They must be found by jailing those who are corrupt and encouraging the use of knowledge workers to assist in technical deliberations. Otherwise, contract out. The more bureaucrats employed, the more corruption and lack of effectiveness may be predicted. Economic development in postcommunist countries is proceeding most rapidly in those countries having fewer numbers of bureaucrats.

²¹ See, for example, *Prague Business Journal*, "More Talk Than Ever on Czech Business Environment," February 3-9, 2003, pp. 1, 10, discussing the **Euro Czech Forum**.

3. In pure political emergencies such as war and attack from within or without plus law enforcement and the military, the hierarchical model may be retained. Presidents and prime ministers cannot respond to a military attack with a committee. However, they can assemble expert teams when time permits such as JFK in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The overwhelming number of government policy decisions can wait to assemble a team or working group.
4. While the judiciary must be independent of the legislative and executive branches, there can be direct communication between legislative and executive committees and working groups. Otherwise, time is being wasted. It is important that key legislators, as necessary, meet with key executive branch personnel in seeking policy solutions. Legislatures may still control funding bills. Voting on substantive bills should reflect the input of expert working groups.

5.2 Knowledge workers

1. Knowledge workers may be used to complement and supplement working groups and committees. In some cases they may be engaged to perform complete studies and recommendations. In the latter cases, they will need to be compensated. For short periods of consultation, their travel will need to be reimbursed.
2. By placing proposed programs and policies on internet sites, knowledge workers will have enough incentive to respond. In many cases this will provide the easiest, quickest and least cost alternative to their use. Governments may wish to invite one or two respondees to personally present their ideas before government officials.
3. Foundations and other philanthropic organizations may be approached toward funding critical public projects (perhaps, with a public/private mixture, such as in health care) that would normally be beyond the means of most postcommunist governments. In the area of health care, postcommunist governments will have to shed the excess capacity of hospital beds and steer the medical profession toward private practice, possibly with partial public insurance. Ministries of health will need to demonstrate political will in trading off public vs. private health care delivery.
4. Indigenous knowledge workers, for example, in medicine and public health, telecommunication, biotechnology, computer science, engineering, conservation and environmental management, and accounting, need to be supported financially for study abroad and international conferences to enhance their usefulness to the country. Though some may emigrate, some of these will return, once they assess their homeland is serious about reform. China continues to suffer from its abysmal treatment of returning knowledge workers (though it has recently backed away from seriously harassing its dissidents who return to the country).

5. There is a growing reservoir of transnational knowledge workers that is increasingly collaborating. Russian and American scientists have done so. It is quite likely that such collaborations may have enormous impact on transnational biodiversity, environmental degradation, aeronautical engineering, space applications, medical applications, etc. Russians have benefited from Carnegie and other funding, in the absence of Russian governmental support. While nuclear power generation is a touchy subject (because of hazardous waste and the conceivability of a Chernobyl explosion), the prospect of exploring modified seed generation (the EU is opposed though the policy is based upon a “presumption” rather than clinical tests), genetic manipulation (to interfere with high risk medical infirmities), nitrogen automobiles, micron technology and numerous other applied natural and social scientific possibilities offers potential for new industries and benefits to postcommunist countries. Gouverneurs will need opinions from these experts not only regarding potential hazards, but further elaboration of sensitive policy issues that may arise in wider applications.

5.3 Transparency with interactive decision modes

1. Gouverneurs should save most of their time for security, national defense and foreign policy. The “buck stops” with the elected gouverneur.²² The paper is not recommending turning over the decision to go to war to knowledge workers. It is suggested they be employed whenever feasible to tell the emperor, he has no clothes on. If war is too important to be left to the generals, many political decisions are too important to be left to one gouverneur and plenty of “group think.” The circle of advice needs to be widened; and, it needs to be interactive. The publics of the world need to interact with their gouverneurs.²³
2. The EU white paper opened an important channel for feedback. The responses were well crafted, relevant and strongly suggestive of corrective and constructive measures. Such channels can be open for further feedback by all governments. There is an increasing move for governments to require that its ministries develop and maintain websites with substantive materials from important documents and decisions. The EU has made this one of its expected requirements of members. Similarly, the preparations of a draft of the EU’s first constitutional treaty, referred to as the Convention on the Future of the EU, have included participation by political representatives from EU members and candidate countries,

²² Harry Truman’s famous, “The buck stops here.”

²³ The DIALOG project was designed to increase citizen participation at local government levels. Despite the helplessness that many postcommunist governments feel in communicating with central governments, this project gives indications that citizen involvement at local levels holds promise. Allan M. Kulakow and Barbara Kudrycka, “Building Citizen Participation through Dialog,” *News 2002*, IX, 2, Spring 2002, 1-4, Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe.

and selected members of the European Commission and the European Parliament.²⁴

3. While the grant process may well continue despite the moral hazard of backing its technical proposals with political intent, foundations must be approached by governments to seek their assistance. At the same time knowledge workers may be engaged in the process to assist in coalescing foundation sources. Those knowledge workers who might contribute to a foundation interest may do so by agreement and with the consent of the country in need. However, a knowledge worker can surmise within a very short period of time whether or not a country is serious about reform. If political will is lacking and/or corruption is inescapable, cross that country temporarily off the list. Official aid for that country might be preferable if only for a political reason. Knowledge workers will not stay more than a few hours in the absence of political will. In fact, it is the country that should be approaching the foundations, not vice versa. The country's own scientists may do the same while seeking knowledge partners from outside. Knowledge workers will respond to this challenge. They are quite familiar with the vagaries of imposed governmental aid programs that have saddened so many hearts.

5.4 Channels of communication

1. The internet is there. Most knowledge workers will respond quickly. The usual aid program sends out an RFP (request for proposal) with a deadline that only the Beltway Bandits (Washington consultants) can meet. Knowledge workers do not have the time or the interest to prepare nor to compete for lengthy grant processes. They will have to be found and invited, if appropriate. They will have to be identified, evaluated and rated for various jobs. However, there is a better way to do this. Send out the statement of work needed and ask for responses. Then invite the best responders to the country for consultation. Pay for their travel; not much else. Let them stay for several days. Let them hold discussions with key people. If a relationship develops with the country, further arrangements can be pursued. If not, the country might have received some very good advice for a few days for the price of some travel and a meeting with the gouverneur(s).

²⁴ "The first 16 articles of the treaty were drawn up by the Convention's presidium and presented to the Convention members in October 2002. These chapters define the union and its objectives, EU citizenship, fundamental rights, and the distribution of competencies within the EU... Before the start of February (2003) deliberations, members of the Convention submitted 1,038 proposed amendments to the first 16 articles." Agreement must be reached by consensus since voting is not utilized in the Convention. "Slovakia Weighs in on EU Constitution," *Slovak Spectator*, March 10, 2003, www.slovakspectator.sk.

2. A country needs to develop its own knowledge workers. It can do this in collaboration with foreign knowledge workers. Send the country's best people to study and discuss problems. Most knowledge workers can direct them to professional associations, academic institutions, research groups and other knowledge workers. In time, a country will develop its own attachments with various institutions abroad. Yet, these channels need to be developed. Postcommunist countries may wish to collaborate with knowledge workers in the FSU and CEE. Problems are similar. In some cases, joint or even multi-lateral approaches might be appropriate. Initiative is needed. Vision is important.
3. While interactive telecommunication is expensive, it is cheaper than multiple plane rides and high consultant salaries. Even the telephone can have advantages over the internet. However, personal contact between a country and its knowledge workers is essential. It is important that knowledge workers view processes in action such as city council meetings, parliament, hospitals, universities, businesses, social gatherings, etc. Grant programs terminate after 2-3 years. AID programs renew personnel within the same period. The channels of communication need to be nurtured. Countries need to maintain channels with those countries, associations, individuals and others, that understand their problems and have established rapport with local governors and indigenous knowledge workers. Governance will not be improved in the long run without those who will contribute in the long run. Invite them back. They may want to live somewhere else. But they are like ex-presidents. They are being underutilized. They will work incessantly for 2-3 weeks. They will siphon knowledge from the citizenry, the leadership, the movers and shakers and, possibly, the taxi drivers. They will process this information. They think in research terms. What does it all mean? It is worth paying a few pieces of the local currency to utilize this channel of communication.

6.0 Analysis

- 1 The liberal paradigm of representative democracy has not worked in the postcommunist countries. Leaving aside whether it is working anywhere (from a governance standpoint), one can only argue that the institutions extant in postcommunist countries do not support the liberal paradigm. Neo-Marxists would simply call the liberal paradigm a capitalistic distraction. The empiricism of this Marxist critique

goes beyond the intent of this paper. In any event, Marxist critiques of governance fall exceptionally flat when reduced to national governments rather than expanded to international and transnational orientations such as expounded by Immanuel Wallerstein.²⁵ No state has freely elected a communist government, though communist parties continue to attract significant numbers of voters. Frankly, they had their chance to run national governments. The world does not need another 70 years of social engineering. This paper is arguing for diffusion of power, not, centralization.

- 2 Post-communist countries suffer from high gini coefficients (dispersion of income in a society). A small class at the top possesses well over the majority of income; everyone else is lumped into a middle and/or lower class. While a few young, educated (for the most part) professionals are emerging in post-communist countries, the bulk of the population lies stagnant in political ennui and economic deprivation (depending on your view of deprivation versus semi-poverty).
- 3 Vaclav Havel had argued against political parties. His view was that parties intervene between the public and governance. This paper is not arguing for the elimination of political parties. It is arguing for greater transparency and more open and accessible channels of communication between the public and its governors in governing. An analysis of political parties and how they might contribute to this linkage might be fruitful but cannot be included herein. It is also stating, what may be the obvious, that much of a country's talent (as well as talent abroad) is not being utilized effectively.
- 4 The lack of trust by an apathetic public presents a formidable challenge to the liberal paradigm. The paradigm presumed that the best linkage would focus upon representative government. Yet, the public thinks its government cannot be trusted. In failing to register its vote for or against such governments, publics have failed to express their

²⁵ See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995.

dissatisfaction and isolation from the “social contract.”²⁶

- 5 Present models of government seem less than powerful in facilitating good governance. Naturally, this depends on a definition of good governance. Essentially governance should provide efficient and effective government. That seems lacking. The democratic, representative governance model has deconstructed to interest group governance. The government itself is one such interest group. The public finds the channels for linkage to the governors to be less than satisfactory. Naturally, a national town meeting with a few million in the audience, even if via the media, challenges plausibility. Nevertheless, the current model seems to rely on interaction among major power actors both domestically and transnationally. We are leaving aside the activities of non-government actors such as NGOs, labor unions, multi-national corporations, special interest parties (greens and other environmental groups) that may bypass official government channels. That is another subject that may entice citizens toward non-governmental channels. Nevertheless, channels to those officially elected and their appointees can be enlarged and made more transparent.
- 6 Certainly the typical Weberian hierarchy restricts communicative entrance. Bureaucracies either are emboldened to interpret policies or transmit public requests to higher officials. These officials may simply respond through hired staff with less than satisfying (to the public) responses. Naturally, not every citizen can gain access to top elected officials. Assumedly, such access would force government to a grinding halt. However, at the moment, the public has the impression that the politico-administrative mix deals with the exceptions, when possible, and relies on diffusing policy challenges until such time as an interest group schedules a committee hearing or the public demonstrates peacefully or not so

²⁶ Rousseau had argued that the public could retain its authority should government fail. Thus, the *principal* would be the people and the *agent* would be the government. *The Social Contract*, Charles Frankel, trans., New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1947. This paper argues that the principal is not advocating revolution, rather it is urging increased participation in governance which will, in turn, increase the capacity of national governments.

peacefully. Fending off such communications seems to permit the government to spend much of its time in intra-party, intra-coalition discussions, and, occasionally inter-party discussions, particularly pertinent to public policy decisions, yet often more focused on remaining in power. Since it is impossible (as now constituted) for the public to express itself in all policy matters, government by interest group (again, including the insiders in government as an interest group) seems to prevail. With rather few exceptions, many postcommunist governments supported a proposed war in Iraq in March, 2003, despite popular polls showing significant disaffection by the public.

- 7 As mentioned earlier, the EU White Paper on Governance opened a useful experiment in transparency and medium for public response. The opportunity seemed to strengthen the possibility for important exchanges about how the EU might be governed in the run up to completion of the proposed EU convention or constitution. The substance of responses tended to focus on urging a deliberate process for engaging the EU members in fleshing out both substance and process of what has rapidly become a supranational organization. There was a rather strong emphasis by the respondees in erring toward a “bottom-up” organization rather than implications of a “top-down organization.”²⁷ Whether or not such exchanges indicate the EU’s (in this case, the Commission) receptiveness to dialogue and significant involvement of its member-states in forming and resolving EU policy questions remains to be seen.
- 8 Knowledge workers, while they cannot represent the public, can add to dialogue on policy questions. In certain cases they may coalesce public opinions yet this is not their function. They offer two advantages to enriching the dialogue, and thus, in a small way, enhancing the public’s opinions: (a) they may offer an objective, analytic approach drawing

²⁷ There seems every likelihood that the EU is, or was, moving toward supranational *governance* rather than the slightly more United Nations model of an organization (despite U.N. attempts to bind members to courses of action in military situations and peacekeeping). The EU seemed to be moving ahead on many fronts, particularly, in international trade, tariffs, quality standards, and, for those affected, on the common, Euro and European Central Bank requirements.

upon numerous disciplines and empirical evidence, (b) their orientation is likely to counteract self-serving proposals offered by the government itself or its defenders. Their purpose, however, transcends individual interests (except for pride) and, hopefully, will be drawn toward efficient and effective governance. Political relativeness will be low in their priorities.²⁸

- 9 The paper is essentially arguing that the volume and flow of ideas is important in two respects: (a) decisions have been centralized into an extremely small coterie of decision makers, assuming that key power actors provide the base for resolving public policy questions, thus, limiting both the expertise and perspectives of numerous interested citizens as well as trans-national experts; (b) it is critical that publics raise their trust in government, thus, participating at various entry points to governance. Such entry points may include town meetings in neighborhoods, towns and larger communities (for example, districts of large post-communist cities). This increased involvement, were it to be ignited by increased trust (implying a government that can “stomach” such feedback), would increase the paucity of available communicative channels and add substance to policy deliberations. As a corollary, increased valence of opinions would not be limited to street demonstrations and letters to editors. It makes no sense for postcommunist countries to lose the excitement and passion of dissident gatherings producing metaphorical messages transmitted by playwrights and academics when freedom now invites openness and ideas without hidden meanings.

6.0 Conclusion

²⁸ “Refugees” from Silicon Valley, and elsewhere, have experienced a large drop in their incomes. Despite this, Bill Gross (founder of Idealab, an incubator for Internet-based start-ups) maintains an estimated \$200 million from his prior wealth of \$1 billion. Says Gross, “Maybe since Sept. 11 and maybe because I’m almost 45 and maybe because I have four wonderful happy kids, I want to do things that are important for the world.” Ted Kamen, (inventor of the Segway Human Transporter) recently demonstrated a water purifier that also generates electricity). The device, resembling a Good Humor ice cream cart, takes filthy water (quite prevalent in much of Africa) and distills it into crystalline purity. Says Kamen, “Here you take the box and put it directly where someone needs it.” Some of this activity has been inspired by Po Bronson’s book, *What Should I Do with My Life?* *The New York Times* labels this breed, “New Age Saviors.” *International Herald Tribune*, March 18, 2003, p.17.

The paper has argued that an “intellectual deficit” exists within national governments in general, and postcommunist governments in particular. This deficit is fueled and nurtured by a model of governance that focuses on interest group representation, the government constituting one of the interest groups. Publics are weary of promises, such as they might be, distrustful of institutions, and disdainful of expressing themselves, presuming that such expression falls on deaf ears. In order to strengthen communication channels for publics, governments will need to facilitate two-way channels in ways that may well improve public policy outcomes. The paper assumes that the present apathy, if not skepticism, toward governments and governance, could be deflected and transformed positively by enlisting increasing public participation. A special ingredient of this mix might well be the inclusion of “knowledge workers” who might create an intellectual stimulus to the armies of governments and their supporters who seem mired in defending the *status quo*, preserving their permanence in power, and fending off suggestions for change that unnerve those in power. Knowledge workers may be developed internally or enlisted from abroad. They are not interested in interfering in politics. Their interest is in effective policy change. They can be utilized by postcommunist governments to enhance policy analysis and formulation at less than exorbitant costs. Finally, the paper is arguing not so much for diffusion of power, *per se*, but an increase in the decision interactions, analyses and recommendations. Existing government channels seem confined to internal group think and debates with transnational governments. These political games are not resolving critical policy debates that affect the bulk of citizenry. Failure to recognize this, may cause regime change rather than regime transformation. If the gap between publics and governments continues to widen, the potential that postcommunism offers to the survivors of regime change in 1989, will provide a specious epitaph for those who labored so hard to create a new world.

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